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This dissertation analyzes the duties, roles, relationships, and influence of 
legislative fiscal analysts in state budget policy. Legislative fiscal analysts are the 
focus of this research because of their participation in the development of the budget, 
one of the most important issues that legislatures undertake. State legislatures 
depend upon fiscal staff to develop, analyze, and monitor the state budget. Today, 
the development of the state budget is a daunting task made more difficult by 
legislator turnover due to term limits, the increasing complexity o f public programs, 
periods of Gscal stress, public resentment over taxes, and the call for increased 
government performance, and heightened demands on legislators' time &om 
constituents and lobbyists. These modem day challenges to state budgeting make 
fiscal staff support more crucial today than in previous decades.
Legislative fiscal staffs provide a great variety of services to the legislature 
such as the review and analysis of agency budget requests and executive 
recommendations, fiscal analysis of bills, monitoring of agency expenditures, drafting 
bills and amendments, gathering and disseminating a variety of Sscal and 
programmatic information to state legislators, and in some cases, making budget 
recommendations to legislative committees. Given that fiscal staffs provide these 
types of services that assist legislators in making decisions about the budget, it is 
important to understand their role in the development of budget policy. Despite this 
crucial role, little recent attention has been paid to this group of key budget actors.
Although several studies assessed the basic duties and characteristics of 
legislative fiscal staff in the 1960s and 1970s, the academic community has been 
largely silent about these players in the state budget process since that time. Previous 
research on legislative Sscal analysts typically &ils to discuss diSerences among 
individual analysts in terms of duties, roles, and influence and focuses instead on the 
fiscal office as a whole. The present research not only provides a current picture of 
the duties and characteristics of legislative Gscal analysts, including their educational 
and professional background, but seeks to expand the literature on whether specific 
duties and characteristics lead to differing degrees of influence. While there is 
research in the 1970s on the influence of legislative fiscal analysts in one state, the 
current study adds to this literature by assessing legislative fiscal analyst influence 
based upon the perceptions of key budget actors such as legislators, agency personnel, 
and executive budget analysts in four states.
The present research also expands what we know about the relationships 
between legislative fiscal analysts and key budget actors by specifying the &equency 
and nature of legislative fiscal analyst contact with other budget actors, the types and 
usefulness of information provided to legislators, and the level of discretion given to 
analysts by the legislature in providing information. Finally, the current study 
explores several political, structural, and individual factors potentially impacting the 
degree of influence of legislative fiscal analysts such as term limits, budget cycle, 
staff size and duties, tenure and expertise of the legislative Gscal analyst, and 
legislator tenure. It is hoped that the knowledge gained through this study will lead 
to new research questions for the study of legislative 6scal analysts. The next section
reviews the historical rise of legislative hscal analysts and their importance in the 
budget process.
Legislative Fiscal Analysts as a Research Focus 
State budget policy, the process by which resources are allocated among 
competing claims and interests, is probably the most significant policy that governors 
and legislatures develop. Aaron Wildavsky (1964, 5), a leading budgeting scholar, 
emphasized the importance of the budget when he claimed that the budget process 
represents:
The victories and defeats, the compromises and the bargaining, the realms of 
agreement and the spheres of conflict in regard to the role of... government 
in our society... In the most integral sense, the budget lies at the heart of the 
political process.
Richard Fenno (1966, xiii) further underscored the importance of the budget in terms 
of power:
The power of the purse is the historic bulwark of legislative authority. The 
exercise of that power constitutes the core legislative process-underpinning 
all other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between 
the legislative and executive branches of government...
Despite the importance of the budget, state legislatures have traditionally been 
disadvantaged in developing budget policy. Since the advent of the executive 
budget, governors have dominated the budget process by directing and controlling it. 
The state budgeting literature has documented this dominance (Anton 1966; Howard 
1973; Sharkansky 1968; Schick 1971). This early executive dominance was the 
result of the introduction of the executive budget in the late 1890s and early 1900s at
the local level as a means of reducing government corruption and increasing both 
democracy and efficiency. The executive budget was a mechanism for making one 
individual, the chief executive, responsible for the budget, thus, increasing efficiency. 
Because the chief executive was a representative of all the people, the executive 
budget also supported the goal of democracy (Bland and Rubin 1997).
The passive role of the legislature in the budget process was indicative of the 
strength of the executive branch in all matters of the state. Legislatures of the past 
were criticized for their lack of initiating legislation, innovation in public policy, and 
in particular, review of the executive budget (Schick 1971). State legislatures were 
"sometime governments" ignored by scholars and dominated by governors (Burks 
1971). Early observers of state legislatures bemoaned the obsolete procedures and 
committee systems, inadequate pay to attract quality individuals, and infrequent 
legislation sessions (Bums 1971; Jewell and Patterson 1966; Keefe 1966). In an 
effort to strengthen state legislatures, reformers, such as the Citizens Conference on 
State Legislatures, recommended the enhancement of legislative professionalism by 
increasing space for individual members and committees, lengthening legislative 
sessions, reducing the size of the legislative body, and increasing legislative pay and 
stafT size (Rosenthal 1998). Thus, the state legislative reform movement 6om 1965 
to 1980 sought to reshape legislative processes, personnel, facilities, and Amctions 
(Rosenthal 1994). Legislative reform took a variety of shapes within the states, but 
can be placed in seven broad categories. First, legislative activity was improved in 
many state legislatures. States increased the &equency of legislative activity by 
convening and/or lengthening annual sessions and spending more time on legislative
oversight during the interim. In some states this required a constitutional amendment 
to remove or amend language in the state's constitution restricting the length of a 
legislative session. Today, 43 states have annual sessions (Grooters and Eckl 1998). 
Second, to attract more qualified individuals, many states increased legislative pay 
and made salary increases easier to change by authorizing salary increases in statutes 
as opposed to specifying salaries in the state constitution. Third, rigorous standards 
of conduct were established. In an effort to strengthen and increase the public's 
respect for the institution, state legislatures created codes of ethics, conflict of interest 
clauses, and ethics commissions. Fourth, space and building facilities were 
enhanced. Many state capitols underwent major renovations during the reform period 
in an effort to provide adequate facilities for legislators. By 1980, a majority of 
legislatures had increased ofBce space for individual members, renovated capitols, 
and created new office buildings and spaces for committees and staff (Rosenthal 
1994). Fifth, standing committees were strengthened. The number and size of 
standing committees were reduced so that individual members could become experts 
in a specific area of jurisdiction. Other committee related reforms included open 
meetings and advance notice of meetings, unifarm committee rules, and the 
publication of committee reports and votes. Sixth, legislative oversight of programs 
was established. Legislatures began engaging in review of administrative rules and 
regulations, overseeing the appropriation of federal funds, and performing sunset 
reviews. Finally, legislatures began increasing the number and competence of 
legislative staff. Legislatures increased not only the number of staff for leadership.
committees, and rank-and-Gle members, but the variety of staff as well, to include 
fiscal, audit and program review, legal, and research staff.
For the legislative reform movement, the importance of the staff function 
cannot be overstated. While the primary goal of the reform movement was to 
increase the powers of the legislature, the need for independent information became 
one mechanism for accomplishing that goal. Just as the executive branch had the 
services of staf^ the legislature also needed staff to conduct research, evaluate 
proposals and agency programs, and analyze budgets. Therefore, the strengthening 
of legislative staf^ in both size and professionalism, was one of the principal 
concerns for the early reformers. In fact, one notable legislative scholar argued, 
"staff was the m^or panacea for what ailed legislatures" (Rosenthal 1998, S3) 
Legislative staffs give legislators the ability to make decisions, independent of 
governors, state agencies, and interest groups. "In general, legislative staff has 
evolved parallel to the legislatures: the more professional and deliberative the 
legislature as a whole became, the more advanced the staff support became” 
(Thielemann 1994, 802). Since the legislative reform movement ended around 1980, 
state legislatures have made progress in usurping some executive powers and 
strengthening their influence over state policy, including the budget (Rosenthal 1998; 
Sabato 1983). According to a leading legislative scholar, "legislatures may not 
always prevail in contests with the governor, but they can no longer be taken for 
granted or expected simply to rubberstamp gubernatorial initiatives" (Rosenthal 
1998, 301).
Today, legislatures have the services of full-time professional and clerical 
staff and session-only professional and clerical staff. ̂  These employees provide a 
myriad of services to legislators and committees. There are also many diSerent 
organizational arrangements of staS" such as central office staf^ committee staff) and 
partisan staff In fact, the National Conference of State Legislatures (1979) 
identified eleven types of staST organizations The most common type of staff 
arrangement outlined in the 1979 report on legislative staffing was the legislative 
council arrangement. A legislative council includes legislators of both chambers 
acting as the body overseeing staff as well as overseeing the activities of the 
legislature during the interim. In this arrangement, all legislative staffs are 
centralized under a legislative council and provide nonpartisan Hscal, bill drafting, 
audit, and research services to all members.
While the legislative council is the most common staff arrangement, many 
other supervisory structures are found in the states. Closely related to the legislative 
council arrangement is the coordinating council or committee structure. In this 
arrangement, staGs are centralized and operate under a coordinating council or 
committee made up of both house and senate members. The coordinating council or 
committee is responsible for determining general personnel policies and salaries for 
nonpartisan legislative staG) but unlike the legislative council structure, the 
coordinating council or committee is operational throughout the year.
In some cases, organizational structures include a combination of centralized 
staff and other kinds of staG. For example, some states have the services of both a 
centralized council staG and partisan staG for the minority and m^ority parties in
each chamber. Other arrangements include a centralized staCT plus a separate and 
autonomous audit staff supervised by a legislative committee. A good example of 
this arrangement is the centralized, nonpartisan staff within the Arkansas Bureau of 
Legislative Research supervised by the Arkansas Legislative Council and a separate 
legislative audit staST supervised by the Legislative Joint Audit Committee of the 
Arkansas General Assembly. Other staffs operate in separate chamber offices, where 
each chamber has its own staff and staffing policies. Oklahoma provides a good 
example of this arrangement with separate fiscal, policy, and research staff in both the 
House and Senate. A variation of this arrangement is found in some legislatures 
where staffs operate under separate chamber management, typically under the 
direction of the presiding officers in each chamber, but some legislative committees 
employ separate staff as well. A less common structure is partisan staff supervised by 
the party leadership in each chamber. New York and Pennsylvania represent this type 
of staff arrangement where the majority and minority parties in each chamber employ 
staff Despite these various organizational structures for legislative staff  ̂a 
subsequent report on legislative staffing in 1988 showed that the trend in stafBng is 
the creation of centralized staff under the auspices of a legislative council or 
coordinating council (Weberg 1988).
Furthermore, the size of staff has grown tremendously since the 1970s.
"Nearly all the growth in staff has occurred since 1969 with the development of 
specialized staff in areas such as fiscal, legal services, auditing and program 
evaluation, administrative rule review, media relations, computer services, and 
committee staff" (Pound 1999,29). Today, "More than 36,000 legislative staff^
most o f them nonpartisan and working in service agencies... [are] writing bills, 
analyzing budgets, managing information, researching issues, processing legislation, 
programming computers, printing reports, staffing committees, overseeing the 
executive branch, and providing security" (Weberg 1997, 26). A more recent trend 
has been the leveling oE  of the growth of legislative sta% but with continued growth 
for specific kinds of staff such as caucus staff and personal staff for individual 
legislators (Pound 1999).
Due to the importance of the legislative appropriations function common to all 
legislatures, fiscal analysts were among the first types of staff authorized as 
legislatures moved to increase their information processing capability (Hammond 
1985). Early research on legislative fiscal analysts in the 1970s indicated that a 
legislative fiscal staff is one of the most critical factors conditioning the capacity of 
legislative leaders in budget policy. By providing the basic facts needed by decision 
makers and running down the technical details of appropriations proposals, staff aid 
in the formulation of policy. Further, this research showed that fiscal analysts 
increased the output and oversight of those responsible for creating the budget 
(Balutis and Butler 1975; Rosenthal 1973).
The rise in number and quality of legislative fiscal staff may also be a leading 
factor in the increasing independence of the legislative branch in the budget process. 
Recent research indicates a growing parity between the executive branch and 
legislative branch in the state budgeting process with the legislature gaining ground in 
every phase of state budget policy including post-expenditure review (Abney and 
Lauth 1987 and 1998; Gosling 1985; Gosling 1994; Rosenthal 1981). Abney and
Lauth (1987, 1998) argue that the era of executive dominance over the budgeting 
process has been replaced by executive-legislative parity due to the decreasing 
information advantage once held by the governor. The great executive advantage of 
dominating budgetary information has come to an end, as all 50 state legislatures now 
have budgetary staff. In &ct, the growth in legislative fiscal staff has outpaced the 
growth of budget analysts in executive budget offices in recent years (Gosling 1994).
Problem Statement:
The Neglect of the Role of Legislative Fiscal Analysts
The purpose of this research is to assess the duties, roles, relationships and 
influence of legislative f  seal analysts in the development of state budget policy.
There are several critical reasons for devoting time and eSbrt to studying legislative 
fiscal analysts. First, if Wildavsky is correct and the budget lies at the heart of the 
political process, and if legislative fiscal analysts play a role in that process, then 
fiscal analysts become important actors to study. Understanding the role of 
legislative fiscal staff in the development of budget policy is crucial to understanding 
the democratic process. Legislative fiscal analysts are one of several groups of actors 
involved in the most important of public policies: the public budget. In an era of 
term limits, increasingly complex budget issues, and information overload, legislative 
fiscal staffs are essential to the modem legislature and, therefore, important to study.
Second, a fundamental and enduring question in public administration 
concerns the budget decision. V.O. Key (1940) asked over 60 years ago, on what 
basis do we allocate X amount of dollars to Activity A as opposed to Activity B? 
Several groups of actors are involved in this crucial decision, both elected and
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administrative. As part of the administrative set of budget actors, there is a growing 
body of research on executive budget analysts at the federal level (Berman 1979; 
Heclo 1978; Johnson 1984; Mosher 1984; Pearson 1980; Tomkin 1998) and at the 
state level (Appleby 1980; Gosling 1985; Gosling 1987; Lee 1991; Lee 1992; Lee 
1997; NASBO 1999; Thurmaier and Gosling 1997; Thurmaier 1995; Thurmaier 
2000; Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001; Wildavsky 1964; Yunker 1990).
Less research exists, however, specifically regarding legislative fiscal 
analysts. There is numerous research on legislative staffing in general including 
research on the committee and personal staffs of the U.S. Congress, U.S. state 
legislatures, and legislatures outside of the United States.^ Yet, little research exists 
on legislative fiscal analysts at the federal level (Fenno 1969; Kayali 1977) and at the 
state level (Balutis and Butler 1975; Rosenthal 1973; Snow and Clarke 1999;
Weissert and Weissert 2000; Willoughby and Finn 1996). Further, some of the 
research on legislative fiscal analysts at the state level is well over 25 years old. The 
early research indicates that legislative fiscal staffs play an important role in the 
development of state budget policy. This dissertation adds to previous Gndings on the 
duties, roles, relationships, and influence of legislative fiscal analysts in state budget 
policy.
Third, in the collection and dissemination of information, legislative fiscal 
analysts are in a position to impact the decisions of elected officials. The current 
research sheds light on how legislative fiscal analysts influence public policy by 
studying their role in the budget process. The potential 6)r legislative staff" at the 
federal level and state level to influence the policy process due to their expertise and
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the "behind the scenes" nature of their work has been documented (Fox and 
Hammond 1977; Malbin 1980; Romzek 2000; Romzek and Utter 1996). This 
potential for influence gives rise to two primary arguments against the widespread 
and increased use of legislative stafT: 1) stagers, as experts, give advice and make 
decisions as unelected individuals not accountable to citizens and 2) staff come 
between the elected official and her constituents, thus subverting the representative 
process. Therefore, many scholars have questioned the growth and technical 
expertise o f legislative staS^ particularly at the congressional level, and claim that 
legislators abdicate their responsibilities for lawmaking by deferring too oAen to 
experts among their staffs (KoAnehl 1962; Malbin 1980; Meller 1952; Meller 1967; 
Patterson 1967). This issue is extremely pertinent today as members o f Congress 
and increasingly, state legislators, encounter complex problems and time constraints. 
In fact, state legislators may be under more severe time and resource limitations than 
members of Congress due to shorter legislative sessions and term limits. Because 
staffers help to alleviate some of these information burdens, they have the potential to 
influence a member's decisions since they work with the legislators daily and are in 
positions to furnish and withhold information, make suggestions, and possibly give 
advice.
Legislative Ascal staff might be in a better position to inAuence decision- 
making due to the complexity and technical nature of the state budget process 
(Weissert and Weissert 2000). Also, to some extent the power of staff comes Aom 
the power of their bosses (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981). The most powerful 
legislators are oAen those sitting on the money committees. The staffs of these
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committees, in turn, reap the benefits of working for the most prestigious committees 
and members. Therefore, legislative fiscal stafT may be very influential in the budget 
process. This dissertation sheds light on how legislative fiscal analysts influence 
public policy by studying their roles in the budget process.
Despite little recent attention by scholars, legislative fiscal analysts are critical 
players in state budget policy. Identifying who they are, their primary role in the 
budget process, understanding their relationships with other key budget actors, and 
the degree of their influence in the creation of the state budget, will help us 
understand an often-neglected group of actors in the development of public policy.
Summary of Findings
In this study, the m^ority of all respondents perceived legislative fiscal 
analysts to be very influential or influential in the state budget process. Primarily, 
legislative fiscal analysts are influential in the budget process because they are 
information providers, and secondarily, they are influential because they are seen as 
experts in a particular policy area. Legislative fiscal analysts provide the information 
that becomes the basis for legislative deliberation and decision making on the budget. 
Key budget actors commented on the ability o f the analysts to provide an historical 
context of an agency or program, explain the agency budget request, and provide key 
demographic and fiscal information needed for legislative decision making on the 
budget. Further, when analysts summarize and simplify agency budget requests by 
parsing out information to legislators, pointing out areas of concern, or identifying 
key issues, they have the ability to shape legislative deliberation and debate. In other 
words, analysts are influential as information providers because they narrow the range
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of legislative discussion by identifying issues, developing several policy alternatives, 
or making specific budget recommendations.
The current research supports and adds to the existing body of work on 
legislative Gscal analysts by further defining the &ctors linked to legislative Gscal 
analyst influence in the state budget process. As stated earlier, this study found that 
the primary variable linked to influence is the ability of analysts to provide budgetary 
information to legislators. This is also the conclusion of previous studies on 
legislative stafT and legislative Gscal analysts (Patterson 1970a; Snow and Clarke 
1999; Weissert and Weissert 2000). Analysts exert this influence by not only 
providing the basic information about the budget but also as agenda setters. Unlike a 
previous study (Snow and Clarke 1999), indicating that agenda setting occurs with 
staff who develop budget recommendations, the current study indicates that agenda 
setting also occurs among those analysts who do not develop budget 
recommendations. Agenda setting refers to shaping the decision making parameters 
by developing policy options and identifying key issues and concerns, activities 
undertaken by analysts who are not given the responsibility of making budget 
recommendations.
The current research also identifies new variables linked to influence that have 
not been variables in past research. These variables include legislator trust of 
legislative fiscal analyst, fiscal ofGce reputation, the process of budget development, 
the primary point of infuence in the budget process, and the type of staff.
In addition to identifying new variables for future studies, the current study 
sheds light on whether legislative f  seal analysts are too infuential in the budget
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process by giving advice, making decisions for legislators, and promoting their policy 
preferences. This study provides no support for these activities. Comments &om 
both analysts and other budget actors reveal that analysts are fulfilling their role as 
nonpartisan stafF. Several analysts commented that they do not see themselves 
"pushing policy" or "advocating for a particular policy outcome" in the course of 
performing their duties for the legislature. In responding to questions concerning 
advice, the m^ority of the analysts in this study responded that they make special 
effort to avoid giving advice to legislators by giving the legislator several policy 
options or alternatives. Further, several budget actors commented on the ability of 
analysts to remain nonpartisan and present objective information to the legislature.
Organization of the Research
Chapter Two provides the reader with a broad examination of the budget 
process, describes the organizational setting of legislative fiscal analysts in the 50 
states, and presents the Gndings of previous research on legislative staff and executive 
staff that is essential in developing a research framework. This chapter reviews the 
wide range of variables and methods used to study staff at both the Congressional and 
state levels. It further discusses the literature on the factors that may condition the 
degree of influence of legislative fiscal analysts. Finally, chapter Two outlines the 
thesis and research design. Chapter Three provides a description of the legislative 
fiscal analysts in the current study on the following characteristics: sex, age, 
educational background, and previous employment. This chapter also compares 
legislative fiscal analysts with their executive budget office counterparts on these 
characteristics. Finally, the budget process of each state in this study is reviewed as
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well as the primary duties of legislative fiscal analysts. Similarities and differences 
among the states are discussed and a typology of duties is created showing the 
primary duties by state and the point in the budget process where they occur.
Chapter Four analyzes the relationship of legislative fiscal analysts with 
individual members of the legislature, committee members and chairs, agency 
personnel, and executive budget analysts. This chapter explores the types and 
usefulness of information provided by analysts to legislators, the level of discretion 
given analysts in the provision of information, and the nature and &equency of 
contact between analysts and legislators, agency personnel, and executive budget 
analysts. It further discuses how legislators perceive the role of legislative fiscal 
analysts in the budget process and how legislative fiscal analysts perceive their role in 
relation to the state agency(s) under their responsibility. Chapter Five gets at the 
heart of the research question by analyzing the perceptions of legislative fiscal analyst 
influence among the key budget actors. This chapter discusses the reasons for 
legislative Sscal analyst influence and how and when it occurs. It also discusses 
those factors potentially impacting influence and any differences in influence among 
the legislative fiscal analysts. Chapter Six summarizes the findings o f the current 
study, discusses the findings in relation to previous research and develops future 
research questions in this area.
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NOTES
1. Donlan and Weberg (1999) with the National Conference of State 
Legislatures provides comparative information on committee, fiscal, and legal staff 
structures and staff responsibilities for all 50 states and territories in 1999 edition of
2. Susan Hammond surveys the literature on legislative stafGng up to 1983 in 
her chapter entitled, "Legislative Staffs" in ^/ozzzAoot o f Legzf&z^e jkaeorc/z, edited 
by Gerhard Lowenberg, Samuel C Patterson, and Malcolm E. Jewell, (Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press, 1985). This essay focuses on the findings, methods, 
and approaches to studying legislative staff. In a more recent article, Hammond 
continues her exploration of the literature on legislative staffing from 1983 to the 
present in an article entitled, "Recent Research on Legislative Staffs" in LegzfAz/zve 
.yrzzdzgf gzzorrez'/y: 21 (November, 1996).
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CHAPTER TWO
Legislative StafT, Executive Budget Staff, and Legislative Fiscal Analysts: 
A Review of the Literature and Research Framework
This chapter provides the reader with a broad view of the budget process in the 
50 states, presents the Endings of previous literature on legislative and executive staff) 
and develops a model for the study of legislative Escal analysts. A discussion o f the 
budget process across the 50 states illuminates the similariEes and differences in 
budget procedures including the budget timeline, roles of the execuEve and legislative 
branches in the budget process, the structure and number of Escal committees 
responsible for reviewing the budget, and the organizaEonal setting for legislaEve 
Escal staff! The chapter also reviews the literature on staff at all levels of government 
across a wide range of variables including staff educational and professional 
background, staff roles and relationships with other budget actors, staff duties and 
Emctions, and staff inEuence. Next, the chapter discusses the factors that may 
condition the degree of legislaEve Escal analyst inEuence including the professionalism 
of state legislatures, gubernatorial-legislative relationships in the budget process, 
legislaEve term limits, the budget cycle, staff duEes and funcEons, Escal staff size, 
tenure of legislators and legislaEve Escal analysts, legislative Escal analyst contact with 
key budget actors, and legislaEve Escal analyst discretion in providing information and 
budget analysis. Finally, the chapter will outline the thesis and research design based 
upon the review of the literature and the factors condiEoning inEuence.
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The State Budget Process
While the state budget process follows three basic stages in all states, 
preparation of agency budget requests, development of executive recommendations, 
and enactment of the appropriation bill(s) by the legislature, budget procedures and the 
roles and organization of the legislative Gscal staSs vary h"om state to state. The 
following discussion highlights the many facets of the state budget process based on 
the most recent compilation of budgeting procedures by the National Conference of 
State Legislatures (NCSL).^
The Typical Budget Timeline
While most states (43) hold annual legislative sessions, there is variation in the 
budget cycle, or the h-equency at which states enact the budget. States budget either 
annually or biennially. An annual budget encompasses one fiscal year, while a biennial 
budget may be two annual budgets enacted biennially or a true biennial budget 
encompassing two fiscal years. Twenty-nine states adopt annual budgets, while 11 
states operate on the biennial budget cycle and adopt two annual budgets. The 
remaining states (9) operate on a biennial budget cycle and adopt a true biennial 
budget Within these three categories, there are some variations as well. For 
example, Missouri's operating budget is enacted annually, but the capital budget is 
biennial. Kansas enacts an annual budget for its largest operating agencies, but the 
budgets for 20 small boards and commissions are enacted biennially using two annual 
budgets.
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The general timeline for the budget process hrom the formulation of budget 
guidelines and agency requests to the legislative enactment of the budget is quite 
similar among the 50 states. Figure 2.1 shows the typical timeline for the budget 
process. The process starts with the formulation of budget guidelines providing 
instructions to agencies for the preparation of agency budget requests. These 
guidelines are developed by the executive branch and sent to the agencies in January, a 
year before the beginning of the legislative session. In some states, the development of 
the budget guidelines is done in concert with the legislature. In the early spring, 
agencies prepare the budget requests. These requests are submitted to the executive 
branch &om August through November. At this point in the process, legislatures 
have access to the agency budget requests at diSerent times. In 33 state legislatures, 
agency budget requests are submitted to the legislature prior to the preparation of the 
executive budget. In many of these states, the submission of agency requests to the 
executive and legislative branches occurs at the same time. Two legislatures receive 
the agency requests after the executive budget is prepared, but before submission to 
the legislature, one state legislature receives agency requests at the same time the 
executive budget is submitted to the legislature, and three state legislatures receive the 
agency requests after the executive budget is submitted. Three state legislatures 
receive agency budget requests very late in the legislative session or informally upon 
legislator or stafT request. Legislatures in eight states never receive agency budget 
requests.
After the agencies submit the budget requests, budget hearings are held where 
the agency makes the budget request before the executive branch. Some legislatures
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hold agency hearings prior to the legislative session as well. At the conclusion of the 
hearings, the executive recommendations are developed and submitted to the 
legislature as the executive budget. The submission of the executive budget is usually 
done immediately before or at the beginning of the legislative session that typically 
starts at the beginning of January.
In most states, legislative deliberation on the budget starts with the arrival of 
the executive budget at the beginning of the legislative session, however some 
legislatures begin deliberations prior to the legislative session. As stated earlier, in 
Arkansas, the Legislative Council and Joint Budget Committee meet jointly 6om 
October through December to hold agency budget hearings prior to the legislative 
session that begins in January. Both agency requests and executive recommendations 
are reviewed at this time. The two legislative committees make recommendations on 
the budget and those recommendations are presented to the Joint Budget Committee 
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It is important to note that most legislative deliberations on the budget begin 
with the submission of the executive budget and the appropriations bill(s). In most 
states, the executive drives the process by providing the document &om which the 
legislature debates. However, in some states, the legislature ignores the executive 
budget and creates its own document or drafts its own appropriations bill(s) &om 
which debate occurs.
The entity responsible &)r drafting the appropriations bill(s) varies 6om state to 
state. In 28 states, the executive branch has the sole responsibility for drafting the bill. 
State legislatures in 15 states authorize the nonpartisan Gscal stafT to draft the 
appropriations bill(s). In 13 states, either the House or Senate Appropriations 
Committee stafT is responsible for draAing the bill(s). The remaining three states have 
unique bill drafting responsibilities. In Oklahoma, bill drafting responsibilities are split 
between the House and Senate fiscal staffs where the Senate introduces appropriations 
bills for half the state agencies and the House introduces the other half. In Indiana, the 
budget committee made up of four legislators and the state budget director reviews 
requests, makes recommendations, and authorizes committee stafTto draft the bill.
The North Carolina legislature places bill drafting responsibility within a nonpartisan 
bill drafting division made up of legislative staff! It is important to note that even if 
the legislature drafts the appropriations biU(s) it may initially reflect the executive 
recommendation.
The deliberations process on the appropriations bül(s) takes place in legislative 
committees, but these committees vary in size, operation, and name. The 
appropriation bills are typically referred to House and Senate Appropriations
23
Committees, or a joint appropriations or budget committee for review. Most state 
legislatures (39) have a separate hscal committee in each chamber that reviews the 
appropriations bill(s). For example, the Indiana legislature places responsibility for 
review of the appropriations bill in the House Ways and Means Committee and the 
Senate Finance Committee. The legislature in Maryland reviews the *q)propriations 
bill through the Appropriations Committee in the House and the Budget and Taxation 
Committee in the Senate. In legislatures with separate committees there is a variety 
of interaction between them. In some legislatures, the separate committees almost 
always meet together during the session, in others, separate committees may hold joint 
hearings occasionally, and in Montana, subcommittees of the appropriations 
committees are held jointly. Other state legislatures (14) choose to review the budget 
through a joint committee comprised of House and Senate members such as the Joint 
Budget Committee, Joint Committee on Appropriations and Financial ASairs, and 
Joint Commi#ee on Ways and Means. Some states use a combination of joint 
committees and separate committees. For example, the Louisiana Joint Budget 
Committee conducts budget hearings before the session, but separate House and 
Senate appropriations committees also conduct hearings during the legislative session. 
It is through the deliberations in these Sscal committees that legislative 
recommendations are made regarding the budget and incorporated in the 
appropriations bill(s).
The average number of appropriations bills enacted by state legislatures varies 
considerably. While 18 state legislatures enact a single appropriations bill 
encompassing the operating budget and the capital budget, the remaining 32 states
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enact between 2 and 500 separate appropriation bills. For example, Arizona, 
Maryland, and New Hampshire enact two appropriation bills, one for the operating 
budget and one for the capital budget. North Carolina enacts three bills, one for the 
continuation or baseline budget, one for budget expansions, and one for the capital 
budget. Michigan enacts 13 bills for each of the nuyor operating departments, one 
capital projects bill, and three separate bUls for education funding. The Adcansas 
Legislature enacts over 500 appropriation bills during a legislative session conforming 
to a state constitutional requirement limiting each appropriation bill to one subject. 
Therefore, multiple bills are enacted for each state agency including appropriations 
bills for the operating budget, capital projects budget, and supplemental funding.
While legislative deliberations on the budget begin with a legislative 
committee or committees, the full House and Senate must pass the appropriations 
bill(s) after committee recommendations are completed. A conference committee 
may be necessary for the reconciliation of different versions of the budget passed out 
of the House and Senate. After reconciliation, the budget is sent to the governor for 
approval or veto. If the governor approves, the budget is enacted into law.
Governors in all states but one have the power to veto all or portions of the budget. 
Six governors can veto the entire appropriations bill and governors in 43 states can 
veto funding for a particular item. If a veto occurs, the legislature can override the 
veto.
In the 50 states, legislatures generally enact the state budget ft"om April 
through June during the last few days of the legislative session. After the legislative 
session, agencies prepare operating budgets to reflect the enacted budget. There is
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also uniformity among the 50 states with regard to the hscal year. All but four states 
begin the fiscal year on July 1 and end the Sscal year on June 30.
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Organizational Environment
Just as the state budget process diSers, the organizational and supervisory 
environment of legislative Gscal sta@s also varies &om state to state. Fiscal staGs 
operate within the various legislative stafF structures outlined in Chapter 1, however, 
the legislative Gscal sta@s can be categorized into hve basic structures: nonpartisan 
central ohSce staj% nonpartisan joint committee staf^ separate fiscal ofRces in each 
chamber, partisan staff where both the m^ority and minority party in each chamber 
utilize a Escal staE  ̂and legislatures that use mixed staff arrangements. Table 2.1 
categorizes each state legislature's f  seal staff according to the supervisory body.
Some 20 fscal staSs operate under the auspices of a joint commission or council. This 
represents the most common supervisory structure where Gscal staSs in nonpartisan 
central ofBces report to a joint management commission, committee, or council such 
as a legislative council or legislative coordinating committee. This committee or 
council is responsible for overseeing the administration of the entire legislature, 
including stafGng. TSIine Escal staSs work for a joint Escal committee or work for 
separate Escal committees in both the house and the senate chamber. This means that 
there is one Escal staff working either for a joint committee or separate Escal 
committees in both chambers. Ten states have separate Escal staff in each chamber 
who report to either an agency or ofGce or directly to a parEcular Escal committee.
For example, Oklahoma has two Escal ofBce staSs, one for the House and one for the
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Senate. Here, analysts report to a nonpartisan agency within each chamber. These 
hscal analysts are responsible for stafGng and providing information to all the hscal 
committees in a particular chamber. However, in Massachusetts, the Senate and 
House Ways and Means Committees have separate staff The Committees have 
authority over the analysts, who are hired by the committee chair. Two states are 
clearly partisan. New York and Pennsylvania. The m^ority party and minority party 
has its own staff in each chamber. These staffs provide partisan analysis to members 
of the respective caucus. Finally, nine states have Sscal analysts working in a variety 
of supervisory arrangements. California is an example of this type of state. The 
Legislative Analyst's OfGce is a nonpartisan, centralized f  seal ofGce that supports the 
Joint Legislative Budget Committee. However, legislators also have minority and 
nuyority staSers who provide partisan analyses of budgetary issues. The Louisiana 
Legislative Fiscal OfGce as well as House and Senate staff provide information to the 
Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget during the session. During the interim, the 
Louisiana Legislative Fiscal OfGce provides support for the Joint Legislative 
Committee on the Budget. In Iowa, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau provides ûscal and 
budgetary information to members, but partisan caucus sta@s also provide members 
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According to Snow and Clarke (1999), this supervisory distinction is important 
in terms of the mission of the hscal staE Fiscal staff who report to a joint 
commission or council usually has an institutional mission rather than a political 
mission. Therefore, this staff is referred to as nonpartisan. The f  seal analysts in this 
capacity typically w o it for both political parties in both chambers. Loyalty lies with
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the institution rather than with a particular political party or chamber. For example, 
legislative Sscal analysts in Kansas and Maine work in nonpartisan, centralized Gscal 
ofBces supervised by a legislative council. In describing its functions and duties, "the 
Kansas Legislative Research Department is a nonpartisan stafT agency that serves the 
House and the Senate under the auspices of the Legislative Coordinating Council" 
(Kansas Legislative Research Department, 2002). The Maine legislature dictates that, 
"As nonpartisan employees of the [Maine] legislature, members of these staff ofSces 
are prohibited &om engaging in political activity or taking a public position with 
regard to any matter that is under active consideration by the legislature. In their 
work, nonpartisan staff must maintain their neutrality"(Maine Legislators' Handbook 
2000, 55). Nonpartisanship not only means providing objective information for all 
members of the legislature, but can extend to more private and personal issues such as 
the prohibition of political campaigning.
Snow and Clarke (1999) consider staSs that serve fscal committees in each 
chamber as well as staSs supporting joint committees, as having a political mission as 
opposed to an institutional mission. While the Escal analysts serve all committee 
members, the committee chair -  and thus the m^ority party -  supervises the work of 
staff This leads Snow and Clarke to consider these staGs bipartisan rather than 
nonpartisan. Fiscal staGs serving the m^ority party or the minority party have a clear 
political mission. There can be several types of staff arrangements for those staGs 
having pure political missions. Typically, both the m^ority and minority party will 
have its own staff in each chamber. Also, the Gscal committees may employ both 
majority and minority Gscal staff and each staff would be responsible for providing
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analyses and information to the respective party leaders.
Overview of Research Findings on Legislative Fiscal Analysts
Legislative staSs at both the Congressional level and the state level have been 
the subjects of a growing body of research. Since the legislative reform movement at 
the state level &om the 1960s through the 1980s and stafT expansions in Congress due 
to the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act, scholars have increasingly devoted time to 
the study of legislative staff Early research focused on calculating staff size and 
describing staff educational and pro&ssional characteristics of both committee and 
personal staff at the congressional level. More recent research on congressional staff 
and state legislative staff analyzes activities, roles, and impact on budget and policy 
decisions. Also, the growing body of research on executive budget staff is equally 
important in the research on the duties, roles, and influence of legislative f  seal analysts 
as a point of comparison between the two types of staff
What do we know speciGcally about legislative Gscal analysts in state 
legislatures? At the beginning of the state legislative re&rm movement, one study 
described the basic duties and roles of legislative staff in seven states (Balutis and 
Butler 1975). This was the Grst study at the state level to describe staff 
characteristics and the wide range of Gscal ofBce duties. In an attempt to uncover 
whether the presence of a Gscal staff has implicaGons for the work of the state 
legislature, Rosenthal (1971) analyzed the diSerences in the Gscal committee review of 
the budget both before and aAer the creaGon of a legislative Gscal staff. This study 
found that the number of budget changes by the Gscal committee increased aAer the
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creation of legislative fiscal staff Not only are legislative ûscal committees more 
active due to Gscal staff these Gscal analysts are perceived to be inGuential in the 
budget process. A 1970s study (Balutis 1975) in one state found that legislative Gscal 
analysts perceive themselves as inGuenGal in the budget process and legislators, 
lobbyists, and execuGve branch personnel corroborate this inGuence. Despite these 
early studies showing an impact on legislative review of the execuGve budget and the 
perceived inGuence of Gscal staff in the budget process, few studies have been 
conducted since that time.
One recent study by Snow and Clarke (1999) provides a starting point for the 
study of legislative Gscal analysts. Here, the authors descnbe the differences in duGes 
and point of inGuence of Gscal staff based upon the locaGon and mission of the Gscal 
ofGce. Snow and Clarke found that nonpartisan centralized Gscal staffs inGuence 
legislators during committee hearings and budget hearings when Gscal staffs present 
their reviews and analyses of agency budget requests to the Gscal commiGee.
However, partisan fiscal staffs tend to be more influential during caucus meetings.
In the most recent study on legislaGve Gscal analysts, Weissert and Weissert 
(2000) Gnd that trust between the legislator and legislaGve Gscal analyst impacts the 
degree of legislaGve Gscal analyst inGuence. Further, appropriations commiGee chair 
tenure is directly linked to the inGuence of the analyst. WeisseG and WeisseG show 
that legislative Gscal analyst inGuence increases as the tenure of the appropriations 
commiGee chair increases. Therefore, it is the relaGonship and the trust that is built 
between the commiGee chair and legislaGve Gscal analyst that condiGons the degree of 
inGuence.
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In summary, early studies of legislative Gscal analysts describe general Gscal 
ofGce duGes, although with little comparison or explanaGon of diSerences in duties. 
More recent studies have gone beyond mere descripGon of general duGes to explore 
some of the factors involved in the degree and point of legislaGve Gscal analyst 
inGuence. The current study will build upon these past eGbrts as well as the research 
on congressional staGF and execuGve budget staff The following discussion 
summarizes the research and important variables used in studying congressional staG) 
legislaGve staG  ̂ and execuGve budget staG! This discussion will provide a starting 
point for building a model of legislaGve Gscal analyst inGuence utilized in this study. 
These vanables include: staff background, staff roles and relaGonships with other 
actors, staff duGes and GmcGons, staG inGuence, and manner of inGuence.
Important Vanables in the Study of Legislative Staff
SfaG Background
Staff background (educaGon, training, previous employment, state of 
residence, recruitment, tenure, and career aspiraGons) has been analyzed with a vanety 
of congressional staff (DeGregono and Snider 1995; Fox and Hammond 1977; 
Hammond 1975, 1994; Kayali 1977; KoGnehl 1977; Romzek and Utter 1996;
Salisbury and Shepsle 1981), state legislaGve Gscal staff (BaluGs 1975; Famum 1975; 
Hartmark 1975; Kyle 1975; Willoughby and Finn 1996), and executive budget staff 
(Gosling 1987; Lee 1991; Lee 1997; NaGonal AssociaGon of State Budgeting OfBcers 
1999; Thurmaier and Gosling 1996; Tomkin 1998; Yunker 1990). For the purposes of 
the current research, research linking staff background to speciGc staff duGes and
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influence is of particular importance. The characteristics of the people who stafT a 
legislative ûscal ofBce may impact how that ofBce operates in terms of products 
created and induence wielded.
For executive budget staG) at both the federal and state levels, research exists 
on educational background, stafT size, and average salaries (Lee 1991; Lee 1997; 
National Association of State Budgeting OfBcers 1999; Tomkin 1998). Lee (1991) 
has documented the change in both the level of education and the educational 
background of executive budget analysts over two decades. The number of staff with 
master's degrees has increased, while staff with less than a bachelor's degree or with a 
doctorate remained small in number. Further, Lee notes that analysts with accounting 
backgrounds have been replaced with analysts holding degrees in the social sciences 
and public administration. Business administration and public administration together 
accounted for 51 percent of the staff in 1970 and 52 percent in 1995. "However, 
business administration was more than twice the size of public administration in 1970, 
whereas in 1990, the two disciplines were evenly balanced (Lee 1997, 137-138). 
During the same time period, Lee observed an increase in executive budget ofBces 
conducting program analysis, although this trend reversed itself after 1990. 
Nonetheless, the trend for more analysis Gom 1970 to 1990 could be a result of the 
change in the educational backgrounds of executive budget analysts.
In fact, the shift in educational background has been linked to speciGc role 
orientations of executive budget ofBces at the state level. Gosling (1987) studied 
budget ofBces in three states and identified distinct orientations of those ofBces: a 
policy orientation versus a control orientation. A budget ofBce exhibiting a policy
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orientation is one where the budget analysts review policy alternatives in response to 
agency requests and initiate policy proposals even when no agency request exists. In 
this role, budget analysts deGne policy problems, evaluate alternatives, and recommend 
options. On the other hand, a control-oriented ofBce does not initiate policy and is 
primarily engaged in assisting agencies in Gnancial management. The analyst in a 
control-oriented oGBce is most likely to be an expenditure monitor and "number 
cruncher." Gosling Gound that analysts in control-oriented oGBces have predominantly 
business administraGon and accounting degrees while analysts in more policy-oriented 
ofBces are more likely to have a public administration or other social science degree.
In this study, the different orientations of the budget ofBces are reGected in the 
backgrounds of people hired as budget analysts.
The work of Thurmaier and Gosling (1997) support the linkage between 
budget ofBce orientation and the educational background of analysts. In addition, 
they uncovered another link, observing that educational background condiGons the 
individual role onentation of the budget analyst with respect to the state agencies 
under her supervision. Analysts with a social science background are more likely to 
take on an advocacy role. The advocacy role is deGned as one where the executive 
budget analyst advocates or supports agency programs and budget requests viewed as 
good public policy and consistent with gubematonal objecGves. In contrast, analysts 
with a business or accounting background are more likely to report a more adversanal 
or control-onented role with respect to their agencies. However, more recent 
research, using a larger sample of executive budget ofBces, Gnds Gttle support for the
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linkage between the roles of executive budget analysts and their educational and 
professional background (Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001).
Data on legislative Gscal staff background at the state level is less numerous 
(Balutis and Butler 1975; Rosenthal 1981; and Willoughby and Finn 1996). One of 
the Grst descriptions of legislative Gscal staG" characteristics is now over a quarter 
century old (Balutis and BuGer 1975). This collection of essays describes Gscal staff 
educational and professional background in seven states. This work does not make 
comparisons among the Gscal staGs in those states or explore the relationship between 
background and the roles and duGes of staG. From this collection of essays, one can 
discern that Gscal analysts in the 1970s held bachelor's degrees in a wide range of 
disciplines including accounting, economics, poliGcal science, public administration, 
mathematics, educaGon, and law. Further, some analysts were recruited immediately 
after college graduaGon while others had previous experience in state government.
A more recent study by Willoughby and Finn (1996) of legislaGve Gscal 
analysts in nine southern states Gnds that the typical legislaGve Gscal analyst in the 
south is male, about thirty-nine years of age, and earns over $45,000 per year. 
Additionally, the typical analyst in the south has been on the job about six years, has 
previous employment in a state agency, and has completed a master's degree typically 
in business or public administraGon. Despite the recent work of Willoughby and Finn 
(1996) on legislaGve Gscal staG background, little is known about possible linkages 
between legislaGve Gscal analyst educaGon and job duties, roles, and relationships with 
agencies.
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StafT Roles and Relationships with Other Actors
Previous research investigates the relationships among diSerent types o f staG" 
and between staG and other key actors in the policy process. Research has compared 
committee and personal staG discussed conGict and interaction between partisan and 
nonpartisan staG and analyzed the impact of diSerent types of staG on the legislative 
process (Fox and Hammond 1977; Patterson 1970a and 1970b; Price 1971; Rosenthal 
1971,1973; Rosenthal, Kost and Hill 1988; Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b). Of primary 
importance for the current study is that research which analyzes the relationships of 
budget and Gscal analysts with other key budget actors, in particular, governors, 
legislators, and agency personnel.
ExecuGve Budget Analysts
The tradiGonal role of the execuGve budget examiner in the budget process has 
been the adversanal "naysayer" or "cuGer" role. Wildavsky's (1964) landmark study 
on the federal budget process idenGGes the role of the budget examiner "as a 
Presidential servant with a cutting bias" (Wildavsky 1964, 160). In explaining the 
roles of key budget actors, Wildavsky argues that budget analysts are aware that 
agencies pad their budgets. Therefore, the Budget Bureau "is compelled by agency 
advocacy to take a cutting role. Even where the Bureau is disposed to increase a 
program over the previous year, the chances are that the agency is requesting even 
more and there is liGle choice but to wield the knife" (WGdavsky 1964, 162).
While the common perception of the execuGve budget analyst is the 
"adversary," Davis and Ripley (1969) found that most budget examiners in the former
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Bureau of the Budget acknowledge a neutral role with respect to the agencies under 
their purview. This reported neutrality was supported by interviews with the agency 
directors. In fact, adversarial and advocacy roles were found to be the exceptions 
among the executive budget examiners. More recent research indicates that the 
OfBce of Management and Budget (0MB) has become more politicized over the years 
(Heclo 1977, Johnson 1984, Johnson 1989). This change has aSected the roles of 
the 0MB examiners with respect to their agencies (Tomkin 1998). Most recently, 
Tomkin (1998) Ends that the 0MB has moved &om a role orientation of neutrality to 
one of policy advocacy. This role orientation depends upon how each presidential 
administration uses the 0MB Some administrations encourage a more technical, 
"cutter" role and some emphasize a larger advocacy role. At times, these roles merge 
where the examiner takes on the responsibility for "poUcy policing" (Tomkin 1998,
74). In this role, examiners assume both a “naysayer” and advocacy role with respect 
to agency requests where the requests are evaluated on whether they are in accord 
with the president's policy priorities. Examiners may be actively involved in 
developing alternatives for programs that are a presidential priority and less so when 
there is no such priority.
In a study o f executive budget analysts at the state level, Thurmaier and 
Gosling (1997) found that most analysts characterized their role with respect to state 
agencies as an advocacy role, although some analysts report multiple roles that vary 
with the phase in the budget process or with diSerent agencies. Analysts in three 
states reported advocating for agency programs that they viewed as good public policy 
and consistent with gubernatorial objectives. Further, the advocacy role is
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conditioned by the interaction between executive budget analysts and the governor 
(Thurmaier and Gosling 1997; Thurmaier 2000; Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001). In 
those states where executive budget analysts routinely brief the governor and have a 
personal afhliation with the governor, analysts are more comfortable taking on a policy 
analysis and development role with respect to their agencies. Whereas those analysts 
isolated &om the governor are more likely to be "number crunchers" or budget 
technicians.
Legislative Fiscal Analysts
On relationships between legislative stafF and agencies, less is known. In a 
study of the stafF of the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Kayali (1977) 
found that the relationship between appropriations committee stafF and executive 
agencies was cooperative, not antagonistic. StaSs interact most &equently with the 
executive agency budget ofiFicial rather than the agency director. “The clerk of the 
committee describes this interaction as follows: ‘Because of the unending flow of 
information of a Gscal nature that is required far the functioning of the appropriations 
process, stafF members of the House Appropriations Committee share a bond of trust 
and respect with agency budget ofScers'" (Kayali 1977, 81-82).
At the state level, Duncombe and Kinney (1987) report that agency personnel 
feel it is important to maintain good relations with executive budget stafF as well as 
with legislators and legislative Gscal analysts. State agencies take the legislative stafF 
role seriously and try to maintain good relations with staff
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On relationships between legislative Gscal stafT and legislators, some research 
focuses on the presence of shared values and perceptions about the primary role of 
stafT and the Gscal committee. Fenno's (1962) study of the U.S. House 
Appropriations Committee revealed shared perceptions among committee members 
and committee stafT on the tasks of the committee. Both members and stafT shared the 
view that the primary role of the committee was to protect the treasury. Likewise, a 
study of the LegislaGve Budget Board (LBB) in Texas yielded the same type of shared 
percepGons by legislators and Gscal stafF (BuGer 1975). Both LBB staGF and members 
reported that the primary tasks of the LBB were to cut agency requests and improve 
agency operaGons. Because of these shared perceptions of the appropnate role of the 
LBB, members of the budget board generally accepted the recommendaGons of the 
staGFand reported high conGdence in the LBB staff s ability to make objective 
recommendaGons congruent with the LBB role in the budget process.
Many quesGons arise G"om the literature on staGT roles and relaGonships with 
other budget actors. What types of interacGon occur between legislaGve Gscal analysts 
and members of the state legislature? Do legislaGve Gscal analysts and legislators 
perceive the same role for stafF in the legislaGve process? What is the relaGonship 
among legislaGve Gscal analysts and rank and Gle members, appropnaGon committee 
members, and appropnaGon committee chairs? How do legislaGve Gscal analysts 
perceive their role with respect to the agencies under their purview? While agency 
personnel report the signiGcance of establishing good relaGons with legislaGve Gscal 
staf^ what is the nature of this relationship?
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StafT Duties and Functions
Legislative stafT duties have been identified and described in a vanety of 
research at the congressional level (Burks and Cole 1978; DeGregorio 1994,1995; 
Fenno 1966; Fox and Hammond 1975b, 1977, 1994; Green and Rosenthal 1963; 
Kofnehl 1977; Patterson 1973, 1977; Price 1971; Romzek and Utter 1996; Rundquist, 
Schneider and Pauls 1992; and Saloma 1969) and at the state level (Balutis and Butler 
1975; Jones 1988; Snow and Clark 1999; and Weissert and Weissert 2000).
For the purposes of the current research, studies providing patterns and 
typologies of stafF duties are useful as a starting point for assessing whether these 
duties correspond to different levels of staff influence. A review of these staff 
typologies and patterns follows.
In his study of the personal and committee staffs of Congress, Patterson 
(1970a) f)und that the two types of staff engage in different activities and serve 
different purposes for members of Congress. The personal staffs of members are 
oriented to political activities, such as the re-election of the member or responding to 
constituent requests, while committee staffs provide technical information. However, 
Price's (1971) study of four Senate committee stafk indicates that not all committee 
staffs are information specialists or technicians. Price identiSed two types of staff: 
the "policy entrepreneur" and the "professional." While both types of staffers held 
high levels of expertise in their speciGc policy areas, analyzed proposals, and draAed 
bills or amendments at the request of senators, important differences came to light.
For the "professional," neutrality and expertise were the basic norms and analyzing 
proposals was the main task. The "policy entrepreneur" was more committed to
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activism and partisanship. This type of staler continuously searched for policy gaps 
and opportunities. "He was more willing to use his position to implement his own 
policy preferences and to let political considerations influence the role he assumed.. in 
the end he valued creativity more than expertness and did not hesitate to establish a 
particular identihcation with the interests and ambitions of the chair or of other 
members" (Price 1971, 335). For the entrepreneur, partisan and personal 
considerations guided stafT work and directed him to particular objectives. In contrast, 
the "professional" remained neutral with respect to various senators and proposals and 
kept his own personal preferences at bay. Burks and Cole (1978) pursued the 
entrepreneur-professional dichotomy in their 1974 survey of the role orientations of 
congressional aides. This study hnds that most aides perceive themselves as a mixture 
o f the professional and the entrepreneur.
Fox and Hammond (1975b, 1977) identify hve professional stafT activity 
patterns of the personal staff of U.S. Senators. Threroctorf handle constituent 
projects and casework, meet with lobbyists or special interest groups, and visit with 
constituents. S&rpywrferf work on legislative research and bills, draft speeches, and 
door remarks. Corre.!po/Kkrs are typically the secretaries and clerks who handle 
requests for information and draft correspondence. Affre/Yrsers are the press aides. 
Finally, the f/rvesTfgorors handle oversight issues regarding the executive and judicial 
branches. Of these dve patterns. Fox and Hammond observe that those staffers taking 
on the Weractor role have tremendous responsibility and authority and are often 
senior professional aides.
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Building upon Price's professional/entrepreneur typology, DeGregono (1988) 
provides a more recent review of House and Senate stafT work styles. In a survey of 
high-ranking House and Senate staff directors of congressional subcommittees, 
DeGregorio identified four unique staff working styles. Similarly to Price, 
DeGregorio discovered entrepreneurial stafkrs who are guided by both their personal 
preferences and the wishes of the subcommittee members. While DeGregorio Gnds 
that entrepreneurial aides do not advance their own personal preferences if they 
undermine or conflict with those of the legislators, these staGers do use "...ingenuity 
and expertise to search for initiaGves that advance personal interests and at the same 
time serve the interests of the superiors (DeGregorio 1988, 465). Most closely 
representing Price's "professional" role are the technicians. Using their substanGve 
experGse, they help the legislators make decisions. Technicians are less attached to 
policy outcomes than the entrepreneurs who have strong preferences about the 
direcGon policy changes should take.
Adding to Pnce's typology, DeGregono found two addiGonal work styles. 
PoliGcos are those aides who exhibit loyalty to the committee chair. These aides have 
close personal relaGonships with the chair and report that their main function is to 
ensure that the chair gets what he or she wants. Their loyalty to the chair surpasses 
their own personal policy preferences. Finally, the remaining staff aides (the m^ority 
o f aides interviewed) did not Gt into one of these three categories, refecting the wide 
variety in the work styles of congressional staff In an attempt to more precisely link 
duGes with inGuence, DeGregono (1994) identiGes a "hierarchy of services" provided 
by House and Senate high-ranking commiGee aides of the U.S. Congress. Each aide
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reported the services he or she believed to be the most important to members.
Services receiving the highest ranking included: protecting committee chair from 
surprises, furnishing factual information on the substance of bills, and reporting on the 
political reception a bill faces. DeGregorio found that the rankings of these three 
services were very high among all aides and that individual and organizational 
characteristics had little or no bearing on their provision. "Everyone at the senior level 
gathers 6cts that are instrumental in formulating policy and in protecting legislators" 
(DeGregorio 1994, 6).
However, for activities thought to be more closely associated with influence, 
less regularity was found among the interviewees. Negotiating minor issues, coming 
up with ideas for new policy initiatives, and providing judgments about the political 
implications ofbills received moderately high rankings, but with less consistency than 
the Srst three types of services. Finally, negotiating mtyor issues and developing 
explanations of Washington activities for constituents back home received low rankings 
&om most of the committee staff The low rankings of these services are attributed to 
two factors. When major decisions have to be made, aides call in the members. The 
unelected status of the staSers precludes them &om making deals on issues with m^or 
ramiGcations. With regard to providing explanations of Washington activities, 
committee staSers report that the personal staGs of legislators typically provide this 
service as these individuals tend to be more familiar with the member's district.
DeGregorio (1995) continues this line of research and further explores the 
factors that explain variation in staff involvement in the "hierarchy of activities." In 
explaining the variations among staff aides, DeGregorio arrives at several conclusions
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First, staSers who work for busy members and committees report higher than average 
involvement in information gathering and negotiating minor issues for the chairs. 
Second, committee chairs are more likely to delegate more substantial policy or 
political work to aides who are trusted and loyal. "Committee chairs are more 
inclined, for example, to defer to aides who join congressional committees out of 
loyalty to the chair and when partnerships endure for longer than average periods of 
time (DeGregorio 1995, 274-275). Committee chairs ".. .report either retaining the 
sensitive negotiations for themselves or delegating selectively -  only after stafF 
demonstrate their powers of discernment" (DeGregorio 1995, 274). Third, aides and 
chairs have similar views about the provision of services. Committee chairs report 
that StafF aides are called upon more to provide substantive information as opposed to 
political information and advice. This supports the aides' perceptions as to the most 
important service provided to commiMee members.
Few studies specihcally on legislative hscal stafFhave attempted to develop 
typologies, although several works identi^ primary functions and describe the role of 
legislative Gscal stafFinthe budget process. Balutis and Butler (1975) provide the Grst 
examination of legislative Gscal ofBces by describing the nature of staff work Seven 
essays describe the primary GmcGons and duGes of the legislaGve staBF ofBce or Gscal 
committee stafF in New Mexico, Flonda, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, New York, 
and Texas. Each of the essays describe the role of legislative staff as assisGng in the 
creation of public policy by providing the basic facts needed by decision makers.
These essays describe both Gscal committee stafF and nonparGsan central ofBce Gscal 
staff Common stafF duties can be gleaned G"om the essays. Generally, all Gscal
44
analysts are assigned a single state agency or a group of agencies or policy areas. All 
staSs provide some level of budget analyses of agency requests and gubernatorial 
recommendations. Presenting information before the money committees is a common 
function, as is stafGng committees, preparing Gscal analyses or notes, and developing 
budget bill summaries. In addition to the above duties, legislative Gscal analysts in 
Florida and Texas prepare independent revenue estimates and prepare budget 
recommendations for the legislature
Another more recent publication is similarly descripGve of legislative staGT 
funcGons. Donlan and Weberg (1999) of the NaGonal Conference of State 
Legislatures compiled a 50 state proGle describing the basic duGes of each legislative 
Gscal oGGce and/or Gscal commiGee staff This research was compiled based upon 
surveys of legislaGve Gscal ofGce staff The duGes and funcGons of legislaGve Gscal 
staff represent a variety of services performed, but many are common to all staSs. 
These duGes include but are not limited to: analyzing agency budget requests and 
execuGve recommendaGons; prepanng Gscal notes; drafGng appropnaGon bills and 
amendments; tracking bills with Gscal impact; conducting research at the request of 
commiGees or individual members; stafGng Gscal/budget commiGees and 
subcommiGees; and presenting budget analyses to commiGees. As documented in 
Balutis and BuGer (1975) some staGs have additional duGes. Fiscal analysts in some 
states are also responsible for estimating revenues; paGicipating in wnGng budget 
preparation instructions for execuGve branch agencies; and developing pohcy opGons 
and making budget recommendaGons to the Gscal/budget commiGee.
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Snow and Clarke (1999) make the Grst attempt at providing some insight into 
why and how work diSers among legislative Gscal stafT. They created a typology 
linking the type of stafT work to specihc organizational structures based on telephone 
interviews with 25 legislative hscal ofBce directors. Snow and Clark identic two 
types of staGT: facilitators and leaders. Facilitators provide legislators with information 
such as an analysis of agency budget requests, executive recommendations, 
explanations for signiGcant deviations &om past appropriations, and other technical 
data. This information helps legislators make their own budget recommendations. 
Leaders, however, prepare budget recommendations for the committee and these 
recommendations are debated along with executive recommendations and agency 
testimony.
Snow and Clarke further identic stafk with political missions and those with 
institutional missions. StaGs with political missions are partisan ofBces. These 
partisan staGs are typically associated with a party caucus in each chamber. Also, 
staGs working for the appropriations committee in one chamber may have political 
missions as weU, particularly if hired by the committee chair representing the m^ority 
party. This latter arrangement is referred to as a bipartisan staG! StaGs with an 
institutional mission are typically centralized, nonpartisan staff loyal to the legislative 
institution, as opposed to a particular party or chamber. Table 2.1 shows that 
bipartisan committee staG" and party caucus stafT most oGen provide technical 
assistance to committee chairs and party leaders, respectively. On the other hand, 
providing budget recommendations, policy advice, and technical assistance are duties 
most closely linked to noi^artisan central staG
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Table 2.1
Typology of Staff Type and Primary Role
StaG Type Primary Role in Hearings and Deliberations
Bipartisan Committee Facilitators Facilitator with committee chair
Partisan Caucus Facilitators Serve the needs of the party caucus
Institutional Leaders Recommendafions in budget hearings
Institutional Facilitators Technical support in budget hearings
Source: Adapted Aom Snow and Clarke (1999,15).
The work of Snow and Clarke leads to the assumption that staGs representing 
the "institutional leaders" may have more inGuence in the process than the facilitators 
due to their independent preparation of budget recommendations Gom which 
legislators deliberate.
The previous research on staG work styles and typologies provides us with 
general descriptions of legislative fiscal analyst duties and functions. From these 
descriptions and typologies, one can begin to assess if various staG duties and 
typologies are associated with diGerent levels of inGuence.
StaG InGuence
Legislative stafik are inGuential. There is anecdotal evidence of this power at 
both the Congressional and state level (Malbin 1980; Rosenthal 1981; Bisnow 1990). 
In the early 1970s, Balutis (1975b) assessed legislative staG inGuence based upon the 
perceptions of inGuence held by staG  ̂legislators, agency personnel, and lobbyists.
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StafT members reported being influential in the budget process and legislators, agency 
personnel, and lobbyists corroborate this perception. StafT influence stems &om stafT 
expertise, the ability to provide information to members, acting as information 
conduits between legislators and other groups involved in the budget process, and by 
selecting and compiling much of the information on which legislative decisions are 
made.
Rosenthal (1974) studied fiscal staff impact on budget review by the Joint 
Finance Committee in the Wisconsin legislature. In the year prior to creating a 
legislative Sscal staff  ̂the Joint Finance Committee made approximately 16 changes to 
the budgets for higher education and public welfare. This number increased to 29 the 
next year when the Committee had the services of a hscal staff Likewise, the dollar 
changes made in both the higher education and public welfare budgets changed 
signifcantly with the addition of a fiscal staff (Rosenthal 1974, 158-159). Rosenthal 
reports that after the committee had the support of legislative Gscal analysts, agency 
behavior and executive budget ofBce behavior changed where
[ajgency representatives check with hscal analysts prior to 
formulating budget requests. They take greater pains than previously 
in preparing and justifying agency proposals in order to minimize their 
vulnerability. The behavior of the governor and his budget advisors has 
also changed. Even before executive budget hearings, the Bureau of 
Management cautions agencies to cut items in anticipation of legislative 
staff scrutiny. During executive hearings, the governor's advisors 
devote particular attention to those areas most likely to receive critical 
staff examination.
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These Sndings are supported by research in New York state showing similar 
behavioral changes in agency personnel, governor's staS^ and executive budget 
oSBcials after the creation of the legislative hscal ofhce (Balutis 1975b).
Two recent surveys of legislators at the state level provide evidence of the 
increasing legislative staff influence over the past two decades (Carey, Niemi and 
Powell 1998; Moncrief^ Thompson, and Kurtz 1996). In research to ascertain changes 
in the influence structure of state legislatures, Moncrief et al., reported " A substantial 
m^oiity of respondents perceived that the influence of media and committee staff had 
grown during their time in the legislature. In both cases, well over half of all 
respondents felt the inGuence of these two groups had increased some or a great deal" 
(Moncrief et al. 1998, 60). This research also found that legislators viewed the 
increase in staff influence "as positive and necessary" to deal with complex issues and 
the need for information (Moncrief et al. 1996, 60-61). Similarly, Carey, Niemi, and 
Powell (1998) report an increase in staff influence in term limited states.
In a study of executive budget staff at the state level. Gosling (1987) 
researched staff influence on gubernatorial budget policy by measuring influence in 
two ways. First, he analyzed the perceptions of influence by staff and key budget 
actors. Second, Gosling analyzed the congruence between staff recommendations and 
gubernatorial acceptance of those recommendations. This research consisted of a 
three state case study where executive budget analysts, budget ofBce team leaders, and 
agency directors were interviewed. The Gosling study found that executive budget 
analysts clearly believed that they influence the budget process. This perception of 
influence was consistent with responses from both the team leaders and agency
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directors. This perception of influence is supported by the high congruence between 
analyst appropriation recommendations and the executive budget ofhce 
recommendations and final executive recommendations on the budget.
Also building upon the Patterson model presented earlier in this chapter, 
Weissert and Weissert (2000) posit that influence is a combination of three key stafT 
functions: agenda setting, proposal shaping, and information gathering. As did 
DeGregorio, health policy staSers were asked to identic and provide examples of 
agenda setting, proposal shaping, and information gathering. All staff interviewed 
reported that gathering information was their primary function. All analysts, 
therefore, contributed to this aspect of influence. However, less staff provided 
specif c examples of agenda setting and proposal shaping.
Weissert and Weissert further attempt to unravel the factors associated with 
influence. They identify two institutional constraints that may impact influence: staff 
hiring practices and committee chair experience. The researchers hypothesized that 
committee chairs with the ability to hire staff would result in an increase in staff 
influence. Likewise, experienced committee chairs would also result in an increase in 
staff influence due to the increased level of trust between analyst and committee chair. 
This fve state study largely supported the researchers' hypothesis that the 
institutional factor of chair experience is a good predictor of trust. Analysts reported 
higher levels of trust more often with experienced chairs. Further, those analysts 
reporting being trusted by the committee chair also provided examples in the areas of 
information gathering, agenda setting, and proposal shaping that lead the researchers 
to view them as the most influential in this study. Therefore, the institutional factor of
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chair experience impacts trust, which is important to the level of influence. This study 
is consistent with other research on the importance of trust between legislator and stafT 
(DeGregorio 1995; Guston, Jones, and Branscomb 1997). For instance, Guston et 
al., found that one of the most signihcant factors in the use of technical information 
and analyses developed by staG" was the characteristic of trust where members are 
more likely to be persuaded by a piece of information if it comes Gom a trusted staG 
member.
In one of the few studies speciGcally dedicated to legislative Gscal staG at the 
state level. Snow and Clarke (1999) discover that influence varies at diGerent points in 
the budget process depending upon the organizational structure of the Gscal staG 
Table 2.2 shows that bipartisan committee staG (staG who work for the appropriations 
committee in either the House or Senate chamber) and partisan caucus staG most oGen 
inGuence committee chairs and party leaders during committee and caucus 
negotiations. On the other hand, institutional leaders and facilitators, which are 
typically nonpartisan, centralized Gscal oGces, are most likely to be inGuential prior to 
and during budget hearings.
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Table 2.2
Staff Type and Primary Point of Staff Influence
Staff Type Primary Point of Influence
Bipartisan Committee 
Facilitators




Brief party caucus and party leaders, support conference 
committee negotiadons
InstituGonal Leaders Committee and subcommittee hearings. Agenda setters 
through presentaGon of preferences.
InstituGonal Facilitators PreparaGon of infbrmaGon fbundaGon for budget hearings.
Source: Adapted &om Snow and Clarke (1999,15).
The literature just presented provides a range of research on the influence of 
legislative stafTin all 6cets of the public policy process, as well as more precise 
measurements of inSuence primarily using typologies and hierarchies of services. 
However, little research has been conducted specihcally on hscal analysts operating in 
the legislative branch.
Research also seeks to understand the impact of stafT at diGerent stages of the 
policy cycle: agenda setting, proposal shaping and policy formation, and policy 
adoption. The following discussion explores staG influence in the policy process as 
information gatherers, agenda setters, problem identiGers, proposal shapers, and as a 
direct influence on the Gnal voting decision.
StaG as Information Gatherers, Agenda Setters, and Proposal Shapers
Patterson (1970a, 1970b) provides one of the Grst conceptualizations of staG 
inGuence. Patterson identiGes four staG capabilities that reveal the degree to which
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committee staG"participate in the legislative process: intelligence (providing legislators 
with information), innovation (presenting legislators with policy alternatives), 
integration (the degree to which the staGs are internally cohesive and cooperative with 
each other, the governor's staG"and executive agency staG) and inGuence. InGuence is 
a function of the other three capabiliGes. It represents the ability to provide and 
analyze information, draG legislation, and give advice or policy options. Patterson's 
conceptualization has been used as the Gamework for future studies on legislative 
StaG!
Balutis (1975b) uses the Patterson approach in his study of the professional 
staGs of the legislative Gnance commiGees in the New York state legislature. Balutis 
found that the New York staG" contributes to the budget process in all four ways 
(intelligence, innovation, integration, and inGuence). Legislative staGers perform a 
variety of functions that direct and Glter the Gow of information to members and this 
makes staGF inGuential in the process. By scheduling meetings and testimony, tracking 
biUs, analyzing proposed bill changes, drafting ^propriation biGs, and oGering policy 
alternatives and options, staG" cany out the intelligence and innovation functions.
StaGs fulfill the integration function by acting as infbrmaGon conduits between the 
execuGve and his staG  ̂agency personnel, and legislators. By engaging in these 
activiGes, Balutis argues that staGers are inGuential in the process.
The policy analysis and evaluaGon literature also sheds light on staG inGuence 
by investigating whether legislators use infbrmaGon and analyses prepared by 
legislaGve staG These studies Gnd that legislative staGers are key players in the 
coUecGon of infbrmaGon about public issues and in the fbrmulaGon of proposals to
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address those issues (Gray and Lowery 2000; Guston, Jones, and Branscomb 1997; 
Hammond 1990; Kingdon 1984; Whiteman 1995; Sabatier and Whiteman 1985).
At the Congressional level, Kingdon's 1984 study of the U.S. Congress 
identiGes the key participants in identifying the problems for study and in the 
development of altemadves for solving those problems. Two different groups emerge 
G"om Kingdon's study. As visible participants, the president, Congress, party leaders, 
high level poliGcal appointees, and the media were most inGuential in the problem 
identiGcation stage. In the second stage of the policy process \\iiere policy alternatives 
are generated, Kingdon found that the invisible participants, career civil servants, 
congressional staGers, and policy specialists outside of government, were more 
inGuenGal.
The importance of the "invisible cluster" identiGed by Kingdon is underscored 
by Whiteman's (1995) enterprise perspective on congressional decision-making. An 
enterprise refers to a member, her personal staG  ̂and the appropriate committee staG". 
This enterprise deals with a variety of representatives Gom interest groups, support 
agencies, executive agencies, state and local governments, constituents, and other 
StaG It is through this interplay with these interested parties, that staGers play a 
primary role in gathering information needed to shape legislative alternatives and in 
formulating an enterprise position on an issue. Whiteman identiGes four information 
search patterns typically used by staG based on the scope of the search objective and 
the range of sources consulted. Each search pattern includes a diGerent network of 
people or groups. Some search patterns are very narrow, while others incorporate a 
wide variety of group input. Whiteman concludes that congressional staGers are
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înBuential as disseminators of information. They seek out diGerent information 
sources with each search pattern and, thus, diGerent voices and perspectives are heard 
and valued when members of congress formulate proposals and make decisions.
The critical function of staG as information disseminators has changed in recent 
years argues Hammond (1990). Hammond Gnds that congressional staGers have 
increased their issue expertise and this has lead to increased opportunities to play a 
signiGcant role in the legislative process. "They [staG] Glter inGarmaGon and their 
expert judgment sets parameters for decision making and determines the decision 
details. Also, they serve as infbrmaGon sources for members and communicaGon 
links between staGk and members" (Hammond 1990, 64). One might argue that 
staG& at the state level are in a better position to set the agenda and act as infbrmaGon 
links due to insGtuGonal constraints such as shorter legislaGve sessions, term limits, 
and higher turnover in general.
Research at the state level supports the importance of staG as infbrmaGon 
disseminators. In an 11 state study of legislators, legislaGve staG ranked as the most 
important source fbr technical infbrmaGon and analysis in six of the 11 states, with 
execuGve agencies coming in at a close second (Guston, et al. 1997).
The work of Gray and Lowery (2000) upholds previous studies as they fbund 
that Minnesota legislators rated legislaGve staG high as sources of infbrmaGon fbr 
legislators, parGcular in the policy fbrmulation stage. Just as BaluGs reported some 
twenty-Gve years ago, staGers are important infbrmaGon conduits. Gray and Lowery 
fbund that staGkrs rely on a vanety of sources of policy experGse, including execuGve
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agency ofBcials, legislative study commissions, and what is happening in other states 
to disseminate information to legislators.
The previous discussion indicates that stags at both the congressional and state 
level are important information sources fbr legislatures. Influence occurs through the 
information gathered, the sources used, and how it is presented to legislators.
Staff in the Policy Adoption Stage
While studies show that staff can be important actors in providing information 
and in developing alternatives fbr legislative action, less research finds a strong staff 
impact on the actual voting decision of legislators. The voting decision of legislators 
has been a subject of research in Congress (Matthews and Stimson 1975; Kingdon 
1981) and in the state legislature (Hurwitz 1988; Mooney 1991; Patterson 1996; 
Songer et al, 1985; Wahlke et al, 1962). A wide variety of actors have the potential 
to shape the vote choice of legislators: constituents, party leaders, legislative 
colleagues, lobbyists, and staff This research shows that at the congressional level, 
staffs do not appear to be major influences upon the vote choice of members. At the 
state level, the evidence is mixed regarding the impact of staff on the voting decisions 
of legislators.
A study by John Kingdon (1989) on congressional floor voting in the U.S. 
House of Representatives indicates that staff is less of an inGuence on the direct voting 
decisions of members of congress than perceived by scholars and political observers.
In comparison to other key actors (constituents, administration, interest groups, party 
leaders, and fellow congressmen) potentially influencing members of Congress, staff
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was the lowest reported influence on decisions by members of Congress. Kingdon 
posits that either stafTinfluence is extremely subtle, or it is present only in those areas 
where the member has a particular interest (202). However, Kingdon did 5nd that 
staGF importance increases with less senior members of the House of Representatives. 
Kingdon (1989,202) assumes that fbr junior members
[i]t takes some period of time fbr congressmen to develop either 
habitual patterns of voting or comprehensive sets of fellow 
congressmen to whom to use fbr cues; in that period of feeling one's 
way, the congressman uses his staO" more than he does after a few 
years in the House. Apparently, here because of political uncertainty 
back home, the congressman will consult with his stafT more 
6equently, in order to check the possible political ramiScations of 
his vote. Congressmen &om safer districts, on the other hand, ^ p ea r 
to have less of this sort of problem.
Kingdon acknowledges that his observations in the late 1960s, if done today, 
might yield difkrent results. With increased staST and number of floor votes, it is likely 
that stafT influence on floor voting decisions has also increased, although Kingdon 
does not believe stafTto be a primary influence on floor voting decisions. Kingdon's 
study finds that fellow congressmen and constituents are the most influential 
individuals on the floor voting decisions of U.S. House members.
Likewise, Songer et al. (1985) and Hurwitz (1988) find little support fbr staff 
influence on the vote choice at the state legislative level. These state studies report far 
more reliance on the personal values and opinions of individual members as the most 
significant determinant of the voting decision. In a more recent study, Mooney 
(1991) finds that "insiders" contribute more to the roll-call voting decisions of 
members than "outsiders" in the three state legislatures studied. Legislators'
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colleagues and legislative stafT compose the "insiders" \\dnle the media, individuals 
&om other units of government, and academics represent the "outsiders." Mooney 
argues that insiders contribute to roll call voting because the information provided by 
this group is simplified and easily accessible to the member. In the development of 
legislation, Mooney Gnds that outsiders were more important than the insiders arguing 
that in writing bills, legislators have the time to use the complex and difGcult 
information &om outside sources (Mooney 1991, 451).
Much of what has been presented derives 6om work at the congressional level. 
Little work has been speciGcally carried out on state legislative fiscal staff This 
literature presents evidence that staGs are important sources of information fbr decision 
makers. Therefore, the staff function of collecting, summarizing, and disseminating 
information makes them influential. However, influence may occur in other ways as 
well. Influence can be indirect and it can be difGcult to detect. It is the subtle nature 
of influence that we now turn.
Manner of Influence
Despite both anecdotal and empirical evidence of staff influence and power, 
what speciGc impact do these unelected individuals have on legislative deliberations 
and outcomes? Because stafGa"s do not vote or sponsor legislation, items that are 
quite visible fbr measuring the activity of legislators, legislative staff influence is a 
difGcult concept to assess and quantil^. Patterson (1970a) defnes influence as "the 
powers behind the scene." In most cases, legislative staff work does indeed occur 
"behind the scenes." Some staff functions can be highly visible such as written
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documents analyzing agency requests and executive recommendations, memos and 
letters providing information on a state program or activity, presentations in 
committee meetings, and bills or amendments drafted on behalf of legislators. Beyond 
the more recognizable duties and functions of staf^ there may be more subtle displays 
of analyst influence on the decision making of legislators. These displays could take 
the form of preparing questions fbr members to ask of agency personnel during budget 
hearings, keeping members informed of a particular issue of interest, or ordering 
agenda items in a particular 6shion. Little is known about these oAen unseen or 
undocumented sources of influence fbr legislative Gscal analysts.
However, there is an entire body of research on agency behavior and agency 
strategies fbr increasing budget success. Several budgeting scholars have identiGed 
"acquisitiveness" as one strategy used by agencies to increase budget success.
Agencies that are highly acquisitive, or those that ask fbr large budget increases, are 
more successful in acquiring large increases over their previous year's budget than 
agencies that do not exhibit acquisitive behavior (Bozeman 1977; Le Loup and 
Moreland 1978; Sharkansky 1968; Thompson 1987). Wildavsky (1984) has also 
identiGed some general strategies used by agencies to build support fbr their agency's 
budget request. These strategies include the ability of the agency to develop an acGve 
clientele in order to mobilize support fbr the agency and the development of conGdence 
and trust of other budget actors. Budget decisions by elected ofBcials oAen based on 
the judgments of agency administrators. These judgments are more likely to be 
accepted if the elected oGScials have conGdence and trust in the agency oGBcials. Other 
scholars report that agency budget success derives Aom establishing good relations
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with key budget actors including the legislature and legislative stafF (Duncombe and 
Kinney 1987). Finally, agencies also use a variety of strategies to respond to cuts, 
reforms, and the initiation of new programs (Kettl 1992; Levine 1978; Mikesell 1995; 
Rubin 1985; Schick 1973).
The Weissert and Weissert (2000) study of health policy staEF reveals some 
speciGc strategies used by stafT to influence the agenda setting stage of policy making. 
For instance, one policy staSer reported using an intern to research issues that might be 
of importance to members. The staffer would then disseminate this information and 
present possible problems and solutions to legislators. Other staffers report "shopping" 
an idea around to see if legislators are interested in pursuing it. The educational activity 
is one that Weissert and Weissert fbund quite &equently among staff! Some staff 
report using workshops to where legislators and experts discuss issues, or attending a 
conference on a particular issue and then informing legislators about that issue 
(Weissert and Weissert 2000,1137-1139).
Factors Conditioning the Influence of Legislative Fiscal Analysts
The study of legislative f  seal analysts is hampered by a multitude of problems 
due to the vast array of organizational and structural arrangements. "It is probably 
safe to say there is more variation between state legislatures than any other institutions 
o f state government " (Hamm and Moncrief 1999, 144). The presence of term limits, 
state legislative professionalism, various staff arrangements and size, and 
gubernatorial-legislative relationships are just a few of the variables that must be 
considered when studying legislative fiscal staff. As with all legislative staff  ̂fiscal
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stafT are also constrained by the organizational setting in which they work. StafT 
cannot sponsor legislation or vote and the norm of anonymity often prevents them 
&om playing a public part in the decision-making process (Light 1992; Bisnow 1990; 
Patterson 1970a). Therefore, studying legislative hscal analyst influence is difGcult 
due to the nature of analyst work, their subtle role in the budget process, and the 
diversity of the 50 states. Several of these factors are discussed below as well as their 
potential to impact the inGuence of legislative Gscal analysts.
Legislative Pro&ssionalism of State Legislatures
Not all legislatures are equally endowed with legislaGve capacity due to 
diGEering levels of professionalism among state legislatures. Hamm and Moncrief 
(1999) categorize all 50 stale legislatures based upon the dif&rences in session length, 
size of legislative operations, and salary. There are substantial differences between the 
states in regard to these items. Some state legislatures such as California and New 
York meet almost year-round, much like Congress, and employ several hundred 
stafkrs. At the other end of the spectrum, legislatures such as North Dakota, 
Wyoming, New Mexico, and Utah meet only in session fbr a few months each year. 
According to Hamm and Moncrief) nine states are categorized as professional 
legislatures with nearly year-long sessions, high pay and large staffs while 16 states are 
citizen legislatures with relaGvely low legislator salary, short legislaGve sessions, and 
small session staSs. The m^onty of states (25) 611 somewhere between the 
professional and citizen legislature and are referred to as hybrid legislatures (Hamm 
and Moncrief 1999, 145).
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According to Theileman (1994), as a legislature becomes more professional so 
does their stafT support. Larger, more professional and specialized staSs, therefore, 
are likely to be fbund in the "professional" legislatures. An argument can be made 
that the more professional and specialized stafT become, the more influence they have 
over the development of budget policy.
Gubernatorial - Legislative Relationships
The relationship between the governor and the legislature in the budget process 
impacts the duties and roles of Gscal analysts, and potentially, their influence in the 
process. Clynch and Lauth (1991) divide states into three categories of gubernatorial 
-  legislative relations based upon constitutional language and statutes outlining the 
responsibilities of each branch in the budget process. In legislative dominant states, 
both branches receive agency budget requests simultaneously, thereby giving 
legislative fiscal staff more time to review agency requests than in those states where 
agency requests are submitted to the legislature when the executive budget is 
submitted. Texas is a legislative dominant state. The Texas Legislative Budget Board 
(LBB) has a large fiscal staff that develops revenue forecasts and prepares budget 
recommendations fbr the LBB. These activities are typically the responsibility o f the 
executive branch in other states. In Texas, the legislative budget drives legislative 
deliberation, not the executive budget.
In executive dominant states, however, the legislature is at an infbrmation 
disadvantage as legislators do not receive copies of agency budget requests. The 
National Conference of State Legislatures identifies eight states where the legislature
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never receives agency budget requests (Grooters and Eckl 1998). Governors present 
the budget document and this is the starting point fbr legislative deliberation. In 
executive dominant states, governors may also have strong veto powers as well as the 
primary responsibility fbr revenue fbrecasting.
Some states St the mixed state model where the governor's budget is the 
starting point fbr the legislature, but legislators and stafF receive agency requests and 
recommendations. Unlike executive-dominant states, legislative staGs have the 
opportunity to review, analyze, and disseminate infbrmation to legislators. Some 
legislative staGs have longer periods of time to review agency requests than others.
As discussed earlier in this chapter the receipt of agency budget requests by the 
legislature varies Gom state to state, with some 33 legislatures receiving the requests 
before the executive budget is prepared and the remaining states receiving the requests 
aGer execuGve budget preparaGon or not at all (Grooters and Eckl 1998).
Therefbre, the consGtuGonal and statutory powers of the legislature regarding 
the budget process may impact the duties, roles, and inGuence of Gscal staG in that 
process. LegislaGve staG may be more inGuential in the development of budget policy 
in a legislaGve-dominant state. In a legislative-dominant state, the legislature provides 
Gscal analysts with the authonty to make recommendaGons that could lead to higher 
levels of inGuence compared to Gscal staGs with no such authonty.
Term Limits
Term limits are currently in place in 17 states (NaGonal Conference of State 
Legislatures 2002a) .̂  One consequence of term limits is the loss of expenenced
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legislators. This loss of expertise and knowledge of the legislative process as well as 
state programs and services may cause a power shiA toward other actors. In those 
states with legislative term limits, it is expected that Ascal stafF may have more 
influence due to the inexperience of term-limited legislators. Research indicates that 
in term-limited legislatures, power shifts to legislative stafF and sometimes to 
committee chairs (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). An ongoing study by the 
National Conference of State Legislatures Gnds that legislative stafF report that they 
exert more influence in the legislative process as a result of term limits (NCSL 2000). 
In some of the early research on stafF influence (Patterson 1970a, 1970b), higher levels 
of influence were associated with inexperienced committee chairmen or junior 
members who are just learning the ropes. From this body of research one can argue 
that term limits reduces the knowledge of members, thus increasing stafF influence.
However, there is a growing body of literature presenting a diGerent view of 
the impact of term limits with regard to the influence o f legislative staff Some 
scholars argue that term limits will reduce the trust between legislators and staGF where 
the member may be more prone to get infbrmation and advice from sources other than 
StafF (Weberg 1999; Weissert and Weissert 2000). And as previous work fbund 
(DeGregorio 1995), committee chairs are more likely to delegate authority to 




Since the late 1940s, the trend for states has been to move &om biennial 
budgeting to annual budgeting. Currently 30 states operate on an annual budget cycle, 
11 states have a biennial enactment of two annual budgets, and the remaining states 
have a biennial enactment of a true biennial budget (Grooters and Eckl 1998). 
Although most states budget annually, Arizona and Connecticut have recmtly returned 
to biennial budgeting (General Accounting OfBce 2000). Proponents of biennial 
budgeting argue that it ûees up time greatly needed to undertake more legislative 
oversight and agency financial management and program eSectiveness. Those 
opposing biennial budgets cite the difBculty in revenue fbrecasting and the inability of 
biennial budgets to respond to changing economic or programmatic conditions as the 
two m^or pitfalls (Sutberry 1998). While the conflict over the efBcacy of annual 
versus biennial budgeting continues, the budget cycle itself may be an important factor 
in legislative staff influence. It is expected that Gscal analyst influence increases in 
those states with biennial budgets. Snell (2000) indicates that biennial budgeting 
reduces the legislators' familiarity with budgets, therefbre increasing the need to rely 
on staff knowledge on the budget. It is also argued that in biennial budget states, 
governors are thought to have the edge in both planning and implementing state policy, 
and programs (Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001). However, there does not appear to 
be a link between fbrmal gubernatorial powers and the budget cycle (Snell 1995). If 
legislators have less knowledge about the budget or if they perceive the governor as 
having the edge in the process, they may rely more on their legislative Gscal staff to 
provide infbrmation and keep them infbrmed on budgetary matters during the interim.
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StafT Duties and Functions
StafT duties may also determine the degree of infuence. Previous research on 
Gscal StafT work generally describes job duties and functions of the Gscal ofGce but 
little is known whether those duties and functions are linked to dif&ring degrees of 
inGuence. While most Gscal staf& are responsible fbr a common set of duGes and 
functions such as providing general Gscal and programmatic infbrmation to legislators, 
reviewing and analyzing agency requests and/or executive recommendaGons, and 
stafBng Gscal committees, other staffs go beyond these common funcGons. Some stafT 
are involved in more policy onented funcGons such as the provision of stafT budget 
recommendaGons and budgetary advice. Therefbre, some stafT duGes may be more 
conducive to promoting inGuence than others. It is expected that analysts providing 
budget recommendaGons are more inGuenGal than their counterparts who do not.
Size of Fiscal StafF
Just as there is variation in staff duties and functions, legislative fiscal staff size 
varies as well. Some states have large Gscal staffs such as Califbmia's OfBce of 
LegislaGve Analyst and Texas' LegislaGve Budget Board. Other state legislatures 
may have as liGle as three or fbur Gscal analysts serving the entire legislature. The size 
o f staff may play a role in the degree of inGuence. It is expected that the larger the 
staff) the more inGuenGal the legislaGve analyst. Larger Gscal staffs may give the 
individual analyst the opportunity to specialize in one or two policy areas. She can 
more easily become an expert in those areas as opposed to an analyst in a smaller 
ofGce. There is at least anecdotal evidence to suggest that staffers with a more narrow
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policy or program interest may wield more influence (Hammond 1990). The analyst 
in a small ofBce may be responsible fbr many agencies and policy areas, thus taking on 
a generalist role.
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Tenure
In addition to institutional and organizational factors, individual 5 seal analyst 
characteristics may also alter influence. Legislative Gscal analysts with longer tenure in 
their position may have more inGuence due to their insGtutional memory and expertise. 
The literature on bureaucrats (Rourke 1984) indicates that bureaucratic power results 
6om institutional memory and experGse. Bureaucrats have much longer tenure than 
elected oGGcials and high-level appointees. Specialized knowledge, coupled with 
longevity, make bureaucrats important actors in public policy decisions. Researchers 
studying legislative stafF draw the same conclusions (Malbin 1980; Rosenthal 1991; 
Weissert and Weissert 2000). In fact, Weissert and Weissert (2000) argue that fiscal 
staffs may be more influential than other types of staff because of their detailed 
knowledge of the budget not oAen shared by others. Therefbre, it is asserted that 
legislaGve fiscal analysts with longer tenure are perceived to be more inGuenGal than 
less-tenured analysts.
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Contact with Key Budget Actors
LegislaGve fiscal analyst contact with key budget actors may also increase 
inGuence. Thurmaier and Gosling (1996) in their study of execuGve budget analysts 
fbund that budget analysts who AequenGy interact with the governor in various 
bnefings and meetings are more likely to present an independent and objecGve analysis
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of the agencies under their purview as opposed to simply acting as "number 
crunchers." Thurmaier and Gosling hypothesize that this Sequent contact makes the 
analyst more comfbrtable in that relationship and thus gives the analyst the ability to 
present independent analyses. Studies of congressional staff also indicate that a long 
and loyal relationship between staffer and legislator increases the likelihood that the 
legislator delegates more important work to the staf&r (DeGregorio 1994).
Little infbrmation is known about the kinds of relationships 6)und between 
legislative Gscal analysts and other budget actors. Are there diSerent patterns of 
contact among legislative Gscal analysts within states and between states that impact 
these relaGonships? What are the relationships that legislative Gscal analysts have with 
agency personnel and their execuGve budget ofBce counterparts? How visible are 
legislaGve Gscal analysts in the budget process. Do they attend committee meetings or 
are they present in the House or Senate chamber when appropnaGon bills are debated? 
It is asserted that legislaGve Gscal analysts with G"equent contact with budget actors 
are perceived as more inGuential in the budget process. It is assumed that legislaGve 
Gscal analysts with high visibility in the budget process will be perceived as more 
inGuenGal in that process.
Legislator Tenure in OfBce
Individual legislator charactenstics can play a factor in analyst inGuence as 
weG. LegislaGve Gscal analyst inGuence may increase as the tenure of the legislator on 
the appropnaGons committee decreases or as tenure as chair decreases. Research 
shows an inexperienced chair may rely more on experienced staff than more seasoned
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legislators. This is supported by a study of congressional staff DeGregorio (1995) 
fbund that as congressional committee chairs accumulate experience, they also develop 
more independence &om the staff
State legislatures typically experience high turnover. While there has been a 
gradual decline in state legislative turnover in the past 30 years, membership changes 
have remained relatively high (Patterson 1996). According to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, when calculating the percentage of members serving 
in both chambers in 1997, who were not there in 1987, the overall turnover was 72 
percent in senate chambers and 84 percent in house chambers. Turnover is high 
among all legislatures, but higher in citizen legislatures than more professional 
legislatures (National Conference of State Legislatures 1997). Due to these trends 
and term limits, less experienced state legislators will comprise the ranks of state 
legislatures even more so in the future. The interesting question is whether these new 
legislators turn to legislative staff fbr infbrmation and/or advice on state legislative 
matters or get their infbrmation f"om other sources.
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Discretion
The literature on legislative staff at both the federal and state level points to the 
linkage between staff roles and the legislator and/or committee view of their function. 
"The goals and orientations of the committee chairmen and most members are major 
&ctors in shaping staff orientation and activity" (Hammond 1985, 285).
The literature also provides some indication that the amount of discretion given 
to analysts by legislators impacts their influence. "Legislators empower their
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employees. The ofSceholders do this when they act on the advice of their stafF 
members and when they give them or their suggestions a voice at the negotiating table. 
To understand the behavior of congressional aids, therefbre, it is necessary to view 
them in relation to their bosses" (DeGregorio 1994, 2).
In a study of congressional stafT of the Senate Finance Committee, Price 
(1971) fbund that stafT roles mirrored the committee's main task of simply reviewing 
and understanding proposals. The committee function rein&rced stafT behavior of 
gathering and reviewing infbrmation as opposed to a more proactive role. 
"Professionals" are nonpartisan, with neutral competence, they use their expertise to 
analyze and present alternatives; their orientation is reactive." However, other 
committees permit the stafT to search fbr new initiatives and to push proposals; 
constraints exist, but limits are wide. The "pure policy entrepreneurs" are activist, 
partisan, and "committed to a continual search fbr policy gaps and opportunities. 
Finally, "mixed" entrepreneurs serve committees with somewhat less "slack"; aides 
suggest and push proposals, but with less area for maneuver.
Further support fbr this linkage can be fbund in later research on the personal 
staSs of Congress. Malbin (1981) fbund that the way a member uses his or her stafT 
determines the kind and degree of legislative initiatives proposed by staff Some 
members keep their stafT under tight rein; while other members let their staff use their 
technical expertise aggressively to criticize alternatives and make recommendations. 
Similarly, Weissert and Weissert (2000), in their study of staff at the state level, argued 
that staff power is only as great as the legislators want it to be. Therefbre, some staffs 
are more "entrepreneurial" based upon the amount of discretion given to them by
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members or committees. It is expected that analysts with more discretion have more 
influence in state budget policy.
Variables Not Under Study
In addition to the above review of variables that will provide the basis for the 
model used in this study, there are other concepts and variables in the literature that 
are not a component of the current research.
One of the most recent studies on legislative Gscal analysts describes and 
classiSes the budgeting behavior of legislative Bscal analysts in an effort to compare 
this behavior with that of executive budget analysts (Willoughby and Finn 1996). 
Legislative budget analysts in nine southern states with primary responsibility for 
making budget recommendations to the legislature were studied. The rationale for 
making budget recommendations was the focus of the study. This research found that 
unlike executive budget analysts, legislative budget analysts are more likely to consider 
agency workload and efficiency of operations as important cues for making 
recommendations and less likely to rely upon a single political factor as the driver of 
budget recommendations. In contrast, executive budget analysts were more likely to 
rely heavily on the gubernatorial agenda when making recommendations while 
legislative Bscal analysts considered a broader range of political actors including 
legislators' agenda, agency administrators, and the public's support of programs as 
they prepared the budget recommendations. This leads Willoughby and Finn to 
conclude that legislative budget analysts are more objective than executive budget 
analysts in making recommendations. The authors posit that while executive budget
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analysts have one boss, the chief executive, legislative analysts must respond to many 
legislators and a variety of interests.
The current study does not assess the rationale used for making budget 
recommendations. First, some legislative Sscal analysts do not make any type of 
budget recommendation to the legislature. Second, budget actors do many things 
other than make budget recommendations. The purpose of the current study is to get 
a broader picture of the duties, roles, and relationships of legislative Sscal analysts.
This study does not explore the influence in the budget process of other actors 
such as legislative Sscal ofBce directors, agency personnel, and executive budget 
analysts. Although these individuals are other key actors in the development of budget 
policy, the focus of this research is the legislative hscal analyst. It should also be 
noted that this study focuses on the roles, relationships, and influence of nonpartisan 
hscal staff Partisan staff may play difkrent roles and have diSerent relationships with 
their bosses and agency personnel. A comparison of nonpartisan and partisan staff 
should be the subject of future research.
Purpose of the Current Research
The purpose of this research is to Gil a gap in the literature by assessing the 
duties, roles, relationships, and influence of legislative Gscal analysts in the state budget 
process. In order to accomplish this, four broad questions are addressed. First, who 
legislative f  seal analysts and what are the primary duties and types of information 
provided to legislators? Second, what are their roles and relationships with legislators, 
agency personnel, and executive budget analysts? Third, are legislative Gscal analysts
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influential in the state budget process? Do they perceive themselves as influential and 
do other budget actors perceive the same level of influence? Finally, are there factors 
that condition influence? Are there diSerences in reported influence and why? These 
questions are crucial to understanding what legislative ûscal analysts do and the 
opportunities that exist for their influence on budget outcomes.
Three aspects of previous research prompt the current study. First, two 
previous studies measure stafF influence by relying on the perceptions of influence 
&om legislative Gscal staf^ legislators, and agency personnel (Balutis 1975) and 
executive budget sta@) executive budget ofGce team leaders, and agency directors 
(Gosling 1987). There is a need to update work done in the 1970s on the perceptions 
of legislative hscal analyst influence in light of important institutional changes. The 
advent of term limits in 17 states (National Conference of State Legislatures 2000) 
poses interesting questions for staff involvement in the legislative process. Also, after 
decades of legislative stafSng increases, the recent trend of hiring ft-eezes and staff 
reductions in some state legislatures has marked a new trend for the legislative staff 
organization (Weberg 1993). Further, evidence of heightened partisan competition in 
state legislatures has made legislators more responsive to the needs and requests of 
their districts (Rosenthal 1998). According to Weberg (1997, 3) the members of 
legislatures today
. ..will likely care much more about things political than those 
institutional. These legislators will have a narrower policy focus and 
limited legislative experience. They won't know the legislative process 
and its traditions very well, and they won't have time or the inclination 
to learn them-especially in term limited states.
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With this new breed of legislator, stafT will likely become more and more the 
repository of institutional memory. Whether this translates into more influence for 
legislative staff remains uncertain.
The current research also seeks to depart &om previous research on executive 
budget analysts by expanding the groups interviewed. Gosling's (1987) executive 
budget oSSce study interviewed executive budget analysts, executive budget ofBce 
team leaders, and agency directors. In an effort to get a broader perspective on 
legislative hscal analyst duties, roles, relationships, and influence; data &om interviews 
with legislators, agency directors, agency f  seal ofhcers, agency legislative liaisons, and 
executive budget analysts is collected.
Second, this study adds to previous research in its attempt to clari^ the factors 
conditioning influence, and to do this specihcally regarding legislative fiscal analysts. 
Previously studied factors include organization and mission of the Gscal ofBce or staff  ̂
chair experience, ability of chair to hire and fire staf^ and analyst experience. This 
study adds to this list of factors by including a variety of political, institutional, and 
individual analyst, and legislator characteristics.
Third, the current research provides a guide for future research by identifying 
research questions. For example, few comparisons have been made between 
executive budget analysts and legislative budget analysts in terms of their duties, 
relationships with state agencies, education of analysts, and professional background. 
Comparing the two groups on these factors may provide insight as to whether 
legislative Gscal staffs are similar to their executive budget counterparts thus preparing
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the way for Aiture research on whether legislative fiscal analysts use similar decision­
making rationalities as executive budget analysts.^
Design of the Study
Budget processes and formats, committee structures, staff organizational 
arrangements, and state political environment vary substantially 6om state to state, 
thus making the study of legislative f  seal analysts at the state level a daunting task. 
Nonetheless, the present research is a case study of four states with varying political, 
economic, and institutional characteristics.
Units of Analysis
This exploratory study is based on data collected &om 57 telephone interviews 
with legislative fiscal analysts, legislators involved in budgetary decision making 
including joint budget committee chairs, appropriations committee chairs, 
appropriations subcommittee chairs, executive budget analysts, agency directors, 
agency legislative liaisons, and agency fiscal officers in a sample of state governments 
in the United States: Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, and Maine. These four states are 
used as units of analysis to determine whether varying political and institutional &ctors 
condition the roles, relationships, and influence of legislative fiscal analysts in state 
budget policy. Legislative analysts are units of observation to determine if specific 
individual characteristics condition their roles, relationships, and influence in state 
budget policy. Other key budget actors (joint budget and/or appropriations 
committee, subcommittee chairs, and members; agency personnel; and executive
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budget analysts) are employed as units of observation to gain additional insight on the 
roles, relationships, and influence of legislative hscal analysts.
Model of Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence
Based upon the review of previous literature, several variables are thought to 
be important factors conditioning the influence of legislative hscal analysts in state 
budget policy. Figure 2.2 displays the model used in the present research.
Figure 2.2
Model of Legislative Fiscal Analyst (LFA) Influence
Control Variable:
# Structure of hscal staff ofBce: Nonpartisan
Independent Variables:




# LFA staff size
# LFA contact with budget actors and visibility in budget 
process
# Level of discretion given LFA
Legislator inexperience or lack of knowledge
# Biennial budget cycle
# Term limits
# Tenure of legislator
Dependent Variable:
State budget policy influence
# Reported degree of influence by LFAs and other key actors
# Rankings of LFA influence compared to other key actors
# Congruence between LFA appropriation recommendations 
and hnal legislative appropriations
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Case Selection Criteria
All of the legislative hscal analysts in each of the four states work in 
nonpartisan hscal staGF ofGces or nonpartisan joint committee stafT ofBces.
Nonpartisan Gscal staSs were chosen for this study because they represent the most 
common organizational structure for providing hscal services to legislators. 
Nonpartisan hscal stafT ofBces operate in 28 states providing hscal services to all 
members in both chambers (Donlan and Weberg 1999). The remaining states use 
committee staf^ caucus staS  ̂or agencies within individual chambers to provide hscal 
services to legislators.
At the time of this study, the selected states represented a variety of political 
and institutional variables. Arizona and Kansas had Republican governors and 
predominantly Republican legislatures. Colorado's Democratic governor operated 
with a Republican controlled House chamber and Democratic Senate chamber. Maine 
had an Independent governor and a predominantly Democratic legislature. Therefore, 
the latter two states operated under a divided government. Legislators are term 
limited in Arizona, Colorado, and Maine with Maine experiencing the impact of term 
limits for the longest length of time. Maine's term limits took eSect in both chambers 
in 1996 (National Conference of State Legislatures 2002a).
The enactment of the budget varies with the four states studied. Although all 
four states conduct annual legislative sessions, Arizona and Maine biennially enact two 
annual budgets. Colorado and Kansas develop annual budgets.
Just as the budget cycle varies, so does legislative power in the budget process. 
Of the states under study, the Arizona and Colorado legislatures have signrGcant
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power in the budget process. Both states are referred to as "legislative budget 
states" where the legislature creates its own budget document &om which legislative 
deliberations begin. In contrast, Kansas and Maine are "executive budget states" 
where the executive budget is the primary starting point for legislative deliberations.
In addition to preparing the budget document, the executive branch is also responsible 
for the revenue forecast in Maine. However, in Arizona and Colorado, both the 
executive budget oSGce and the legislative stafT are involved in revenue forecasting. 
Kansas uses consensus forecasting where the legislative hscal ofBce is one of several 
participants (National Conference of State Legislatures 1998).
At the time of the study, all four states were experiencing unforeseen and r^ id  
revenue shortfalls. Spending overruns and lower than expected revenues were 
present in all states except Colorado and Maine. The latter two states experienced 
lower than expected revenues but have been able to keep spending on target. The 
Arizona state legislature held a special session in November of 2001 to address the 
revenue shortfall as well as multiple special sessions during the regular legislative 
session beginning January 2002. The drop in revenue for all four states is signiScant, 
with the worst hscal condition found in Arizona. Medicaid, other health programs, 
and welfare were the culprits of program expenditure overruns in these states as well 
as in most other states experiencing revenue shortfalls and expenditure overruns (Eckl 
and Perez 2001).
StafT duties and size of hscal stafT were also taken into account in the process 
of case selection. In order to assess influence, a variety of states were chosen 
refecting dif&rent levels of stafT functions and duties. For the purposes of this
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research, "level one" staSs make formal budget recommendations to the 
appropriations committee. Arizona and Colorado represent level one staGT. "Level 
two" staSs do not make formal recommendations, but do develop policy options for 
legislators and committees. Kansas represents the "level two" staGs. Finally, Maine 
is a "level three" staG where the primary responsibility is analyzing the executive 
budget and/or agency requests. "Level three" stafk do not provide budget 
recommendations or policy options to legislators and/or committees.
As argued previously, the size of staff may also play a role in the degree of 
influence. Larger staGs may give the individual analysts the opportunity to specialize 
in one or two policy areas. Analysts can more easily become experts in speciGc areas 
as opposed to an analyst in a smaller ofhce. The analyst in a small ofBce may be 
responsible for many agencies and policy areas, thus taking on a generalist role. In 
this study, staff size ranges Gom a high of 23 in Arizona to a low of Gve in Maine. 
These numbers include Gscal analysts responsible for budget review and analysis.
They do not include Gscal ofBce directors or those analysts with duties other than 





Divided Tcnn Annual Biennial StafT
Govenunent limit#* Se#»ion Budget Size**
Level One
Budget Recommendation#
Arizona No Yes Yes Yes 23
Colorado Yes Yes Yes No 15
Level Two 
Policy Option:
Kansas No No Yes No 11
Level Three 
Budget Annlyal# Only
Maine Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
Sources:
Divided government information provided by the National Governor’s Association available at 
http://www.nga.ore/cda/files/GOVLIST2001 .PDF, accessed on July 14,200 land the National Conference of State 
Legislatures available at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/partcompe.cfm7vearseD20Q 1. accessed on July 14,2001. 
Term limit information provided by the National Conference o f State Legislatures available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/states.htm. accessed on July 14,2001. Session and biennial budget 
information provided by Jennifer Grooters and Corina Eckl, 1998.
Notes:
*First year o f impact for Arizona term limits was 2000 in both chambers. First year o f impact for Colorado term limits 
was 1998 in both chambers. First year of impact for Maine term limits was 1996 in both chambers.
** Size o f staff accounts for budget or fiscal analysts responsible for budget analysis. Analysts in the budget or fiscal 
office solely responsible for revenue forecasting or fiscal note preparation were excluded. Size o f staff information 
found at each state’s legislative fiscal office website as o f January 2002.
Operationalization of Variables
Control Variable
All legislative Sscal analysts interviewed work in a nonpartisan, centralized 
ûscal ofBces or a joint committee staff ofGce. Arizona f  seal analysts work for the 
Arizona Joint Legislative Budget Committee, similarly Colorado analysts work for the 
Colorado Joint Budget Committee. Fiscal analysts in Kansas and Maine work for 
Gscal ofBces within a larger legislative staff organization. The nonpartisan.
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Legislative hscal analyst duties are measured as three separate levels: Level 
one represents analysts who develop budget recommendations, level two represents 
analysts who develop policy options, and level three analysts prepare analyses of 
agency requests and executive recommendations. In order to analyze this assertion, 
this current research classiGes stafT duties and Gmctions into three distinct levels. 
"Level one" staSs refer to Gscal analysts working in ofBces that provide budget 
recommendaGons to committees or individual legislators. "Level two" staGs refer to 
offices where all analysts routinely provide budget options or alternatives to individual 
members or committees. "Level three" staffs represent those offices where staffs are 
responsible primarily for analyzing budget requests and providing technical 
information to members and committees. It is expected that legislaGve Gscal analysts 
with the authority to provide the legislature with budget recommendations will be 
perceived to be more inGuenfial than those Gscal analysts who do not provide budget 
recommendations.
LFA Tenure
L%islaGve Gscal analyst tenure is measured as the number of years the analyst 
has occupied his or her position and is a continuous variable ranging Gom 1 to 30
81
years. It is expected that legislative Gscal analysts with longer tenure will be perceived 
as more influential than those legislative Gscal analysts with less tenure.
LFA ExperGse
LegislaGve expertise is measured by the number of agencies the analyst has 
responsibihty for in terms of providing Gscal and programmaGc infbrmaGon, budget 
review and analysis, and budget recommendaGons. It is expected that legislaGve Gscal 
analysts who have fewer agencies will have more inGuence than those who have 
responsibihty for a larger number of agencies.
LFA Staff Size
Staff size numbers include Gscal analysts responsible for budget review and 
analysis. They do not include Gscal ofGce directors or those analysts with duGes other 
than budget review and analysis. It is expected that legislaGve Gscal analysts 
operating within larger Gscal staGs will have fewer agencies, and thus, more inGuence 
than legislaGve Gscal analysts operating in smaller ofhces with larger numbers of 
agencies.
LFA Contact with Legislators and Other Budget Actors
Legislative Gscal analyst contact with budget actors and visibihty in the budget 
process is measured in several ways. First, does the analyst develop wntten reports 
identh^mg him or her as the author? Second, does the analyst attend budget hearings? 
Third, does the analyst make presentaGons during these hearings? Fourth, is the 
analyst present in the House and/or Senate chamber when appropnation biUs are
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debated? What is the amount of contact during the budget process (daily, weekly, 
monthly) with key budget actors. It is expected that legislative Gscal analysts with 
higher levels of contact with other budget actors and with more visibility at committee 
hearings, and in the Senate and House chambers wiU be perceived to be more 
influential than their counterparts with less visibility.
Level of Discretion Given LFA
Level of discretion given to the legislative Gscal analyst is measured threefold. 
First, analysts are asked to identify the level of discretion they have in developing 
recommendaGons, creating policy options, and providing infbrmaGon to legislators. 
Second, appropriaGon committee chairs and subcommittee chairs are asked to identity 
the level of discreGon given to analysts. Third, an analysis of statutes creating the 
legislaGve Gscal ofBce and deGning the duGes of that ofBce are reviewed to identify 
any speciGc constraints or parameters placed on analysts in developing 
recommendations, creating policy options, and providing information to legislators. It 
is expected that high levels of reported discreGon by legislaGve Gscal analysts will 
coincide with higher levels of inGuence than those legislaGve Gscal analysts reporting 
less discreGon.
Legislator Inexperience or Lack of Knowledge
Legislator inexperience or lack of knowledge may be the result of several 
Actors limiting the time legislators have on the job. Biennial budget cycle and term 
limits vanables are measured simply as the presence or absence of the variable in each 
state. Legislator tenure as chair is measured as the number of years as chmr of either
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the appropriations committee or appropriations subcommittee. Legislator tenure in 
o@ce is measured as the number of years as a legislator. It is expected that legislators 
with less tenure in the legislature, less tenure on the appropriations committee and/or 
less tenure as chair will result in higher levels of legislative Gscal analyst influence.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is influence in state budget policy. First, 
influence is measured by the reported degree of influence by legislative Gscal analysts 
and other key actors (legislators, agency personnel, and executive budget analysts) on 
an ordinal scale: very inGuential, inGuential, somewhat inGuenGal, and not inGuential. 
Second, inGuence is assessed by comparing legislative analysts with other key actors 
by having legislators, agency personnel, and execuGve budget analysts rank the 
inGuence of legislative Gscal analysts and other key budget actors on an interval level 
scale of one to Gve, where one represents no inGuence and Gve represents high 
inGuence. The final measure of influence examines the acceptance of the analyst 
budget recommendations by the legislature. This measure of inGuence is only 
applicable for those analysts in Arizona and Colorado who make recommendations to 
the legislature.
The first two measures of inGuence are based upon the percepGons of inGuence 
by legislaGve Gscal analysts and key budget actors. The legislative Gscal analysts 
chosen for this study are analysts responsible for high profile poGcy areas. These areas 
correspond with the CorrecGons, EducaGon, and Medicaid agencies. These policy 
areas represent substanGal shares of the budget in most states. The selecGon of these
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specific policy areas or agencies and the ûscal analyst responsible for a particular 
policy area was necessary for two reasons. First, in order to strengthen the validity of 
ûscal analysts' self-assessment of influence, key budget actors gave an independent 
assessment of inSuence. These key budget actors correspond to the policy area 
selected. Agency directors, agency legislative liaisons, and agency budget directors 
for the Corrections, Education, and Medicaid agencies assessed the influence of the 
legislative Gscal analyst responsible for their agency's budget. Similarly, executive 
budget analysts responsible for those policy areas were also interviewed. By selecting 
agency personnel and executive budget analysts responsible far the same policy areas 
as the legislative Gscal analysts, one can determine the inGuence of those speciGc 
legislaGve Gscal analysts. This study attempts to separate the inGuence of the 
legislaGve Gscal oGBce Gom that of the individual analyst. Second, the high proGle 
nature of these three policy areas allows one to interview appropriation committee or 
subcommittee chairs and members of the appropnaGons or budget committee as these 
legislators are more likely to be able to assess the inGuence of these particular analysts 
than the rank and Gle membership. In Kansas and Arizona chairs o f the 
^propriaGons subcommittees responsible for reviewing the budget for the 
Departments of CorrecGons, EducaGon, and Medicaid were interviewed as well as 
appropnaGons committee members. In Colorado, the chair of the full joint budget 
committee was interviewed. Likewise, in Maine, the chair of the full appropnaGons 
committee was interviewed as weU as members of that committee. The joint budget 
and ^propnaGons committees in Colorado and Maine do not have subcommittees, 
therefore, no subcommittee chairs were interviewed.
85
The Ênal measure of influence examines the acceptance of the analyst budget 
recommendations by the legislature. This measure of influence is only applicable to 
those analysts in Arizona and Colorado who make budget recommendations to the 
legislature. Written documents recording analyst recommendations and the 
corresponding legislative recommendations were used as data. An acceptance rate is 
calculated to determine the percentage of the analyst recommendation that was 
accepted by the legislature.
Data Sources and Collection Procedures
The exploratory research uses data collected 6om two sources. The primary 
source of data comes 6om telephone interviews of key budget actors. A secondary 
source of data is derived &om legislative statutes, documents and reports developed by 
the legislative fiscal office, executive branch documents describing the budget process, 
and legislative procedures manuals discussing the roles of the legislature and legislative 
staff in the budget process. Also, external documents prepared by organizations such 
as the National Con&rence of State Legislatures, the National Governors'
Association, and the National Association of State Budget OfGcers were also used as 
background information.
The primary source of data was collected through 57 completed telephone 
interviews of four different groups of key budget actors. Table 2.4 lists the states 
included in the study and the number of each group interviewed. These budget actors 
included legislative fiscal analysts (LFAs) responsible for the budgets of the 
Departments of Corrections, Education, and Medicaid as well as the executive budget
analysts (EBAs) responsible &r the same agency budgets. Toint budget or 
appropriations committee chairs or subcommittee chairs and committee members 
represent another group of key budget actors because they are charged with reviewing 
state agency budgets and making recommendations to the legislature. Finally, agency 
directors, agency legislative liaisons, and agency hscal ofScers in the Departments of 
Corrections, Education, and Medicaid were the Gnal group interviewed for this study.
Table 2.4 
Respondents by Group and by State
Respondents by Group Arizona Colorado Kansas Maine Total
Legislative Fiscal Analysts 3 3 3 2 11
Legislators 4 1 4 4 13
Agency Personnel 4 7 8 8 27
Executive Budget Analysts 3 3 2 3 11
TOTAL 14 14 17 17 62
Note: 62 individuals responded to the request for an interview. However, 57 individuals 
completed the telephone interview. Two agency officials in Kansas, two agency officials in 
Maine, and one agency official in Colorado reported little contact with the legislative fiscal 
analyst and did not complete the interview.
The interviews were conducted from October 2001 through July 2002. The 
interviews of the legislative fiscal analysts ranged fi"om thirty to ninety minutes in 
length. On average, the interviews lasted about 55 minutes. Interviews of the other 
key budget actors were considerably shorter, ranging fi-om 15 to 40 minutes in length. 
On average, these interviews lasted about 30 minutes in length. The interviews for all 
groups were semi-structured with both open-ended and close-ended questions. For 
each interview, the interviewer immediately established her credential as an academic 
and summarized the nature of the study and the protocol to the interviewee. Most
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interviews were scheduled at the convenience of the interviewee after initial contact 
was made by the interviewer. In some cases involving legislative Gscal analysts, the 
interview instrument was sent via e-mail for review prior to the scheduled interview.
The use of telephone interviews has both advantages and disadvantages. The 
advantages are clear. Parten (1966) notes that the refusal rate for telephone interviews 
tends to he very low. Although the response rate is usually lower than for in-person 
interviews, the response rate for telephone interviews is signiGcantly higher than mail 
surveys (Manheim and Rich 1986). Telephone interviews are convenient for both the 
interviewer and the interviewee. Contact can be established fairly quickly and one 
does not have to leave the work setting. Telephone interviews are less intrusive than 
in-person interviews. While interviewer-related sources of bias are not totally 
removed, a voice over the phone is normally less likely to create biasing eSects than a 
person in the respondent's presence (Manheim and Rich 1986). Further, telephone 
interviews are superior to mail questionnaires in that they provide a control over who 
responds to the interview questions. The issue of control is particularly important in 
this research as the majority of the data collected relied upon the judgments and 
perceptions of the interviewees. In an e@brt to use the responses of the interviewees 
as a validity check on the responses of other interviewees it was imperative that the 
individual answering the questions was indeed the appropriate individual. Mail 
questionnaires cannot provide adequate control over who answers the questions.
However, there are some disadvantages to telephone interviews. The 
telephone interview is not capable of observing anything about the person or the 
interview situation as visual cues do not exist. There is also the tendency for the
interviewee to respond quickly to a question in order to reduce the time of the 
interview. To guard against this, the researcher made every eSbrt to interview 
individuals at their convenience and to limit the questions to those most pertinent to 
the current study.
Four distinct sets of interview questions were used and tailored to each of the 
four groups interviewed. The interviews of legislative Gscal analysts sought answers 
to six broad categories of questions. First, demographic and professional background 
questions were asked to determine the kinds of individuals who seek employment as 
legislative Gscal analysts. Second, the analysts were asked quesGons regarding the 
general nature of stafT work during the interim and during the period at which they are 
engaging in work that assists the legislature in making decisions about the budget.
This would not only include the legislaGve session, but could include a period of 
several months prior to the session when analysts are likely to be engaged in 
preparatory work on agency budgets. Third, analysts were asked a series of quesGons 
regarding their relaGonship with legidators including issues of infbrmaGon provision, 
usefulness of infbrmaGon, amount and type of contact, and trust. Fourth, the analysts 
were asked about their perceived inGuence in state budget policy. Fifth, the 
interviewer asked quesGons about their relaGonships with the execuGve budget 
analysts and agency personnel and their view of the role that they play in regards to the 
state agencies under their authonty. Finally, the interviewer asked the analysts to 
discuss challenges or changes faced by legislaGve Gscal analysts in their state.
The interviews of the other key budget actors typically fbllowed the interviews 
with the legislative Gscal analysts. The m^ority of the quesGons asked aGempted to
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assess the validity of the answers provided by the legislative Gscal analysts concerning 
perceived inGuence. In addition to asking these actors about their percepGon of 
legislaGve Gscal analyst inGuence, interviewees were also asked to respond to 
quesGons concerning their relaGonship with the Gscal analysts including the Gequency 
and nature of contact with the analyst. Legislators were asked to describe the most 
useGil types of in&rmaGon provided by the analyst, the level o f discreGon and 
direcGon given by them to the legislative analyst, and the role played by the analyst in 
the budget process. Finally, legislators, execuGve budget analysts, and agency 
personnel were asked to compare and rank the inGuence of the legislaGve Gscal analyst 
in the budget process with the inGuence of other key budget actors.
While all of the interview quesGons were asked of ail legislaGve Gscal analysts, 
the semi-structured nature of the interview allowed the researcher to probe and 
explore certain comments made by the interviewees. It was important to provide 
Gexibility during each interview to account Gar the spontaneity and diversity of 
responses. There&re, none of the interviews were idenGcal in terms of length or 
content, although a basic core of both open-ended and closed-ended quesGons were 
asked. All interview quesGons can be Gaund in Appendix A. All interviewees were 
granted conGdentiality. ThereGare, citaGons of quotes attnbutable to subjects are 
omitted. Occasionally, the state label is also omiGed Wien it might compromise 
conGdenGality.
A secondary source of inGirmation included a review of budget documents 
produced by the Gscal analysts and/or Gscal oGBce. These documents included 
inGarmaGon regarding budget recommendaGons made by the analyst and/or analysis of
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agency requests and executive recommendations, and the legislatures role in the 
budget process. Also, statutes creating the legislative Gscal ofBces were reviewed to 
understand the duties and responsibilities of the ofBce or Gscal committee staff 
Reports prepared by the execuGve budget ofBce summarizing the executive branch 
role in the budget process. LegislaGve procedures manuals providing infbrmaGon on 
legislaGve staff were also examined. Finally, information &om the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, NaGonal AssociaGon of State Budget OfBcers, and 
the NaGonal Governors' Association was as a basis for understanding the budget 
process in each of the four states, as well as for understanding the powers and 
authonty of both the execuGve and legislaGve branches in the budget process for the 
states under study.
Data Analysis
Immediately after each interview, handwntten notes were reviewed and typed. 
Each typewritten interview was assigned a number identifying the interview by state 
and interviewee position in an effort to maintain the confidentiality of the respondent. 
No other identifying features were listed on the typewntten interview document. All 
interviews were then merged into Gve master interview Gles for analysis. Responses 
were categorized by state and by budget actor. Responses were categorized according 




One of the primary research limitations of this study is whether the Endings can 
be generalized to a larger population due to the small case size and focus on legislative 
Escal analysts within three policy areas. With the great diversity of the 50 states 
poliEcally, geographically, culturally, and organizationally, the ability to generalize the 
Endings &om only four states to a larger populadon is problematic. The interviewees 
within the four states were chosen purposively, not randomly. The legislative Escal 
analysts were chosen based upon the speciEc policy areas under study. Likewise, the 
other key budget actors were chosen based upon the policy areas under study and their 
knowledge of the legislative Escal analyst with responsibility for their agency. There 
may be diEerences in the duties, roles, relationships, and inEuence among those 
analysts who have responsibility for lower proEle policy areas or smaller state 
agencies. As these legislative fiscal analysts were not interviewed, this study cannot 
answer these questions. Further, the response rate for one group of key budget actors 
(legislators in Colorado) was low with only one of six committee members responding 
to the interview. Despite these limitations, the exploratory nature of this study can 
open the door for the development of future research questions and hypotheses.
Future studies should expand the number of states, interviewees, and policy areas 
under consideration.
Another issue regarding whether the Endings can be generalized to a larger 
population is the dramatic change in the Escal condition of the 50 states during the 
research EmeE-ame. During the fall of 2001, when data collection began, states were 
entering a period of Escal crisis after several years of revenue growth and budget
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expansion. AU four states under study dealt with signihcant revenue declines either in 
a special session or during the regular legislative session. The 6seal crisis within the 
states studied could impact the roles and influence of the legislative Gscal analysts.
One argument is that in periods of Gscal crisis, the governor has the advantage over 
the legislature. Under condiGons of Gscal stress, legislators oAen defer to the 
governor to propose unpopular tax increases or cuts in spending (Clynch and Lauth 
1991). This may throw the balance of power toward the governor and her staE 
Another argument, however, could be made for an increase in the power of the 
legislature. Legislatures ultimately have the "power of the purse." In times of Gscal 
stress, legislators may be forced to cut programs or Gnd alternative revenue sources. 
StafT may be more inGuenGal in times of Gscal stress as they provide support, 
infbrmaGon, and in some cases recommendations, to a legislature that must make 
difGcult choices on program and service cuts.
The following chapters present the data obtained through the vanous 
interviews. Chapter Three discusses the charactensGcs of the legislaGve Gscal analysts 
in this study and describes the budget process in those states as well. Further, Chapter 
Three identiGes the vanous duties of these legislaGve Gscal analysts and establishes the 
most important or primary duty that they perform for the legislature.
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NOTES
1. Data on the budget procedures in the 50 states was compiled by Jennifer 
Grooters and Corina Eckl of the Fiscal AGairs Program with the National Conference 
of State Legislatures in LegrfWh/g frocgaEwrgj:.' ^  to
awf frocg&gea m tAe Commomyea/tAa, awf Zerntongf. This 1998 
report is based upon data collected through surveys of all 50 states.
2. Four states (Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington) have recently 
repealed legislative term limits. Currently, there is a court challenge to Montana's 
legislative term limits (National Conference of State Legislatures 2002b).
3. Thurmaier and Willoughby (2001) have developed a model for assessing 
how executive budget analysts make budget recommendations to the governor. They 
further review how individual budget analyst rationalities are conditioned by the 
decision context in which they operate. Of central importance to the decision context 




Legislative Fiscal Analysts: Characteristics and Duties Performed
In setting the context for exploring the roles, relationships, and influence of 
legislative Gscal analysts that will be presented later in this study, this chapter 
identiGes the typical legislative Gscal analyst and describes her pnmary duGes. In 
identifying the typical legislative analyst, this chapter investigates whether legislative 
Gscal analysts share common characteristics with their executive budget counterparts. 
In examining this issue, legislative analysts and executive analysts are compared 
along several dimensions: sex, age, educaGon, job tenure, and previous employment. 
Legislative Gscal analyst career choices and job saGsfaction are also explored.
Finally, the focus shiAs to legislaGve Gscal analyst duGes in the budget process.
These duties are examined in the context of discussing the budget process in each 
state. The general duties of the legislative Gscal analysts in this study are categorized 
by type, by pnmary duty, and the point at which they are perkrmed dunng the budget 
process.
Staff charactenstics such as educaGon, previous employment, recruitment, 
tenure, and career aspiraGons have been analyzed with a vanety of congressional staff 
(DeGregono and Snider 1995; Fox and Hammond 1977; Hammond 1975, 1994; 
Kayali 1977; Kofmehl 1977; Romzek and Utter 1996; Salisbury and Shepsle 1981), 
state legislaGve Gscal staff (Balutis 1975; Famum 1975; Hartmark 1975; Kyle 1975; 
Willoughby and Finn 1996), and executive budget staff (Gosling 1987; Lee 1991; Lee 
1997; NaGonal Association of State Budgeting Officers 1999; Thurmaier and Gosling 
1996; Tomkin 1998; Yunker 1990). For the purposes of the current research.
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research linking stafF characteristics to specific staff duties and influence is of 
particular importance. The characteristics of the people who staff a legislative fiscal 
office may impact how that oGice operates in terms of products created and influence 
wielded. Further, comparisons can he made between legislative fiscal staff and their 
executive budget counterparts where more research on characteristics is found.
For executive budget staff  ̂Lee (1991) has documented the change in both the 
level o f education and the educational background of executive budget analysts over 
two decades. The number of staff with master's degrees has increased, while staff 
with less than a bachelor's degree or with a doctorate remained small in number. 
Further, Lee notes that analysts with accounting backgrounds have been replaced with 
analysts holding degrees in the social sciences and public administration. During the 
same time period, Lee observed an increase in executive budget ofBces conducting 
program analysis, although this trend reversed itself after 1990. Nonetheless, the 
trend for more analysis from 1970 to 1990 could be a result of the change in the 
educational backgrounds of executive budget analysts.
In fact, the shift in educational background has been linked to specific role 
orientations of executive budget offices at the state level where Gosling (1987) found 
that analysts in control-oriented offices have predominantly business administration 
and accounting degrees while analysts in more policy-oriented offices are more likely 
to have a public administration or other social science degree. In this study, the 
different orientations of the budget offices are reflected in the backgrounds of people 
hired as budget analysts. The work of Thurmaier and Gosling (1997) support the 
linkage between budget office orientation and the educational background of analysts.
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In addition, they observed that educational background conditions the individual role 
orientation of the budget analyst with respect to the state agencies under her 
supervision. Analysts with a social science background are more likely to take on an 
advocacy role. The advocacy role is defined as one where the executive budget 
analyst advocates or supports agency programs and budget requests viewed as good 
public policy and consistent with gubernatorial objectives. In contrast, analysts with 
a business or accounting background are more likely to report a more adversarial or 
control-oriented role with respect to their agencies. However, more recent research, 
using a larger sample of executive budget offices, finds little support for the linkage 
between the roles of executive budget analysts and their educational and professional 
background (Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001).
Data on legislative fiscal staff background at the state level is less numerous 
and somewhat dated (Balutis and Butler 1975; Rosenthal 1981; and Willoughby and 
Finn 1996). The Balutis and Butler study found that fiscal analysts in the 1970s held 
bachelor’s degrees in a wide range of disciplines including accounting, economics, 
political science, public administration, mathematics, education, and law. Further, 
some analysts were recruited immediately after college graduation while others had 
previous experience in state government. A more recent study by Willoughby and 
Finn (1996) of legislative fiscal analysts in nine southern states finds that the typical 
legislative fiscal analyst in the south is male, about thirty-nine years o f age, and earns 
over $45,000 per year. Additionally, the typical analyst in the south has been on the 
job about six years, has previous employment in a state agency, and has completed a 
master’s degree typically in business or public administration. Despite the recent
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work of Willoughby and Finn (1996) on legislative fiscal staff background, little is 
known about possible linkages between legislative fiscal analyst education and job 
duties, roles, and relationships with agencies.
Characteristics of Legislative Fiscal Analysts
Identifying various characteristics of those individuals who work for state 
legislatures comprised some of the first research on legislative staf^ including 
legislative fiscal analysts. Several educational and professional characteristics were 
assessed at the height of the legislative reform movement. From several studies of 
single states in the mid-1970s, the typical legislative fiscal analyst held a bachelor's 
degree in a wide range of disciplines including accounting, economics, political 
science, public administration, mathematics, education, and law. Some of these 
analysts were recruited immediately after college graduation while others had 
previous experience in state government. Today, some forty years after the 
legislative reform movement began, we can again assess these characteristics.
The data in this study, in part, comes &om interviews with legislative fiscal 
analysts responsible for three policy areas: Corrections, Education, and Medicaid in 
four states: Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, and Maine. Therefore, the interviewer 
attempted to speak with 12 analysts. However, one analyst declined to participate 
because of time constraints due to her part-time work status. Although this study 
reports the findings 6om interviews of only 11 legislative fiscal analysts, some 
information can be gleaned about who they are as individuals by reviewing specific 
demographic, educational, and professional characteristics.
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Legislative Fiscal Analyst Demographics and Education
Table 3 .1 reports the demographic and educational characteristics o f 
legislative fiscal analysts in this study. Of the legislative fiscal analysts interviewed, 
55 percent were female and 45 percent were male. The age of the legislative fiscal 
analysts responsible for the Corrections, Education, and Medicaid budgets ranged 
&om 31 to 56 years, with the average analyst age at 42 years. Five of the 11 analysts 
were between 35 and 45 years of age. The legislative fiscal analysts in this study 
were highly educated professionals with 82 percent holding a degree at the master's 
level or above. Of this population, seven analysts held the master's degree and two 
analysts earned the Ph.D. Five of the seven analysts with master's degrees were 
female, while the doctorate degrees were held by men. The Master of Public 
Administration degree was the most 6equently held graduate degree, followed by the 
master's degree in political science. Graduate degrees in business administration, 
finance, and public policy were held by three of the remaining analysts. For those 
analysts with the Ph D., one analyst earned a Ph.D. in History and anotho" earned a 
Ph.D. in Higher Education. Of those analysts with baccalaureate degrees, 
management and political science were the undergraduate mtyors.
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Table 3.1
Demographic and Educational Characteristics
of








Bachelor's Degree 2 (18%) 1 (9%)
Master's Degree 7 (64%) 10 (91%)
Doctoral Degree 2 (18%)
M ajor in Highest Degree Completed
Political Science 2 (18%) 1 (9%)
Public Administration 3 (27%) 1 (9%)
Public Policy 1 (10%) 2 (18%)
Business Administration & Related Fields 3 (27%) 6 (55%)
History or HSgher Education 2 (18%) 0
Law 0 1 (9%)
Sex
Male 5 (45%) 7 (64%)
Female 6 (55%) 4 (36%)
Age
25-35 2 (18%) 6 (55%)
35-45 5 (45%) 2 (18%)
45-55 3 (27%) 1 (9%)
55+ 1 (10%) 2 (18%)
Executive Budpet Analyst Demographics and Education
The interviewer attempted to interview 12 executive budget analysts from 
each of the three policy areas: Corrections, Education, and Medicaid and 6om  all 
four states: Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, and Maine. Of the 12 contacted, all but one 
agreed to be interviewed.
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As Table 3.1 shows, the m^ority of the executive budget analysts interviewed 
in this study were male (64%) while 36 percent were female. Executive budget 
analyst age varied significantly &om 29 to 65 years. As a group, the executive budget 
analysts were younger, with five of the 11 analysts (55%) between the ages of 25 and 
35, while only 2 legislative analysts (18%) were between the ages of 25 and 35. 
However, the average age of the executive budget analysts was 40, which was similar 
to the average age of legislative Gscal analysts.
As with the legislative fiscal analysts, executive budget analysts in this study 
were also highly educated with 92 percent holding the master's degree. Table 3.1 
indicates that of the executive budget analysts in this study, six of the 11 executive 
budget analysts (55%) held degrees in business administration, finance, economics, or 
accounting. This represents a higher number of executive budget analysts with 
business backgrounds than their legislative counterparts. The remaining executive 
budget analysts held master's degrees in political science, public administration, 
public policy, or law
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Professional Characteristics
Job titles in the legislative Sscal ofGces varied by state with a hierarchy of 
titles reflecting analyst tenure on the job and previous experience. The most senior 
positions are chief analyst, principal analyst, or senior 5 seal analyst, while the title of 
analyst is reserved for junior staff Ninety-one percent of the legislative fiscal 
analysts in this study held one of the senior titles. Of those interviewed, only one 
analyst had not yet achieved a title beyond that of analyst. In most cases, the
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legislative analysts in the senior positions achieved their positions after three to five 
years on the job.
Of those interviewed, the average analyst tenure with the legislature was 7.5 
years. This is slightly less than that reported by a larger study of all legislative staff 
by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). The NCSL study of more 
than 1,000 legislative stafT representing a variety of legislative staff functions found 
that the average respondent worked a little less than ten years for the legislature (Aro 
and Swords 2000). As Table 3 .2 indicates 45 percent of the legislative fiscal analysts 
in this study had been on the job between 5 and 10 years, while 36 percent had less 
than five years with the legislature. The analyst with the most tenure worked 26 
years as a legislative hscal analyst.
The legislative fiscal analysts in this study had varied professional 
backgrounds. However, the m^ohty of the legislative fiscal analysts held previous 
employment in the public sector that included working for a state agency (27%), city 
or county government (27%), or the executive budget office (9%). Three analysts 




Job Characteristics of Legislative fiscal Analysts (LFAs) 
and Executive Budget Analysts (EBAs)
Characteristics LFAs Percent EBAs Percent
Present Job Title
Chief Legislative Analyst 1 9% 0 0%
Principal Analyst 4 36 1 9
Senior Manager 0 0 2 18
Senior Analyst 5 46 4 36
Analyst 1 9 4 36
Tenure as Analyst
0-5 years 4 36% 6 55%
5-10 years 5 46 4 36
10-15 years 1 9 1 9
15-20 years 0 0 0 0
20 years or more 1 9 0 0
Previous Employment
State Agency 3 27% 3 27%
Executive Budget Office I 9 1 9
Local Government 3 27 0 0
Private Sector 2 18 4 36
Non-profit 1 9 1 9
Directly from College 1 9 2 18
Executive Budget Analyst Professional Characteristics
The executive budget analysts interviewed also had varied job titles and a 
similar hierarchy of job titles. As Table 3.2 shows, seven of the 11 executive 
analysts in this study held the more senior titles of principal analyst, senior manager, 
or senior analyst. The senior manager position had responsibility for overseeing 
junior analysts in the budget ofBce. Four of the 11 executive budget analysts were in 
junior analyst positions as opposed to only one of the legislative fiscal analysts. This 
reflects the slightly less tenure reported by the executive budget analysts in 
comparison to their legislative counterparts as six of the 11 executive budget analysts
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(55%) reported working on the job less than five years. In contrast, 36 percent of 
legislative fiscal analysts who had less than five years on the job. Of the executive 
budget analysts interviewed, 36 percent previously held a job in the private sector 
while 27 percent worked formerly in a state agency. This represents a slightly 
higher percentage of executive budget analysts arriving from the ranks of the private 
sector than the legislative fiscal analysts.
Reasons for Employment
In addition to the demographic and educational questions, legislative Gscal 
analysts were asked why they chose to work for the state legislature. The interviewer 
offered seven reasons for choosing to work for the legislature and asked the 
respondents to identify the primary reason among the seven choices. These choices 
included interesting and challenging work, interest in politics, serving the public, 
helping to formulate public policy, opportunities for advancement, job security, or 
other. Similar responses were given for seeking a position with the legislature but the 
primary reason for accepting legislative employment for seven of 11 (64%) 
respondents was the belief that working for the state legislature would be challenging 
and interesting. When discussing the interesting and challenging aspect of the job, 
two issues sur&ced. First, several analysts explained that they thought it would be 
interesting to be "in the middle of the political process." Second, the wide variety of 
skills necessary for the job was also cited as a reason for the interesting and 
challenging aspect of the job. The wide variety of skills used and the opportunity to
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be a part of the political process makes the job interesting and challenging, and 
therefore, attractive for many of the analysts.
The remaining analysts (4 of 11) cited the need for a job, serving the public, 
and an interest in politics as the primary reason for accepting employment with the 
legislature. Secondary reasons for employment varied among analysts. An interest 
in politics and a desire to serve the public were secondary reasons cited by five 
analysts. The remaining analysts reported job security, the potential for future job 
opportunities, and the ability to get back into the public sector to make better use of a 
public policy degree as secondary reasons for taking positions with the l^sla tu re .
In contrast, when asked the same question regarding the primary reason for 
seeking employment in the executive budget office, only four of 11 (36%) executive 
budget analysts responded that they thought the job with the executive budget office 
would be interesting and challenging. In fact, three analysts reported the need for a 
job as the primary reason for accepting employment. This contrasts with only one 
legislative fiscal analyst reporting the need for a job as the primary reason for 
accepting employment. Other reasons given for seeking employment in the executive 
branch included the opportunity to become exposed to several policy areas that could 
lead to future employment, an interest in budgeting, and the ability to do both fiscal 
and policy related work.
In summary, there are both differences and similarities between legislative 
fiscal analysts and executive budget analysts. Of those interviewed, more women 
made up the ranks of legislative fiscal analysts than executive budget analysts. The 
executive budget analysts were younger and held slightly less tenure than the
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legislative fiscal analysts. With respect to education, both legislative fiscal analysts 
and executive budget analysts in this study were highly educated individuals, most 
with master's degrees. However, the executive budget analysts interviewed were 
more likely to be educated in business related Gelds than the legislative analysts who 
reported more &equently holding degrees in public administration, political science, 
and public policy. The emphasis on business related degrees was the most evident in 
Maine, where all of the executive budget analysts as well as the legislative Gscal 
analysts held degrees in business administration or accounting. Finally, most 
legislative analysts reported working previously in a state agency or a local 
government, while most executive budget analysts reported working in either state 
agencies or the private sector. The higher presence of previous employment in the 
private sector for executive budget analysts may reflect the higher presence of 
business related degrees. Executive budget analysts may be pulled &om the ranks of 
the private sector more frequently than legislative Gscal analysts and those executive 
budget analysts from the private sector are more likely to have business or accounting 
degrees.
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Likes and Dislikes About the Job
The last o f the professional background questions for legislative Gscal 
analysts covered the topic ofjob likes and dislikes. Each analyst was asked what he 
liked most and least about the job. The interviews revealed more positive responses 
regarding the job as legislative analyst than negative responses. Previously it was 
reported that legislative Gscal analysts accepted their position with the legislature
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primarily because of the belief that the job would be interesting and challenging. The 
interesting and challenging aspect of the job is reported as one of several reasons why 
analysts like their work with the legislature. The variety in the job, the opportunity 
to deal with interesting policy issues, and the excitement of being part of the political 
process, were cited as reasons for job eiyoyment. Some responses &om the 
legislative analysts included:
The job changes every year. You are doing the same mechanical 
things, but the issues change yearly. [There is] a lot of variety, the 
sessions are interesting with many interesting policy issues up for 
debate. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
[The job is] not just number crunching, not just writing, not just 
presentations, it is open-ended, we have discretion to look into 
whatever we want to look into, it's a mixture of things.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The contact with different people. The variety is incredible. [I] 
like the areas I am working on -  they are important. [There is] always 
something going on, I am never bored. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I am in the center of things, where decisions are made. There is also a sense 
of accomplishment aAer its all over. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The job is different by day and by time of year. I enjoy my job and being
part of the policymaking process. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
In general, there were more positive comments about the job than negative 
comments. Analysts were asked to describe what they liked least about their job. 
The most common negative comment about the job was the heavy workload prior to 
and during the legislative session. Seven of 11 analysts reported that working long 
hours with little time off was a negative aspect of the job. The work of the 
legislative fiscal analyst is cyclical. Legislative sessions are usually three to five
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months in length, with periods of high workload and interaction with legislators and 
agency personnel prior to and during the session followed by a period of "downtime" 
during the interim after the legislature adjourns. Therefore, work is compressed into 
a short time&ame where analysts are under tremendous pressure to do an incredible 
amount of work in a short period of time. For these analysts, legislative budget 
preparation can begin several months prior to the session with the analysis of agency 
requests and executive recommendations. Fiscal staff work continues throughout the 
legislative session that usually begins in January and ends somewhere between April 
and June. Several analysts reported 60-70 hour workweeks during the legislation 
session.
In addition to the long work hours during the legislative session, analysts 
reported high stress levels associated with the session and some apprehension 
regarding the quality of information and analyses provided to the legislature during 
the legislative session. Several analysts (four of 11) reported that the legislative 
sessions are stressful, with many demands placed upon them. Two analysts &om 
different states reported that stress and heavy workload were reasons for the high 
turnover in fiscal staff in their state. Five of the 11 analysts interviewed commented 
on the tremendous workload during the session and the impact that it has on their 
ability to provide timely and accurate information These analysts reported the 
ûustration associated with their desire to get information to legislators as quickly as 
possible and the realities of the job due to the time constraints of the legislative 
session.
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As most state governments operate under salary limitations for public sector 
employees, one might think that pay would be a key negative factor in legislative 
branch employment. Interestingly, only one analyst mentioned the low pay of state 
employees as a negative job 6ctor. This analyst reported the pay as "miserable 
compared to the private sector." In summary, legislative fiscal analysts were very 
pleased and satisGed with their jobs. This satisfaction draws mainly from the great 
variety and challenge of the job as well as the exciting political environment in which 
these analysts work. Long work hours, stress, and pressure to perform within a 
limited amount of time are the primary negative factors regarding work as a 
legislative Gscal analyst.
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Duties in the Budget Process
While the four states under study follow the same general budget process as 
outlined in Chapter Two, legislative fiscal analyst duties and the structure and size of 
the fiscal committee(s) varies &om state to state. As described in Chapter Two, the 
state budget process follows several stages and culminates with the passage of the 
budget by the legislature with approval by the governor. The purpose of the next 
section is to describe the budget process and the legislative fiscal analyst duties in 
each state as a precursor to identifying and comparing the primary duties o f the 
legislative fiscal analysts. This section will discuss the operating environment, 
reporting structure, and the formal duties of legislative fiscal analysts. It will further 




The fiscal analysts in Arizona work for the Arizona Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee (JLBC) of the state legislature. According to the Arizona Legislative 
Manual (2001), the primary tasks of the JLBC are to make recommendations to the 
legislature regarding the state budget, state revenues and expenditures, future fiscal 
needs, and the organization and functions of state government. The legislative fiscal 
director is appointed by the JLBC who subsequently hires the pro&ssional staff of the 
JLBC In Arizona, there are 23 legislative fiscal analysts of the JLBC who have 
responsibility for providing information and budget recommendations regarding state 
agencies to the legislature. See Appendix B for organization chart of the Arizona 
legislature and legislative 6 seal staff
In addition to providing services to the JLBC, staff analysts also provide fiscal 
services to the Arizona Appropriations Committees and subcommittees in each 
chamber, the Joint Committee on Capital Review, and the Joint Legislative Tax 
Committee. According to the Arizona Legislative Manual (2001), the fiscal staff of 
the JLBC provide the following non-partisan services: 1) Analyze and prepare 
recommendations for the state budget, 2) Provide technical, analytical, and 
preparatory support in the development of appropriation bills considered by the 
Legislature, 3) Develop periodic economic and state revenue forecasts, 4) Analyze 
economic activity and state budget conditions, 5) Prepare fiscal notes on the bills 
considered by the Legislature that have a fiscal impact on the state or any of its 
political subdivisions, 6) Prepare the annual /(gporf after the budget
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is completed that details the budget and legislative intent, and 7) Prepare 
management and fiscal research reports related to state programs and state agency 
operations.
Analysis o f Agency Requests and Development of Budget Recommendations
In September, prior to the beginning of the legislative session in January, the 
fiscal analysts receive the agency budget requests. The governor's budget staff) the 
Arizona Office of Strategic Planning and Budget (OSPB), sends the fiscal stafFcopies 
of the agency budget requests upon receipt &om the state agencies. Both the JLBC 
staff and OSPB staffs analyze the agency budget requests, develop revenue estimates, 
and prepare independent budget recommendations.
JLBC fiscal analysts prepare the P r c y w f W that becomes the 
document that the appropriations committees work &om during their deliberations on 
the budget. Each member of the appropriations committees receives a copy of the
This book contains a detailed analysis and summary of the 
budget of each state agency, budget estimates, an explanation of the budget changes 
&om the previous year, and various performance measures. A budget table provides 
prior year actual expenditures, current year appropriations, separate budget 
recommendations by the OSPB staff and the JLBC analysts. The budget 
recommendations of the JLBC staff also contain justiAcations for the various line 
item budget recommendations as well as the assumptions used in developing the 
specific recommendations.
In the preparation of the budget recommendations, JLBC staff work closely 
with the chairs of the appropriations committee in each chamber. Analysts review the
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agency requests with the chairs and present various policy options in the preparation 
o f budget recommendations. Also, individual members of the appropriations 
committees request meetings with the fiscal analysts to discuss the agency budgets. 
Finally, the last step to occur prior to the session is the review and analysis of the 
executive budget that arrives in December. The JLBC staff review and analyze the 
executive recommendations and incorporate these recommendations in the frqpaygcJ 
^M f^gt^oo^that must be completed by the first day of the legislative session.
Legislative Session Activity
Arizona has annual legislative sessions, but in Fiscal Year 1994 the state 
began implementing the biennial enactment of two annual budgets (General 
Accounting Office 2000). In Fiscal Year 1994, 26 small regulatory agencies were 
converted to a biennial budget, followed by all but the 15 largest agencies in F Y 
1996. In Fiscal Year 2000, the remaining 15 largest agencies were converted 
(General Accounting Office 2000). Currently, in odd-numbered sessions, the 
legislature considers funding for all budget units. In even-numbered sessions, the 
legislature considers supplemental adjustments to the approved biennial budget.
The line-item budget recommendations prepared by the legislative fiscal 
analysts in the fall provide the starting point for legislative deliberations on the 
budget. The primary duty for the JLBC analysts at the beginning of the legislative 
session is the presentation of budget recommendations to the appropriations 
committee in each chamber during budget hearings where each committee will 
develop a set of budget recommendations, based upon fiscal staff information and 
recommendations. The appropriations committees may meet jointly or separately.
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Both committees are divided into subcommittees that cover the broad functional areas 
of state government. It is typical for these subcommittees to meet jointly to discuss 
the agency budgets within their jurisdiction. Although each appropriations committee 
has a m^ority and minority staff analyst to assist the committee members, the JLBC 
analysts are the primary source of fiscal information for the committee members. 
During budget hearings each JLBC analyst briefs the appropriations committees on 
his/her recommendations and compares the JLBC staff recommendation with that of 
the OSPB staff recommendation. Agency ofRcials are also permitted to present their 
budget requests after the JLBC analyst presentation. Likewise, OSPB analysts are 
also present at the public hearings and have the opportunity to testify on behalf of the 
governor. Afterwards the JLBC analysts respond to any comments made by the 
OSPB.
In addition to presenting recommendations and answering questions within 
the appropriations committees and subcommittees, JLBC analysts support caucus 
deliberations on the budget as well. The main function in caucus meetings is to 
answer any questions that arise &om the discussion of agency budget requests and 
analyst recommendations. Toward the latter part of the session, JLBC analysts are 
busy responding to specific requests for information, answering questions, and 
presenting the appropriations committees and party caucuses with a variety of policy 
options.
In addition to developing and presenting budget recommendations the fiscal 
analysts also prepare fiscal notes on legislation that may impact the state budget.
Each analyst is responsible for preparing fiscal notes on bills with a potential
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budgetary impact on the agency they have responsibility for. Finally, analysts are 
responsible for duties that are clerical in nature. Some of these duties include 
scheduling and coordinating committee and subcommittee meetings, assisting 
members in developing motions to implement alternatives to the JLBC staff 
recommendation, serving as the ofBcial "scorekeeper" of committee action, and 
recording that action into the ofBcial tracking system.
AAer subcommittee and full committee deliberation on the budget has been 
completed, the full house and senate will consider a general appropriations bill, 
commonly referred to as the "feed bill." The JLBC analysts draA the bill in 
accordance with commiAee action. The JLBC analyst responsible for a particular 
agency's budget will draA that portion of the "feed bill." In addition to the "feed 
bill," analysts also prepare the capital outlay bill which funds the construction and 
m ^or maintenance and repair o f state facilities are draAed by JLBC and the omnibus 
reconciliation bills that represent changes in law that are necessary to implement the 
budget. As in all states, once deliberation ends and the full house and senate pass 
these bills, they are sent to the governor for approval.
Colorado
Operating Environment
The six-member Joint Budget CommiAee (JBC) of the Colorado General 
Assembly has the support of a non-partisan staA. The JBC hires a A seal staff director 
who subsequently hires the staff analysts. The JBC has the assistance of 15 
legislative Ascal analysts who work solely on state agency budgets for the Colorado 
legislature. See Appendix B for an organization chart of the Colorado legislature and
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legislative fiscal staÆ Colorado statutes mandate that the JBC analyze the 
management, operations, programs, and fiscal needs of the departments of state 
government. In fulfilling that role, JBC stafT "analysts review budget requests, prior 
year stafT write-ups, statutes, appropriation reports, audit reports, interim committee 
reports, other pertinent information, and meet with agency personnel and other 
individuals to learn about programs, departments, and their operations" (Colorado 
General Assembly 2001).
Analysis of Agency Requests and Executive Recommendations
Although the Colorado legislature plays a strong role in the development of 
the budget, the executive branch begins the process with the submission of agency 
budget requests to the Governor's Office of State Planning and Budgeting (OSPB) in 
late summer and early fall. AAer review by the governor and the analysts within the 
OSPB, the agencies submit their requests that now include the governor’s priorities to 
the joint budget committee by November 1. At this point, the legislative fiscal 
analysts review the executive budget and brief the joint budget committee on the 
agency budgets and executive priorities. Formal presentations are made by the 
analysts during these commiAee "brieAngs" which are open to the public. These 
"brieAngs" are wriAen documents prepared by the analysts and accompany the formal 
presentations. The bneAng documents are quite lengthy and cover such topics as an 
overview of the particular department, including key responsibilities, factors driving 
the budget, major funding changes for the last two Ascal years, an analysis of the 
pnonty requests of the department, and Agures comparing actual expenditures with 
current year appropriations. Finally, the hrieAng documents contain a section on key
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department issues. For example, the briefing document for the Department of 
Corrections discussed the impact of population projections on &ture bed needs and 
the status of facilities under construction in terms of completion date and cost.
According to the fiscal analysts, these briefings have two purposes. First, 
they are used to prepare the JBC members for upcoming agency hearings by alerting 
the JBC members o f the issues surrounding the agency budget requests, agency 
operations, and agency plans for the future. Second, the questions and discussions 
that the JBC has regarding the briefings provide a basis for the budget 
recommendations made by the fiscal analysts later in the legislative session. The 
analysts become cognizant of the concerns and desires of the JBC based upon these 
discussions and incorporate these things into their budget recommendations. After 
the briefings, the JBC members decide what issues they wish to pursue with the 
agencies during the agency hearings. Fiscal analysts work with the JBC members to 
prepare a list of topics and a detailed agenda for the agency hearings held with most 
departments. The departments are given an opportunity to review the agenda prior to 
the hearing to give agency personnel time to respond to the issues and concerns of the 
JBC. The departmental hearings are held in late fall prior to the beginning of the 
legislative session in January.
Legislative Session Activity and the Development of Budget Recommendations
The Colorado General Assembly convenes annually beginning in January and 
deliberates on an annual budget. The first order of business by the Colorado Joint 
Budget Committee at the start of the session is to review agency requests for 
supplemental funding for the current fiscal year. The JBC analysts review the agency
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requests for supplemental funding and make recommendations to the JBC Once the 
JBC makes it recommendations, these supplemental requests are introduced as 
supplemental appropriation bills to be acted upon by the Colorado General Assembly.
After the certification of funds available for the next fiscal year has been 
completed, staff analysts begin making their budget recommendations for the 
upcoming fiscal year. Fiscal analysts again make formal presentations to the JBC 
explaining their recommendations and providing justifications for funding and 
changes in the number of employees for each of the state agencies. The presenting of 
budget recommendations typically takes place in March and April and is referred to 
as the "figure setting" process. The JBC will vote on each line item recommendation 
made by stafF and any changes made by the JBC is incorporated into the "long bill," 
which represents the budget for state operations for the upcoming fiscal year. Each 
fiscal analyst is responsible for drafting a portion of the "long bill" corresponding to 
the agency for which they have made recommendations. It is introduced for 
consideration in both houses and it is first discussed in the party caucuses in both 
chambers. The JBC analysts are present at the caucus discussions to answer any 
questions and to prepare amendments made by the caucuses or individuals members 
that will be debated on the floor of each chamber.
Besides the primary tasks of briefings and budget recommendations, JBC 
analysts have other duties during the session. One such duty is the review of fiscal 
notes of bills prepared by the Colorado Legislative Council analysts. Analysts within 
this council, a legislative committee composed of House and Senate members, 
prepare fiscal notes ofbills based upon analyses developed by the state agencies.
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JBC staff subsequently review those fiscal notes and either concur with the legislative 
council staS" or make additional comments regarding fiscal impact. The Colorado 
JBC analysts also stafTthe appropriations committees in each chamber. The 
appropriations committees are required by law to review all bills with a revenue or 
expenditure impact and are a secondary committee of reference on these types of 
bills. The staff function with regards to the appropriations commi#ees is primarily a 
clerical one where the analyst calls the roll before the meeting and assists in handing 
out written documents. As with all the legislative fiscal analysts under study, the 
JBC analysts respond to a variety of member requests for information during the 
session.
After both houses pass the "long bill," the JBC members act as the conference 
committee to resolve any differences between the bills. The budget bill is then 




The fiscal analysts in Kansas operate within the Fiscal Division of the 
Legislative Research Department (LRD) that comes under the auspices of the 
Legislative Coordinating Council (LCC). The LCC is a bipartisan committee of both 
House and Senates members who are responsible for most stafP services in Kansas. 
The ChiefFiscal Analyst is appointed by the LCC who subsequently hires the fiscal 
analysts (Donlan and Weberg 1999). There are 11 legislative analysts in the fiscal 
division who provide budget information regarding state agencies to the Kansas
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legislature. Kansas analysts w oit for all members of the legislature, but primarily 
provide staff support for the Senate Ways and Means Committee and the House 
Appropriations Committee. See Appendix B for an organization chart for the Kansas 
legislature and legislative fiscal staff Kansas fiscal analysts are responsible for both 
general research and fiscal analysis to special committees, select committees, and 
most standing committees during the legislative session and during the interim. 
According to the Legislative Procedure Manual duties performed by the fiscal 
analysts include assisting committee chairpersons in planning committee work, 
formulating questions for committee chairs and members, preparing various reports, 
assisting members in researching topics and in responding to requests 6om 
constituents, analyzing agency requests for ^propriations and fiscal impact of 
proposed legislation, and participating in revenue and expenditure forecasting 
(Legislative Procedure in Kansas 1998).
Analysis of Agency Requests and Executive Recommendations
The LRD fiscal analysts receive agency budget requests in mid-September at 
the same time that the analysts within the Kansas Division of Budget receive the 
requests. From mid-September until the beginning of the legislative session in 
January, the LRD fiscal analysts review and analyze the agency budget requests. By 
law, the executive recommendation, referred to as the governor's budget report, is 
submitted to the legislature on or before the 8*̂  calendar day of each regular session. 
Shortly thereafter, the LRD fiscal analysts receive the executive recommendation for 
each agency. LRD fiscal analysts update their analysis o f each agency to reflect the 
governor's recommendations.
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The review and analysis of both the agency budget requests and subsequent 
gubernatorial recommendations are published in a budget "workbook" given to each 
legislator. This analysis entails reporting m^or departmental issues and budget 
requests, changes over current year expenditures and appropriations, and historical 
information on departmental programs and expenditures. According to the 
legislative fiscal analysts, this "workbook" is used by the legislators throughout the 
session as a reference guide to agency requests and executive recommendations. 
Unlike the fiscal staffs in Arizona and Colorado, the Kansas fiscal analysts do not 
develop or present budget recommendations to the Senate Ways and Means 
Committee and the House Appropriations Committee.
Legislative Session Activity
Kansas operates under an annual legislative session and annual budget cycle. 
However, 20 small regulatory agencies are budgeted biennially through two annual 
budgets (Grooters and Eckl 1998). Unlike Arizona and Colorado analysts, fiscal 
analysts in Kansas do not draft appropriation bills. The Office o f the Revisor of 
Statutes (a legislative staff agency operating under the auspices of the Legislative 
Coordinating Council) is responsible for drafting the appropriation language. The 
governor's budget recommendations are embodied in the appropriations bill drafted 
by the Revisor's Office. All agency appropriations are contained in a single 
appropriations bill, commonly referred to as the "mega bill." The appropriations are 
considered simultaneously by the Senate Ways and Means Committee and the House 
Appropriations Committee. In addition to the "mega bill," there are also 
appropriation bills for supplemental appropriations and capital improvements.
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Subcommittees of the Senate Ways and Means Committee and the House 
Appropriations Committee are appointed to review the appropriations of various 
agencies. LKD fiscal analysts present a summary of the agency requests and the 
executive recommendations to the subcommittees whereby the subcommittees are 
responsible for drafting a report detailing all adjustments to the governor's 
recommendations found in the appropriations bill. In addition to making formal 
presentations, Kansas Gscal analysts have clerical duties as well. Analysts are the 
primary support for the subcommittees of the Senate Ways and Means and House 
Appropriations Committees. In this capacity, analysts work with the subcommittee 
chairs to prepare agendas, contact agencies or specific individuals to ^ p ea r and 
testi^  before the subcommittee, record subcommittee action, and prepare the 
subcommittee report to the full committee. After the submission of this report, the 
full committee in each chamber then discusses and votes on the subcommittee 
reports. The fiscal analysts are present in the house and senate chambers to explain 
the subcommittee reports and answer questions. Typically, a conference committee is 
convened to reconcile differences in the appropriation bills passed in each chamber. 
After passage by both chambers, the mega bill is submitted to the governor for 
approval. Throughout the legislative session, Kansas fiscal analysts must also 
respond to information requests by individual legislators and keep track of changes in 




Legislative analysts in Maine work in the OfBce of Fiscal and Program 
Review that comes under the auspices of the Legislative Council made up of the ten 
elected members of the House and Senate leadership. The Maine Legislative Council 
is responsible for the overall management of the entire Maine Legislature. The 
Director of the OfBce ofFiscal and Program Review is appointed by the Legislative 
Council and subsequently hires the legislative fiscal analysts. In Maine, there are 
eight legislative fiscal analysts. Five of these analysts have sole responsibility for 
providing budget and fiscal information concerning state agency budgets to the Maine 
legislature. See Appendix B for an organization chart for the Maine Legislature and 
legislative fiscal staff. According to the ybr
LegzfWoM. frocgfA/rgf, j'erv/cgf, owf Focty, 2001 Edition, analysts within the 
Office ofFiscal and Program Review provide these services: 1) staff the Committees 
on Appropriations and Financial Affairs, Taxation, and Transportation as well as 
other legislative committees as assigned, 2) collect and analyze fiscal and program 
information related to the finances and operation of state government, prepare general 
fiscal background materials, and monitor agency financial status, including transfers 
o f funds, 3) analyze the governor's budget and all other appropriation requests and 
provide fiscal research upon request &om legislators, legislative committees or 
commissions, 4) conduct special budget studies, including revenue and expenditure 
projections and trends, 5) review all bills and amendments for fiscal impact and 
prepare fiscal notes, 6) draft bills for introduction in cooperation with the Revisor of
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Statutes, and 7) provide staff assistance to interim study subcommittees and 
commissions.
Legislative Session Activity and Analysis of Agency Requests and Executive 
Recommendations
Unlike the fiscal analysts in the other states, Maine fiscal analysts are at a 
disadvantage in reviewing and analyzing agency budget requests because they receive 
the requests at a later date than the executive budget ofRce. The Maine legislature 
receives agency budget requests after the executive budget has been submitted to the 
legislature, early in the legislative session. It is at this point that the legislative fiscal 
analysts are responsible for analyzing the requests pertaining to the agencies under 
their auspices.
Although the Maine legislature meets annually, the budget is enacted 
biennially and encompasses two annual budgets. During the first annual session or
the “long session,” the budget for the state of Maine is enacted for the next biennium. 
This session generally runs &om January through June in odd-numbered years. The 
“short session” runs from January through April of even-numbered years and budget 
activities during this session encompass supplemental requests for the current 
biennium.
The executive budget office drafts several appropriation bills (Grooters and 
Eckl 1998). These bills represent the governor's budget request and are referred to as 
the “unified budget proposal” fr)r the expenditure of funds and the revenues projected 
to be available for the operation of state government. These bills must be submitted 
to the legislature by the Friday following the first Monday in January of the frrst
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regular session (Legislators' Handbook 2000). The budget request encompasses two 
parts. Part I represents the current services budget which consists of requests for 
money to continue existing programs and services and Part II consists of additional 
money for new and expanded programs.
After the legislature receives the agency requests and budget bills, the Joint 
Standing Committee on Appropriations and Financial Affairs begins public hearings 
on each agency's requests. According to legislative rules, other committees of the 
legislature (policy committees) are required to review those parts of the budget 
relating to its subject area jurisdiction. These policy committees provide 
recommendations to the Joint Standing Committee on Appropriations and Financial 
Affairs. Furthermore, each policy committee appoints a subcommittee to serve as a 
liaison to the joint appropriations committee where the subcommittee participates in 
the deliberations.
The legislative fiscal analysts prepare their analyses of the agency requests to 
be used by the joint appropriations committee. These analyses include a comparison 
of historical and proposed fnancial and position requests and an explanation of the 
budget requests. These analyses are provided in written form to the director of the 
Office ofFiscal and Program Review who is responsible for presenting the 
information to the joint appropriations committee. Individual fiscal analysts do not 
make presentations befare the committee. Agency directors are also present at the 
budget hearings and are responsible for summarizing their requests before the 
committee. After input &om the policy committees and after the budget presentations 
have been made by the director and the agencies, the joint appropriations committee
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votes on amendments to the budget bills originally submitted by the governor. The 
committee's report on the bills is submitted to the entire legislature for approval 
(Legislators' Handbook 2000).
In addition to providing information to the director regarding agency budget 
requests, each A seal analyst is responsible for preparing G seal notes. The Gscal note 
process in Maine is a significant duty of the legislative analysts as reported by 
analysts, legislators, and agency personnel. By joint rules of the Maine legislature,
G seal notes are required on "every bill or resolve aGecting state revenues, 
appropriaGons or allocation or that requires a local unit of government to expand or 
modify that unit's activities" (OfGce ofFiscal and Program Review 2001). The joint 
rule also gave responsibility for Gscal note preparation to the OGice ofFiscal and 
Program Review. The importance of the Gscal note process is reGecGve in the staff 
document outlining the Gscal note process. This document speciGes the procedures 
for Gscal note preparaGon. While the legislature's joint rule places the sole 
responsibility for the creaGon of Gscal notes with the Gscal analysts, state agencies 
are required to cooperate with the Gscal analysts due to the agencies' expertise and 
program speciGc knowledge. Agencies are expected to review all legislation for 
potenGal impact and submit an estimate of Gscal impact to the OFPR. Subsequently, 
the OFPR analysts consider these estimates when prepanng the Gscal notes (OfGce of 
Fiscal and Program Review 2001).
In conjunction with analyzing agency requests and executive 
recommendations and Gscal note preparation, Maine Gscal analysts also respond to a 
variety of requests Gom the joint appropnaGons committee as well as individual
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legislators. The analysts also track legislatives changes to the budget throughout the 
session in an eSbrt to keep the budget in balance.
Interim Work of Legislative Fiscal Analysts in all States
In addition to work specifically aimed at assisting legislators with decisions 
about the budget, analysts perform other tasks during the interim or after the 
legislature adjourns the regular session. Interim work for legislative fiscal analysts in 
all four states has similar qualities and characteristics. The interim is typically a time 
when analysts are involved in preparing session summaries, working for interim 
committees, and updating models, charts, and other information to be used during the 
next budget cycle. Analysts also use the interim to educate themselves on new 
agency programs and issues as well as federal legislation that could impact state 
operations. Analyst comments concerning interim activities included:
After the session is over, we do year-end reports and a report 
summarizing the appropriations bill. We also get out into the field to see 
our institutions. We get to know people in our agencies, make contacts, 
this helps during the year when I have to ask them for information. We 
typically do not do constituent work, members have interns and aides 
who do this, although we may provide a contact or phone number for these 
people. I look at the kinds of issues relevant to the committee for next 
year, I ask the department about the kinds of initiatives they are undertaking. 
I spend a lot of time looking at federal law, the federal welfare reform 
legislation for example. I watch rulemaking by the feds, to find out the 
budget impact on the state. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
During the interim, I usually answer a wide variety of member questions. 
Members see something in the newspaper, and want more information 
on it. I try to understand the budget better to help me during the session.
I look at new programs, how are they working? I look at other states 
and update my models. If the committee tours a facility, then I go with them. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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In summer, its mostly dealing with individual legislator requests for 
information, "on the spot" requests where members come into our 
office and ask questions, it could be a constituent request, or members 
thinking about future legislation. Some interim committee stafBng is 
necessary as well. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We often get requests for interim committee work or projects &om interim 
committees. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
In summary, all of the analysts interviewed are nonpartisan and work in fiscal 
offices or stafTjoint budget committees. Each analyst is responsible far a specific 
agency(s) or policy area. The Colorado and Arizona legislatures have stronger roles 
in the budget process than legislatures in Maine and Kansas. This stronger role 
impacts the duties of the legislative fiscal analysts in these states. The analysts in 
Colorado and Arizona are given the responsibility of not only reviewing and 
analyzing agency budget requests and executive recommendations, but they must also 
provide the fiscal committees with budget recommendations. A more complete look 
at the differences and similarities in duties follows.
Agency Responsibilities and Duties of Legislative Fiscal Analysts
During the interview process, the legislative fiscal analysts reported a wide 
variety of duties such as identifying and analyzing fiscal and programmatic issues, 
preparing various fiscal reports, gathering background data on specific legislative 
issues, draAing legislation, preparing reports to committees and individual members, 
and in some cases, making budget recommendations.
In the course of fulfilling these duties, legislative fiscal analysts must 
understand the agencies they are responsible for, both fiscally and programmatically.
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Many o f the analysts reported that they must have a broader range of knowledge than 
other legislative stafF because they receive both programmatic and fiscal questions 
6om  legislators. Many types of activities facilitate an understanding of state agency 
programs and services such as onsite visits of state facilities, developing a network of 
agency contacts, participating in agency meetings and work sessions, and attending 
legislative committee meetings on subjects related to the agency for which they have 
responsibility. Therefore, it can be assumed that analysts become experts in a 
particular policy area because of these activities. This issue will be explored in 
subsequent chapters. However, some of the analysts might be in a better position to 
become experts in a specific policy area due to the number of agencies they have 
responsibility for and the size o f the fiscal office in which they work.
The legislative fiscal analysts and executive budget analysts in this study were 
asked to state the number of agencies under their responsibility. Table 3 .3 shows the 
variation in the number of agencies assigned to the legislative fiscal analysts and 
executive budget analysts in this study. When reviewing the number of agencies of 
the legislative fiscal analysts, the legislative fiscal analysts interviewed from Arizona 
and Colorado have fewer agencies compared to the analysts in the other two states. 
Furthermore, the number of Gscal analysts solely responsible for budget analysis is 
greater in Arizona and Colorado than in Kansas and Maine. Table 3 .4 also indicates 
that the executive budget analysts in Arizona and Colorado have more agencies and 
supervisory duties than their legislative counterparts. Kansas legislative Gscal 
analysts and their executive budget counterparts are more evenly matched in terms of 
job responsibilities, while Maine executive budget analyst have fewer agency
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responsibilities than the Maine legislative fiscal analysts. Therefore, Arizona and 
Colorado legislative analysts may be in a better position to become experts in a 
particular policy area because they are responsible for only one policy area or agency.
Table 3.3
Number of Agencies Per Analyst By State and Policy Area





Corrections Analyst 1 1 + supervisory 
duties*
Education Analyst 1 4
Medicaid Analyst 1 3 + part of another 
agency**
Colorado
Corrections Analyst 1 3
Education Analyst 1 + part of 
another agency**
1 + supervisor 
duties*
Medicaid Analyst 1 1 + supervisor 
duties*
Kansas
Corrections Analyst 14 NR***
Education Analyst 8 8
Medicaid Analyst 2 1
Maine
Corrections Analyst NR*** 5
Education Analyst 24 15
Medicaid Analyst 16 4
Note: The data in this table represent agency assignments as of January 2002. The 
number of analysts represents only those analysts with responsibility for agency 
budgets. It does not include analysts with sole responsibility far revenue forecasts, 
Sscal note preparation, personnel review, or tax policy.
* Individual is responsibility far supervising junior analysts within office.
** Agency responsibility is split among two or more analysts where the analyst has 
responsibility for one or more offices or divisions of an agency but not responsibility 
for the entire agency.
***NR=No response &om individual.
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Table 3 .4 shows the number of analysts in each type of ofRce. In two states, 
the number of legislative analysts responsible for the review of state agencies is larger 
than the number analysts in the executive budget office (Arizona and Colorado). 
Kansas and Maine legislative analysts are outnumbered by their executive budget 
counterparts.
Table 3.4
Number of Analysts by State and Office^





Note: Number of analysts in each ofGce represents only those analysts with primary
responsibility for agency budgets. The number does not include office directors, 
deputy directors, or individtmls with primary responsibility for revenue forecasts,
fiscal note preparation, personnel or tax policy.
Tables 3 .3 and 3.4 indicate that the number of Arizona and Colorado 
legislative fiscal analysts responsible for state agency budgets is larger than the 
number of analysts in the executive budget office as well as their legislative 
counterparts in Kansas and Maine. The larger staff size allows analysts in Arizona 
and Colorado to have fewer agency responsibilities, thus, allowing them to specialize 
in one agency or policy area.
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Types of Duties Performed by Legislative Fiscal Analysts
Through a review of previous literature on the duties and roles performed by 
legislative and executive staff (Balutis and Butler 1975, Thurmaier and Gosling 1997) 
as well as comments from the analysts in this study, several broad types of legislative 
fiscal analyst duties were identified. Legislative fiscal analysts were asked to 
describe and provide examples of the duties that they perform for the legislature when 
it is making decisions about the budget. The interviewer reviewed these activities 
and grouped like activities into four broad types of duties: clerical, monitoring, 
facilitating, and policy initiating. This section describes the activities that comprise 
each type of duty. After the description of general duties, the analysts were asked to 
cite their primary duty for the legislature when it is making budgetary decisions. 
Although fiscal analyst duties are similar among states, the type of duty and when it 
occurs differs among the states under study. Therefore, the 5nal section of this 
chapter reports the piimary duty performed by analysts in each state as well as other 
secondary duties performed, variations in duties among the states, and the point at 
which these duties occur in the budget process.
Tvpes of Duties
C/gMcoZ fForAer. One of the main clerical activities of legislative Gscal 
analysts is the staffing of committees and subcommittees. This activity includes 
scheduling meetings and testimony at the request of committee and subcommittee 
chairs, handing out reports and other documents, recording committee actions, and 
preparing the committee or subcommittee report. These types o f clerical activities
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can occur during the legislative session and during the interim as many analysts are 
requested to staff interim committees. Other clerical activities include tracking 
appropriations bill(s) and amendments through some type of bill and amendment 
database. Maine analysts report keeping up with additions to the budget made by 
legislators throughout the legislative session in an effort to maintain budget balance. 
Further, Arizona and Colorado analysts have responsibility for draAing portions of 
the appropriations bill dealing with their area of expertise based upon legislative 
recommendations in that area. Several analysts commented on their clerical duties:
We StafT the appropriations commiAees. We hand things out.
We record the discussions. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I also StafT the appropriations commiAees. This is a clerical role, no speaking 
here other than just calling the roll. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I staff the appropriations subcommiAee on human services. I prepare wriAen 
documents on the subcommiAee recommendations that are read before the full 
appropriations commiAee. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We review the appropriations bill to see that the right commiAee 
recommendation got in the bill. We would correct any mistakes made when 
amending the bill. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We make arrangements for other people to be there [at the subcommiAee 
meeting], contacting agencies to appear, as well as other lobbyists for 
example. We know the people in the agencies and the legislators' secretaries 
do not, so it is easier for us to call and schedule these people.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I amend the portion of the appropriations bill that concerns Medicaid hased 
upon the budget recommendations Aom the House Appropriations and 
Senate Ways and Means CommiAees. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
A/bwtor. All analysts repoAed having responsibility for some type of 
agency or fund monitoring. The most Aequently cited monitoring activities were the
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tracking of agency expenditures and the preparation of spreadsheets recording 
changes in caseloads, or tracking the implementation of an agency program to chart 
progress or congruence with legislative intent. As with some clerical duties, 
monitoring also occurs throughout the year as many analysts report these types of 
activities occurring during the legislative session as well as the interim. Further, 
there are some similarities in monitoring activities within each policy area. For 
example, all of the analysts responsible for the Medicaid program reported keeping 
abreast of caseload growth. Two analysts develop their own caseload models, while 
the other relies upon information collected by the agency or &om the executive 
budget office. The two analysts responsible for developing their own Medicaid 
models often participate in meetings with agency officials and the executive budget 
office where issues impacting caseload are discussed. Two of the corrections 
analysts pointed to monitoring the number of prison inmates and beds needed in the 
state correctional facilities. Finally, legislators also request analysts to provide 
expenditure or revenue histories for a variety of agencies and programs. Analyst 
comments regarding activities that involve monitoring included:
I provide technical estimates for the foundation formula for education 
expenditures. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I found a $20 million math error in the budget request for the Medicaid 
program. I said, this must be wrong. I called the budget director and 
asked that her people check into it. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I look at inmate growth, implications o f proposed changes in the law, and 
case processing in the courts to figure out if there is a backlog. I estimate 
whether these things mean more inmates or less.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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My job is a technical job. I look at the Medicaid forecast. I look at health 
care trends, number of recipients, clients served, types of services used and 
when, etc. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I track expenditures throughout the year. I make sure the agencies are 
following the guidelines set by the legislature. I review department 
expenditures and report to the legislature whether they have over spent in a 
particular area. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Legislators ask me to provide an historical perspective on Medicaid.
What are the biggest cost drivers for that program, what are the trends in 
costs? Caseloads? (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I project revenue gaps and provide current and projected cash flows for 
particular state funds. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
FocfAfafor. Facilitation occurs when analysts respond to a wide range of 
information requests &om legislators and disseminate that information to them. In 
the course of facilitating, it may be necessary to make contact with a variety of 
individuals such as agency personnel, the executive budget ofBce, other legislative 
staf^ and external organizations. Facilitation also implies that analysts are learning 
about the agencies they are assigned. This knowledge can be passed on to legislators 
when questions arise.
Facilitation also includes but is not limited to, the summarization and 
examination of agency requests and/or executive budget recommendations. When 
analyzing agency requests and executive recommendations, analysts point out issues 
that legislators should be aware of such as potential problems with programs or 
funding, possible federal regulations or legislation that may impact a state agency or 
program, and caseload growth and trends. Further, these analyses may include 
current Gscal year expenditure summaries and comparisons to previous Gscal years, 
current appropriation levels, and other caseload or Gscal data. Facilitation also
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involves fiscal note preparation as analysts determine the fiscal impact of a particular 
bill on agency programs or the fiscal impact of legislation on local communities.
The end result of the review and analysis of agency requests, executive 
recommendations, and/or fiscal note preparation is the dissemination o f that analysis 
to the legislature through formal presentations, meetings with individual legislators, 
and/or through written documents. See appendix C for examples of an analysis o f an 
agency request and Appendix D for an example of a fiscal note. Comments &om 
analysts further explain the activities associated with facilitation:
I must let my bosses [legislators] know what the
issues are. The department may say that the issues are X, Y, and Z
and I think that it is X (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I clarify the issues for legislators. For example, public hospitals in the 
Denver area do about the same things, they take care of people on Medicaid. 
But one hospital had costs that were 20 percent higher than the others. 
Legislators wanted to know why this occurred. I sat down with the finance 
officer of that hospital and was able to find out that the variable driving that 
increased cost was the case mix, the people in that particular hospital 
were sicker than those in the other hospitals. I identiGed what is the real 
issue, the real problem and relayed that information back to legislators. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We make presentations to the committee in the fall during the brieGngs 
[analysis of agency budget requests] where we review the agency requests and 
brief members on the various issues regarding the agency.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We provide them [legislators] with an analysis of the executive budget, 
this is a comparaGve analysis o f the agency request versus the executive 
recommendation. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
My job is to know what is going on in my agency to facilitate 
decisionmaking. I am a source of information when they aren't in town. I 
keep them updated. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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I provide fiscal notes on each bill. This entails getting information &om 
the departments on what this proposal would cost What would be the 
impact on the department of this change? This takes a lot of my time 
during the session. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
foZ/cy fMftzator Policy initiation occurs when fiscal analysts prepare 
budget recommendations for the joint budget committee or appropriations committees 
based upon their own research and knowledge provide budget recommendations. In 
this role, the analyst goes beyond scrutinizing and evaluating agency budget requests, 
programs, and the fiscal impact of proposed legislation to one where the analyst 
recommends new agency programs or positions, changes in existing programs or 
positions, and additions or reductions in funding Analysts in two states perform this 
type of duty. In Arizona, budget recommendations are developed prior to the 
legislative session. Colorado legislative fiscal analysts prepare budget 
recommendations in March or April when the legislature is in session. Analysts in 
Arizona and Colorado make budget recommendations on each line-item appropriation 
and number of agency positions and formally present their recommendations to the 
fiscal committees. See Appendix C &r an example of a budget recommendation. 
Analysts responsible for making budget recommendations described this activity:
When we develop our recommendations in the fall, we look at the agency 
request and executive recommendation and meet with committee chairs to go 
over these requests. We then present these recommendations to the 
appropriations committee (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
In early spring, we make presentations to the committee when we present our 
budget recommendations verbally and through a written document. I make 
recommendations by each line item and on funding and number of positions. 
We also make recommendations on mid-year adjustments.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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I am responsible bar making recommendations for each line in the Corrections 
budget. To do this, I review the budget, call the agency iff  have questions, 
and incorporate the concerns raised by the legislators during earlier public 
hearings on the agency requests. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Another activity that falls within this category is the development of policy 
options for individual legislators or legislative committees. The analyst taking on the 
policy initiator role also provides policy options or alternatives to legislators. In this 
role, analysts initiate policy themselves by providing legislators with different policy 
options that may include providing several Amding sources for a new program and/or 
fleshing out different means of operating a program or delivering a service. Requests 
for policy options come either Aom individual legislators or the committee chair will 
formally request staff to provide various policy options to the committee. Comments 
regarding policy options included:
A legislator wanted to expand coverage for the uninsured. He asked 
how could we set up a system to cover the uninsured? What 
would the cost be? (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
If  a member wants to change the eligibility requirements for a particular 
program, then I would research the cost of doing that.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I am often asked to And alternatives for increasing revenues or different 
options on funding a particular program. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We let the chairs know what is going on with the agency and we would 
provide them with a list of options, how can the budget be decreased or 
increased in certain areas. I give them various options, the pros and cons and 




While analysts in all four states are responsible for undertaking many of the 
same clerical, monitoring, information collection and dissemination, and review and 
analysis duties, variations do exist in reported primary and secondary duties and the 
point in the budget process where these duties occur. Table 3 .5 indicates that there 
are three duties common to the analysts in the states under study: summarizing 
agency budget requests and/or executive recommendations, responding to 
information requests, and tracking agency expenditures, caseloads, etc. Therefore, 
facilitation/analysis and agency monitoring are the two types of duties found in all 
6)ur states. Beyond this commonality, duties vary among the analysts.
One of the most important distinctions in analyst duties occurs in Arizona and 
Colorado. Analysts in these states prepare budget recommendations, while analysts 
in other states do not. Similarly, Arizona and Colorado analysts also have 
responsibility for drafting portions of the appropriations bill(s). The preparation of 
budget recommendations and drafting the appropriations bill by staff reflects the 
strength of the Arizona and Colorado legislatures in the budget process. Whereas, in 
Kansas and Maine, analysts do not make budget recommendations and the governor's 
budget is embodied in the appropriations bill drafted by other entities.
Although three states are involved in some way with fiscal impact analysis, 
the nature of involvement and the amount of time spent on this analysis varies. The 
preparation of fiscal impact statements is the most time consuming for analysts in 
Arizona and Maine. Four of the five analysts interviewed in these states reported a 
significant amount of time preparing fiscal impact statements on proposed legislation.
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Analysts in Arizona and Maine are provided with ûscal note guidelines and general 
format for the preparation of fiscal notes. In Arizona, fiscal notes are prepared at the 
request o f individual legislators and are submitted to the fiscal analyst responsible for 
fiscal note coordination who subsequently assigns the request to the appropriate fiscal 
analyst (Baf&ur 2000). In Maine, Gscal notes are required by joint rules of the 
legislature and analysts are responsible for preparing notes for all bills and 
amendments in their policy area. As in Arizona, a principal analyst is responsible for 
coordinating the Gscal note process. In Colorado, the Gscal note section of the 
Legislative Council has the responsibility for Gscal note preparaGon. However, 
Colorado Gscal analysts report that they review the Gscal notes prepared by the Gscal 
note section and make correcGons or additions if needed.
Analysts in Arizona, Colorado, and Kansas report making formal 
presentaGons to their respecGve Gscal committees, primarily regarding the review and 
analysis of agency requests and executive recommendations. Maine analysts do not 
report such presentaGons on agency requests and executive recommendations, as this 
duty is reserved for the Gscal staff director and agency directors.
Primary Duty
As the legislative Gscal analysts were describing their general duties, they 
were also asked to identify their primary duty for the legislature when it is making 
decisions on the state budget. Table 3 .5 indicates that Gscal analysts in Arizona and 
Colorado report their primary duty is twofold: preparing brieGngs or analyses of the 
agency budget requests and preparing budget recommendations for the legislative 
committees responsible for the budget. These activities were deemed so important
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that analysts in these states had a difficult time choosing the primary duty. For 
analysts in Arizona, the process of analyzing requests and preparing 
recommendations occurs at the same time over a period of a few months, whereas in 
Colorado, the two duties are done at different times in the budget process.
Likewise, Kansas and Maine analysts also report that the analysis of agency 
budget requests is a primary duty, but other duties are also important. For the 
analysts in Kansas, staffing the subcommittees of the Senate Ways and Means 
Committee and the House Finance Committee takes up a lot of their time during the 
legislative session. These subcommittees meet two or three times a week and the 
chairs o f  the subcommittees rely upon the Kansas analysts to coordinate meetings, 
assist in the development of agenda, record subcommittee action, hand out material to 
the committee members, and draft subcommittee reports. As discussed above, the 
Maine analysts interviewed reported that preparing fiscal notes on all legislation 
having a hscal impact is a significant part of their daily work during the legislative 
session. In addition to the fiscal impact statements, Maine analysts also rq)ort that 
they engage in the preparation of financial reports and historical and trend analyses.
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Table 3.5
Duties Performed and Primary/Secondary Duties* of Legislative Fiscal Analysts






Review and evaluation 
of agency budget 
requests
#1 #1 #1 #1 Facilitator
Development of policy 
options
X X X Policy
Initiator
Fiscal note preparation X #2 Facilitator
Fiscal note review X Facilitator
Presentations to 
committees
X X X Facilitator




X X X X Facilitator
Tracking
expenditures/ caseloads








X X X Clerical
Worker
X= Denotes duty performed by ana ysts
# 1=  Denotes primary duty 
#2= Denotes secondary duty
Table 3 .5 reports the point at which specific duties are performed by the 
legislative analysts in each state. The most significant feature of Table 3 .5 is the 
time &ame or starting point for the analysts. The budget process begins earlier 6)r 
analysts in Arizona, Colorado, and Kansas due to the submission of agency requests 
and/or executive recommendations before the session begins. Whereas Maine 
analysts have a shorter time &ame for the analysis of agency requests as they receive 
agency requests at the beginning of the legislative session in January.
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Unlike analysts in Arizona and Kansas, analysts in Colorado make two sets of 
formal presentations to committee members. The first presentation or "briefing" 
occurs in December after the receipt of the executive budget proposal in November. 
These "briefings" comprise the review and analysis of agency requests and executive 
recommendations. A second round of formal presentations occurs March through 
April. At this time, the analysts present the Colorado Joint Budget Committee with 
their budget recommendations.
Development of policy options, fiscal note preparation, responding to 
legislator requests, stafBng committees, and tracking agency expenditures occur 
throughout the legislative session in all states where these activities are undertaken. 
Finally, Arizona analysts draft their portion of the appropriations bill after agency 
hearings and after committee, subcommittee, and caucus deliberations have taken 
place. Likewise, Colorado analysts draft the appropriations bill aAer presenting 
budget recommendation to joint committee and after receiving the line-item 
recommendations by the committee.
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Table 3.6
Point in Budget Process When Duty Occurs






Nov-Dee, prior to legislative session 
Jan-April, during legislative session






Nov-Dee, prior to legislative session 
Nov-Dee, piior to legislative session 
Sept-Dee, prior to legislative session 
Jan, beginning of legislative session
Development of policy options AZ
CO
KS
Before and during legislative session 
Before and during legislative session 
Before and during legislative session
Fiscal note preparation AZ
ME
Throughout legislative session 
Throughout legislative session
Fiscal note review CO Throughout legislative session





Jan, beginning of legislative session 
Dec, prior to legislative session AND 
March-April
Jan, beginning of legislative session
StafBng committees CO
KS
Throughout legislative session 
Throughout legislative session






Throughout legislative session 
Throughout legislative session






Throughout legislative session 
Throughout legislative session
Throughout legislative session 
Throughout legislative session
Drafting appropriations bill(s) AZ
CO
Middle of legislative session 
Middle to end of legislative session





Throughout legislative session 
Throughout legislative session 
Throughout legislative session
Conclusion
Legislative fiscal analysts and executive budget analysts perform similar 
functions for the legislature and executive, respectively. Both groups of analysts have 
responsibility for a specific agency or group of related agencies and provide
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information to their bosses regarding agency budget requests, budget 
recommendations &om either the executive branch or legislative branch, and other 
fiscal and programmatic issues of importance to the state. While the legislative fiscal 
analysts operate in a nonpartisan environment where they respond to the needs of 
legislators &om all political parties, their executive budget counterparts have one 
master in the governor.
Of those interviewed, more women made up the ranks of legislative fiscal 
analysts than executive budget analysts. The executive budget analysts were younger 
and held slightly less tenure than the legislative fiscal analysts. With respect to 
education, legislative fiscal analysts and executive budget analysts are highly 
educated individuals, with 86 percent holding a master's degree or doctoral degree. 
The legislative analysts are more likely to hold degrees in public administration, 
political science, and public policy while their executive budget counterparts are more 
likely to be educated in business related Gelds. Most legislative analysts reported 
working previously in a state agency or a local government, while most executive 
budget analysts reported working in either state agencies or the private sector. The 
higher presence of previous employment in the private sector for executive budget 
analysts may reGect the higher presence of business related degrees among this 
group. Executive budget analysts may be pulled from the ranks of the private sector 
more &equently than legislative Gscal analysts and those executive budget analysts 
&om the private sector are more likely to have business or accounting degrees.
Overall, legislative Gscal analysts were very pleased and satisGed with their 
jobs. This satisfaction draws mainly &om the great variety and challenge of the job
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including the exciting political environment in which these analysts work. Long 
work hours and pressure to perform within a limited amount of time are the primary 
negative factors regarding work as a legislative fiscal analyst.
In support of the legislature, analysts &om all four states perform many of the 
same duties. In this study, all of the analysts engaged in the review and analysis of 
agency requests and executive recommendations, agency monitoring, and responding 
to legislator requests for information. The analysis of agency requests and executive 
recommendations is the primary duty for all analysts, although Colorado and Arizona 
analysts also report that the development of budget recommendations is a primary 
duty. The most significant difference in duties among analysts in the four states 
under study concerns the development of budget recommendations. Arizona and 
Colorado analysts are given the responsibility for developing and presenting budget 
recommendations to the legislature, while analysts in the other two states do not 
undertake this duty. Reflecting the strength of the legislature in Arizona and 
Colorado, analysts not only develop budget recommendations for the legislature, but 
they also draft the appropriations bills that are the basis for legislative deliberation on 
the budget.
From the description of duties by the legislative fiscal analysts, facilitating 
and monitoring are the types of duty common to all eleven analysts. Facilitation 
require analysts to understand their assigned agency(s) including both fiscal and 
programmatic issues as well as develop contacts with agency personnel and the 
executive budget office in an effort to collect pertinent information regarding state 
agencies. Facilitation also requires communication skills to effectively disseminate
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that information in a variety of formats to the legislator or legislative committee. 
Monitoring refers to activities such as preparing revenue and expenditure trends and 
analyses and monitoring caseloads.
The next chapter discusses the relationships that analysts have with key 
budget actors including legislators, agency personnel, and executive budget analysts. 
In the course of this discussion, more light is shed on facilitation as legislators 
respond to questions regarding the most useful types of information provided to them 
by the analysts, legislator reliance on that information, and the degree of direction and 
discretion given analysts when providing such information. Further, in an attempt to 
identify factors that condition influence, the &equency and nature of contact among 
the key budget actors will be discussed as well as the views of agency personnel and 
executive budget analysts on the importance of establishing good relationships with 
legislative fiscal analysts. Finally, in an effort to validate the responses of the 
analysts regarding the duties and activities performed, both legislators and agency 
personnel will comment on their perceptions of the most appropriate role played by 
the legislative fiscal analyst.
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NOTES
1. Sources 6*r Table 3.4: Arizona legislative stafF available at 
www.azlee.state.az.us/ilbc/ilbcstf.htm accessed November 1, 2001. Arizona executive stafF 
available at www.state.az.us.ospb/pdf0203 Mid-Biennium Book.pdf accessed November 1, 
2001. Colorado legislative staGF available at www.statB.co.us/gov dir/lee dire/jbc/stafFhtm 
accessed October 1, 2001. Colorado executive stafF available at 
www.state.co.us/eov dir/eovnr dir/ospb/Budeet analvsts.htm accessed October 1,2001. 
Kansas legislative staff available at http://skvwavs.lib.ks.us/ksleg/KLRD/klrd.html accessed 
October 1, 2001. Kansas executive staff available at http://da.state.ks.us/budget/stafF.htm 
accessed on October 1, 2002. Maine legislative staff available at 
www.state.me.us/leeis/ofpr/contaGLhtm accessed October 1, 2001. Maine executive staff 
available at www.state.me.us/budget/web-b-staff.pdf accessed October 1, 2001.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Legislative Fiscal Analysts: Roles and Relationships with Key Budget Actors
In the course of enacting the state budget, many actors are involved. State 
agencies prepare agency budget requests reflecting their needs but also in concert 
with gubernatorial budget priorities and objectives. The executive budget ofRce 
reviews and adjusts the agency requests to reflect the governor's perspective.
Finally, the legislature gets its opportunity to review the executive budget and pass an 
appropriations bill with the support of legislative analysts who provide the basic 
information &om which legislators make decisions. T h e r^ re , the state budget is 
shaped by a variety of actors.
This chapter explores the relationships that exist between legislative analysts 
and the other key actors involved in the development of the state budget. Because 
legislative Ascal analysts work for the legislature, special attention will be devoted to 
the relationship that exists between legislator and analyst, including the 6 equency and 
nature of contact, the most useful information provided by the analysts, the discretion 
with which it is provided, and legislator reliance on that information. Legislators 
also reveal the role that best characterizes legislative fiscal analysts in the budget 
process. The relationship between analyst and legislator is important in 
understanding how analysts assist legislators in making budgetary decisions, arguably 
some of the most important decisions made in state government. Agency persoimel 
also describe the role o f the legislative fiscal analyst responsible far their agency's 
budget. By determining the roles that analysts play with respect to their assigned 
agencies, we can compare legislative fiscal analyst roles with executive budget
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analyst roles with which there is previous research. Finally, as facilitators of 
information, legislative fiscal analysts interact with agency personnel and the 
executive budget ofGce to get the information needed for the legislative branch. This 
chapter explores this interaction as well as responses &om agency ofRcials and 
executive budget analysts on the importance of establishing a good relationship with 
the legislative fiscal analyst.
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Relationships with Legislators
In their capacity as fiscal staff  ̂analysts are charged with providing a variety 
o f services to the fiscal committee(s) in their respective state legislatures. These 
services were identified and discussed in C huter Three as the general duties of 
legislative analysts and included such activities as analyzing agency requests and 
executive recommendations, developing budget recommendations, preparing fiscal 
notes, collecting various expenditure data, preparing reports, stafRng committees, 
researching issues, and responding to legislative requests for information.
In this study, 13 chairs and members o f either appropiiations or budget 
committees and subcommittees were interviewed. These committees are responsible 
for reviewing agency budget requests, listening and responding to legislative fiscal 
analyst presentations on agency budgets, and making recommendations on the state 
budget. Therefore, legislators sitting on these committees were contacted due to their 
position to assess the role of legislative fiscal analysts in the state budget process.
The researcher was able to interview legislators &om each of the four states under 
study. Due to the differences in committee structure among the four states, different 
types of members were contacted and interviewed in each state. When possible.
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subcommittee chairs in the policy areas that correspond to the assigned agencies of 
the legislative fiscal analysts were interviewed. Full committee members and chairs 
were interviewed in those states without subcommittees. In Arizona, Kansas, and 
Maine, four legislators were interviewed for this study. Only one legislator h-om the 
Colorado Joint Budget Committee was interviewed far this study as other committee 
members failed to respond to the interview request.
During the interview process, analysts and legislators were asked a variety of 
questions regarding the nature and &equency of their interactions, the most useAil 
information provided by analysts, the degree of analyst discretion in providing that 
information, legislator trust and reliance on analysts for information, and whether 
legislators ask analysts for advice. These questions were designed to better 
understand the relationships between fiscal analysts and legislators, as these 
relationships have not been explored in previous literature. Further, by understanding 
these relationships, we can determine if they condition legislative fiscal analyst 
influence in the budget process.
Contact between Legislative Fiscal Analvst and Legislator
The first questions asked of legislative Gscal analysts were whom they come 
into contact with and for whom they perform the most work. In answering these 
questions, analysts were asked to select 6 om a variety of legislators: individual 
legislators, committee members, committee chair, caucus leaders, members o f a 
particular political party, or members in either the House or the Senate. In general, 
there are common patterns of analyst contact with legislators. All analysts reported 
having primary interaction with and giving primary support to the members of the
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fiscal committees. The most common place of contact is in the committee setting. 
However, there are variations in interaction among analysts in the four states due to 
differences in committee structure. Arizona and Kansas have similar committee 
structures that are comparable in size. Both states have appropriations committees in 
each chamber. The Arizona House ^propriations Committee is comprised of 17 
members and the Arizona Senate Appropriations Committee has a total membership 
of 12 legislators. The Kansas Senate Ways and Means Committee is comprised of 
11 members and the Kansas House Appropriations Committee has a total 
membership of 23. In both states, the committees are broken down into 
subcommittees responsible for distinct subject areas. In contrast, joint committees 
operate in Colorado and Maine where the Colorado Joint Budget Committee (JBC) 
has only six members and the Maine Joint Committee on Appropriations and 
Financial Affairs is comprised of 13 members. Unlike Arizona and Kansas, the 
Colorado and Maine joint committees have no subcommittees. See Appendix B for 
an organizational chart showing the size and composition of each of the fiscal 
committees in the four states under study.
Committee structure and size are factors in explaining contact between analyst 
and legislator. Analysts in Arizona reported primary contact with and working for the 
appropriations committee chairs and subcommittee chairs in each chamber, followed 
by the members of those committees. Arizona analysts are often in attendance in the 
appropriations committees and subcommittees but legislative fiscal analysts also 
reported attending caucus meetings where they present information and answer 
various questions. In Kansas, while all three analysts reported primary contact with
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and working for individual members of the Kansas House Appropriations and Kansas 
Senate Ways and Means committee, interaction with subcommittee chairs is quite 
Sequent at the beginning of the legislative session when subcommittees are reviewing 
agency budget requests and making recommen&itions to the full committee.
Although Arizona analysts report attending committee, subcommittee, and caucus 
meetings &equently when making formal presentations and answering specific 
questions, Kansas analysts are always present in subcommittee meetings due to their 
role as primary clerical staff Therefore, visibility for Kansas legislative analysts is 
quite high among subcommittee members primarily due to their role as the sole 
staffers for the subcommittees.
The two Maine analysts interviewed reported primary contact with and 
working for the individual members of the Joint Committee on Appropriations and 
Financial Affairs. Similarly, analysts in Colorado report coming into contact with 
and working more for the members of the joint committee as whole, as opposed to 
committee chairs. Unlike analysts in the other three states, none of the Colorado 
legislative analysts interviewed made a distinction in contact and primary service 
between the committee chair and committee members. Due to the small size of the 
Colorado budget committee, analysts serve all members equally. Therefore, the size 
of the committee may dictate the interaction between analysts and legislators. With 
larger committees, analyst contact is more Aequent with committee and/or 
subcommittee chairs. In this study, as committee size decreases, contact with all 
members of the committee is more common.
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From the legislative perspective, some interesting legislator-analyst 
relationships come to light. Full committee chairs and members were adced to report 
how much contact they have with the three legislative fiscal analysts responsible for 
the budgets of the Corrections, Education, and Medicaid agencies. Subcommittee 
chairs and subcommittee members were asked to report how much contact they have 
with the legislative 6 seal analyst responsible for the particular state agency 
corresponding to the subcommittee's jurisdiction. The first question asked of 
legislators required them to identify by name the legislative fiscal analyst responsible 
for the budgets of the Corrections, Education, and Medicaid agencies. This question 
attempted to assess the general legislative awareness of the legislative fiscal analyst 
responsible for each policy area. The Colorado legislator interviewed accurately 
identified all three analysts, while one minority party legislator in Arizona and one 
legislator in Kansas could not identify the analyst responsible for the Corrections 
Department. No legislator in Maine could accurately identify all three analysts by 
name. Although the number of legislators interviewed was small, this question 
indicates that Maine analysts were the least likely to be identified by the legislators 
for which they work.
Legislators were also asked whom they have more contact with, the legislative 
fiscal analyst or the fiscal office director. Legislators in Arizona, Colorado, and 
Kansas reported more Aequent contact with the legislative fiscal analyst responsible 
for a particular agency's budget, while Maine legislators reported more Aequent 
contact with the A seal office director or the principal analyst. However, legislators 
Aom all states reported contacting the A seal analyst more Aequently than the Ascal
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ofRce director when they have a specific question regarding an agency's budget. If 
the legislators have a more general question about state finances, they are more likely 
to contact the director.
When legislators were asked how much contact they have with the legislative 
fiscal analyst several patterns emerged. In all states, direct legislator contact with the 
analysts is episodic and coincides with the nuyor duties that the analysts perform. 
Legislator contact with legislative analysts is quite frequent when analysts present 
their review and analysis of agency requests and executive budget recommendations. 
This period of Sequent contact occurs prior to the legislative session for Arizona and 
Colorado analysts and at the beginning of the session for Kansas and Maine analysts. 
Additionally, Colorado analysts present their budget recommendations formally to the 
Joint Budget Committee during the months of March and April and there is Sequent 
legislative contact with analysts at this point.
In those states with subcommittees (Arizona and Kansas), the subcommittee 
chairs reported at least weekly contact and, at times, daily contact with the analyst 
responsible for the subcommittee's policy area. In Arizona, legislative fiscal analysts 
and chairs interact during the scheduled subcommittee meeting as well as in Sequent 
visits with the chair to discuss agency budget requests. In Kansas, contact between 
chair and analyst occurs during subcommittee meetings is very Sequent as analysts 
staff the subcommittees, but contact also occurs outside the subcommittee setting 
when chair and analyst discuss future meetings, agendas, and requests for 
information. In Arizona, less frequent contact was reported non-chair committee 
members. Contact between legislator and analyst is often dependent upon the
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legislator requesting an independent briefing with analysts to discuss a specific 
agency's budget. No non-chair committee members were interviewed in Kansas.
Minority party members interviewed in Arizona reported less contact with 
analysts than members of the majority party. One minority member reported more 
contact with the minority analyst assigned to staGF the appropriations committees than 
the legislative fiscal analyst. The appropriations committees in each chamber have 
both majority and minority analysts who are responsible for committee staffing. The 
legislative fiscal analysts are present during these meetings to either present their 
budget recommendations, to provide other Gscal information, or to respond to 
committee member questions regarding budget issues. At least for one minority 
legislator, more contact occurs with the minority staffer of this committee than with 
the legislative Gscal analyst responsible for providing the fiscal information.
Minority legislators in other states did not report less contact with analysts compared 
with members of the m^ority party.
Finally, fiscal office protocol also determines frequency of contact. All Maine 
legislators reported more contact with the fiscal office director and principal analyst 
than the junior fiscal analysts. This was not the case for the legislators in the other 
three states where legislators reported more frequent contact with the legislative fiscal 
analyst rather than the fiscal office director. In Maine, fiscal office protocol dictates 
that the fiscal office director and the principal analyst are present in committee 
meetings on a daily basis to answer committee questions and present information on 
agency budget requests. Junior analysts in Maine are not present daily in the
155
committee, nor do they make presentations before the committee. Therefore, Maine 
analysts are less visible in the process than analysts &om the other states under study.
The researcher also analyzed whether contact varied based upon individual 
analyst and specific policy area (Corrections, Education, or Medicaid). When 
reviewing analyst and legislators responses to the questions regarding contact, no 
pattern of contact based upon any particular analyst or specific policy area could be 
identified.
In summary, there are several common features regarding contact between the 
analysts and legislators &om all four states. First, all analysts reported working 
primarily for members of the fiscal committees as opposed to legislators with no 
involvement in budgetary or fiscal matters. Second, contact is generally episodic, 
coinciding with the formal presentations by analysts regarding agency budget 
requests and budget recommendatioirs in those states requiring analysts to perform 
this duty. Third, legislators more &equently contact legislative Sscal analysts when 
they have a specific question about an agency's budget as opposed to the fiscal officer 
director who is more likely to be contacted when a question is broader in nature. 
Despite these common features, contact varies &om state to state based upon a variety 
of factors. First, committee structure and size is important. Larger committees with 
subcommittees require more interaction between analyst and chair. Here, staff 
direction is typically given through the chairs, not individual members. Analysts in 
legislatures with larger committees and subcommittees report primary contact with 
and working for committee and subcommittee chairs more Aequently than individual 
members of the committees. Legislator comments also support this pattern. This
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pattern is found in Arizona and Kansas, but is especially true in Kansas where the 
analysts are the only staST support for the subcommittees and must assist the 
subcommittee chair in organizing meetings. Second, m^ority/minority status can 
also impact contact at least in one of the four states under study. M^ority party 
members report more Sequent contact with analysts than minority party legislators. 
This pattern of contact is common to Arizona, but was not found in the other states 
under study. Finally, fiscal ofhce protocol also determines analyst contact with 
legislators. In Maine, the fiscal stafT director and principal analyst are seen as the 
primary staff in committee meetings where they make presentations before the 
committee rather than the legislative analysts. Although Maine analysts report 
working primarily with all members of the appropriations committee, they seem to be 
the least visible of the analysts in this study. They do not make formal presentations 
before the committee and have no opportunity to gain visibility in a smaller venue 
due to the lack of subcommittees. Maine legislators report coming into contact with 
the fiscal oSice director and principal analyst more than the junior analysts. Further, 
legislators in Maine were less able to identi^ analysts by name than the legislators in 
other states.
The Provision of Budgetary Information by Analysts
As explained in Chapter Three, legislative fiscal analysts perform a wide 
range of duties. In the course of performing these duties legislators receive a variety 
of information &om the fiscal staff. This section explores legislator reliance on that 
information, the most useful kinds of information provided by the legislative Gscal
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analysts, the amount of discretion and direction given analysts in providing 
information, and the role of information provision in building tmst with legislators.
All legislative fiscal analysts were asked to select the extent that legislators 
rely on them far information 6 om three categories: a great deal of reliance, some 
reliance, or little or no reliance. Nine of the 11 analysts reported that they believed 
legislators rely on them "a great deal" for information. One analyst reported that 
legislative fiscal analysts are the "eyes and ears" for the l%islature by keeping 
legislators abreast of key issues. Other analysts responded that legislators rely on 
them a great deal due to the information advantage that they have over legislators. 
Unlike legislators, who have other commitments on their time, analysts have full time 
responsibility for understanding and gaining knowledge on a particular agency or 
policy area.
Although the majority of the analysts reported that legislators rely on them a 
great deal for information, some analysts cautioned that particular groups of 
legislators are less dependent than others. Two of the 11 analysts reported "some 
reliance" o f legislators with regards to information. One analyst replied, "there are 
some legislators not on the appropriations committee who don't know where we are 
located." This further indicates that the rank and file members of the legislature 
receive little direct support &om the fiscal staff Another analyst stated that staff is 
only one source of information with state agencies, lobbyists, and the executive 
budget ofRce as other important sources of information for legislators.
Partisanship may determine the reliance on information &om analysts in one 
state. Although responding that legislators rely on them "a great deal" for
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information, two analysts &om Arizona commented that there is a perception among 
members of the minority party that staff is more "Republican than Democrat." 
Because of this perception, the minority party may be less likely to contact staff than 
the m^ority party if staff is seen as belonging to or supporting one party over the 
other. Previously, it was established that the minority party legislators in this state 
reported less j&equent contact with the analysts than the majority party members 
interviewed. Analysts &om the other three states did not make comments regarding 
different perceptions of information reliance among political party members.
Because the majority of analysts reported a great deal of reliance on 
information by legislators, identifying the types o f information that are the most 
useful for legislators when they are making decisions about the budget is important in 
understanding how analysts assist legislators in the budget process. Both legislative 
fiscal analysts and legislators were questioned about the types and usefulness of 
information provided by analysts.
Legislative fiscal analysts were asked two questions regarding the types and 
use&ilness of information. First, what kinds of information do you [analyst] most 
6 equently provide during the budget process? Second, &om the kinds of information 
that you [analyst] provide, what are the most useful for legislators? The comments 
&om the analysts reveal that a wide variety of information is provided to legislators. 
Although most information requests concern agency budgets, some requests are 
programmatic in nature. The most Sequent kind of information provided by analysts 
concerns the agency budget request. Analysts are responsible for summarizing the 
content of the agency budget request, providing historical G seal trends, comparing
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past e)cpenditures and appropriations, as well as responding to various questions &om 
legislators. Responses from the analysts included:
I provide anything related to the budget. From presenting an analysis 
of the agency's budget request to more specific information based upon 
specific questions f"om legislators. We respond to adhoc questions 
&om members, these questions can be both fiscal and programmatic, 
but mostly fiscal. For example, what did this agency spend in this line 
item last year? Why have the costs far this program increased over the 
past five years? Did the agency use all of its appropriation for this 
program last year? (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I prepare the technical estimates on K-12 education. I give chairs 
background information on increased enrollment, what the local property 
tax rate is, how much is collected, what the agency requests in increased 
funding and why. I lay out \^diat the agency is asking far, give them 
background information on the request. I do an individual calculation of 
the request, to see if my numbers differ from the department. I explain 
to chairs why our numbers differ. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We provide all kinds of information. Mostly fiscal, but we are asked 
questions and provide information relating to the management and 
operation of agencies and programs, the fiscal needs of agencies, we 
review the executive budget and the budget requests of each agency, we
study the state’s funding structure and financial condition and brief the 
members on this. We also get questions on personnel, purchasing, and 
reporting procedures of the state. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Information specifically about an agency's budget, trends in funding, 
specific information on something legislator wants to do, how it would 
impact agency. Mainly information about specific programs. The 
most useful is the budget write-up. It contains information about the 
agency request and budget, how it differs &om previous years, m ^or 
program changes, funding trends and changes. There is a lot of information 
there. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Fiscal analysts are the in-house experts on agency budgets. We get 
questions directly related to the agencies we are responsible for, 
anything &om what are the major items in the agency request to how 
much did they spend last year to how a program operates.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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Legislative analysts were also asked to report the most useful kind of 
information provided to legislators. From the analyst perspective, the most useful of 
all information provided to legislators is that which is provided during the review and 
analysis of agency requests and the presentation of budget recommendations in those 
states where this duty occurs. All but one analyst reported that the analysis of 
agency requests and the presentation of budget recommendations is the most useful 
kind of information for legislators. One of the two analysts interviewed in Maine 
reported that fiscal notes are the most useful kind of information provided to 
legislators. The legislative fiscal analyst commented:
We also do fiscal notes and this is important. We print them out on ofRce 
letterhead and the members sometimes wave them around and say, 'and this is 
how much it is going to cost.' (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
In all four states, written documents are prepared for members of the Gscal 
committees regarding the review of agency budget requests, executive 
recommendations, and budget recommendations. Analysts in three states, Arizona, 
Colorado, and Kansas ^ e  Anther responsible for presenting their analysis o f agency 
requests and analysts in Arizona and Colorado also develop budget recommendations. 
In discussing the most useAil information provided to legislators, the following 
responses reveal the importance of the summaries of agency requests, executive 
recommendations, and the provision of budget recommendations.
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The budget information provided during presentation of recommendations 
is the most useful. I do a lot of comparison charts, between my numbers and 
the OSPB [Office of Strategic Planning and Budget] numbers, or my numbers 
and agency numbers. When I estimate the cost of the foundation formula, I 
provide my assumptions and then compare that with the OSPB and agency. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
When we make our presentations on the budget. When we brief the 
members of the committee. When I am finished with my presentation, it 
is a question and answer session by the committee members. It helps them 
to get a perspective on the agency, what are they doing now, what have 
they done in the past. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The two most helpful things are the documents in fall and spring.
In the fall, the briefing [analysis of agency requests] provides them with the 
issues and questions to ask the agencies when they come in for the hearings. 
The document in the spring is the figure setting [budget recommendations] 
document. It contains the bulk of the recommendations here, the basis 
for the budget. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The budget write-up, [analysis of agency requests] they [members] carry it 
around, they make notes on it. It is the thing they start with. We know they 
use it. They make reference to it. If we raise an issue in it, then they almost 
always bring it up. It sets the agenda for their debates.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The most useful is the initial analysis of agency requests and executive 
recommendation and then we respond to additional requests for 
information based upon our presentation. We make the initial analysis to the 
subcommittee, the legislators don't look at the executive budget itself  ̂ it is too 
lengthy. So our analysis is the main document that they use to make 
decisions. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
For the most part, the legislative analysts in this study believe that the analysis 
of agency requests and development of budget recommendations are the most usehil 
types of information provided to legislators. Furthermore, the importance given to 
these two tasks coincides with the primary duties cited by the legislative analysts in 
Chapter Three. In that chapter, it was revealed that the primary duty of analysts in all 
states was the analysis of agency requests. In addition to the analysis of agency
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requests, analysts in Arizona and Colorado cited as a primary duty the provision of 
budget recommendations and these analysts also report this activity as information 
that they deem useful for legislators. In Chapter Three, the Maine analysts reported 
that the 6 seal note process is an important secondary duty and both Maine analysts 
concluded that the fiscal note is also an important and useful kind of information that 
they provide to the legislature.
Due to the importance of the analysis of agency requests and budget 
recommendations, a more thorough examination of the content of those analyses is 
warranted. Again, analysts in all four states under study provide some type of written 
analysis to legislators regarding agency budget requests and executive 
recommendations. Documents from two states are reviewed here to better 
understand the kinds of information collected and disseminated.
In Arizona, each member of the Appropriations Committee in each chamber 
receives a copy of the f r q p o s g f / T h i s  book contains a detailed analysis 
and summary of the budget request of each state agency, budget estimates, an 
explanation of the budget changes &om the previous year, and various performance 
measures. A budget table provides prior year actual expenditures and current year 
appropriations. The f .600^ also contains separate budget 
recommendations by the Office of Strategic Planning and Budget staff and the 
legislative fiscal analysts. Accompanying the recommendations of the fiscal analysts 
are the justifications and assumptions used for arriving at the specific 
recommendations. Likewise, Colorado analysts provide similar information in the 
"briefing documents" that accompany the formal analyst presentations on the
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executive budget proposal. The briefing documents can be quite lengthy, up to 
several hundred pages in the case of the analysis of the Medicaid program. The 
presentations and briefing documents cover such topics as an overview of the 
particular department, key responsibilities, factors driving the budget, and major 
funding changes for the last two Gscal years. The briefing document also contains an 
analysis of the priority requests of the department, figures comparing actual 
expenditures with current year appropriations and the upcoming fiscal year budget 
request. Finally, the briefing documents contain a section on key department issues. 
For example, the briefing document for the Colorado Department of Corrections 
discussed the impact of population projections on future bed needs and the status of 
facilities under construction in terms of completion date and cost. Although the 
analysis of agency requests and preparation of budget recommendations occurs at the 
same time in Arizona, the two duties are separate in Colorado. After the presentation 
of the briefing documents, analysts have a few months to prepare the budget 
recommendations during the "figure setting" process as it is referred to in Colorado. 
The figure setting documents [budget recommendations] include a brief overview of 
the request, staff recommendations and the justification for that recommendation.
See Appendix C for examples of analyses of agency requests and budget 
recommendations &om Arizona and Colorado.
It is clear that the m^ority of legislative analysts perceived the analysis of 
agency requests and the provision of budget recommendations as the most useful 
information provided to legislators. What is the perception of legislators in this 
study? Legislators were also questioned on the most useful kinds of information
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provided by the legislative fiscal analysts. From the legislative perspective, the most 
useful information provided by analysts is that which provides a broad picture and 
historical analysis of agency expenditures and programs, key issues confronting the 
agency, and explanation of past decisions. This kind of information is routinely 
provided by the analysts in their analyses of agency budget requests. Comments 
made by the legislators reveal the importance of an analyst who can provide an 
historical perspective and a broad understanding of agency programs and services:
He [LFA] reviews what is being asked for by the Education Department, 
provides us with the big picture. (Legislator)
I often want to know a thorough analysis o f a program, why it is there, 
what it does, how it functions, what are its resources, what good does it do, 
how long has it been established. (Legislator)
The relationship between how one piece of the budget/agency effects 
other agencies, the history of agency programs. I want to 
know how did we get here, history of decisions, how and why was this 
decision made? (Legislator)
When we have new decision items, they [LFAs] give us some idea of how 
that fits with the overall direction of the department and they [LFAs] are 
very helpful with getting a great deal of detail, number crunching. They 
[LFAs] provide a great deal of information on the number o f people in 
departments, how that compares with other departments and other years, etc. 
(Legislator)
From a starting standpoint, the analyst provides an overview of the 
Governor's budget proposal, this baseline is crucial. I must have an analyst 
who gives me an understanding of this baseline. (Legislator)
They provide a lot of useful information. They get information on the 
specifics o f an agency's budget. They help us to understand the 
specific budget items being requested. For example, why did a 
particular department's budget increase last year, Wiat drove the increase? 
(Legislator)
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These comments show the importance of staff as individuals who are valued 
for their capacity to understand the key issues and problems associated with an 
agency or program and ability to explain items in a budget request or executive 
recommendation. Legislators also reported that information pointing out certain 
items in the budget request and/or developing different options to pursue are also 
important informational items provided by the legislative analysts. These legislators 
responded:
He looks at funding in the past, future costs and things we should be 
aware of in the agency budget request. (Legislator)
The analyst can point out unusual items in the agency request. This kind 
of information is prepared in a written document as soon as the executive 
gets his recommendations out. (Legislator)
He tells us things that we should be aware of in the agency budget request. 
(Legislator)
They tell us whether removing funding would damage education seriously 
and how. They tell us what programs should not be touched. What are the 
consequences of cutting K-12 programs? (Legislator)
They give us innovative ways to do things differently such as how to 
maximize general revenue and federal dollars, this is especially important 
in the Medicaid program where we rely on substantial federal fmding. 
(Legislator)
In addition to providing general information about an agency's budget 
request, two of the four legislators interviewed &om Maine specifically cited the 
importance of fiscal notes. Fiscal notes are prepared by legislative analysts in Maine 
in an effort to identify the cost of proposed legislation for the upcoming biennium. 
Maine legislators commented:
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They also do fiscal notes. This is the second m^or Ainction of the staff.
This is very important to the legislature. Rules say we [legislature] must 
have fiscal notes on all bills. There are about 300 pieces of legislation that 
they [analysts] look over to find out if there is a cost. This is a substantial 
part o f what they [analysts] do during the session. (Legislator)
Fiscal notes are very important. We [committee] look at these notes to know 
all o f the costs of a bill. Really important, maybe more so than anything else 
that they [analysts] do. (Legislator)
These comments support the responses &om the Maine legislative fiscal analysts in 
their assessment of fiscal notes as an important secondary duty and as useful 
in&rmation for legislators.
In summary, these comments show that the legislative analysts are responsible 
for providing the basic information upon which legislative decisions are made. 
Further, due to their knowledge of an agency, they set the parameters for dd)ate by 
calling to the attention of legislators specific issues relating to the budget request, 
identifying areas of need or concern, and estimating the costs o f proposed legislation. 
Because analysts provide this basic information to legislators and are perceived to 
rely upon analysts a great deal for information, it is necessary to explore how much 
discretion analysts have in performing this task.
Level o f Direction and Discretion Cliven Analysts
In an ef&rt to more fully explore how analysts provide information, both 
analysts and legislators were asked a series of questions involving the types o f 
direction given to analysts by legislators and the perceived degree of discretion in 
providing that information. These questions were designed to investigate whetho"
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the degree of direction and discretion conditions the influence of legislative fiscal 
analysts to be evaluated in Chapter Five.
Legislative fiscal analysts were asked if they are given direction by legislators 
when providing information and/or making recommendations. Of the 11 legislative 
fiscal analysts interviewed, all analysts responded that they are given direction &om 
legislators on the kinds of information to provide and, if applicable, on how to 
develop budget recommendations. Conunents &om analysts included:
We are given direction by the members when they want us to provide 
different ways of doing things. I may be asked to prepare four options 
and then the legislature picks the one they like. I would not provide options 
on my own without being asked first. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Legislators provide both general and specific direction. If they ask a 
specific question, we provide the answer. If they want basic information 
about an agency, we do the research. They make requests and we provide 
the information. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Direction is apt to range &om the very specific such as eliminate this tax 
and/or increase Amding to this program, to more general instruction such 
as do something to increase support for retired teachers.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
These comments indicate that analysts provide information in response to 
legislator requests. Analyst comments suggest that direction is deSned as responding 
to requests for in&rmation, answering specific questions, preparing policy options on 
behalf o f legislators, and visiting with members to get their views on agency budgets 
or committee agendas. As stated previously, all analysts reported receiving direction 
&om legislators. However, comments &om all three analysts in Colorado suggest less 
direction than analysts in the other three states. All three Colorado analysts reported 
that the development of budget recommendations is conditioned somewhat by
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"common policy" set by the Colorado Joint Budget Committee (JBC), regarding 
uniform increases or decreases in operating costs, health care costs, and travel 
expenses as examples. However, comments &om all three analysts seem to indicate 
that they are fairly free to provide information and develop their own 
recommendations independent of any formal direction &om the members o f the JBC. 
Comments &om these analysts included:
A very small amount of direction. There may be general or informal 
direction that comes down &om the JBC through the staff director to us.
For example, JBC may inform us that they do not want to see any new 
positions for the department. Sometimes we ask, so should we not look 
at increasing staff at all? Then the JBC says, well, consider it but provide a 
justification. The JBC also sets common policy that we follow. This 
usually tells us that we can increase maintenance and operations by 
only 3%. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We have some direction &om the JBC. We have common policy. Typically 
this is a common set of numbers for calculating things such as funding for 
salary increases. The analyst can recommend changes to this, but we must 
provide a justification for not following common policy. Other than that, we 
are not given any other guidelines for providing information or making 
recommendations. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Some direction comes from the common policies. These are policies that are 
set by the JBC. We do typically stay within common policy. This is a set of 
policies regarding travel, medical expenses, etc. based upon an inflationary 
factor. For example, travel is to be reduced by 2.6%. We typically follow 
this, but we are 6 ee to make recommendations that are different than the 
common policy, but we have to provide a justification for it. The JBC 
members do not come into our offices and tell us what to do, or how to make 
recommendations, they do not influence our recommendations.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The Colorado analysts perceive less direction on the part of legislators than 
analysts from the other states under study. Other than coming under the mandates of 
"common policy" set by the Colorado Joint Budget Committee, Colorado fiscal
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analysts report little direction &om committee members. When asked to provide 
some indication as to how many recommendations made are governed by common 
policy, one Colorado analyst reported that the common policy represents about "1.5 
percent of the recommendations" that she make concerning her agency.
This seems to be in stark contrast to the analysts &om Arizona who reported 
getting direction &om the chairs of the appropriations committees when preparing the 
budget recommendations. Comments &om these analysts included:
The chairs give us a general overview and instructions such as we [chairs] 
don't want to give them [agency] the full amount for that request, so 
give us some numbers, different options or suggestions. We do, and 
then they make a decision. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We work closely with the chairs. They let us know what they want. There 
will be times that they want certain things in the budget and we accommodate 
them. You have to be aware of what leadership wants. If for instance, they 
want a $100 million tax cut, we would be aware of that and make our budget 
recommendations accordingly. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We are given direction by the chairs. During the initial meeting of the 
subcommittee, we work closely with the chair o f the subcommittee. I 
inquire about what to focus on and who should be there. If the chair says 
that he is not interested in a particular item, then, I don't put in on the 
agenda. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Another way of assessing the ability of analysts to w oit independently in 
providing information to members is to measure the amount of discretion that they 
perceive. Analysts were asked to report how much discretion they have in providing 
information or making recommendations to legislators from three categories: a great 
deal of discretion, some discretion, or no discretion. All o f the analysts interviewed 
in this study reported that they have a great deal of discretion in providing 
information. As stated earlier, comments &om the analysts suggest that direction
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means responding to a specific question, request for information, or visiting with the 
committee chair. Discretion, however, means having some control over answering 
the question, providing the requested information, or providing legislators with 
information that an analyst deems to be useful. In other words, analysts are directed 
to answer specific questions, but there is discretion in how they choose to answer it. 
Analyst comments on the level of discretion included:
We have a lot of discretion in what they see, in putting together the 
initial budget proposals [budget recommendations]. (Legislative Fiscal 
Analyst)
A great deal of discretion. We can tell them what we want. We have 
complete access to legislators. They are tolerant of input whether they 
listen is another thing. There are relationships that you develop with 
members, some I feel more comfortable with than others and I approach 
these members more. I am the education specialist, and for those members 
with an interest in education, I provide information to them and discuss 
education programs with them. There are no barriers to providing 
information. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
A great deal of discretion. We know what is going on with our agencies.
We have a tremendous amount of responsibility. They rely on us for memory. 
Analysts act as memories for the members. You learn what is essential
information to provide and what is not due to your expertise and relationship 
with certain members. I know the interests of certain members and I keep
them informed of things that I know they are interested in.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We have a great deal o f discretion in presenting information about agency 
budget requests. I do whatever I can to provide them a baseline, give them a 
sense of perspective about the agency and agency programs, and let them 
know what the key issues are. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We have discretion to look into whatever we want to with regard to our 
agencies. We don't assume a knowledge base with members, especially 
with term limits. It is up to us to provide them [legislators] with the basic 
concepts and descriptions of programs. We are the experts and we let them 
know what is going on. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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In providing basic information about agencies and in developing the analysis 
of agency requests, the analysts report a great deal of discretion. These comments 
seem to indicate that analysts are information condensers where they parse out agency 
information and hone in on key issues of interest to legislators. These comments 
show that as facilitators, some analysts do take it upon themselves to inform members 
about agency activities.
In an effort to validate the responses of the fiscal analysts, legislators were 
asked if they give specific direction to the legislative fiscal analyst in terms of the 
in&rmation provided by the analyst. All 13 legislators responded that they give 
direction to legislative fiscal analysts. Most of the direction occurs by asking 
specific questions of analysts, requesting information in specific or uniform format, 
and providing parameters either verbally during a committee meeting or in written 
form on how analysts are to provide information or make certain kinds of budget 
recommendations. Common réponses &om legislators included:
When we [^propriations committee] ask questions of staf^ we are very 
specific about what we want &om them. (Legislator)
I ask specific things of the analyst. For example, one o f my issues is pro-life. 
I would ask the analyst is there any money going to a program that would 
fund an abortion? The analyst would ferret that information out for me.
And, if the analyst saw something or found something of interest to me in 
that area, she would point that out to me. (Legislator)
I explain what Td like to do in committee, what to discuss, who should be 
there to testify. I also tell the analyst to go look at the data and tell me if 
I am right or wrong. Sometimes I have a hunch about something but I need 
the analyst to verify it. (Legislator)
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We [appropriations committee] have designed a package of information 
that the analysts should use to prepare information for the committee 
regarding the review of agency budgets, although over the last five years, not 
much has changed in this package. This year we asked that analysts provide 
more comparative information such as comparing this year's budget to prior 
year and adding more graphs -  more visual information. (Legislator)
Some information is traditional in terms of format, such as the budget 
summaries where analysts follow a uniform format. This is a written 
document that they [analysts] provide to us on the agency requests and 
executive recommendations. At other times, the committee asks for specific 
kinds of information. For example, we are looking at reimbursement rates for 
Medicaid providers. We may ask the analyst to provide us with a list of 
reimbursement rates for Medicaid providers and histoiy of those rates. 
(Legislator)
I, as an older member, tell them [analysts] what I want. But new members 
don't do this as well. When I first got to the legislature, a senior member said 
to use the staff often, but be clear about what you want. New members 
have difficulty with this, because they don't know enough to ask the right 
questions. Staff are also reluctant to release information to the 
appropriation committee members, without first getting authorization from 
the chairs, this is hnstrating sometimes. (Legislator)
These comments &om the legislators in this study support the responses o f the 
legislative Gscal analysts, where both analysts and legislators defne direction in a 
similar 6 shion. Legislators can be very precise in what they ask of analysts in terms 
of posing specific questions, asking for information, and providing some uniform 
policy or written direction on how to present information to the committee.
Two legislators &om Maine reported that analysts would not bring them 
infarmation that was not requested. These legislators replied:
Staff never approach me with information that I have not requested. 
(Legislator)
They [analysts] only respond to direct questions, they would not just come 
to us or me and give me information. (Legislator)
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Although several legislative Hscal analysts commented that they do take it upon 
themselves to inform legislators of an issue not specifically requested, none of these 
analysts were &om Maine.
Further, all of the legislators interviewed in states where analysts make budget 
recommendations report providing analysts with their views and opinions regarding 
the agency budget requests and the recommendations to be developed by the analyst. 
Legislator responses &om Arizona and Colorado are as follows:
When I meet with [LFA] early on before he prepares his recommendations,
I tell him what I am concerned about, or what I would like to see in the way 
of increases or decreases, program changes, etc. in the Corrections budget. 
(Legislator)
In terms of the budget recommendation, the appropriations committee and 
subcommittee chairs ask the analyst to come up with areas for potential cuts, 
areas that could handle cutbacks, look at programs started within the last two 
years, and see how much we could eliminate. They give us options, can you 
come up with 5 ways to cut this program back? (Legislator)
When I meet individually with the analyst about a certain agency's budget,
I am very vocal. I tell the analyst what I am concerned about, what I would
like to see in this budget when they make their recommendations.
(Legislator)
The committee has a set of common policy on things such as increases in 
positions, travel, salaries. This guides the analysts in preparing their 
recommendations to us. (Legislator)
Although all eleven analysts responded that they have a great deal of 
discretion in providing information, only three of 13 (23%) legislators reported that 
the analyst has a great deal of discretion. Comments &om legislators reporting a 
great deal of discretion included:
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A great deal of discretion in providing budget recommendations and 
information to us. While we [committee] have "common policy" that guides 
the analysts in calculating personal services, maintenance and operation, and 
travel, the analysts can go outside of this policy if they provide a justification. 
Also, for those agencies with less than 20 people, we let the analyst look 
at these agencies and make recommendations on how much if any to cut in 
personal services. (Legislator)
A great deal of discretion. We are part time legislators and depend upon them 
for information. (Legislator)
No legislator reported that analysts had little or no discretion in providing 
information or budget recommendations. However, the m^ority of legislators 
reported that analysts have some discretion, but within certain boundaries. The 
m^ority o f legislators (ten of 13) reported that analysts have some discretion in 
providing information or making budget recommendations. From the legislator 
perspective, the nonpartisan nature of fiscal staff precludes analysts 6om interjecting 
their own views. Four of the 10 legislators reporting that analysts have some 
discretion specifically commented on the responsibility o f staff to provide objective 
information to all members of the legislature, regardless of political party. These 
comments indicate that analysts have some discretion in providing information, but it 
must be done in a nonpartisan fashion:
They have some discretion, but staff is nonpartisan. They do try to make 
sure that we have both sides of the argument. (Legislator)
Analyst has a lot of flexibility within the rules but they must provide 
objective information and respect anonymity. For example, the information 
provided to members is confidential unless a member says otherwise.
They have some discretion, but have to have professional ethics. (Legislator)
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Yes they do have discretion, but LFAs are required to be nonpartisan, 
not give their own opinions. Although they are requested to provide policy 
options, or options to be considered, they are expected to provide unbiased 
information to the members. For example, should we fold at risk education 
aid into the basic education aid or keep it separate? What would be the pros 
and coos of doing this? (Legislator)
They [LFAs] have discretion within the boundaries of the questions 
that we ask. They must respond to both sides of the aisle, to both 
parties. Again, the committee asks specific questions of staff and 
they provide us with the answers or information. (Legislator)
Despite these comments on the importance of objectivity when providing 
information, two members of the minority party in one state perceived staGF to be 
influenced by the m^ority party. Two of the four legislators interviewed in this state 
believe that the m^ority party and committee chairs direct the analysts in the 
provision of information. For members of the minority party in this study, this is not 
viewed positively. No other members of the minority party interviewed in other 
states responded that analysts take too much direction &om the m^ority party. The 
minority members perceiving some influence by the majority party responded as 
follows:
They [LFAs] do have some discretion in providing information and making 
recommendations, but they are too under the control of the appropriation 
chair, they may be limited in what they recommend depending upon the 
chair, they may be inhibited in providing options because of this. 
(Legislator)
Staff is nonpartisan, but now I think that there was some influence by the 
m^ority party to have a certain outcome during last session. The minority 
party has to be more vocal to counter this. (Legislator)
In summary, legislative analysts provide a variety of information to 
legislators. The m^ority of analysts reported that their review of agency budget
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requests and executive recommendations is the most useful type of information 
disseminated to legislators with the Maine analysts also citing the importance of fiscal 
note preparation. The importance placed upon agency budget request analysis 
supports the view of the analysts that their primary duty is the review and analysis of 
agency budget requests and executive recommendations. From the legislative 
perspective, the most useful type of information supplied by analysts is that which 
provides the context and history of agency programs, past expenditures, future trends, 
and pressing issues for a particular agency. While analysts provide this type of 
information throughout the budget process, it is within the analyst summaries of 
agency budget requests that this kind of information is disseminated to the legislators 
in written form, formal presentations, or both. The review of the analysis of agency 
budget requests in Arizona and Colorado showed the kind of information provided to 
legislators.
In providing this information, analysts and legislators perceived a similar 
degree of direction &om the legislators. Direction for both budget actors is defined as 
legislators asking specific questions, asking for the development o f policy options, 
giving their views on an agency's budget request, setting some uniform format for the 
analysis of agency requests, and setting some policy regarding salaries and travel to 
be used in the development of budget recommendations.
However, some difkrences arise among the perceptions of the legislative 
analysts with respect to direction. All three Colorado analysts reported little or no 
direction given to them by legislators when they provide information or make budget 
recommendations. This was not the case for analysts in the remaining states, as all
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analysts in Arizona, Kansas, and Maine reported that they do receive direction &om 
legislators. Analysts report a great deal of discretion in their ability to provide 
information and make budget recommendations, although legislators are less likely to 
report analysts have a "great deal" of discretion. The m^ority of legislators reported 
that the analyst has "some" discretion in providing information to them where the 
analyst is expected to provide information in a nonpartisan, objective, and 
confidential fashion.
From this discussion on information provision, analysts provide the 
foundation for budget decisions by supplying the basic knowledge about the budget 
and identifying key issues for legislators. They do this task in an environment o f 
basic direction from legislators, but also with a &ir amount of discretion. Some 
direction is very specific and other direction allows the analyst to exercise discretion 
in informing legislators.
Information Provision and Legislator Trust
While in&rmation provision is a primary duty of legislative analysts, it is 
important in other aspects pertaining to the relationship that analysts have with 
legislators. One dimension of information provision is its link to legislator trust. In 
the course of establishing whether analysts believed legislators had trust in them, the 
link to information provision was revealed. Analysts were asked whether they 
believed legislators trusted them and if so, why? All eleven analysts reported that 
legislators had "a great deal" of trust in them. Nine of 11 (75%) analysts reporting a 
"great deal" of legislator trust referred to their ability to provide honest, accurate.
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timely, and reliable information as reasons for trust. Analyst responses on why they 
are trusted a great deal included:
Presenting the best information, honestly assessing the situation, how solid 
is the information that I have? Always try to do the best research, be honest in 
discussions, and tell them whether it is hard-cold data or "guesstimates." [I 
tell legislators] this is what I know for sure or what I think will happen.
Giving them the best that I can -  tell them that I can do more if  they need. We 
are there to assist them. They rely on us. Open-honest communication. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
For me, I try to be responsive, when someone asks me about something, I 
am very forthcoming with information. I am honest about what I do. I 
clearly state my assumptions when I make recommendations in my 
documents. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
By providing members with nonpartisan, logical, analytical look at what is 
happening in a department. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We earn trust, and I think we are trusted. It is the reliability o f information.
If you make a mistake, find it, and fix it. Quick responses and make sure you 
get back with them. I have been here a long time, giving them perspective 
and background, they trust me. I hear members say, she sure knows a lot.' 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
By providing accurate and timely information in a confidential manner.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
When I provide them information, I tell them both sides of the story. This 
builds trust. If they hear only one side &om me then they are not likely to 
listen to me again. They want you to be honest. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Don't lie. Tell them [legislators] that you don't know the answer and then 
tell them that you will find out. Keep them informed. They hate to be 
blindsided. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Three analysts commented that they are trusted because they respect the need for 
confidentiality and because of their tenure and expertise. One legislative analyst 
replied, "It is the sensitivity of information. I never identify the member to the public 
or agency. I keep the legislator's name secret unless they specifically say otherwise."
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In summary, all analysts reported being trusted by legislators. For many of 
the analysts, the provision of honest, accurate, and timely information to members of 
all political parties is one reason for their perception of trust on behalf of legislators. 
Therefore, information provision is an important component of trust. In this study, 
legislators were not asked whether they trust analysts and why or why not. Future 
studies regarding legislative analysts should ask legislators questions about trusting 
the analyst as a means of validating analyst responses.
Legislator Requests for Advice
Up to this point, this chapter has concentrated on the interaction between 
analyst and legislator particularly regarding the provision of information. From this 
discussion, it is clear that analysts are important in providing information that 
becomes the foundation for the decisions made by legislators. However, another 
way to assess the analyst/legislator relationship and the possible influence that 
analysts have on legislative decisions is whether legislators ask analysts for advice. 
This question is important to address the issue of whether legislative analysts, as non­
elected individuals, have too much power over the decisions of the elected ofBcials.
Analysts were asked if legislators ask them for advice. Eight of II  analysts 
responded affirmatively, that legislators do ask for advice, while three analysts said 
no. Further, no analyst reported that they actually give advice to legislators. In fact, 
most analysts reported that giving advice was not part of their role with the legislature 
as nonpartisan staff Analyst comments included:
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Some legislators ask for advice, but we don't like that. Sometimes, 
individually, they will ask us for advice. We have to say, it is a policy 
decision. I can't tell you what to do. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Yes, it is fairly routine for members to ask us for advice. But it is not our 
role to advocate policy. I try to give them various options, the pros and cons 
and let them make the decisions. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Yes, but it depends on how someone defines advice. If they ask for funding 
suggestions, such as are you aware of how I could fund this program? What 
are some revenues that I could use? Then, we do this all the time. However, 
if  they ask us should we vote for a particular bill, then no, we would not do 
this. We aren't policy staff (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
They may ask for information on what a department is doing and why 
they are doing it, but they never ask us how to vote. (Legislative Fiscal 
Analyst)
Yes, some do [ask for advice]. But I try to side-step this by saying let me give 
you a list of options, but you don't have to do anything. I try hard not to say, 
you have to do this. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Occasionally they do. We have to become skilled at responding without 
giving them policy direction. We pitch it in an historical context, this has 
been done before and this is what happened. Here are things that could 
happen if you do that, other options you can consider. If a new member asks 
for advice, then I say, well that's a policy question and I can't tell you. I try to 
give pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages. We can tell them impacts, 
but do not appear to tip it, appear objective and balanced. You have to work 
at that. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Yes, but it is rare. Rarely do we get "what should I do." If they do, I say that 
I can come up with 3 possible scenarios and gives downsides and upsides to 
each. I give them a range and they can pick hom them. (Legislative Fiscal 
Analyst)
One of the analysts responding that legislators do not ask her for advice commented:
They may ask my boss, but at my level, I don't give advice. Because we 
are nonpartisan, we present the data, the facts and its up to them to take it 
hom there. They would not ask us to tell them whether an agency request is 
legitimate, but would trust us to bring up something that we thought might 
be a problem. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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During the interview, analysts were quick to point out that they do not give 
advice, although occasionally they may be asked for advice. When analysts are asked 
for advice, they steer the conversation to options and alternatives or advantages and 
disadvantages of supporting one policy over another. This type o f role is consistent 
with the primary duty reported by legislative fiscal analysts: one of facilitating 
objective information to legislators.
Legislators were also queried about whether they ask the legislative fiscal 
analyst for advice. No legislator responded that they ask analysts for advice on how 
to vote or for their particular view on an issue or policy. Instead, there were several 
legislators (six of 13) who responded affirmatively to asking analysts for advice, but 
upon review of their responses, these legislators were simply asking analysts to 
provide information or policy options. Therefore, for those legislators who reported 
that they ask analysts for advice, the type of "advice" requested is within the scope of 
the analyst's duty as information provider. These legislator comments included:
Yes, I may ask for a special study, where I ask LFA to pursue a particular 
option, I may ask for numbers on a particular program to see if that is what 
I want to do. (Legislator)
Yes, absolutely, we place a lot of confidence in the analysts. I would ask, 
in your opinion, is this program running smoothly? They would point out any 
trouble spots. What are the implications for cutting a program or service? 
What is the number of illegal aliens funded and how many US citizens are not 
receiving services because of this? What would happen if we terminated a 
program? (Legislator)
Yes, but I don't know if you would call it advice. If we or our colleagues ask 
for information, for a constituent request, we go to staff and tell them to check 
into this request, and get back to us. (Legislator)
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Yes, I may ask things, but not in committee meetings. I may ask, "what is 
your personal opinion of this agency request?" But they often don't want to 
tell me that. More often its, are there two ways to do this? Analyst often 
gives options/alternatives. The giving of options is only upon request by me, 
only if I ask. (Legislator)
Yes, we do so in committee settings. If a committee member wanted to fund 
a particular educational program, he would go to the analyst and ask the 
analyst to w oit out where they could find the funding for this program, then 
he would bring this information back to the full committee for consideration. 
(Legislator)
However, Gve legislators responded that they did not ask legislative fiscal 
analysts for advice, but provided examples of other legislators asking for advice. 
Comments &om these legislators included:
I do not ask for advice, but when analysts are at our caucus meetings, 
there will be members who try to get them to tell their opinion about whether 
an agency has enough money. But analysts are not at the meetings to give 
opinions, just to answer questions. As leader of my caucus, I have had to 
admonish people who ask staff for advice. Now, they may go ask staff 
something after the meeting, but during the caucus, I tell them not to ask those 
kinds of questions. Analysts absolutely do a dance around those types of 
questions. They are objective in providing information. They provide both 
sides and let us decide &om there. (Legislator)
They [LFAs] try and make sure we have both sides. We have a couple of 
members who ask for recommendations and direction that are illegal or 
unconstitutional, staff is good at pointing out the legal issues. Staff is 
nonpartisan. They point out both sides of the issue. (Legislator)
No. But, there are members who do because they don't understand the 
analyst role. AnalyAs typically shift question to "Here are the options you 
might consider." They are rather adept at doing this. (Legislator)
No. They [LFAs] are scrupulous to not play a policy role. No role in policy 
making. That is our job. (Legislator)
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No, not me, but some members do ask questions of analysts that make them 
uncomfortable. For example, the agency wanted to transfer money 
&om one program to another. A member asked the analyst if this was 
something that we should do. The analyst was being care&l not to inteiject 
his own opinion in his answer, but to give us an analysis of what the 
ramifications might be of such a shift. Often times, they [LFAs] are asked, 
can we do this? If  it is a legal issue, they always tell us whether we can or 
cannot do it. That is their job. But, when discussing whether an agency needs 
additional funds, that is a policy matter that analysts leave up to us. They 
would try to tell us the implications of more money, but that's it. (Legislator)
In summary, both analysts and legislators reported that analysts are 
occasionally asked for advice. Some of this advice falls within the normal duties of 
analysts as information providers. Most legislators referred to advice as asking 
analysts to provide policy options or asking them for general information. However, 
some legislators responded that they do not ask analysts for advice but have observed 
other legislators asking analysts for their opinion. Under these circumstances, as 
reported by both analysts and legislators, the analysts move the question away from 
advice to one of stating options and alternatives, with the decision to be left up to the 
legislators. As far as asking analysts for the most obvious type of advice, the voting 
decision, no analyst or legislator responded that this occurs. The comments &om 
both analysts and legislators suggest that analysts are keeping within their boundaries 
as nonpartisan staff by providing objective information when asked by legislators and 
not interjecting their own policy preferences.
LFA Role in the Budget Process: The Legislator s Perspective
Chapter Three explored the general duties and activities of the legislative 
fiscal analysts 6om the perspective of the analysts. This allowed the interviewer to
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develop broad categories of duties performed by the legislative fiscal analysts in this 
study: clerical and monitoring duties; facilitating the exchange of information and 
analyzing agency information for key issues and problems; and initiating policy by 
providing policy alternatives and developing budget recommendations. These broad 
categories of duties can now be linked to various roles that legislative analysts 
assume during the budget process. By comparing the primary duties reported by the 
analysts with the legislator perception of the roles analysts play in the budget process, 
one can validate the responses of the analysts regarding their primary duties 
performed. During the interview process, legislators were asked to select the role that 
best fits the legislative fiscal analyst in the budget process 6"om a list of roles 
provided by the interviewer. The roles used in this part of the study were adapted 
&om a study of executive budget analysts (Thurmaier and Gosling 1997). In the 
Thurmaier and Gosling study, executive budget analysts were interviewed and asked 
to characterize their role with respect to their agencies in the budget process. 
Thurmaier and Gosling provided a list of roles for the executive budget analysts to 
choose &om that included: agency advocate, adversary, Acilitator, policy analyst, or 
other. Although Thurmaier and Gosling evaluated executive budget analysts, their 
study can be useful in studying the relationship between legislative fiscal analyst and 
state agency. Both types of analysts, legislative and executive, are responsible for 
understanding the agencies under their supervision, reviewing and evaluating agency 
requests, providing information to their respective bosses, and in some cases, 
developing budget recommendations. Therefore, the roles in the Thurmaier and 
Gosling study can provide a &amewodc for capturing the relationship between
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legislative Gscal analyst and the state agency. However, some parts o f the Thurmaier 
and Gosling study were changed. First, the title of the policy analyst role was 
changed to policy initiator in the current study. The title change of policy analyst to 
policy initiator more appropriately reflects the descriptions of the duties performed by 
the analysts for the legislature and allows &r comparison in role choice among the 
key budget actors in this study. Second, a clerical role is added to the current study to 
reflect that some legislative fiscal analysts play the role of clerical worker when they 
staff committees. Third, the current study expands the number of individuals 
interviewed by reporting the perceptions not only of legislative fiscal analysts but also 
the perceptions of agency directors, agency fiscal or budget officers, and agency 
legislative liaisons. In the Thurmaier and Gosling study, only executive budget 
analysts were interviewed concerning their role. Brief descriptions o f the roles as 
defined in previous research (Thurmaier and Gosling 1997; Thurmaier and 
Willoughby 2001) are described below with the exception of the clerical role. The 
clerical role was defined based upon responses from the legislative analysts when 
asked to describe their duties for the legislature.
The clerical role refers to the various activities undertaken by the legislative 
analysts such as scheduling committee meetings, calling agency persoimel to testify 
before the committee, handing out documents during meetings, recording committee 
action, drafting committee reports, and tracking bills and amendments. The monitor 
role reflects those activities associated with the tracking of agency expenditures, 
revenues, and caseloads. In this role, analysts prepare spreadsheets indicating 
changes in caseloads such as increases or decreases in number of children in public
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schools, developing models projecting the number of Medicaid recipients and other 
healthcare trends and the number of individuals in state correctional facilities and the 
bed space needed to keep those individuals incarcerated. The facilitator role occurs 
as legislative fiscal analysts assist in the decision making of the legislators by 
collecting and disseminating information to members and objectively analyzing 
information &om state agencies and other sources. For example, an analyst is 
engaging in the facilitator role when she studies, scrutinizes, and evaluates agency 
budget requests and/or executive budget recommendations, develops fiscal notes, and 
evaluates agency programs and services. In this role, analysts not only gather 
information for legislators &om other sources such as state agencies, the executive 
budget office, other legislative staS^ or some outside organization, but take that 
information and go beyond merely summarizing and disseminating it to legislators. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, when analyzing agency requests and executive 
recommendations, analysts point out m^or departmental issues that members should 
be aware of such as potential problems with programs, the impact of possible federal 
regulations or legislation, and trends in expenditures and funding. Facilitation also 
involves fiscal note preparation as analysts determine the fiscal impact of a particular 
bill on agency programs or the fiscal impact of legislation on local communities.
The end result of the review and analysis o f agency requests, executive 
recommendations, and/or fiscal notes is the dissemination of that analysis to the 
legislature through formal presentations, meetings with individual legislators, and/or 
through written documents. In the policy initiator role, the analyst goes beyond 
scrutinizing and evaluating agency budget requests, programs, and the 6 seal impact
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of proposed legislation. The analyst taking on the policy initiator role also provides 
policy options or alternatives to legislators and/or makes budget recommendations.
In this role, analysts initiate policy themselves by providing legislators with different 
policy options that may include providing several funding sources for a new program 
and/or fleshing out different means of operating a program or delivering a service. 
This role also consists of developing budget recommendations where the analyst 
recommends new agency programs or positions, changes in existing programs or 
positions, and additions or reductions in funding. The initiation of policy options and 
budget recommendations by the analyst is the defining aspect of this role. Earlier in 
this chapter, it was discussed that analysts often provide policy options to legislators 
when asked by a legislator or committee. In the policy initiation role, analysts are 
initiating policy on their own by bringing options and budget recommendations to the 
attention of the legislature.
During the interview process, the interviewer briefly described each role and 
asked legislators to select the most appropriate role of the legislative Gscal analyst in 
the budget process. Ten of the 13 (77%) legislators interviewed selected more than 
one role as appropriate for legislative analysts. As Table 4 .1 indicates, when 
legislators were asked to select the role of the legislative fiscal analyst in the budget 
process, the most frequent answer was the facilitator role (12 of 24 responses).
While two of the 13 legislators reported that the role legislative fiscal analysts play in 
the budget process is solely one of facilitating, ten legislators reported that the role 
legislative Gscal analysts play included facilitating plus one or more of the other
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roles. Facilitating was the most Sequent role response for legislators in all states 
except Colorado, where the policy initiator role was selected as the most appropriate.
Table 4.1













Clerical 4 (100%) 4 (31%)
Monitor 3 (75%) 3 (75%) 6 (46%)
Facilitator 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 12 (92%)
Policy Initiator 1 (25%) 1 (100%) 2 (15%)
Note: All percentages have been rounded up.
A state-by-state review of analyst roles more clearly underscores the 
similarities and differences among the states. Legislators in Arizona selected the 
facilitator role more often than the other roles with all four of the legislators selecting 
the facilitator role. However, monitoring agency expenditures and caseloads also 
surfaced as an important role for analysts. Comments ftom Arizona legislators 
included:
The LFA is a facilitator. He provides us with information on the budget.
This LFA reviews what is being asked for by the Education Department.
He looks at funding in the past, future costs, things we should be aware 
o f But it is up to us to decide what to do in the future. (Legislator)
They are the monitor and facilitator roles. The [committee] analysts do a lot of 
oversight and monitoring for us. For example, the [LFA] monitors teacher 
salaries in every district and the amount of money spent on construction and 
repairs of schools. But they are facilitators too. They provide us general 
information on agency budget requests, they tell us what we can do 
under the law, and they keep us informed about the things we are 
interested in. (Legislator)
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He is the control and facilitator role, but mainly the facilitator role. They 
provide us with detailed analysis of the agency requests and executive 
recommendations, revenue forecasts, and they answer any questions we 
may have regarding a request, a program, or anything else relating to the 
agency they have responsibility 6)r. (Legislator)
They are facilitators, monitors, and policy initiators, primarily a facilitator 
though. I believe that because we have a part time legislature that we have 
to rely on staff Term limits has also had a tremendous effect on staff 
Because of these things, staff are facilitators. When I schedule my meeting 
with staff on the budget, I ask them to explain the budget request to me, they 
provide me with the basic information on the request. At times, they can 
initiate a policy change by providing different options to me, but only after 
I tell them what my concerns are, and then they explain different ways to do 
things, legally and technically. (Legislator)
These comments indicate that Arizona legislators perceived primarily a 
facilitating role and secondarily a monitoring role for the legislative fiscal analysts. 
One legislator reported that the analyst was primarily a facilitator and monitor, but at 
times performed the policy initiator role. This legislator explained that the analyst 
performed a policy initiator role due to the part time nature of the Arizona legislature 
and the effect of term limits where the legislator had to rely on the analyst's budget 
recommendations.
As Chapter Three pointed out, the primary duties cited by the legislative fiscal 
analysts in Arizona were the analysis of agency budget requests, one activity within 
the facilitator role, and the development of budget recommendations, one activity 
within the policy initiator role, for the appropriations committees. However, as 
previously discussed, only one committee member interviewed cited policy initiation 
as a role taken on by the legislative fiscal analyst and that was in combination with 
the facilitator and monitor role. Therefore, none of the Arizona legislators responded
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that policy initiating was the role that best described legislative fiscal analysts in 
Arizona even though these analysts develop budget recommendations.
Legislators in Maine selected the facilitator role more often than the other 
roles, although monitoring agency expenditures and caseloads also surfaced as an 
important analyst role. Three of the four Maine legislators interviewed reported 
multiple roles consisting of facilitating and monitoring, with two of these three 
legislators stating that facilitating was primary role followed by monitoring, while the 
third legislator perceived monitoring to be more important than facilitating and one 
believed facilitation to be the most important. The 6cilitating role attributed to 
Maine legislative analysts corresponds with the primary duty reported by Maine 
legislative fiscal analysts. In Chapter Three, it was revealed that the Maine analysts 
reported that the review and evaluation of agency budget requests, an activity within 
the facilitator role, was their primary duty. Likewise, a secondary duty reported by 
the Maine legislative analysts was tracking expenditures and caseloads, an activity 
associated with the monitoring role. Legislator comments included:
Facilitator and monitor role. Both important. They do monitor agency 
expenditures, but not in any kind of farmal oversight role, they would 
provide us with information concerning agency expenditures and they 
do give this to us a lot. But they are facilitators too. They focus on 
one policy area and have more expertise than committee members. They 
have the ability to synthesize information for us, especially with their 
budget summaries. (Legislator)
Facilitator role is most important, although they monitor too. They answer 
our questions during the public hearings process and after the agencies 
make their presentations. They also do fiscal notes and this is an invaluable 
source of information for me. This is very important to the Legislature. 
(Legislator)
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More monitor than anything else, but some facilitating too. They 
primarily monitor agency expenditures and provide us with trend 
analyses. But they do provide a dialogue with the agencies, we get 
a lot of information from the agencies and they help us understand 
the agency budget requests. (Legislator)
They play an information role, the facilitator role. They give us the 
information that helps us to be somewhat independent of the executive. 
(Legislator)
Interestingly, the absence o f policy initiating as it relates to the provision of 
policy options or alternatives is of some concern for the some legislators interviewed 
in Maine. Legislators were asked if there is any type of information that you would 
like to have but are not receiving &om the analyst, three of the four Maine legislators 
commented that they would prefer to see staff play a more proactive role in the 
budget process by providing more policy options or suggestions. These legislators 
reported that the analysts were very good at providing historical and expenditure 
analyses, those activities associated with monitoring, but not as good at providing 
policy options, activities more closely associated with the policy initiator role. These 
legislators explained:
They [fiscal analysts] are good at giving us trend analysis. If we ask, 
what is the 10-year expenditure history? Then they can provide 
us with that intim ation. But they will not make suggestions. If I ask how 
should we reduce the payroll in this one area or are there other ways to 
provide this service, they can't do this for us. I want staff to help guide me 
more. If I say I want to do this policy or program, I want them to tell me how 
to get there. When they do provide information, such as the trend analyses, 
they are totally dependent upon the agency for the information. I personally 
think the relationship gets a little too close. The budget grows because of 
this. We are not effective in budget matters, the legislature adopts 90% of the 
executive budget. I want staff to take a stronger role, but this has to come 
&om leadership, the committee chairs. Nonpartisan staff have trouble dealing 
with some of our questions. Staff are trying too hard to be nonpartisan. I 
would vote for partisan staff if it came to that. (Legislator)
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I want them [analysts] to give us options or alternatives so that we could make 
choices. There is much less of this than in the past. It doesn't happen enough 
for me, I would want much more options provided to me. (Legislator)
Previous stafT used to be more involved in pointing out things that we should 
be looking at. We are a part-time legislature and sometimes we don't know 
the questions to ask. They [analysts] provide us with information when asked, 
but I wish that they would provide us with more information. I told the chairs 
that they [analysts] needed to be more active, more strong. We will have new 
chairs next year, so I don't know if this will change. (Legislator)
These comments suggest that some of the appropriations committee members 
interviewed in Maine would like analysts to play a stronger role in the state budget 
process. In Kansas, facilitating was deemed important for legislators along with the 
clerical role. As Table 4.1 indicated, while 6cilitating was viewed as a significant 
activity, all R)ur Kansas legislators responded that the clerical role was also an 
important activity. This is consistent with the description of duties by the Kansas 
legislative Gscal analysts as discussed in Chapter Three. Although Kansas analysts 
reported as their primary duty the review and analysis of agency requests and 
executive recommendations, all cited stafhng subcommittees and working for 
subcommittee chairs as a large task during the legislative session.
The clerical role and the information provision, the facilitator role.
Both roles are absolutely essential. I do not have any personal staff  ̂ therefore, 
someone has to rtm the committee, this would be a technical role, where the 
analyst is responsible for calling people to provide information, setting 
meeting times, etc. But they are facilitators too. Analysts are sources of 
unbiased information. They provide me with any kind of information I want 
concerning the state budget or an agency budget. (Legislator)
The facilitator and clerical role, analysts do not get involved with policy 
decisions, that is our role. There are a number of programs, some are 
straightforward, but some are hard to follow. Analysts keep us up to speed. 
They may provide me with several options on how to do something, but it is 
my choice what to do or if to do it at all. (Legislator)
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They are facilitators and the clerical role too. The analysts are perceived 
to be neutral, nonpartisan sources of information. They are a great resource 
for both sides of the aisle. We are all dependent upon their information. They 
have the corporate memory, but they don't give us policy recommendations. 
(Legislator)
Facilitator is main role. Clerical role is the next important role. They 
provide us with background information, clearing up issues, responding 
to our questions, etc. The LFA also staffs my subcommittee, I would 
consider this a clerical or technical role where she assists me in calling 
roll, handing out reports, etc. (Legislator)
In Colorado, however, the only committee member interviewed cited the 
policy initiator role as the primary role of the legislative fiscal analysts in the budget 
process. This legislator was the only legislator among all interviewed in this study 
citing the policy initiation role as the primary role for analysts. However, this 
statement regarding policy initiation should be interpreted cautiously due to the fact 
that only one member of the Colorado Joint Budget Committee was interviewed for 
this study. In regard to analyst roles, this legislator responded:
They are policy initiators. We [JBC] initiate to, but they [LFAs] do the initial 
issue briefs [analysis of agency requests] and figure-setting[budget 
recommendations], then we can do something about it or not. We can 
determine whether we accept their recommendations or not, but they make the 
recommendations on every facet of the budget based upon their knowledge of 
the agency. They are the experts, we are not. (Legislator)
The comments by this particular Colorado legislator correspond with the 
reported primary duties of analysts in Colorado. Chapter Three revealed that 
Colorado legislative analysts reported that their primary duties were the evaluation of 
agency budget requests (facilitation) and the preparation of budget recommendations 
(policy initiation).
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In summary, while ten of the 13 legislators reported multiple roles for the 
fiscal analyst in the budget process, the facilitator role was the most Sequent 
response, except for analysts in Colorado. The Colorado legislator interviewed 
reported that the analysts play solely the policy initiator role. The perception of 
analysts as facilitators of decision making by the legislators is congruent with the 
primary duties cited by the legislative fiscal analysts. The analysts placed heavy 
emphasis on their review and analysis of agency budget requests and executive 
recommendations and their dissemination of this information to legislators through 
formal presentations in committee. This primary duty corresponds to the facilitator 
role attributed to them by the legislators. Although the facilitator role was most 
6equently cited by legislators, there is variation by state on the secondary role played 
by analysts in three states. In Arizona and Maine, six of the eight legislators 
interviewed in these states req)onded that the monitor role was an important Amction 
of the legislative analysts. In contrast, Kansas legislators responded that while 
facilitating was of primary importance, analysts also perform the essential clerical 
task of staffing committees and subcommittees.
Summary of the Analyst/Legislator Relationship
The relationship between analyst and legislator is primarily one of facilitation 
where the analyst provides fiscal information through a variety of activities primarily 
to the legislators who sit on the fiscal committees. Although analysts in different 
states report different patterns and degrees of contact with the legislators on the Ascal 
committees, similar types of information are provided to them during key periods in
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the budget process. These key periods are the presentation of the agency budget 
requests and, for those analysts in Arizona and Colorado, the presentation of budget 
recommendations. The activities of analyzing agency budget requests and developing 
budget recommendations are the primary duties performed in the budget process by 
the legislative fiscal analysts as discussed in Chapter Three. From a broad, historical 
summary of an agency and its programs to more specific information on a particular 
agency budget request, analysts supply the most basic information to legislators when 
they are making decisions about the budget. Both analysts and legislators report that 
this kind of basic information is the most important information needed to make 
budgetary decisions. Inherent in this facilitation role is the belief by analysts that 
they are trusted by legislators to provide honest, reliable, and objective information 
and that as nonpartisan staff are absolute in their rejection of providing advice to 
legislators. The analysts provide information under modest amounts o f direction 
&om the legislators but with a great deal of discretion in providing information and 
pointing out areas of concern in an agency's budget request. As facilitators, analysts 
are important reducers of information by determining the parameters for debate. The 
analysis of the agency budget requests and executive recommendations paves the way 
for legislators to direct analysts to collect further information on a particular issue or 
direct them to add specific recommendations or devise alternative policy proposals.
One of the most interesting aspects of this discussion is the strength of 
facilitation in describing the role of legislative fiscal analysts in the budget process. 
Although other roles are present, the analyst as an information collector, analyzer, 
and disseminator is the dominant theme. Few legislators perceived analysts to be
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policy initiators, even among those fiscal analysts who develop budget 
recommendations. The exception was the lone legislator interviewed in Colorado 
citing the policy initiator role as the primary role for analysts in her state. While this 
may be perplexing, it can perhaps be explained by the fact that in the course of 
developing budget recommendations, information is analyzed and disseminated to 
legislators, a key component of the Acilitation role. Further, a policy initiator is 
dehned as an individual who proposes new programs or services and/or changes in 
existing programs and services. In many cases, this is done at the request of the 
legislators and at the very least, it is the legislators themselves who have the final say 
as to whether a proposal made by an analyst is accepted, rejected, or modified. One 
other factor could be at play in the discussion on analyst roles. At the time that the 
interviews were taking place, all four states were dealing with some type of fiscal 
stress, either revenues shortages, expenditure ovemms, or both. Fiscal stress could 
reduce the ability of analysts to be policy initiators. Legislative analysts know that 
funding for new programs or expansions of old programs is limited and therefore 
would bring forth less proposals or recommendations for new or expanded programs.
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Relationships with Agency Personnel
Legislative fiscal analysts and agency personnel interact with each other for a 
variety of reasons. From requesting a description of an agency program, clarification 
of a budget request or legislative committee action, explanation o f an agency 
decision, to a summons for agency testimony at a committee hearing, agency 
personnel and fiscal analysts engage in frequent contact. This contact, however.
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varies based upon the point in the budget process and by agency official. Legislative 
fiscal analysts were asked a series of questions regarding interaction with agency 
personnel. First, analysts were asked to state the &equency of contact with agency 
personnel during the budget process, to comment on the point in the process where 
contact is more Sequent, and to discuss the nature of the contact with agency 
personnel.
In general, contact between analyst and agency personnel is more Sequent at 
the point when fiscal analysts are preparing their analysis o f agency requests and/or 
budget recommendations. It is at this point where analysts reported heavy contact, 
often daily, with agency officials. The nature of legislative analyst contact focuses on 
the agency budget requests including clarification of a specific request, explanation of 
an assumption used in developing a request, discussions on how calculations were 
made, and other fiscal and/or programmatic issues deemed relevant by the analyst in 
developing her analysis and presentation. The &equency and nature o f contact with 
agency personnel were similar among all analysts interviewed in this study. Analyst 
comments included:
Contact at least once a week. Getting in&rmation needed to do the budget 
recommendation book, to answer legislator questions, and iff  have a 
question, etc. I have more contact with the agency than the executive budget 
analyst, usually the fiscal officer. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
During the peak of the session, when we are preparing and then presenting 
our budget recommendations, it [contact] is probably every other day. They 
[agency] know the most. They are my single point of entry. They control 
the information. I contact the fiscal manager the most, but I do call 
others as well, such as the program people and liaison.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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Contact is several times a week when I am developing my budget 
recommendations. Mostly the budget director, for in&rmation about their 
budget request, how they are splitting funds between federal, state, and other 
funds. They keep records on each school district and I get that information 
&om them. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I contact them [agency] daily, use them for in6>rmation more than the 
executive budget staff! Most intense contact during the legislative session 
at the beginning when we are developing and presenting our agency budget 
analyses to the committee. Most contact with budget ofAcer and then the 
agency director. During session, contact primarily concerns the budget 
request. I always have questions regarding how they calculated something, 
why they need a new position, what the impact is of something that they 
want to do. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
A lot of contact during the session, its daily, but at the end of the session it 
tapers off. During the budget process, I contact the agency to gain a better 
understanding of what is behind the request, what is included, getting the 
details of the request, sometimes a member will ask for information, or we 
need you [agency] here for a meeting. I typically have contact with the 
finance director. But it depends upon the issue. With specific budget issues, 
it's the finance director, the fiscal officer most oAen knows everything 
that is going on. Sometimes if it is program related, I call the program 
director, it depends upon what you want to know. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The comments Aom the legislative fiscal analysts indicate that contact with 
agency persormel is more Aequent when analysts are preparing then analyses of 
agency requests and when analysts prepare then budget recommendations for the 
legislature. The point o f heavy contact varies among the states, as analysts perform 
the tasks of analyzing requests and developing budget recommendations at different 
times. Arizona analysts have a heavy period of contact in the fall prior to the session 
when they prepare a review of agency requests and develop then budget 
recommendations. Colorado analysts have two peak periods of agency contact, once 
in the fall prior to the session when they prepare and present the analysis of agency 
budget requests, and again in the spring, when developing the budget
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recommendations. Kansas analysts have significant agency contact in the late fall as 
they begin reviewing agency budget requests. In contrast, Maine analysts contact 
agency personnel early in the legislative session when they receive agency budget 
requests. Although these are typically the peak periods of agency contact, analysts 
reported calling agency personnel prior to and throughout the legislative session to 
provide information resulting 6om a legislative request. Further, the comments 
suggest that analysts have the most contact with the agency fiscal or budget officer.
Interim contact is much less Sequent than immediately prior to and during the 
legislative session. Contact with agencies during the interim is sporadic and occurs 
under a variety of circumstances. For example, the analyst may visit a state facility 
with committee members, contact agency ofGcials due to interim committee work 
that pertains to a specific agency, seek a legislative request for information, or meet 
with agency personnel regarding agency compliance with legislative intent as 
programs are implemented. Typical responses from analysts regarding contact 
during the interim included:
During the interim there is less contact, we are doing less work, usually 
dealing with ad hoc questions &om member. This could be both fiscal or 
programmatic questions. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Much less contact during the interim, contact could be associated with 
an interim committee, where I will be asked to put together information for 
the committee, or I will get a specific request &om a member for information. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
A lot less contact and sporadic. We often get out and visit state 6cilities. I 
may ask the department about any initiatives they are undertaking that 
legislators should be made aware o f (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Very little contact, the [agency] budget director is busy putting together next 
year's budget, so I don't bother them. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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During the interim the contact is less, but I do contact them. I look at 
new programs and see how they are working. I educate myself on the 
department. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
In this study, agency directors, agency legislative liaisons, and agency budget 
or fiscal officers were interviewed &om the Corrections, Education, and Medicaid 
agencies. These three types of agency personnel were chosen as each have a 
different relationship and perspective on the role of the analyst. Agency directors 
have a broad view of agency needs and may have less direct contact with legislative 
analysts due to their position as director. Agency legislative liaisons lobby the 
legislature in the state capitol, thereby seeing firsthand the relationship between 
analyst and legislator. Agency budget or fiscal ofRcers have the ability to assess the 
budgetary impact of the analyst on the agency's budget request. For this study, 22 
agency ofhcials were interviewed. The researcher was able to interview at least one 
ofBcial 6om Departments of Corrections, Education, and Medicaid in all three states, 
except for the Arizona Education Department. In addition to the 22 interviewed, five 
ofRcials were contacted but reported little or no contact with the legislative fiscal 
analysts and therefore, did not complete the interview. Of the 6ve officials reporting 
little or no contact, two were agency directors. One agency director was new to the 
agency and did not have knowledge of the legislative analyst, while the other agency 
director left all contact with the legislative analyst with the agency fiscal officer. The 
remaining agency officials were legislative liaisons who were actually public 
information officers with primary responsibility for interacting with the public and 
media. Therefore, in this study, not all agency directors or legislative liaison 
positions have regular contact with legislative fiscal analysts. When requesting an
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interview with the agency budget or fiscal officer, none of these individuals refused 
an interview due to little or no contact with the legislative analyst. Again, this 
suggests that contact is the most Sequent between analyst and fiscal officer.
Responses by all agency personnel (budget officer, liaison, and director) 
support the comments made by the legislative analysts that heavy contact, usually 
daily or several times a week, typically occurs when analysts are preparing their 
analyses o f the agency requests and/or developing budget recommendations. Agency 
personnel were asked to comment on the 6equency and nature of contact with the 
legislative fiscal analyst responsible for their agency's budget. Eighty-one percent of 
the agency personnel interviewed (18 of 22) responded that contact during these 
periods is quite high, usually daily or several times a week. The interviews revealed 
that 60 percent of the agency personnel reporting daily contact were the agency 
budget officers, followed by the agency legislative liaisons at 30 percent. This is not 
surprising as one would assume that legislative fiscal analysts and agency budget 
ofBcers would have the most Sequent contact due to questions surrounding the 
agency budget. Some agency personnel commented concerning contact included:
Contact is greater when he is putting together his budget recommendations, 
couple o f times a week. We would contact him to make him aware of things 
we feel strongly about. If he has questions about our budget request, he calls. 
Or information requests &om legislators. We also called a couple of meetings 
to educate him on vdiat we thought were important issues for the department. 
(Agency OfRcial)
During the legislative session it is daily. [LFA] starts analyzing the budget in 
November, it is at this point in the process, that he has questions regarding our 
request and budget decision items, questions that also come &om legislators. 
(Agency OfRcial)
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Multiple times a day. From November 1 until figure setting is over, we are 
speaking with each other at least once daily. She is asking questions about the 
budget request, we have a two inch binder that she goes through. She is 
looking at the data, she also initiates inquiries Grom members and I respond to 
those. (Agency Official)
Virtually daily. There may be a number of reasons why I contact [LFA]. 
[LFA] reviews the fiscal notes prepared by the legislative council staff There 
are times when there is disagreement between the agency view and legislative 
council view. I may call [LFA] to ask what am I not understanding about how 
the legislative council views this impact. I may not understand their 
perspective. I may ask [LFA] how can I &ame this issue better? If we do an 
analysis of a bill or the price tag of a bill, we would initiate contact with 
[LFA] use her as another knowledgeable source on the issue to see if  our 
assumptions hold water. (Agency Official)
Daily contact during the session. "You name it." She is at every committee 
meeting on Education and we talk to her about everything. She is good about 
telling us about bills that concern our agency and what is happening in the 
legislature. Also, when the legislature wants information, she calls us and 
tdls us that the legislature needs something from us. She often seeks 
clarification from us. She knows our budgets real well, but sometimes we 
have to help her understand some of the specifics. (Agency Official)
Daily. Mostly specific questions about our budget request, questions about 
how a certain bill will impact our agency, they must do fiscal impact 
statements and they call to fnd out what our opinion is on those fnancial 
impacts. (Agency Official)
These comments by the agency personnel in this study support the analyst 
responses. Heavy contact, usually weekly and often daily, occurs during the time that 
analysts are preparing agency budget analyses and budget recommendations. These 
comments suggest that contact is a two-way street between analyst and agency. Both 
actors contact each other 6equently and both actors request and give information to 
each other. For analysts, contact with the agency primarily concerns questions 
surrounding the agency budget request and legislative inquiries. For agency 
personnel, contact with analysts occurs for a variety o f reasons including getting
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information on a committee action or legislative proposal impacting the agency, 
providing new information that changes the agency budget request, and attempting to 
better understand the legislative perspective or intent regarding a proposal or action 
relating to the agency. The interviews did not reveal any patterns of contact based 
upon the policy area of the analyst. However, the interviews did reveal some 
differences among the states. Agency personnel &om Colorado and Kansas were 
more likely to report daily contact with the legislative fiscal analyst than agency 
personnel &om Arizona and Maine. Further, two of the 22 agency officials reported 
that contact was rare with the legislative fiscal analyst even during these peak periods. 
In Maine, an agency fiscal officer responded that questions &om the legislative 
analyst concerning the agency's budget request are typically handled by the executive 
budget ofRce. In Kansas, an agency director commented that most inquiries 6om the 
legislative analyst are funneled through the agency fiscal ofRcer.
All agency personnel reported that contact drops off signiGcantly during the 
interim, just as reported by the legislative fiscal analysts. Contact aAer the legislative 
session occurs due to interim committees or task forces, transmitting of reports &om 
agency to legislature, visitation of state facilities, or educational meetings set up by 
the agency to inform analysts about agency operations and services.
In an attempt to establish whether the legislative fiscal analyst is an important 
actor with respect to an agency's budget, agency personnel were asked a series of 
questions designed to measure the significance of analysts for the agency. First, 
agency personnel were ask to identify by name, the fiscal analyst responsible for their 
agency.
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All agency personnel accurately identified by name the legislative fiscal 
analyst responsible for their agency's budget. This ability to identify the analyst is 
indicative of the heavy contact between the two groups of budget actors. As the 
comments &om the legislative analysts indicate, state agencies are a major source of 
information for analysts. Likewise, agency personnel use legislative analysts as 
sources of information for legislative intent and concerns, status ofbills, and 
committee action.
Second, the agency personnel were asked if they seek advice &om the 
legislative analyst on how to present budget information and/or approach legislators. 
Nine of the 22 (41%) agency personnel responded that they do ask the legislative 
fiscal analyst for advice primarily concerning how to disseminate information. 
Comments 6om some agency ofRcials included:
Yes, more so on how to present the budget information, not so much in 
approaching legislators. I often ask how would they [legislators] like to 
see certain things, how to clarify certain issues, the Medicaid budget is 
very complex and I need to simplify things, what to include and not 
include in information that I give to legislators. (Agency Official)
Yes, &om time to time. We sent the chair of the committee a request not 
too long ago and she turned it down, I asked [LFA] why and how to 
present it again, so I do ask for his advice. (Agency OfRcial)
I do have questions about the budget process. I may ask about procedure, 
if  we have to go in &ont of the committee, I will ask how that works. I rely 
first on the governor's budget analyst, but I do call [LFA] on occasion and 
ask him what he thinks. (Agency Official)
The budget office does not approach legislators, but we do ask for advice. 
Just last week I sat down with [LFA] to go over the last session. I wanted 
to know if our budget request was organized well, if there is enough or 
good supportive information, was it okay? (Agency Official)
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Yes. We just took over a veteran's facility that closed in order to use it 
for a correctional facility. Before we did this, we took [LFA] out there for 
a visit to explain why we wanted to do this. We used him to "test the 
waters" to see where [LFA] is on an issue, this gives us a good idea of how 
the legislators will react and it gives me ideas on how to counteract [LFA] 
arguments. It gives me the chance to refine my arguments and to address 
[LFA] arguments so that we don't have issues. (Agency Official)
Occasionally, her knowledge of a particular legislator and how they process 
information is better than mine. For example, I am planning to talk to 
Senator X on this issue, do you think it would be useful to have charts, 
graphs? and she might say, use spreadsheets or something else instead. She 
is good at doing that. (Agency Official)
In summary, when reviewing contact between analyst and agency, no patterns 
appear among individual analysts or by policy area. However, similar patterns of 
contact are present among the four states in that heavy contact occurs during the 
period when analysts are preparing their reviews of agency budget request and/or 
developing budget recommendations. Because most of the contact surrounds the 
agency budget, agency fiscal officers are important information sources. Further, 
supporting the &equent contact reported by both actors, all agency personnel were 
able to identify by name the analyst responsible for their agency and almost half o f 
the agency officials reported asking the analyst for advice on how to present or clarify 
information to legislators. Therefore, the comments &om both actors suggest that the 
relationship is important. To further assess this assumption, agency officials were 
asked to rank the importance of establishing a good relationship with the legislative 
G seal analyst.
Importance of Establishing a Good Relationship with Legislative Fiscal Analvst
Previous research has indicated that agency budget officials take the role of 
legislative staff seriously and attempt to establish good relations with them
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(Duncombe and Kinney 1987). The current study expands previous research by 
asking three different types of agency personnel (directors, legislative liaisons, and 
budget officers) to rate the importance of establishing a good relationship with the 
legislative fiscal analyst responsible for their agency's budget as either very 
important, important, somewhat important, or not important. Table 4.2 indicates that 
91 percent of the agency officials interviewed responded that it was very important or 
important to establish a good relationship with the fiscal analyst, with 82 percent 
responding that a good relationship was very important. Some differences arise 
when reviewing the responses by type of agency official. Nine of ten (90%) budget 
officials interviewed responded that it was very important to establish a good 
relationship, while nine of 12 (75%) directors and legislative liaisons reported that 
establishing a good relationship with the legislative analyst was very important. 
Interestingly, the two agency officials reporting that establishing a good relationship 
was only "somewhat important" were from the same state (Maine) and each o f these 
individuals also reported less contact with the analyst responsible for their agency's 
budget than the contact reported by other agency officials in that state. Therefore, the 
importance of establishing a good relationship may be conditioned by the amount of 
contact with the legislative fiscal analyst. The strongest support for establishing a 
good relationship with the fiscal analyst was found in Colorado, where all agency 
persormel reported that it was "very important" to establish a good relationship with 
the legislative fiscal analyst responsible for their agency's budget and the agency 















Very Important 4 (66%) 5 (83%) 9 (90%) 18 (82%)
Important 1 (17%) 1 (17%) - 2 (9%)
Somewhat Important 1 (17%) 1 (10%) 2 (9%)
Not Important “ - - “
Total 6 (100%) 6(100%) 10 (100%) 22 (100%)
The relationship between analyst and agency personnel is important for each 
group of budget actors. In many ways, the relationship between analyst and agency 
is symbiotic as they both rely on the other for assistance. From the viewpoint of the 
analyst, the agency is a major point of contact when legislators ask questions about 
agency programs or Bnances. When legislators make a request for information 
regarding an agency or program, that agency may be the sole source of information 
for the analyst.
For agency ofGcials, having a good relationship with the analyst is essential in 
getting the agency perspective conveyed to the legislators. When asked why it is 
important to establish a good relationship with analysts, the m^ority of agency 
personnel reported that due to analysts disseminating information about the agency to 
legislators, it is important to have a good relationship. Agencies can use analysts as 
facilitators of information and for accurately reporting agency issues and concerns. 
Analysts who are able to learn and understand programs, services, and important 
issues report this information back to legislators as part of their facilitating duty. 
Because of this, agency ofGcials feel it necessary to establish a trusting and honest
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relationship with these individuals acting as facilitators. Ten of 22 (45%) agency 
personnel specifically commented that establishing a good relationship builds trust 
between the two groups. Trust enables the agency personnel to feel confident that the 
legislative fiscal analyst accurately and objectively communicates the agency 
perspective to the legislature. Further, trust is necessary so that analysts will have 
confidence that the agency is providing fair and accurate information. This 
relationship helps to insure that the analyst and agency work together to educate the 
legislature on agency programs and services. Comments &om agency officials 
included:
The relationship opens the door for me to provide information to the 
analyst prior to the committee presentation. Once things get to the 
committee, the dynamics change. If she [legislative fiscal analyst] and I 
can visit prior to this, then I may get something that is palatable for 
my agency. I have to convince her that what the agency is asking for is 
reasonable. If we don't agree, then at least I know what her argument is 
and I can prepare a response to the committee that backs up my view. 
Trust is the key. If she trusts me, she is less likely to believe that I am 
padding the agency's budget. There is some suspect of agencies by 
analysts. I understand this. But trust helps us to work with each other 
better. (Agency OSicial)
The analyst provides information to appropriation members that they 
take as "the law" -  the final say on an item. It is important to 
have a good working relationship and trust with the analyst and one 
who will take our word with full faith and confidence that it is the answer. 
(Agency Official)
This person has direct contact with the members. They have a 
larger base than we do. They must have a clear understanding of 
what is going on in our agency. There must be a high level of 
trust between the agency and the analyst. [The LFA] must have 
confidence in us and in the types of information that we provide.
(Agency OSicial)
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If I have a good relationship with her and if she has a good 
relationship with me, then she can understand the logic behind 
our requests. The analyst must be able to convey our requests and 
information accurately, objectively, and impartially. There is an 
element of trust that I work on to achieve. They build institutional 
knowledge about what we do and they share that with members. 
(Agency OfRcial)
It is important to have a trusting relationship so they know that we are 
giving them fair and honest information. (Agency OfGcial)
The better my relationship with the analyst, the more trust that he has 
that we are providing honest information that would beneGt the state. 
(Agency OÉicial)
Further, agency personnel recognize the importance of establishing a good 
relationship because of the joint effort needed between the two groups to provide 
accurate and timely information to legislators. Agency personnel know that they 
have to work with the analysts in an effort to fulfill the intent of the legislature. 
Comments by both analysts and agency personnel presented earlier in this chapter on 
the nature of contact suggest a symbiotic relationship between the two budget actors. 
Examples of this joint effort included analysts informing agency personnel of the 
specific kinds of information requested by the legislature, agency personnel calling 
analysts to seek clarification on a committee request or action, and analyst and agency 
personnel working together on a committee request. Further, joint eGbrt is apparent 
when analysts provide a "heads up" on issues the legislature is considering such as 
possible requests for information or the impact of Aiture legislation. Therefore, in 
addition to establishing a good relationship because analysts provide information to 
legislators and in an eSbrt to build trust with the analyst, five of 22 agency personnel
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cited the need to establish a good relationship because of the joint eObrt required to 
complete legislative requests. Agency responses included:
We want to make sure that we get things done as requested by the 
legislature. We [analyst and agency] work together to fulfill the intent 
of the legislative request. Together, we can get the data and get it to 
the legislature. (Agency Official)
We are all trying to get the very best and timely information to the 
legislators so that they can make good policy decisions. It is a 
joint effort between the analyst, myself and my staff to get good 
information to the policymakers so that they are able to do their work. 
(Agency Official)
Because of term limits, she is a thread of continuity for our programs. 
She will be more likely to have our history than the committee members. 
She very much can serve as a guide to what the committee is thinking 
so that I can get an early notice of concerns on their part.
(Agency Official)
The importance of establishing a good relationship with legislative fiscal 
analysts takes on another dimension in Arizona and Colorado. Four of 10 (40%) 
agency officials in Arizona and Colorado specifically stated that it is necessary to 
establish a good relationship with the analyst because the agency needs the support of 
the analyst in getting its budget request accepted by the legislature. Because analysts 
in Arizona and Colorado present budget recommendations to the legislature, agency 
personnel may have a greater need to develop a good working relationship with the 
analysts. The agency officials explained:
She is the one who prepares the initial budget recommendation, 
we need her to have a good understanding of what we do and of 
our requests and to support them as much as possible. (Agency Official)
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Communication is the key to a good relationship. An open, honest 
relationship is essential in our being successful in getting our 
agenda through. We lobby [the legislative fiscal analyst] just like we 
lobby the legislators because of the budget recommendations that he 
makes. (Agency Official)
Our funding for our agency is dependent upon our relationship. He is 
the one who develops the budget recommendations for the legislature. 
We can cut our losses by being up&ont and honest with him,
(Agency Official)
I have to convince her that what the agency is asking for is reasonable. 
She is responsible for our budget recommendation. I visit with her, 
provide her information, and get responses to her in a timely fashion. 
(Agency Official)
In summary, the m^ority o f the agency officials interviewed (91%) indicated 
that it was "very important" or "important" to establish a good relationship with the 
legislative fiscal analyst. Agencies understand the importance of analysts as 
significant sources of information for the legislature. This necessitates establishing a 
good relationship so that both parties are confident that the information provided by 
agencies and presented to legislators by analysts is accurate and honest. In addition, 
in Colorado and Arizona establishing a good relationship may take on more 
importance because analysts make recommendations on the agency budget.
Perception of LFA Role with Agency by State 
Earlier it was discussed that legislators in this study perceived the role of 
analysts in the budget process as primarily one of facilitation. The discussion will 
now turn to the perception of analysts and agency personnel concerning the role 
played by the analysts with respect to state agencies. The roles used in this part of 
the study were adapted &om a study of executive budget analysts (Thurmaier and
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Gosling 1997). In the Thurmaier and Gosling study, executive budget analysts were 
interviewed and asked to characterize their role with respect to their agencies in the 
budget process. Thurmaier and Gosling provided a list of roles for the executive 
budget analysts to choose &om that included: agency advocate, adversary, facilitator, 
policy analyst, or other. Although Thurmaier and Gosling evaluated executive budget 
analysts, their study can be useful in studying the relationship between legislative 
fiscal analyst and state agency. Both types of analysts are responsible far 
understanding the agencies under their supervision, reviewing and evaluating agency 
requests, providing information to their respective bosses, and in some cases, 
developing budget recommendations. Therefore, the roles in the Thurmaier and 
Gosling study can provide a ûamework for capturing the relationship between 
legislative fiscal analyst and the state agency. However, some parts of the Thurmaier 
and Gosling study were changed. First, the title of the policy analyst role was 
changed to policy initiator in the current study. Second, the title o f adversary was 
changed to monitor in the current study. The title change of policy analyst to policy 
initiator and adversary to monitor more appropriately reflects the descriptions of the 
duties performed by the analysts for the legislature and allows 6)r comparison in role 
choice among the key budget actors in this study. Third, the current study expands 
the number of individuals interviewed by reporting the perceptions not only of 
legislative fiscal analysts but also the perceptions of agency directors, agency fiscal or 
budget ofBcers, and agency legislative liaisons as well. In the Thurmaier and 
Gosling study, only executive budget analysts were interviewed concerning their role 
with state agencies. It should be noted that the roles used to describe the analyst
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relationships with state agencies are similar to the roles used to describe the analyst 
relationship in the budget process used earlier in this chapter. When discussing 
analyst roles in the budget process, legislators were asked to select the most 
appropriate role for legislative analysts. When discussing analyst roles with the state 
agency, the agency advocacy role described below was substituted for the clerical 
role used in the legislator interviews. A description of the roles describing the 
analyst relationship with the state agency follows.
The agency advocacy role is one where the legislative fiscal analyst supports 
the agency and its programs before the legislature. In this position, the analyst has a 
good working relationship with the agency, believes in the objectives of the agency, 
and disseminates and supports agency positions before legislative committees. The 
monitor role suggests a less collegial role with the agency. This role is most closely 
associated with the detailed monitoring of the agency by tracking agency 
expenditures, preparing spreadsheets showing changes in caseloads or program 
recipients, and/or questioning an agency request or position on an issue. The 
facilitator role denotes a more positive relationship with the agency, but not as an 
advocate. This role occurs when analysts collect information about state agencies, 
provides information to members, and can involve the analysis of agency requests 
and/or executive budget recommendations and fiscal note preparation. When 
analyzing agency requests and executive recommendations, analysts point out major 
departmental issues that members should be aware of such as potential problems with 
programs or funding or possible federal regulations or legislation that may impact a 
state agency or program. In the course of fulfilling this role, the analyst must be
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active in understanding agency programs, making agency contacts, and 
communicating ideas and issues 6om agency to legislator and vice versa. In the 
policy initiator role, the analyst provides policy options or alternatives to legislators, 
makes budget recommendations that could include recommending new agency 
programs and/or changes in existing programs. In this role, analysts would define 
problems within programs, evaluate alternatives, and recommend options, including 
funding levels and number of positions. By developing solutions to defined 
problems, the policy initiator role goes beyond the facilitator role of merely providing 
information, summarizing agency programs, and pointing out areas of concern or key 
issues.
During the interview process, the interviewer briefly described each role and 
asked analysts to select the most appropriate role for themselves in the budget 
process. Likewise, agency officials were asked to select the role that best described 
the relationship between analyst and agency. Table 4.3 captures the most Sequent 
role responses. As with the legislators interviewed, multiple roles were selected by 
some of the respondents. Table 4 .3 reveals that the most Sequent response either 
separately or in concert with other roles, is the facilitator role with 29 of 33 
respondents selecting the facilitator role. Both legislative fiscal analysts and agency 
persormel selected the facilitator role more f-equently than the other three roles.
215
Table 4.3
Legislative Fiscal Analyst and Agency Personnel Perception
of










Agency Advocate - - -
Monitor 6 (55%) 7 (32%) 13 (39%)
Facilitator 10 (91%) 19 (86%) 29 (88%)
Policy Initiator 2 (18%) 7 (32%) 9 (27%)
Note: All percentages have been rounded up.
Ten of the eleven (91%) analysts reported that the facilitator role was the best 
description of their relationship with state agencies. Five of 11 (45%) analysts 
selected only the facilitator role while five of 11 (55%) analysts selected the 
facilitator role along with one or two additional roles, with facilitating being the most 
important. One analyst selected monitoring as the most ^propriate role with regard 
to his agencies. The selection of facilitation as the most appropriate role on the part 
of the analysts supports the discussion on the primary duties in Chapter Three. 
Responses from analysts included:
I must let my bosses [legislators] know what the
issues are. The department may say that the issues are X, Y, and Z
and I think that it is X (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
My job is to know what is going on in my agency to facilitate 
decision making. I am a source of information when they aren't in town.
I keep them updated. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We make presentations to the committee in the 611 during the briefings 
[analysis o f agency budget requests] where we review the agency requests 
and brief members on the various issues regarding the agency.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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Nineteen of 22 (86%) agency personnel selected the facilitator role. Twelve 
of 22 (55%) agency personnel reported that the facilitator role was solely the role that 
best characterized the legislative analyst responsible for their agency. Seven of 22 
(32%) agency ofGcials selected the facilitator role along with other roles. Among 
these seven officials, 6ve commented that the facilitator role was the most important 
of the multiple roles selected and two officials commented that the policy initiator 
role was the most important. Agency persormel comments regarding analysts as 
facilitators included:
She [fiscal analyst] is a &cilitator. The committee uses her as an 
information gatherer. She reviews the department request and gives 
her analysis to the legislature and that usually spawns questions &om us. 
Then we wodc with her to see that those questions get answered. 
(Agency official)
The role is a 6cilitator. One of gathering, analyzing, and 
communicating information to the legislature. To provide information 
to members regarding our agency, our budget request, and issues that 
are important to us. (Agency official)
Facilitator role more than anything else. Due to the nonpartisan nature 
of the office, there is no policy initiating there. (Agency official)
Although the &cilitator role was chosen most &equently by legislative 
analysts and agency personnel, several other roles were selected. For example, 
agencies and analysts rqiorted that at times the relationship can be antagonistic. An 
agency director commented that the legislative agenda is not the same as the agency's 
agenda. Because analysts work for the legislature, they assist the legislators in 
making decisions that agencies may not support. Therefore, leading to strained 
relationships can develop as analysts work with agencies to implement legislative
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initiatives. The occurrence of these strained relationships is supported by analyst 
comments. For example, several analysts mentioned that it is often uncomfortable for 
them to request information &om an agency that is a burden on the agency in terms of 
time and staff resources to request information for a legislative proposal not 
acceptable to the agency.
Although no respondent identified the agency advocacy role as the most 
appropriate for legislative fiscal analysts either separately or in concert with other 
roles, there can be rare occasions when agency advocacy occurs. During the course 
of the interview, several agency officials and legislative Gscal analysts provided 
examples of agency advocacy. These responses included:
He [fiscal analyst] is not an advocate. But he did help the department 
this past session. The state had to make some budget cuts this year.
The committee wanted to cut two or three items in our budget, but [analyst] 
advocated for our department on why we [agency] could not cut them 
because they were necessary items for us. (Agency Official)
The agency had been asking for new computers and software.
They [agency] showed me what they needed and the type of software 
that could do the job for them. I agreed that the software would be useful. 
They needed $1 million for the computers. I advocated on their behalf for 
this software, but I justified what I did based on the fact that they would 
be more efGcient in doing their jobs with the new computers and software. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
He helped the department by going the extra mile to make our views known 
to the legislature. (Agency Official)
Table 4.4 reveals the differences in responses by state. The primary role for 
legislative fiscal analysts is the most clear among Kansas and Maine respondents. 
Kansas is the only state where none of the interviewees responded that the analysts 
played multiple roles. All Kansas agency ofGcials and legislative fiscal analysts
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reported that the most appropriate role o f the legislative fiscal analyst is facilitation. 
The respondents from Maine were also similar in their role selection with analysts 
and agency officials most Goquently responding that the facilitator role best 
characterizes Maine fiscal analysts, although the monitor role does appear as a 
secondary role for the analysts.
Table 4.4
Legislative Fiscal Analyst and Agency Personnel Perception
of
LFA Role with Agency by State
State Legislative Fiscal 
Analyst
Agency Personnel Total Role 
Responses
Arizona
Agency Advocate “ - -
Monitor 2 (40%) 1 (14%) 3 (25%)
Facilitator 3 (60%) 4 (57%) 7 (58%)
Policy Initiator « 2 (29%) 2 (17%)
Total 5 (100%) 7 (100%) 12 (100%)
Colorado
Agency Advocate " - -
Monitor 3 (42%) 4 (31%) 7 (35%)
Facilitator 2 (29%) 4 (31%) 6 (30%)
Policy Initiator 2 (29%) 5 (38%) 7 (35%)
Total 7 (100%) 13 (100%) 20 (100%)
Kansas
Agency Advocate - - -
Monitor - - -
Facilitator 3 (100%) 6 (100%) 9 (100%)
Policy Initiator - - *
Total 3 (100%) 6 (100%) 9 (100%)
Maine
Agency Advocate " ”
Monitor 1 (33%) 2 (29%) 3 (30%)
Facilitator 2 (66%) 5 (71%) 7 (70%)
Policy Initiator — «
Total 3 (100%) 7 (100%) 10 (100%)
Note: All percentages have been rounded up.
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Arizona and Colorado oSer the most interesting look into legislative ûscal 
analyst roles. Overall, the ^cilitator role is most dominant 6»r legislative fiscal 
analysts in Arizona. Two of four agency officials in Arizona selected solely the 
&cilitator role as that which best characterized the fiscal analyst. However, the 
remaining two agency ofGcials reported multiple roles for the analysts including both 
monitoring and policy initiating, although they reported that the primary role of the 
legislative fiscal analyst is &cilitation. From the analyst perspective, none of the 
Arizona fiscal analysts reported policy initiation as the role that describes their 
relationship with state agencies even though they are responsible for providing budget 
recommendations r^arding the state agency budget requests to the legislature.
In Colorado, all six of the agency personnel interviewed reported multiple 
roles for the analyst including monitoring, facilitating, and policy initiating. With 
respect to the agency personnel interviewed, these three roles received approximately 
the same percentage of responses, with a slightly higher response for policy initiation. 
It is important to note that Table 4.4 also reveals that the policy initiator role is 
selected most &equently in Colorado as opposed to the other states. However, four 
of the six agency personnel stated that the primary role is the facilitator role while 
only two stated that the primary role is the policy initiator. From the legislative 
analyst perspective, two of the three Colorado legislative analysts perceived some 
policy initiation on their part, but it is secondary to the Acilitator and monitor roles.
In fact, Colorado G seal analysts are the only analysts in this study selecting the policy 
initiator role and they do so only as a secondary role.
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This lack of policy initiation reported and perceived by both analysts and 
agency ofBcials in Arizona and, to some extent Colorado, is somewhat puzzling given 
the fact that analysts in these states prepare and present budget recommendations to 
the legislature as the activity of developing budget recommendations is a component 
of the policy initiator role. As discussed earlier in the chapter, only one legislator in 
Arizona selected the policy initiator role and this role was secondary to the facilitator 
role. The sole legislator interviewed in Colorado, however, did select the policy 
initiation role as that which best describes analysts in her state.
Perhaps the most illuminating comments come from the legislative Gscal 
analysts themselves in terms of how they perceive their roles. The legislative fiscal 
analysts in Arizona do not perceive themselves as having a policy initiator role even 
though they prepare budget recommendations, one of the activities associated with 
this role. In responding to the interview question on the types o f duties performed 
for the legislature, two legislative analysts commented:
We provide technical support, not policy development for the chairs, 
who drive the policy. I initiate policy on behalf of the legislators. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I have a support role, a technical estimation role where I provide estimates 
and forecasts. There is not much policy orientation, we are not advocating 
for policy positions. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
As stated earlier, analysts in Colorado do perceive a policy initiation role, but it is 
secondary to 6cilitation. From the agency perspective, several specific comments 
&om agency personnel in Arizona and Colorado point to analysts engaging in policy
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initiation, but always on behalf o f the legislature or in some cases, the agency itself 
Comments &om these agency officials included:
The analyst is both a facilitator and policy initiator. He gathers information, 
and he would say that he does that, that he is a facilitator. But he also 
makes recommendations, when there is a legislative agenda either driven 
by one member or by some fiscal crisis, then he is a policy initiator.
(Agency official)
If the committee has something that they feel strongly about he [LFA] 
does try to move us [the agency] in that direction, but he does not come 
up AMth things himself He initiates on behalf of the legislature.
(Agency Official)
At times, she [fiscal analyst] may be a policy initiator, if there are new 
things we are pushing, we would contact her and let her know about it, 
let her know about the budget impact so she could relay that to members.
If we can convince her of the worthiness of our request, she would 
consider that in her recommendations.
(Agency official)
Therefore, if the recommendations are perceived to originate &om sources 
other than the analysts, the policy initiator role is not likely to be seen as a dominant 
role for these analysts. Also of importance to this discussion, is the overlap that 
appears in the roles. As stated earlier a majority of legislators and agency persoimel 
reported multiple roles for the legislative analysts. Perhaps this is due in part to the 
fact that when analysts develop budget recommendations and present those 
recommendations to the legislators, it is perceived to be part of the facilitation role 
rather than policy initiation. Certainly, when analysts present their recommendations 
to the legislator, they are informing them of issues surrounding the agency's budget.
In summary, the most Sequent response either separately or in concert with 
other roles is the facilitator role. Although no interviewee selected the advocacy
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role, there are times when advocating for the agency may occur. Interestingly, while 
Arizona and Colorado analysts prepare budget recommendations for the legislature no 
Arizona analyst perceived a policy initiator role and two Colorado analysts selected 
the policy initiator role, but commented that it was secondary to the &cilitator and 
monitor roles. Despite the reluctance of some legislative fiscal analysts to select the 
policy initiator role, two agency officials in Arizona and five agency officials in 
Colorado selected the policy initiation role in concert with one or more of the other 
analyst roles. Only in Colorado did two agency officials select the policy initiator 
role as the primary role for analysts.
Summary of Analyst/Agency Relationship
Not only are legislative fiscal analysts facilitators with respect to their role in 
the budget process, but also with respect to their role with state agencies. The 
facilitator role best describes the relationship between analyst and agency. Just as 
there are periods o f heavy contact between analyst and legislator, the same is true 
between analyst and agency. The key periods in the budget process, the review of the 
agency budget requests and the development of budget recommendations, elicit the 
most Sequent contact between analyst and agency personnel. The nature of this 
contact centers on the agency budget request and legislation or proposals that could 
impact the agency's budget. Facilitation goes both ways in this symbiotic 
relationship. Analysts and agency personnel use each other as sources o f information. 
On the analyst side, state agencies are the starting point for getting clarification and 
justification concerning the agency budget request. On the agency side, state officials 
rely on analysts to keep them abreast of legislative activity concerning their agency's
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budget and for disseminating key information regarding their agency to legislators. 
The relationship between analyst and agency is extremely significant and is reflected 
in the importance that agency personnel place in establishing a good relationship with 
the legislative fiscal analyst. The comments from each group give the impression that 
trust and respect is necessary so that each group feels comfortable accepting the 
information provided by the other. Almost half o f the agency personnel commented 
that establishing a good relationship builds trust between the two groups. Trust 
enables the agency ofBcial to feel confident that the legislative ûscal analyst 
accurately and objectively communicates the agency perspective to the legislature. 
Further, trust is necessary so that analysts will have confidence that the agency is 
providing fair and accurate information. As key actors in the budget process, analysts 
and agency personnel must work together to respond to the various information 
requests by legislators.
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Relationships with Executive Budget Analysts
Legislative fiscal analysts and executive budget analysts perform similar 
functions for the legislature and governor, respectively. During budget development, 
the executive budget analyst reviews agency requests, gathers agency justification for 
those requests, and makes suggestions or recommendations to the governor. Once the 
governor's budget is presented to the legislature, budget analysts provide support, 
clarification, budget recommendations, and other information to the governor 
regarding legislative and agency budget initiatives (Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001). 
In the course of providing information to the legislature and the governor, legislative 
fiscal analysts and executive budget analysts interact with each other, typically
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regarding a specific agency. Just as legislative fiscal analysts are responsible for a 
particular state agency or policy area, the work of the executive budget office is also 
divided up in this manner. In this study, the executive budget analysts interviewed 
corresponded to the same policy areas as the legislative fiscal analysts interviewed. 
O f the 12 executive budget analysts contacted, 11 agreed to the interview.
Legislative Analvst /Executive Analyst Contact
As one measure of interaction between legislative and executive analysts, 
each executive budget analyst was asked to identify by name, his or her legislative 
counterpart. All executive budget analysts interviewed correctly identified the 
legislative fiscal analyst responsible for the same policy area as the executive budget 
analyst.
Arizona analysts in both the legislative and executive branches report weekly 
contact, usually by phone, during the legislative session. At times, daily contact can 
occur, particularly at the point when the legislative analysts are developing their 
budget recommendations prior to the legislative session. Four of the six legislative 
and executive analysts interviewed &om Arizona specifically indicated that the nature 
of contact centers on verifying numbers and discussing the assumptions used in 
arriving at various calculations and recommendations. Both legislative and executive 
analysts have the responsibility for preparing Medicaid caseload projections, prison 
bed projections, and estimates of the number of children in public schools. These 
analysts confer with each other on the assumptions used to develop those projections 
and to verify calculations.
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In Kansas, both sets of budget actors reported at least weekly contact and at 
times, daily contact, during the session. Daily contact occurs during the period a 
specific bill is being discussed by the legislature that involves the policy area of the 
analysts. All three legislative analysts reported contacting the executive budget 
analyst to ask questions regarding the executive recommendation and to better 
understand the logic behind those recommendations. Also, one legislative analyst 
commented that he often calls his executive budget counto-part to get another 
perspective or opinion on a legislative proposal. The executive budget office may 
have a different perspective or have additional information that could shed light on 
the impact o f a proposal. Executive budget analysts in Kansas are likely to contact 
the legislative analysts during the session to clarify a committee or chamber action or 
to verify that the appropriations bill was drafted correctly by the Revisor's Office, the 
legislative staff entity responsible for drafting the appropriations bill in Kansas. As 
one executive budget analyst commented, there is a great deal o f language and 
numbers that comprise the appropriations bill and drafting mistakes can occur. If 
there is a mistake, the executive budget analyst contacts the legislative fiscal analyst 
who is responsible for correcting the bill.
Less contact occurs between legislative and executive analysts in Colorado. 
Two of the Colorado fiscal analysts commented that they rarely contact the executive 
budget analyst even when the analysts are preparing their briefings and budget 
recommendations for the legislature. The third Colorado legislative analyst reported 
contact with his executive budget counterpart at the point when he is developing the 
briefing document, but the nature of this contact centers on the legislative analyst
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sending written questions to the executive budget analyst regarding the executive 
budget proposal. From the executive budget analyst perspective, only one Colorado 
budget analyst reported weekly contact with the legislative analyst, while the other 
two budget analysts interviewed described contact to be monthly or even less during 
the budget process. The interviews in Colorado indicate that contact between the 
legislative fiscal ofRce and executive budget office is less frequent than contact in the 
other states, even during the peak periods where the legislative fiscal analysts are 
reviewing and analyzing the executive budget proposal and preparing their budget 
recommendations. In contrast, Arizona and Kansas legislative analysts and executive 
analysts reported daily or weekly contact with each other during analysis o f agency 
requests.
Maine legislative fiscal analysts have patterns of contact with their executive 
budget counterparts similar to that reported by the Arizona and Kansas legislative 
analysts. During the session, this contact is likely to be weekly and at times monthly. 
Maine legislative analysts typically contact their executive budget counterparts for 
clarification on the agency request and executive recommendation. One analyst 
responded that the executive budget analysts have more detailed information about 
the agency budget requests than the legislative fiscal office. Although the legislative 
fiscal analysts rely on the executive budget office to supply them with detailed 
information regarding budget requests, the executive budget analysts interviewed 
reported less &equent contact with their legislative counterparts as two of the three 
Maine executive budget analysts reported little contact during the legislative session. 
When contact does occur, it centers on getting information about pending legislation.
227
clarifying actions taken in legislative hearings, or reporting an error in an agency 
request or appropriations bill.
In summary, the &equency and nature of the contact between analysts in the 
legislative and executive branch differs by state. Arizona analysts in both branches 
reported more contact with each other during the development of budget 
recommendations than the analysts in Colorado. Arizona analysts in both branches 
report working together, exchanging information, verifying numbers, discussing 
possible legislative or gubernatorial proposals, and sharing the assumptions used in 
preparing recommendations. In contrast, less contact is apparent between legislative 
and executive analysts in Colorado when agency requests are being reviewed and 
budget recommendations are being prepared. Legislative and executive analysts in 
Kansas report weekly and sometimes daily contact during the session with each group 
sharing information, answering questions, and informing the other on actions taken 
by the legislature and governor. Although Maine analysts report that they contact 
their executive budget counterparts at least weekly, the executive budget analysts 
report that they contact the legislative fiscal analysts much less &equently. However, 
one area of contact is similar among all analysts in the states. In all four states under 
study, contact decreases significantly during the interim as the two groups of analysts 
work on projects independently that typically do not involve contact with each other.
Legislative Analyst /Executive Analyst Relations
Legislative analysts were asked to report on the nature of the relationship with 
their executive budget counterparts. Legislative analysts were asked to describe their 
relationship with the executive budget analyst by selecting &om four categories:
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collegial, adversarial, neutral, or other. Although ten of 11 (91%) legislative 
analysts reported collegial relationships with their executive budget counterparts, at 
times adversarial or competitive relationships can arise. Three legislative analysts 
reported a collegial, but adversarial relationship due to the fact that they work for 
different branches of government. One legislative analyst explained that personally 
his relationship with the executive budget analyst is collegial, but structurally they are 
adversaries. The analysts are often on opposite sides of the issue due to different 
bosses with different agendas. Another legislative analyst reported a collegial but 
sometimes competitive relationship, with competition on the part of the executive 
budget analyst. Interestingly, all of adversarial or competitive comments were &om 
legislative fiscal analysts in states where budget recommendations are provided to the 
legislature. The remaining legislative analyst (one of 11) reported a neutral 
relationship with his executive budget counterpart
As previously discussed in this chapter, 82 percent of the agency personnel 
interviewed reported that a good relationship was very important to establish with the 
legislative fiscal analyst responsible for analyzing their agency's budget. However, 
less enthusiasm was exhibited for the importance of establishing a good relationship 
by the executive budget analysts. Obviously, agency personnel have a greater stake 
in establishing positive relationships with legislative fiscal analysts due to the 
analysts' responsibility for presenting agency budget requests, issues, and concerns to 
the legislators and in some cases, making budget recommendations for the agency. 
The relationship between legislative analysts and executive budget analysts, however, 
is one primarily of sharing information and verifying numbers. This is a relationship
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that may benefit h"om being a positive one, but it may not be a necessity for the 
analysts to establish a good relationship in the course of fulfilling their roles for the 
legislature and governor.
Table 4.5 shows that 55 percent (six of 11) of the executive budget analysts 
reported that a good relationship was veiy important, while 27 percent (three of 11) 
reported that it was somewhat important and 18 percent (two of 11) reported that it 
was not important to establish a good relationship with the legislative fiscal analyst.
Table 4.5
Importance of Establishing a Good Relationship with LFA
Relationship Executive Budget Analysts 
(n = ll)
Very Important 55% (6)
Important -
Somewhat Important 27% (3)
Not Important 18% (2)
Total 100% (11)
The relationships that exist between legislative analysts and their executive 
counterparts differ by state perhaps based upon legislative-executive authority in the 
budget process and personal connections between analysts. Some tension between 
the analysts is exhibited in the states where the legislature is a strong player in the 
budget process, particularly in Colorado. All three executive budget analysts in the 
Colorado, reported that it was only somewhat important to establish a good 
relationship with the legislative analyst and one executive budget analyst in Arizona 
reported that it was not important at all to establish a good relationship. Comments 
&om these executive budget analysts included:
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Our relationship doesn't matter, my predecessors thought that it 
wasn't important and a waste of time. The [legislative] analyst has 
diSerent objectives because he works for the legislature. He has too 
many bosses who have political agendas that may or may not be good 
for the agency or stMe. The analyst has to respond to this. Because of 
this, he doesn't have time to get out into the agencies to see what is going 
on. He doesn't always know what is happening with the agencies 
because of that. (Executive Budget Analyst)
He (LFA) helps me to understand things. He helps me answer questions. 
But it is not essential to have a good relationship. We could have a 
relationship where I do my work and he does his and we never 
communicate with each other. (Executive Budget Analyst)
We can both do our jobs without establishing a good relationship, but it is 
better to have a good relationship. (Executive Budget Analyst)
The relationships between the analysts in Colorado may reflect the strength of both 
legislative and executive stafls. Neither is reliant upon the other for information, 
therefore it is not necessary to establish a strong rdationship with each other.
It is important to note that two of the three executive budget analysts in 
Arizona reported that it was very important to establish a good relationship with the 
legislative analyst. However, these responses came &om executive analysts who had 
known the legislative fiscal analyst previously either in graduate school or in previous 
employment. Therefore, a friendship had developed between the executive and 
legislative analysts. During the interviews, both budget actors mentioned this 
ûiendship and the length of time that they had known each other.
In Kansas and Maine, four of the five executive budget analysts reported that 
it was very important to establish a good relationship with the legislative analyst. In 
contrast with Colorado and Arizona, no analyst &om Maine or Kansas, either
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legislative or executive, referred to the relationship as adversarial or competitive. 
Common responses from executive analysts in Kansas and Maine include:
The relationship is very important because we work very closely 
with them. They give the initial presentations to the legislature 
on what is in the executive recommendations and agency requests.
They know that they can call me and ask me questions on the 
budget, it helps everyone. If the relationship is adversarial, then 
They aren't as likely to call me. We can help each other.
(Executive Budget Analyst)
The relationship cannot be adversarial. We must work with each 
other, our relationship is very cooperative and collegial. The 
sharing of information is important, both sides can make 
mistakes, we can share information in advance. We do not 
surprise each other in committees, we do not embarrass each 
other in committee by not telling one or the other about something.
(Executive Budget Analyst)
We need to have a good working relationship. We need to get to 
know each other personally. I want to know if that person has 
integrity, if I can trust them. We share a lot of information, and 
trust and integrity are important. (Executive Budget Analyst)
A good relationship is important because the Governor's Budget Office 
and the Legislative Fiscal OfRce must work together on the budget. They 
[analysts] are sources of information on how and why the legislature has 
changed the budget. We ask them what goes on in the committees. They 
ask for our help in determining the policy implications of proposed legislative 
changes. We have to have each other's help. (Executive Budget Analyst)
The lone executive budget analyst reporting that establishing a good relationship was 
not important was due to the lack o f contact with his legislative counterpart. This 
particular executive budget analyst &om Maine reported little contact with the 
legislative fiscal analyst during the legislation session and rare contact during the 
interim.
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In summary, 55 percent of the executive budget analysts interviewed reported 
that establishing a good relationship with legislative fiscal analysts was very 
important. This is lower than that reported by agency officials. From the above 
discussion, the relationship between legislative and executive analysts could depend 
upon legislative/executive relations in the budget process and the personal 
coimections between analysts. In those states where the fiscal offices are both 
strong, some competition may exist between the analysts. In this study, Arizona and 
Colorado analysts were identiBed as operating in "level one" ofRces wdiere the 
preparation of budget recommendations are required of the analysts. In contrast, 
"level two" and "level three" fiscal staffs (Kansas and Maine) do not prepare budget 
recommendations. Therefore, because of the additional duty o f preparing budget 
recommendations, the Arizona and Colorado fiscal offices are referred to as strong 
ofRces in relation to the executive budget ofBce. This relationship could lead to 
competition among the legislative fiscal analysts and executive budget analysts as 
four o f six executive budget analysts in Arizona and Colorado reported that it was 
only "somewhat important" or "not inrportant" to  establish a good relationsh^ with 
the legislative Sscal analyst. However, two of the six analysts &om these states 
reported a very good relationship with the legislative analyst, having known the 
analyst in a previous job and in graduate school. Therefore, personal relationships 
could overcome any adversarial issues related to a strong fiscal office. Similarly, the 
length of time on the job could increase the collegiality between the analysts as 
people who have known each other for some length of time perhaps are Aiendlier 
towards one another. Five of six executive budget analysts in the executive-budget
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States o f Kansas and Maine reported that it is "very important" to establish a good 
relationship with the legislative fiscal analyst. One executive budget analyst in 
Maine diverged &om this sentiment. This particular analyst could not determine 
whether a good relationship is important due to his lack of contact with the legislative 
fiscal analyst.
Summary of Legislative Fiscal Analyst/Executive Budget Analyst Relationship
Relationships between the two budget actors vary among states and among 
analysts within the same state. While performing similar duties, each type of analyst 
has a different boss with a different agenda. This necessarily leads to some secrecy, 
competition, and disagreement between the two groups of analysts. In Colorado, 
where analysts are responsible for preparing budget recommendations for their 
respective bosses, competition, less interaction, and even secrecy surrounding the 
budget recommendations conditions the relationships. In Arizona and Kansas, 
analysts from both sides rely upon each other for information, to verify calculations, 
and to assess the plausibility of a proposal. Kansas analysts report very collegial 
relationships perhaps due to the fact that the legislative fiscal analysts do not make 
budget recommendations and therefore pose no threat to the executive budget staff 
In Maine, a more lopsided relationship occurs where perhaps a weaker legislative 
staff is farced to rely on the executive budget staff for much of the infarmation 
provided to the legislature. The relationship between legislative fiscal analyst and 
executive budget analyst, may in fact, mirror the relationship between the legislative 
and executive branches. Stronger legislatures allow their staffs a larger role in the
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process, through the development of policy options and budget recommendations. 
This, in turn, may condition the relationship between legislative and executive staff
Conclusion
This chapter described the f-equency and nature of contact between analysts 
and other key budget actors, discussed the role of the analyst in the budget process 
and described the relationships that exist between analyst, legislator, agency 
personnel, and executive budget analysts. Legislative analysts have primary contact 
with chairs and members of the fiscal committees and provide them with information 
that is the basis for legislative decision-making on the budget. Therefore, the most 
useful kind of information provided by legislative analysts is that which offers a 
broad assessment o f agency programs and services, explanation of the historical 
context of agencies and past decisions, and a review of problem areas or issues.
Much of this information is provided to legislators during the budget process when 
the analyst provides her review and analysis o f the agency budget request and if 
appropriate, presentation of budget recommendations. It is during these periods in the 
budget process where analysts and legislators report very Sequent contact with each 
other.
Although the m^ority of analysts, legislators, and agency personnel selected 
the ûicilitator role as that which best describes the legislative fiscal analyst, other 
roles were cited reflecting the different duties performed by the analysts. Legislators 
in Kansas selected the facilitator role along with the clerical role indicating the 
importance of the Kansas analysts as the sole staff for the subcommittees. Likewise, 
Maine analysts are perceived primarily as facilitator, but engage in monitoring as
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well. The Colorado legislator, some agency personnel and legislative analysts in 
Colorado selected the policy initiator role reflecting the analyst duty of developing 
budget recommendations. It should be noted that only the Colorado legislator 
selected the policy initiator role as the sole role for analysts. Less support 6)r the 
policy initiator role was found for the Arizona analysts. Therefore, even though 
analysts develop budget recommendations in these states and this is one activity 
comprising the policy initiator role, the perception of analysts as facilitators is more 
significant than analysts as policy initiators. Furthermore, comments &om analysts 
and legislators indicated that analysts do not provide advice or their own opinions to 
legislators.
Recognizing that legislative G seal analysts are instrumental in providing 
information to legislators on agency programs and Gscal issues, the m^ority of 
agency personnel reported that it is very important for them to establish a good 
working relationship with the legislative G seal analyst The relationship between 
analyst and agency is symbiotic. Comments Gom analysts and agency personnel 
suggest a need for these budget actors to work together in responding to legislative 
inquiries and assisting in legislaGve decision making on the budget. Contact between 
analyst and agency is heavy during the periods where analyst review agency budget 
requests and make recommendations. This contact mirrors the point in the budget 
process where both analysts and legislators reported heavy contact with each other. 
However, legislative Gscal analyst contact with the executive budget analysts is not as 
uniGDrm as the contact with the other budget actors. Differences in contact vary by 
state and by individual analyst, perhaps reGecting the legislative-executive
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relationship in the budget process as well as personal relationships that arise among 
the analysts. Executive budget analysts, as a group, reported less importance in 
establishing a good relationship with the legislative hscal analysts than agency 
personnel, although some individual executive budget analysts reported that it was 
very important to establish a good relationship with their legislative counteiparts. A 
more independent relationship between the two types of analysts is apparent in 
Colorado where analysts there have less contact with each other than that reported by 
the analysts in the other three states under study.
Chapter Five will assess the influence of legislative Gscal analysts based upon 
perceptions of influence by the key budget actors. It will assess the congruence of 
Arizona and Colorado legislative Gscal analyst budget recommendations to that of the 
Gnal legislative appropriaGons as an additional measure of inGuence in those states. 
Further, a review of the process of developing budget recommendations and the types 
of budget recommendations made will be discussed to assess any diSerences in this 
acGvity between the two Gscal staSs. Finally, Chapter Five will discuss the various 
factors that are assumed to impact the degree of inGuence as outlined in the model of 
legislative Gscal analyst inGuence presented in Chapter Two.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence in the State Budget Process
As discussed in Chapter Two, there is some expectation that legislative stafk 
are influential in the policy making process. There is both anecdotal evidence 
(Malbin 1980; Bisnow 1990) and empirical research (Balutis 1975b; Rosenthal 1974; 
Carey et al. 1998; Moncrief et al. 1996; Weissert and Weissert 2000) supporting this 
conclusion of influence. Although research indicates that legislative staffers are less 
important in the actual voting decision of legislators (Kingdon 1989; Songer et al. 
1985; and Hurwitz 1988), a fair amount of research exists that supports the influence 
of legislative staff as information gatherers and agenda setters (Guston et al. 1997; 
Gray and Lowery 2000; Hammond 1990; Balutis 1975b).
While the above research points to the influence of staff at both the federal 
and state levels, staff at the state level might be in a better position to influence due to 
the time and expertise constraints placed on state legislatures. Part-time legislatures, 
high turnover due to term limits, and the increasing complexity of state programs, 
make staff support crucial at this level. In an effort to deal with these complexities 
and time constraints, legislatures began increasing the size of staff in the 1970s, 
particularly specialized staff such as "...fiscal, legal services, auditing and program 
evaluation, administrative rule review, media relations, computer services, and 
committee staff" (Pound, 1999, 29).
Further, legislative fiscal staff might be more influential than other legislative 
staff due to the complexity and technical nature of the state budget process (Weissert 
and Weissert 2000). Also, the power of particular staff often comes &om the power
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o f their bosses (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981). The most powerful legislators are 
often those sitting on the money committees. Therefore, fiscal staffers may be 
perceived as more influential because they work for the most prestigious committees 
and members. Due to the complexity of the state budget, all 50 state legislatures now 
have budgetary staff and recent research has shown a growing parity between the 
executive branch and legislative branch in the state budgeting process (Abney and 
Lauth 1987 and 1998; Gosling 1985; Gosling 1994; Rosenthal 1981). Legislatures 
are now ̂ l e  to challenge the governor in budgetary matters due to the support o f  
fiscal staff For all of these reasons, legislative fiscal staff may be very influential in 
the budget process. This chapter will explore the perceptions of legislative Gscal 
analyst inGuence in the budget process, discuss differences in inGuence, and examine 
the variables conditioning the inGuence of legislative Gscal analysts.
A Model of Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence
Chapter Two introduced the model of legislative Gscal analyst inGuence used 
in this study and provided a description of the variables assumed to condition the 
inGuence of legislative Gscal analysts. Figure 5.1 displays the variables introduced 
in Chapter Two that may condition the inGuence of legislative Gscal analysts in the 
budget process. The model includes a control variable representing the nonpartisan 
nature of the Gscal ofRce where the analysts under study work. In addition, the 
model includes several independent variables thought to impact legislative Gscal 
analyst inGuence such as analyst duties for the legislature, tenure in position, 
expertise in a pardcular policy area, degree of contact with key budget actors, degree 
of discreGon in providing information or budget recommendations to legislators, as
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well as the size of the fiscal office. In addition, legislator experience and tenure in 
office may also impact the level of legislative analyst influence in the state budget 
process. The model in Figure 5.1 also shows the dependent variable used in this 
research, state budget policy influence. The dependent variable will be discussed in 
the next section where the discussion focuses on the degree of legislative Gscal 
analyst inGuence in the four states under study.
Figure 5.1
Model of Legislative Fiscal Analyst (LFA) Influence
Control Variable:
# Structure of Gscal staff ofGce: Nonpartisan
Independent Variables:




# LFA staff size
# LFA contact with budget actors and visibility in budget
process
# Level of discretion given LFA
Legislator inexperience or lack of knowledge
# Biennial budget cycle
# Term limits
# Tenure of legislator
V
Dependent Variable:
State budget policy inGuence
# Reported degree of inGuence by LFAs and other key actors
# Rankings ofLFA inGuence compared to other key actors
# Congruence between LFA appropriation recommendations 
and Gnal legislative appropriations
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Finding» of Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence
Perceptions of Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence
The dependent variable in this study is legislative fiscal analyst influence in 
state budget policy. Legislative fiscal analyst influence is measured in three ways. 
First, influence is measured by the reported degree of influence by legislative fiscal 
analysts and other key actors (legislators, agency personnel, and executive budget 
analysts) on an ordinal scale: very influential, influential, somewhat influential, and 
not influential. Second, influence is assessed by comparing legislative analysts with 
other key actors by having legislators, agency personnel, and executive budget 
analysts rank the influence o f legislative fiscal analysts and other key budget actors 
on a scale o f one to five, where one represents no influence and five represents high 
influence. The final measure of influence examines the acceptance of the analyst 
budget recommendations by the appropriations or budget committee and/or the 
legislature. This measure of influence is only applicable for those analysts in Arizona 
and Colorado who make recommendations to the legislature.
As stated above, one measure of legislative staff influence is based upon the 
perceptions o f influence by the key budget actors in this study, including the analysts. 
In addition to questions regarding the general duties performed for the legislature and 
the types and usefulness of information provided, legislative fiscal analysts were 
asked to assess their own influence in the budget process. Legislative fiscal analysts 
were asked to rate their perceived influence in the budget process by selecting &om 
several degrees of influence: very influential, influential, somewhat influential, or not 
influential. After the initial response by the legislative fiscal analyst, the interviewer
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asked a series of questions to better understand this influence. Analysts were asked to 
comment on the source of their influence, the type of legislator influenced the most, 
and the primary point of influence in the budget process. Each of these issues will be 
discussed in this chapter.
In an effort to validate the legislative fiscal analyst responses, legislators, 
agency personnel, and executive budget analysts were asked similar questions 
regarding legislative analyst influence. Agency officials were asked to assess the 
influence of the analyst on the agency's budget request or recommendation by 
selecting &om different degrees of influence: very influential, influential, somewhat 
influential, or not influential. Similarly, executive budget analysts were asked to 
assess the legislative analyst by selecting &om the different degrees of influence.
Finally, legislators were asked to assess the influence of the analyst on their 
decision making on the budgets of the Corrections, Education, and Medicaid 
agencies. Due to the differences in committee structure among the four states under 
study, different types of legislators were interviewed. In Arizona and Kansas, 
appropriations subcommittee chairs and members responsible for the Medicaid, 
Education, and Corrections Departments assessed the Escal analyst responsible for 
those areas due to the presence of subcommittees in these states. For example, the 
appropriations subcommittee chair responsible for reviewing the Education budget 
assessed the influence of the legislative Escal analyst assigned to the Education 
budget. In Colorado and Maine, where there are no subcommittees, appropriations or 
budget committee chairs and members were asked to assess each of the three analysts 
responsible for the Medicaid, EducaEon, and Corrections Departments. Therefore,
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some legislators only assessed the influence of one analyst, while others assessed the 
influence of all three legislative analysts.
Table 5.1 shows the responses of all budget actors interviewed in this study 
and indicates that 42 percent of all respondents perceive legislative fiscal analysts to 
be very influential and 31 percent of all respondents perceive analysts to be 
influential. In other words, 73 percent of all respondents perceive legislative fiscal 
analysts to be very influential or influential in the budget process. However, there are 
differences among actors. Of the four groups interviewed, legislative fiscal analysts 
had the largest percentage of responses in the "very influential" and "influential" 
categories. Nine of the 11 legislative fiscal analysts (82%) reported that they were 
very influential or influential in the budget process, while two analysts &om the same 
state reported no influence. Sixteen of 23 legislators (70%) responded that the fiscal 
analysts were very influential or influential, while 77 percent (17 of 22) of agency 
officials perceived analysts as very influential or influential. Executive budget 
analysts perceived the lowest levels o f influence with six of eleven (63%) executive 
analysts reporting their legislative counterpmts as either very influential or influential. 
Therefore, the perception of influence is the highest among legislative fiscal analysts, 
followed by agency personnel, legislators, and executive budget analysts.
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Table 5.1

















5 (46%) 10 (44%) 9 (41%) 4 (36%) 28 (42%)
Influential 4 (36%) 6 (26%) 8 (36%) 3 (27%) 21 (31%)
Somewhat
Influential
7 (30%) 4(18%) 2 (18%) 13 (19%)
Not
Influential
2 (18%) 1 (5%) 2 (18%) 5(7%)
TOTAL 11 (100%) 23 (100%) 22 (100%) 11 (100%) 67 (100%)
* The total munix r of legislators interviewed was 13. However, in those states with no subcommittees
the individual committee member interviewed reported on the influence of each of the three legislative 
analysts responsible Ar the Medicaid, Corrections, and Education budgets.
Note: All percentages have been rounded up.
Although the majority of budget actors interviewed in the current study 
perceived the fiscal analysts as a group to be either very influential or influential, 
there are some noteworthy differences by state. Table 5.2 shows that the analysts 
receiving the highest percentage of "very influential" or "influential" responses are 
those analysts from Colorado (100%), followed by the analysts in Kansas (87%) and 
Arizona (79%). Maine analysts received the lowest percentage of responses in the 
"very influential" and "influential" categories at 43 percent. Further, Maine analysts 




Legklative Fkcal Analyst Influence by State
Level of 
Influence







Very Influential 1 (33%) 1 (33%) 2(50%) 4(29%)
Influential 2 (67%) 3 (75%) 2(50%) 7 (50%)
Somewhat
Influential
1 (33%) 1 (25%) 2 (14%)
Not Influential 1 (33%) 1 (7%)
Total Responses 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 14 (100%)
Colorado
Very Influential 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 6 (100%) 14 (93%)




Total Responses 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 6 (100%) 15 (100%)
Kansas
Very Influential 1 (33%) 1 (25%) 1 (17%) 3 (20%)
Influential 2 (67%) 1 (50%) 3 (75%) 4 (66%) 10 (67%)
Somewhat
Influential
1 (50%) 1 (17%) 2 (13%)
Not Influential
Total Responses 3 (100%) 2 (100%) 4 (100%) 6 (100%) 15 (100%)
Maine
Very Influential 1 (33%) 6 (50%) 7(30%)
Influential 1 (33%) 2 (33%) 3 (13%)
Somewhat
Influential
6(50%) 3 (50%) 9 (39%)
Not Influential 2(100%) 1 (33%) 1 (17%) 4 (17%)
Total Responses 2 (100%) 3 (100%) 12 (100%) 6(100%) 23 (100%)
* The total number of legislators interviewed is 13. However, in those states with no subcommittees 
the individual committee member interviewed reported on the influence of each of the three legislative 
analysts responsible Ar the Medicaid, Corrections, and Education budgets.
Note: All percentages have been rounded rq).
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Table 5.2 indicates that Colorado legislative analysts are clearly perceived 
among all respondents in that state to be very influential or influential, with 93 
percent of the responses in the "very influential" category and no responses in the 
lowest two categories of influence. In contrast, Maine analysts have the lowest 
perceptions o f influence with just 43 percent of responses in the "very influential" 
and "influential" categories, while 57 percent of the responses comprised the 
"somewhat influential" and "no influence" categories. These Endings hold up after a 
review of the perceptions excluding analyst assessment of their own influence. 
Finally, when reviewing the data by state and by group, Colorado legislative Escal 
analysts had higher percepEons of their own inEuence than other legislative Escal 
analysts. Legislators in Colorado and Kansas ranked their analysts higher than 
legislators in the other two states when reviewing the number of responses in the very 
inEuential and inEuential categories. All agency personnel in Arizona and Colorado 
perceived the legislative analysts in their state as either very inEuential or inEuential 
representing more responses in these categories than the agency personnel responses 
in Kansas and Maine. Executive budget analysts in Colorado perceive their 
legislative counterparts to be more inEuential than the executive budget analysts in 
the other three states with 67 percent Colorado execuEve analysts responding that the 
legislative analysts are very inEuential. When reviewing the percentage of 
respondents selecting the highest categones of inEuence (very inEuenEal and 
inEuenEal), Colorado analysts are above all other legislative analysts among all key 
budget actors. Upon review of the percepEons of the key budget actors by policy
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area, there are no patterns of analysts responsible for one policy area being perceived 
as more influential than analysts in another policy area.
Rankings of Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence and Other Key Budget Actors
In addition to having the respondents assess their perceptions of legislative 
fiscal analyst influence, the legislators, executive budget analysts, and agency 
personnel interviewed in this study also ranked the influence of legislative fiscal 
analysts compared to other key budget actors. This ranking used a scale of one to 
Ave, with one corresponding to no influence and Gve corresponding to high influence. 
This measure is an interval level measure while the previous measure o f influence 
used an ordinal scale based upon four categories of influence. Each budget actor, 
except for the legislative fiscal analyst, was asked to rank the legislative 6 seal analyst 
in term of his/her influence on the (Corrections, Education, or Medicaid) budget in 
comparison to other budget actors on a scale of one to five. The other key budget 
actors in the ranking included legislative fiscal office director, executive budget 
director, executive budget analyst, governor, governor's staff  ̂appropriation 
committee members, other members of the legislature, agency personnel, and 
lobbyists.
Table 5.3 indicates differences in influence among actors and states based 
upon the rankings. The rankings provide support for the perceptions of legislative 
fiscal analyst influence reported earlier in this chapter. Table 5.3 indicates that the 
appropriations committee and governor received higher average rankings than any 
other budget actor at 4.4 and 4.2 respectively.
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Table 5.3
Average Ranking of Influence of Key Budget Actors by State




4.4 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.4
Governor 3.2 4.4 4.3 4.7 4.2
Legislative Fiscal 
Analyst
3.9 4.5 4.5 3.0 3.8
Executive Budget Office 
Director
3.2 3.6 3.9 4.1 3.9
Legislative Fiscal Office 
Director
4.0 3.4 3.4 2.5 3.3
Executive Budget Analyst 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.3
Governor's Staff 2.5 3.6 2.3 4.5 3.2
Table 5.3 also indicates that the executive budget office director and the 
legislative fiscal analysts were also ranked high at 3.8 and 3.9 respectively. When 
reviewing rankings by budget actor, legislators ranked legislative Gscal analysts 
higher than any other key budget actor except for the appropriations committee. Not 
surprisingly, agency personnel and executive budget analysts overall ranked the 
governor and executive budget office director higher than the appropriations 
committee and legislative staff. When reviewing rankings by state, legislative fiscal 
analysts in Colorado and Kansas are ranked higher than analysts in Arizona and 
Maine. Maine legislative fiscal analysts, as well as the fiscal office director, received 
the lowest average rankings among all the key budget actors in Maine. Further, the 
rankings in Maine suggest the governor is the most influential player in the budget 
process compared to other states, as the governor and his staff garnered the highest 
rankings of all the budget actors in Maine. These rankings support the perceptions of 
the key budget actors on the influence of legislative Gscal analysts presented earlier.
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The table does not include the average ranking of agency personnel, lobbyists, 
and other members of the legislature due to the inability of those interviewed to 
provide a specific rank for these budget actors. Many of the respondents could not 
give a ranking but commented that the influence of non-appropriations committee 
members varied based upon the knowledge and individual power o f that member. 
Similarly, many of those interviewed reported that some lobbyists and agency 
personnel are highly influential while others are not. For this reason, no overall 
average could be attained for these budget actors. Further, a review of the rankings 
does not show any patterns in rankings among the analysts in the three policy areas.
Comparison of Analyst Recommendations with the Legislative Budget Decision
The final measure of influence is the congruence between legislative fiscal 
analyst budget recommendations and the legislative acceptance of those 
recommendations. This measure of influence is only valid in Arizona and Colorado 
where analysts prepare budget recommendations for the legislature. Documents 
&om each state were obtained showing legislative fiscal analyst budget 
recommendations, executive recommendations reflecting the governor's priorities, 
and final legislative appropriations in Arizona and Colorado. A comparison is made 
showing the percentage of the analyst recommendation accepted by the legislature. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 indicate that the budget recommendations made by the legislative 
fiscal analysts in Arizona and Colorado are not signiGcantly changed by the 
legislature.
In Arizona, legislative fiscal analysts begin reviewing agency requests and 
executive recommendations in the fall, prior to the legislative session. The legislative
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fiscal analysts consult with the chairs of the appropriations committee in each 
chamber as well as other appropriation committee members when developing their 
recommendations. These recommendations are presented to the appropriations 
committees when the legislature convenes in session as the Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee (JLBC) staff recommendations. Table 5 .4 compares the legislative 
analyst recommendations with the executive recommendations and the final 
legislative appropriations &ir FY 2002.^ Table 5.4 shows little percentage difkrence 
between legislative fiscal analyst recommendations and the executive 
recommendations for fiscal year 2002. Legislative fiscal analyst recommendations 
for the Departments of Education and Medicaid were higher overall than those of the 
executive, while the legislative fiscal analyst recommendation for the Department of 
Corrections was lower. The largest differences in recommendations were with the 
Departments of Medicaid and Corrections. In FY 2002, the legislative fiscal analyst 
total recommendation for Medicaid Department was 104 percent of the executive 
recommendation and in FY 2002, the legislative fiscal analyst total recommendation 
for Corrections Department was almost 97 percent of the executive recommendation. 
With respect to legislative acceptance of the recommendations offered by the 
legislative fiscal analyst, the results were mixed. In FY 2002, for the Corrections and 
Medicaid Departments, final legislative appropriations were closer to the 
recommendations of the executive than the recommendations of the legislative fiscal 
analyst. However, the legislative total appropriation for Education Department was 
closer to the recommendations of the legislative analyst than the executive.
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Table 5.4 
Arizona -  FY 2002
Executive Recommendations, Legislative Fiscal Analyst Recommendations, & 












as % of 
JLBC
Legislature 
as % of 
Executive
Corrections 581,628,900 575,867,700 99.01% 597,015,800 103.67% 102.65%
Education 2,964,933,800 3,006,500,700 101.40% 3,002,040,800 99.85% 101.25%
Medicaid 2,347,033,800 2,439,874,400 103.96% 2,365,570,600 96.95% 100.79%
Source: Executive and JLBC budget recommendations from the froywseef ET 2002 200/.
Available at www a7lep,state.az.us/ilbc/02red)k/red)ktoc.Ddf accessed on November 14,2001. Legislature's 
appropriaticm 6om the fT  2002/1/yrofnaAoms Aeporr-Jvng 200/. Available at 
www azleE.slate.az.us/ilbc/02app/02toc.htm accessed on November 14, 2001.
The process of developing recommendations in Colorado diSers &om that in 
Arizona. Colorado analysts begin preparing their recommendations for the legislature 
during the legislative session and typically present those recommendations in March. 
Table 5.5 shows little percentage difkrence between legislative Sscal analyst 
recommendations and those 6om the executive. Legislative fiscal analyst total 
recommendations for the Departments of Education and Medicaid were higher overall 
than those of the executive, while the legislative recommendation for the Department 
of Corrections was lower. This same phenomenon was also apparent in Arizona. In 
Colorado, the largest percentage difference among the recommendations occurred in 
the Department of Corrections where the legislative hscal analyst total 
recommendation was approximately 98 percent of the executive recommendation.
With respect to legislative acceptance of the recommendations ofkred by the 
legislative fiscal analyst, recommendations by the legislature were more similar to the
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recommendations of the legislative fiscal analysts than the executive 
recommendation. Although the percentage difference among all o f the 
recommendations in both states is small, it appears that legislative analyst 
recommendations in Colorado are closer to the final legislative ^propriation than 
their counterparts in Arizona.
Table 5.5 
Colorado -  FY 2002-2003 
Executive Recommendations, Legislative Fiscal Analyst Recommendations, & 


















Corrections 571,416,143 562,720,886 100.45% 562,287,191 99.92% 98.40%
Education 3,067,027,994 3,098,748,825 101.03% 3,105,105,322 100.21% 101.24%
Medicaid 2,109,330,352 2,116,952,948 100.36% 2,151,959,887 101.65% 102.02%
Source: Executive recommendations and JBC staff recommendations from Figure Setting Document-March 
2002 and Legislature’s appropriation available at Long Bill-General Appropriations A ct available at 
WWW.state.co.us/eov dir/leg dir/ibc/ibcstaffdocs.htm accessed on July 13,2002.
Staff documents showing analyst budget recommendations for the 
Corrections, Education, and Medicaid agencies indicate that recommendations can be 
broken down into two categories: technical recommendations and policy 
recommendations. Technical recommendations include uniform or standard changes 
to employee salaries, m ait or performance pay, operating expenses, employee travel, 
rent, and health insurance. Staff documents in Arizona and Colorado describe the 
method used by the analysts in calculating these items for the budget
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recommendations. In Arizona, these changes are referred to as "standard changes" 
and in Colorado they are referred to as "common policy."
Policy recommendations include increases or decreases in programs and/or 
services. Examples of this type of recommendation include increases or decreases in 
funding for programs due to demographic changes, expansions of existing programs 
and/or services, and recommendations for new programs and/or services. Analysts in 
both states make this type of recommendation. Adjustments in funding for programs 
and services due to demographic changes are common in both states among the three 
policy areas. For example, the legislative fiscal analysts responsible for Medicaid 
recommended both increases and decreases in funding for various programs due to 
changes in the number of individuals expected to enroll or become eligible for those 
programs. Likewise, one analyst responsible for the Corrections Department 
recommended a decrease in funding for prison operations due to his projections 
showing a decrease in inmate growth. For the analysts responsible for making 
recommendations regarding public school aid, these recommendations are almost 
solely based upon enrollment projections where growth is based upon the number of 
Average Daily Membership (ADM) students attending public schools in the state.
Expansions in existing programs can also be found among the analyst policy 
recommendations. One analyst in charge of the Medicaid agency recommended an 
increase in a program to provide Medicaid services to eligible students during the 
school day to take advantage of enhanced federal funding for this population. An 
increase in funding due to enhancements in federal grants for specific populations or 
programs is a common reason for analyst recommendations in the Medicaid and
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Education Departments. Another analyst recommended expanding a Medicaid &aud 
unit in order to reap future savings. Demographic changes are the driver in many of 
the analyst recommendations in the three policy areas. Analyst comments with 
respect to their duties for the legislature supports this review of the budget 
recommendation documents. When describing their duties, these analysts reported 
that estimating and calculating enrollment, number of recipients eligible for services, 
number of beds needed for inmates, reviewing changes in existing programs and the 
impact on funding as important aspects of their job. These activities are done when 
the Arizona and Colorado analysts review and evaluate agency budget requests and 
then prepare the budget recommendations for the legislature. See Appendix C for 
examples o f technical and policy recommendations made by the Arizona and 
Colorado legislative fiscal analysts.
In summary, 73 percent of the respondents in this study reported that 
legislative fiscal analysts are either "very influential" or "influential." As a whole, 
the legislative fiscal analysts interviewed perceived their own influence as higher than 
the other budget actors. Executive budget analysts perceived the lowest levels of 
legislative fiscal analyst influence. There are differences in influence by state, where 
analysts in Colorado received the highest perceptions of influence and analysts in 
Maine received the lowest perceptions of influence. Rankings comparing legislative 
fiscal analyst influence to that of other key budget actors support the perception 
findings. When reviewing the congruence between analyst budget recommendations 
and that of committee and legislature, few overall differences exist. However, the
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final legislative appropriations are more closely aligned with the recommendations of 
the Colorado legislative fiscal analysts than the Arizona legislative fiscal analysts.
Control Variable
In this study, all Gscal offices under study were nonpartisan. Nonpartisanship 
refers to G seal analysts who work for legislators of all political parties as well as 
legislators in both chambers. In this study, nonpartisanship was identified in the 
model of legislative G seal analyst influence as a control variable. Because all of the 
legislative Gscal analysts work in a nonparGsan office or for a joint committee, it was 
expected that this variable would be an equal source of inGuence on the analysts in all 
four states. In general, that assumption appears to be true. However, there is some 
variation among the responses of the key budget actors regarding nonpartisanship and 
legislative Gscal analyst inGuence. Several key budget actors responded that the 
nonpartisan nature of the staff is a reason for analyst inGuence. As stated earlier, as 
nonpartisan staf^ analysts are required to provide information to legislators of all 
parGes in both chambers. Nonpartisanship also implies that the analysts do not 
inteiject their own views or policy onentaGon when providing information. This 
research provided evidence in Chapter Four that the legislative Gscal analysts in this 
study scrupulously avoided inteijecting their own views and providing advice to 
legislators. It is the provision of objective infbrmaGon that was cited as a source of 
inGuence by 12 of the key budget actors in this study with Gve of the 12 comments 
coming Gom legislators. Some of these comments included:
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They are influential because the information that they give us is 
important, but they don't try to influence our priorities on the 
budget at all, they leave that up to us. (Legislator)
They are supposed to be neutral. She [LFA] does a good job of this. 
Here in [state], we don't have a problem with analysts pushing policy. 
(Agency Official)
They are influential due to the information they give. Analysts 
are perceived to be neutral, nonpartisan. Great resource for both sides 
of the aisle, we are all dependent upon their information. They have 
the corporate memory, but don't give us policy recommendations, the 
information they provide is not biased and it is instrumental in our 
decision-making. (Legislator)
Very influential. They are also seen as just presenting the facts, and 
not trying to convince them of something. When she presents the issues, 
she is presenting the facts as she sees them. She tries to get all sides of 
the story. (Agency Official)
I believe that they try to provide good information. They are not biased. 
Good information is what you need to make good decisions. Their 
influence is by providing objective information. (Legislator)
However, three key budget actors reported that influence is limited due to the 
nonpartisanship exhibited by staff Some agency ofhcials commented:
I think she could be very influential, the committee relies on their 
staff But [LFA] does a good job of presenting the facts and letting the 
committee decide for themselves what to do. But I think she is less 
influential because she presents the facts and lets committee decide for 
itself) she doesn't present just one side. Because I think she goes 
to a great extent to make the committee to make decisions for themselves, 
she is not influential. (Executive Budget Analyst)
They aren't influential. They aren't policy staff (Agency Official).
Although originally identified as a control variable, the nonpartisan status of 
the analysts may be an independent variable conditioning the influence of legislative 
fiscal analysts due to the variation in the comments from some of the key budget
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actors. Future research should consider the nonpartisan status of legislative Gscal 
analysts as a potential factor in analyst influence.
Reasons for Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence
It has been established that legislative Gscal analysts are perceived to be 
inGuential by the key budget actors, although the degree of inGuence varies among 
the states, with Colorado and Kansas legislative Gscal analysts exhibiting greater 
inGuence than their counterparts in Arizona and Maine. The next part of the research 
examines the variables conditioning the degree of legislative Gscal analyst inGuence. 
This section relies upon the comments Gom the key budget actors presented in this 
c h ^ e r  as well as comments Gom Chapters Three and Four to explore the types of 
legislators inGuenced and how and why legislative Gscal analysts in this study are 
inGuential.
In an effort to discover the types of legislators inGuenced the most by 
legislative Gscal analysts, the interviewer asked legislative Gscal analysts to select the 
type of legislator inGuenced the most Gom the following list: individual members of 
the legislature, committee members, committee chair, caucus leader, member of a 
particular political party, members in one chamber as opposed to the other chamber. 
As stated in Chapter Four, the legislative Gscal analysts in this study report having 
contact with and working primarily for the chairs and members of the Gscal 
committee(s) in their state legislature. Therefore, one assumes that chairs and 
members of the Gscal committees would be reported as the legislators who are 
inGuenced the most by the legislative Gscal analysts. This assumption is supported
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through the comments made by the legislative fiscal analysts when they were asked to 
select the type of legislature they influence the most.
All three Arizona analysts reported influencing appropriation committee 
chairs and subcommittee chairs the most, then appropriation committee members. 
Colorado analysts reported influencing all members of the Joint Budget Committee 
equally, no doubt due to the small size of this six-member committee. Two of three 
Kansas analysts reported influencing members of the fiscal committees the most, 
second was committee and subcommittee chairs. One Kansas analyst reported 
primarily influencing the subcommi#ee chair, then secondary influence with the 
committee members. Maine analysts reported influencing committee members, 
however, both analysts were hesitant to say that they have influence at all. When 
asked to assess their own influence in the budget process these analysts perceived no 
influence on their part and were reluctant to answer any questions regarding their 
influence in the budget process. With the exception of the Arizona analysts who 
reported influencing committee and subcommittee chairs the most, the remaining 
analysts reported primarily influencing all committee members. Therefore, 
comments &om these analysts on the type of legislator influenced the most parallels 
the type of legislator that they report having the most contact with and doing the most 
work for.
Legislative Staff Duties
As discussed in Chapter Three, the general duties of the legislative fiscal 
analysts in this study are similar. Analysts in all states are responsible &r providing 
general and specific information on agency programs, services, and budgets.
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However, some différences exist in the areas of budget recommendations and the 
provision of policy options. Analysts in Arizona and Colorado work in 6 seal offices 
that provide budget recommendations to committees. Analysts in Kansas routinely 
provide budget options or alternatives to individual members or committees, but do 
not have authority to develop budget recommendations. Maine analysts are 
responsible primarily for analyzing budget requests and preparing Gscal notes for the 
appropriations committee. Maine analysts do not develop budget recommendations 
and generally do not offer policy options to legislators. According to the model of 
legislative Gscal analyst inGuence, it is assumed that Colorado and Arizona analysts 
would have higher perceptions of inGuence due to their budget recommendation 
duGes.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Colorado analysts were perceived to be 
the most inGuential of all the analysts in this study, therefore, providing support for 
the assumpGon in the model. However, Arizona analysts had lower levels of 
perceived inGuence than analysts in Kansas, where no budget recommendaGons are 
prepared for the legislature. In addition, a review of the congruence of legislative 
appropriaGons with legislative Gscal analyst recommendations in Colorado and 
Arizona showed that the Gnal legislative appropnations were closer to the 
recommendations o f the Colorado legislative Gscal analysts than the Arizona 
legislative Gscal analysts, although the differences were small. To assess whether 
staff duties condiGon inGuence, key budget actors were asked to explain how and 
why the legislative Gscal analyst is inGuential. These comments were examined for 
linkages between staff duties and inGuence.
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Legislative fiscal analysts were asked why they are influential in the budget 
process. Of the nine analysts reporting that they are influential in the budget process, 
different types of reasons were given for that influence. Comments &om these 
analysts included:
I am very influential because after eight years, there are few people who 
have the knowledge of the funding for [agency]. There are many layers 
of law and it is very complex. There is no way legislators can understand 
it and with high stafF turnover in the legislature and in the [agency],
I am viewed as knowledgeable. I have knowledge of the programs. We are 
also influential in the fiscal notes, lots of sway over the fiscal notes. If 
a bill has a big price tag, very hard to get it through the process. We identify 
the potential fiscal implications of bills. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I am influential. For instance, there may be a misunderstanding over 
something in the governor's budget. So I say, what they [agency] are 
really doing is... So by clarifying things and providing technical 
information, I am influential. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I am very influential because of the number of recommendations that 
they [committee] go along with. I had one recommendation that varied 
this year, others were accepted. They almost always accept and the 
legislature almost always accepts the [committee] recommendation. I 
start the bidding. The department puts their agency request forward, 
this is the baseline, then I bring in my recommendations, then the 
committee responds to me. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I am influential because of my role to identify issues and analyze 
agency requests and executive recommendations. We are not 
very influential, we are one source of information, but because we 
condense it and provide analysis and zero in on what is important, we are
influential. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
My job is to know what is going on to &cilitate decision making.
I am a source of information when they aren't in town. Keeping 
them updated. You build up e)q)ertise to provide that information.
We are non-partisan staS^ but we aren't "non-talkers." When the 
governor or agency tries to convince them [legislators] to do 
something, we speak up and tell members of possible problems.
We are not advocates of a particular side but advocates for 
informing members. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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We are influential because we are responsible for pointing out areas 
of concern or what they should be aware of in each agency budget. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Among these comments, there are some diSerences among states that should
be identified, In Colorado, all three legislative fiscal analysts interviewed responded
that they are influential because of the preparation of budget recommendations for the
committee. In addition, two of these analysts also commented that influence comes
&om providing information. In contrast, only one analyst in Arizona specifically
mentioned the development of budget recommendations as a reason for influence, but
all three analysts commented that other &ctors are reasons for influence such as
knowledge of agency and agency programs, clarifying issues for legislators,
providing general information, and preparing Gscal notes. These comments suggest
that in those states where budget recommendations are made, this specific duty can be
a reason for influence, although this view is more prevalent among the Colorado
analysts than the Arizona analysts. More important, however, is the fact that the
m^ority o f analysts in all states responded that the reason for their influence is based
upon their knowledge of agency programs, ability to provide general information, and
to identify issues and concerns for legislators. Interestingly, the analysts &om Maine
reported that they are not influential in the budget process. No other analyst in any
other state commented that they have no influence in the budget process. Comments
G"om the Maine analysts included:
I have no influence at all. Tm trying to give them the facts. I f  the facts 
tell a story or lead them to make a decision then that is their decision.
But I don't know if the information that I provide influences them.
There are other sources of information, others who are more influential, 
such as lobbyists. We present the facts. I do not influence at all.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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I am not influential. As an analyst, I do not have much influence over 
the entire budget or the [agency] budget. However, legislators heavily 
rely upon my analyses of certain items in the budget and the information 
that I provide. I communicate pertinent information to the applicable 
House or Senate Chair that might assist in the debate.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Therefore, even though Maine analysts appear to have similar duties when 
compared to analysts in the other states under study, they do not perceive any 
influence associated with those duties. This lack of perceived influence by analysts in 
Maine is supported by other key actors in that state. Maine analysts had the lowest 
degree of influence among all of the analysts in this study, particularly among agency 
personnel and executive budget analysts.
To assess whether staff duties condition influence, other key budget actors 
were asked to explain both how and why the legislative fiscal analysts are influential. 
Legislators in this study were asked to describe how legislative Escal analysts are 
influential in the budget process. When reviewing legislative responses to how the 
legislative Escal analyst is inEuential, all legislators interviewed responded that the 
provision of information is how the analyst is inEuential. Even in those states where 
analysts prepare budget recommendations, none of the legislators interviewed 
speciEcally mentioned budget recommendations as a method of inEuence. Some 
legislative comments included:
They provide us with all kinds of information. [Legislator]
The analysts are instrumental in providing infbrmaEon that is essential
to our decision making on the budget. [Legislator]
Because of the detailed information that they provide us. [Legislator]
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Because we rely on them k r  almost all of our information, that is how 
they are influential. [Legislator]
From the legislative perspective, these comments indicate that the analyst as 
an information source is important in determining how an analyst is influential.
When asked why the legislative fiscal analyst is influential in the budget process 
common responses also appear. These comments indicate that there is some overlap 
between how and why analysts are influential. The provision of information seems to 
be important in how and why legislative fiscal analysts are influential. The fiscal 
analyst as an information provider was cited by 10 of the 13 legislators (77%) 
interviewed in this study as a reason for influence. Some legislator comments 
included:
They are influential because we rely on them for almost all our 
information, more so than the agencies. (Legislator)
We are a citizen legislature where members do not have time to know 
or understand every issue. They crank out an astonishing amount of 
information. They never say we can’t do that or that we can’t have 
that done in time. They are very bright. They are diligent in pursuing 
every question a member has. They are a godsend! (Legislator)
Because they say this costs X amount. They provide the basic information. 
They can verify the agency information, although they can say that they 
don’t agree with the agency, we have to take their word for it. They give 
us the statistics. They do track expenditures during the session, we have 
to have a balanced budget, and they keep track of the totals to make sure 
that we balance in the end, to bring the budget into balance. They also 
give us information on whether or not an agency can do something 
according to statutes. They let us know if an agency request violates 
statute, although I think they often go to the Attorney General’s office 
to get this information. (Legislator)
Legislators want information to make decisions with, they do not want to 
be blindsided, they want the truth &om analysts and expect analysts to 
be truthful. (Legislator)
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They are very influential in the sense that they are providing information 
to us. They shape the information. (Legislator)
Comments &om agency personnel on how analysts are influential in their state 
largely support the comments of the legislators. However, comments from the 
agency persormel in Colorado and Arizona place more emphasis on budget 
recommendations as a source of influence than the legislator comments in these 
states. Agency persormel in Arizona and Colorado commented:
She [LFA] is influential because she does prepare a draft of our 
recommendations. She isn't "very influential" because if the legislature 
doesn't like something that she recommends, I don't think that they 
would go for it. She does evaluate our requests and provides a lot of 
information to the committee, she is influential here. And if she makes 
a mistake in the appropriations bill, it might not be corrected by the 
legislature and we would have to live with it. (Agency Official)
He is very influential. If we don't want something and he does, then 
his budget recommendations get done. From my observation, the legislature 
accepts his recommendations for the most part, although I can't give 
you an acceptance rate. It is my observation that the legislature 
depends upon him to provide a lot of information for them.
(Agency Official)
He [LFA] is influential. The legislature seems to respect him. He 
is a good presenter of information, he grasps subjects quickly, they rely 
on him, but I would like to see him be more influential in terms of 
investigating our agency and programs and making recommendations.
The way our process works is that we [agency] make our requests and 
send them to the governor's budget office, then the OSPB analyst and 
JLBC analyst negotiate a recommendation. They work together, they 
have discussions and communicate amongst themselves.
(Agency OfRcial)
The analyst is very influential. He makes the recommendations 
and they are accepted by the committee ninety-five to ninety-nine percent 
of the time, seldom are they challenged. His recommendations are 
seldom ever overturned by the committee. The information we 
[agency] give him and the lobbying we do with him pays off in 
spades. (Agency Official)
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She is very influential. Ninety-five percent of what she recommends is 
accepted by the legislature. She makes recommendations to legislature 
and she decides how to package them. Recommendations are always 
subjective in putting together. (Agency Official)
He is very influential because he makes the budget recommendations on 
the entire department's budget. There are some 20 separate decision 
items that he makes recommendations on. I may by successful at going 
around him on 2-3 issues, but he will set that budget. He is ninety-eight 
percent successful at getting committee to go along with his 
recommendations. (Agency Official)
These comments indicate that agency personnel in Arizona and Colorado are 
aware o f the budget recommendations made by the analysts and believe that they are 
a source of influence for the analyst because most budget recommendations made by 
the analysts are accepted by the legislature. Agency comments are supported by the 
comparison of analyst recommendations with final legislative appropriations 
discussed earlier in this chapter showing little difference between those 
recommendations and the final legislative appropriation. Within the agency 
comments reported above, there are some distinctive comments worth noting.
Several agency personnel in Arizona, in addition to pointing out the significance of 
budget recommendations, also stated the importance of the analyst as an information 
provider and the fact that legislators rely upon that information. Also, one agency 
official in Arizona even commented on the desire to see the analyst be more proactive 
in making recommendations regarding the agency budget. This official described a 
process Wiere the analysts in both the executive and legislative branches work 
together to develop the final recommendation for the agency. In contrast, the 
comments by agency personnel in Colorado were very clear that the budget 
recommendations and the high accq)tance rate of those recommendations were how
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the analyst is influential with one official actually commenting that the agency 
lobbies the analyst for a good recommendation. The process of developing budget 
recommendations in Arizona and Colorado will be discussed later in this chapter to 
assess whether any differences in that process could perhaps condition the level of 
influence of the legislative fiscal analysts.
Agency comments &om the other states under study largely reflect the 
importance of analysts as information providers. When asked how the legislative 
fiscal analyst is influential, agency personnel in Kansas and Maine responded:
She provides clarification for them [legislature]. She provides them 
with information on our budget. (Agency Official)
She provides information to the members when she briefs them during 
committee meetings. [Agency Official]
He [analyst] is a m^or source of information for the legislators. 
(Agency Official)
How the analyst is influential is due to the enormous amounts of 
information that she gives to legislators. [Agency Official]
Therefore, in those states where the analysts prepare budget 
reconunendations, agency personnel, as a group, most often link the development of 
budget recommendations as a method of legislative Gscal analyst inGuence. This is 
probably due to the awareness of agency personnel of the speciGc recommendations 
made by the legislative analysts that could directly impact their agency. However, 
information provision also appears in the comments as a method of legislative Gscal 
analyst inGuence in Arizona as well as in Kansas and Maine where no budget 
recommendations are prepared by the analysts. Therefore, these comments provide
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support for the comments made by the analysts and legislators that the provision of 
information is an important method of influence.
Agency officials were also asked to discuss why the legislative fiscal analyst 
is influential. Thirteen of the 21 agency personnel (62%) reporting at least some 
influence on the part of analysts specifically identified some aspect of information 
provision as a reason for legislative fiscal analyst influence. As with the legislative 
comments, these comments indicate that there is some overlap between how and why 
analysts are influential. The provision of information seems to be important in both 
how and why legislative fiscal analysts are influential. Responses by agency officials 
included:
Committee members look upon their analysts as people who get the 
"straight story." They (stafQ are seen as the right arm (of the legislature) 
to make sure executive branch is giving them the full and accurate story. 
(Agency Official)
Their role is providing information to the appropriations committee.
They are influential not because they are supporting a particular outcome, 
but because they provide information. Most of their revisions are technical, 
not that we should put more money here or there. Example. A legislator 
who wanted a program in his region Amded, but this was not a high priority 
in our budget. He got a separate initiative (bill) to fund it and we identified 
some existing funds for this purpose. The LFA required in the budget 
document that the money we would be contributing should be subtracted 
&om one account and re-appropriated for this specific purpose. This is the 
kind of involvement that they have. (Agency Official)
They respond to requests for information. Anytime there is a request for 
information whoever provides it can &ame things in any way that they 
want to. In the process of Naming it, you can directly or indirectly influence, 
in how you Eame questions and answers, you can bias what people look at. 
(Agency Official)
They (analysts) make choices about how they present information, how 
they choose their words, how they present information they get &om 
our analysis of the budget. They can be influential here. (Agency Official)
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The fiscal analysts are very influential in the information that they 
provide. They decide what issues to elevate to the committee's attention 
and what not to elevate. The committee always asks the analyst what 
they think. Nine times out of ten they (committee) goes with what the 
analyst says. (Agency Official)
Also, they do have great deal of involvement in Gscal impact statements on 
any legislation that affects us. They are helpful in identifying 
the potential Gscal implications of bills. And they are inGuential, even 
controlling, in allowing or disallowing certain costs to be speciGed in 
the Gscal impact statements. Example. There was one bill that we thought 
would require some future costs, but no immediate costs. We wanted to show 
in the Gscal impact statement the future costs, but the LFA said to show no 
costs in the Gscal impact statement because there would be no cost for this 
biennium. They are much more involved in the Gscal impact statements 
than anything else. (Agency ofGcial)
These comments indicate that agency ofGcials are aware of the inGuence of 
analysts as signiGcant sources of information for legislators, particularly with analysts 
determining the types of items to elevate to the attention of legislators, or identifying 
and focusing on certain issues. By providing information and G-aming the issues, 
agency personnel perceive legislative Gscal analysts to be inGuenGal. This awareness 
by agency personnel that analysts are inGuential because they can shape or &ame an 
issue or legislative discussion can be linked to the large m^ority of agency personnel 
citing the importance of establishing a good relationship with the analyst.
Establishing a good relationship with the analyst is essential is guaranteeing that 
information regarding the agency will be accurately presented and deGned by the 
analyst before the legislative committee.
Executive budget analysts were also asked to describe how the legislative 
Gscal analyst is inGuential in the budget process. Due to differences among the 
analyst comments in the four states under study, each state will be reviewed
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separately. Of the two Arizona executive budget analysts reporting some degree of 
influence, the comments included:
[LFA] is very influential in the budget process. He makes the 
recommendations to the legislature. We share a lot of 
information when we are both making our recommendations. The 
legislative fiscal analyst can be instrumental in supporting the 
executive budget proposal during the legislative budget review process. 
(Executive Budget Analyst)
The analyst [LFA] is somewhat influential. She does make recommendations 
but with Medicaid, it is basically an entitlement program and caseload driven. 
It is good for our forecasting to not be too far apart. We try to be within a 
reasonable range that everyone can agree on In the fall, when we are both 
developing the budget, we develop our own recommendations separately, 
but then we have phone conversations to ask each other about our 
assumptions and justiAcations for our recommendations. We have an 
informal conversation. We may go line by line and discuss how we came 
up with our recommendation. I am influential in getting her to go along 
with my recommendations, sometimes more so than the agency.
We are usually very close on caseload. The m^or diSerences are 
usually in the area of administrative costs, computers, etc. We 
[executive budget ofGce] always have higher numbers for administration. 
Executive Budget Analyst)
These comments indicate that budget recommendations can be how the 
analyst is influential. There is communication between the legislative fiscal analysts 
and executive budget analysts when developing recommendations suggesting that the 
two types of analysts work together consulting and conferring on the 
recommendations. Further, the comments indicate that each analyst tries to get the 
other one to accept their recommendations. Again indicating that these analysts 
communicate their thoughts and rationale for the recommendations to each other.
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Ail three executive budget analysts in Colorado stated that budget 
recommendations are how the analyst influences the budget process. Comments 6om 
the executive budget ofBce included:
He is very influential. Nine times out of ten the committee goes with 
what the analyst [LFA] says and they accept the analyst [LFA] 
recommendations. (Executive Budget Analyst)
She is very influential. She [LFA] makes recommendations on each 
line item. She even made a recommendation to change the budget 
format for the education budget. The committee almost always accepts 
the recommendations of the analyst. (Executive Budget Analyst)
Influential. She's making the budget recommendations
to the legislature on the budget that we submit, she's got some power
there. (Executive Budget Analyst)
Executive budget analysts in Kansas and Maine responded in a similar fashion 
as did the legislative analysts, legislators, and agency personnel in those states when 
asked to describe how the legislative fiscal analyst is influential. The executive 
budget analysts in these states indicated that how a legislative fiscal analyst is 
influential is linked to information provision. One executive budget analyst 
commented:
By providing information. She is very influential in providing 
committee with information, she provides a great amount of in&rmation 
to the committee. (Executive Budget Analyst)
As discussed earlier in this chapter, all respondents in Colorado stated that the 
legislative Gscal analysts are either very inGuential or inGuential in the budget 
process. Each of the key budget actors in Colorado perceived higher levels of 
inGuence for legislative Gscal analysts than the budget actors in Arizona. Although
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the perception of influence of the Arizona analysts is quite high with 79 percent of the 
respondents reporting that the analysts are either very influential or influential, the 
fact that Colorado and Kansas analysts are perceived to be more influential suggests 
that the mere development of budget recommendations is not the only source of 
influence.
For those analysts in Arizona and Colorado, comments &om the key budget 
actors suggest that the provision of budget recommendations is an important reason 
for legislative fiscal analyst influence for some of the budget actors interviewed, but 
not all of the respondents. Most of the comments from the key budget actors indicate 
the importance of analysts as general information providers. In an attemq)t to further 
explain why Colorado analysts are perceived to be more influential than Arizona 
analysts even though both analysts have the same primary duty of developing budget 
recommendations, an analysis of the process of developing budget recommendations 
is presented. If the process of developing budget recommendations is diSerent 
between the two sets of analysts, then perhaps those differences could condition the 
degree of influence. Some differences between the two states have already been 
discussed. Comments by the Arizona legislative analysts and executive analysts in 
this chapter and in Chapter Four indicate that the two types of analysts have a 
significant amount of contact with each other during the development of budget 
recommendations. Each analyst seems to be aware of the recommendations made by 
the other and is willing to share that information and discuss the rationale behind the 
recommendation. This does not seem to be the case with the Colorado legislative and 
executive analysts.
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In addition to commenting on how legislative analysts are influential in the 
budget process, the Arizona executive budget analysts were probed further about the 
development o f budget recommendations. Two of the three analysts made reference 
to the fact that the legislative fiscal analyst recommendations are based upon small 
revisions to the executive budget ofRce recommendation. These comments included:
We [executive budget office] make many recommendations that he looks 
at and revises. The two recommendations are usually not very far apart. 
(Executive Budget Analyst)
We give them the recommendations and they give pots shots at them, they 
m odi^ it a bit and call it theirs. In the middle of December, we give them 
our recommendations, we talk earlier in the 611 to let them know what we 
are doing. (Executive Budget Analyst)
As discussed earlier in this chapter, two types of recommendations are made 
by the analysts in Arizona and Colorado: technical recommendations and policy 
recommendations. Technical recommendations are those uniform or standard 
calculations made to salaries, operating expenses, and other items. Policy 
recommendations refer to funding changes in programs and/or services. Perhaps if 
the policy recommendations that change program funding due to demographic 
projections are perceived by some to be technical recommendations then this could 
impact the degree of influence. Although the review of the types of budget 
recommendations made by analysts in both states appears to show similar types of 
recommendations being made, if key budget actors in one state perceive those 
recommendations to be technical in nature, this could condition the perception of 
legislative fiscal analyst influence in that state. Some recommendations may not be 
perceived as leading to influence if they are viewed as routine or technical. The
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Medicaid budget could be an example of an agency where budget recommendations 
are driven by caseload and therefore, the recommendations are more technical in 
orientation rather than policy oriented. One executive budget analyst commented:
There are usually never questions on forecasting the caseloads which is 
what the analyst [LFA] does, She makes technical recommendations. 
They are recommendations having to do with the budget for inflation and 
caseload. They [legislative fiscal staff] look at areas where there may be 
savings. The analysts defer to the committee on policy issues. For 
example, in the past session we [executive budget ofRce] recommended 
the implementation of a federal program that allows states to use part of 
the SCHTP money for other populations, such as parents who are 
uninsured. We [budget office] recommended doing that, however, the 
analyst did not take a position on this. The analyst let the committee 
decide whether to implement that program or not 
(Executive Budget Analyst)
In addition to the above comments made by the executive budget analysts. 
Chapter Four discussed the issue of legislative direction in providing information and 
developing budget recommendations, and this level o f direction could condition how 
the budget actors perceive budget recommendations and their linkage to analyst 
influence. In Arizona, legislative fiscal analysts are given cues and general direction 
&om the chairs and members regarding the content of the recommendations. In 
response to how analyst recommendations are developed in Arizona, the analysts 
commented:
The chairs give us a general overview and instructions such as we [chairs] 
don't want to give them [agency] the full amount for that request, so 
give us some numbers, different options or suggestions. We do, and 
then they make a decision. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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We work closely with the chairs. They let us know what they want. There 
will be times that they want certain things in the budget and we accommodate 
them. You have to be aware of what leadership wants. If for instance, they 
want a $100 million tax cut, we would be aware of that and make our budget 
recommendations accordingly. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We let the chairs know what is going on in the agency. Sometimes, this is 
daily contact between us and the chairs. We may give them a list of options 
on how the budget can be increased or decreased. But they make the 
decisions. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Therefore, the mere development of budget recommendations on the part of 
analysts may not necessarily lead to the highest perceived levels of influence if those 
recommendations are seen as coming &om committee chairs, done in concert with or 
"negotiated with" the executive budget ofGce, and/or are perceived to be "technical" 
recommendations as opposed to "policy" recommendations. The process of 
developing recommendations, including the individuals involved in making them and 
whether they are perceived to be policy recommendations, could condition the 
importance that individuals place on budget recommendations as a method of analyst 
influence.
Executive analysts in Colorado were also asked discuss how budget 
recommendations are made. Unlike the analysts in Arizona who reported Sequent 
contact during the period of budget recommendation development, Colorado analysts 
described a more secret and separate process. Executive budget analyst comments 
included:
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The two recommendations are completely separate. [LFA] does not 
know my decisions on the budget. When my ofRce makes a decision we 
do it behind closed doors. The agency request and executive 
recommendations are packaged together as the executive request or budget. 
That is what [LFA] gets in November. We both use assumptions in our 
budget recommendations. Projections are our biggest assumptions such 
as inmate and parole projections, rate of inmates to staff On these things, 
we have similar assumptions. These assumptions are usually accepted by 
everyone. But other projections are more controversial such as medical 
costs for inmates, utilities for 6cilities, staff of a new facility, we both 
spend time going through the programs. The most controversial 
assumptions are for the supplemental recommendations and how you 
adjust the projections to current trends. The legislature always goes 
with the [LFA] projections. (Executive Budget Analyst)
I do not ask what his decision will be on a recommendation or issue 
and neither does he ask me. I become aware of his recommendations 
at the committee meetings when he presents them.
(Executive Budget Analyst)
We go through the same calculations, but separate processes in 
developing our budget recommendations. (Executive Budget Analyst)
Comments 6om the legislative fiscal analysts in Colorado support the 
comments of the executive budget analysts. Two of the three legislative fiscal 
analysts reported little contact with their executive budget counterparts when 
preparing budget recommendations.
I have very little contact with them [Executive Budget Analysts]. It used 
to be more. I don't get anything from them. I get my information f"om the 
agency. The department puts their agency request forward. This is the 
baseline. Then I start the bidding, I bring in my recommendations.
Then the committee responds to me and my recommendations.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Very little contact with the executive budget analyst. They actually contact 
me for information. If I do not have success in getting information &om the 
agency, then I may call the executive budget analyst. We have a new 
governor and he has all new staf^ reliance on them is little because they 
are new. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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The third analyst reported contact with the executive budget analyst, but this 
contact centered on the legislative analyst sending a list of questions regarding the 
executive budget to his executive counterpart. The nature of the contact was one of 
answering various questions rather than having discussions on the recommendations 
specifically made by each analyst. These comments are in stark contrast to the 
comments &om analysts in Arizona where there is very frequent communication and 
discussion of budget recommendations made by both types o f analysts.
A difkrent picture emerges concerning the development of budget 
recommendations on the part of the legislative fiscal analysts in Colorado where these 
analysts seem to have more independence &om both the executive budget analysts as 
well as the budget committee responsible for the review of agency requests and the 
executive budget. Regarding the level of discretion and direction &om legislators, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, all three Colorado legislative fiscal analysts indicated that 
they are fairly free to provide information and develop their own recommendations 
independent of any formal direction from the committee members. Although, all 
Colorado legislative analysts and the legislator interviewed referred to "common 
policy" as an example of direction &om the legislative committee, this policy is even 
conditioned by the analysts themselves. This common policy is set by the legislative 
committee and directs the analysts to use uniform standards for calculating items such 
as personal services; health, life, and dental services; and changes in operating 
expenses when developing staff budget recommendations. Upon further review of 
these common policies, committee staff is responsible for making recommendations 
on the methods to use in calculating the items listed above. Although the legislative
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committee makes the decision whether to accept, reject, or m odi^ the stafT 
recommendation, the fiscal staff has provided the basis for that decision. Therefore, 
when analysts use the common policy to develop their budget recommendations, they 
have had much input into the development of that policy. Further, the legislative 
committee allows each analyst to depart h"om common policy when making budget 
recommendations if the analyst can justify using another method or approach.
Comments provided by key budget actors in Arizona and Colorado suggest 
that legislative fiscal analysts in both states are influential but Colorado analysts have 
higher perceptions of influence than their Arizona counterparts. Final legislative 
appropriations are very similar to the budget recommendations made by legislative 
fiscal analysts in both states, although budget recommendations by the Colorado 
analysts are overall closer to the final legislative appropriation than those of the 
Arizona analysts. The comments 6"om the key budget actors in Arizona and Colorado 
suggest that the process of developing budget recommendations is somewhat different 
in the two states. Although the legislative fiscal analysts in Arizona and Colorado 
begin their preparation of budget recommendations by first reviewing the agency 
budget requests and executive recommendations, the process differs after the point of 
receiving these documents. In Arizona, the legislative fiscal analysts begin preparing 
budget recommendations by reviewing the agency budget requests and visiting with 
key legislators about those requests in September and October. When the 
recommendations &om the executive budget office (executive budget) are submitted 
in December, the legislative fiscal analysts finalize their budget recommendations 
after much interaction with the executive budget office. In contrast, the Colorado
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legislative fiscal analysts review the executive budget in November. Unlike Arizona, 
the Colorado analysts get one document, the executive budget, and this document 
does not separate the agency budget requests &om the executive recommendations. 
The Colorado legislative fiscal analysts begin preparing their budget 
recommendations after review of the executive budget, but with less communication 
with the executive budget ofBce than that reported by the Arizona legislative fiscal 
analysts. After budget recommendations are complete, analysts in each state present 
their recommendations to the legislature. At this point, the process is more similar 
where the analysts in both states compare their budget recommendations to the 
executive budget ofBce or executive budget recommendations. Despite this 
similarity, the more separate process of budget development in Colorado, including 
less interaction with the executive branch and less direction &om the legislature, 
could be why agency personnel and executive budget analysts in Colorado see the 
analysts there as more influential. Interestingly, the legislators in both states viewed 
information provision as the method of influence, rather than the development of 
budget recommendations.
The model of legislative fiscal analyst influence assumed that the 
development o f budget recommendations would lead to higher levels of influence due 
to the ability o f the analysts to suggest policy changes by increasing or decreasing 
funds, revising programs and/or levels o f service. However, the provision of budget 
recommendations may not always link to analyst influence for some key budget 
actors if those recommendations are seen as coming &om committee chairs, done in 
concert with or "negotiated with" the executive budget office, and/or are perceived to
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be "technical" recommendations as opposed to "policy" recommendations. Further, 
not all budget recommendations involve initiating policy. For example, an analyst 
increasing a line item to reflect normal inflationary increases may not be viewed as 
making a policy decision any more than the chair of the committee requesting the 
analyst to increase hmding for a particular program.
In summary, when reviewing the comments &om the key budget actors 
interviewed in this study regarding how and why legislative Gscal analysts are 
influential, several issues related to staff duties come to light. First, Colorado 
legislative fiscal analysts are more likely to respond that budget recommendations are 
linked to their influence than their Arizona counterparts. Of the budget actors 
interviewed, the agency personnel comments were the strongest in support of budget 
recommendations as a method of influence on the part of legislative fiscal analysts, 
particularly in Colorado. Budget recommendations are viewed as important for 
influence but there are differences in the process of developing those 
recommendations in Colorado and Arizona and these differences could explain the 
disparity in perceived legislative fiscal analyst influence between Arizona and 
Colorado analysts. These diffisrences are most apparent in the amount of interaction 
between the legislative analysts and the legislative committee for budget review and 
the executive budget office.
Second, another issue dealing with staff duties concerns Maine analysts.
When reviewing the perceptions of influence, Maine analysts had the lowest 
perceptions o f influence among all legislative fiscal analysts in this study. In the 
Chapter Four discussion on the roles played by analysts in the budget process, some
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Maine legislators commented on the lack of providing policy options by analysts as 
of some concern. Three of the four legislators interviewed &om Maine commented 
that they would prefer to see stafT play a more proactive role in the budget process by 
providing policy options or suggestions. These legislators reported that the analysts 
were very good at providing historical and expenditure analyses, those activities 
associated with monitoring, but not as good at providing policy options, activities 
more closely associated with the policy initiator role. Therefore, in terms of staff 
duties, some Maine legislators would prefer the analysts in their state to play a 
stronger role by undertaking the stafT duty of developing policy options or 
alternatives.
Third, when reviewing comments &om the key budget actors in all four states, 
the provision of information is the dominant factor in how and why legislative fiscal 
analysts are influential in the budget process. Interestingly, no legislator in either 
Arizona or Colorado stated that the provision of budget recommendations was how or 
why the analyst was influential. Instead, these legislators pointed to the act of 
providing information on the part of analysts as the method of influence.
In terms of assessing the model of legislative fiscal analyst influence, budget 
recommendations can be a method for influence, but the more broad activity o f 
information provision is a very important reason for legislative fiscal analyst 
influence. The data suggest that information provision is a primary method of and 
reason for legislative fiscal analyst influence for analysts in all four states even in 
Colorado where the specific duty of developing budget recommendations is also 
linked to influence by the budget actors interviewed. It is important to note, however,
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that the broad activity of information provision can occur through a range of duties 
and roles performed by the legislative fiscal analysts.
LFA Tenure
Legislative fiscal analyst tenure is measured as the number of years the 
analyst has occupied his or her position as analyst. It is expected that legislative 
fiscal analysts with longer tenure will be perceived as more influential than those 
legislative fiscal analysts with less tenure. When reviewing the length of time on the 
job of each legislative fiscal analyst in this study, no patton existed where more 
seasoned analysts were perceived as more influential than analysts with less tenure on 
the job. However, when reviewing the tenure of the analysts among the states, 
differences do exist. Overall, the Colorado analysts had the most tenure with an 
average of nine years on the job. Overall, the Maine analysts had the least tenure 
with less than two years on the job. As stated before, Colorado analysts have higher 
degrees of influence than the analysts in the other states, with Maine analysts having 
the lowest degree of influence, peifi^s reflecting the differences in overall analyst 
experience.
In addition to assessing number of years on the job, comments by analysts and 
the other key budget actors suggest that analyst tenure does impact influence. Four of 
the nine (44%) legislative fiscal analysts reporting that they are influential cited that 
the length of time on the job working with a particular agency leads to influence. 
Comments &om these analysts included:
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I have influence and will have more in time. I am just finally starting to 
understand what I am doing with the [Medicaid] budget. In time, I will 
have more and more influence. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
[Why influential?] Me the person, because of the long number of years 
doing work and solving problems for them [legislators] in my area of 
expertise. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I have worked with the Education Department for a long time. With 
certain legislators, I have built a relationship. I know they will 
listen if I tell them something, especially people who have an interest in 
Education. The members that I have a relationship with tend to listen 
when I tell them something because they know I have worked with the 
Education Department for a long time. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Further, two legislators commented that while they believed the current fiscal 
analyst to be influential, the analysts' predecessors were more influential because 
they had been in their position for a long period of time. In addition to the comments 
by the legislative fiscal analysts and the legislators, some agency personnel and 
executive budget analysts also recognized the importance of tenure on the job and the 
link to legislative fiscal analyst tenure. Of those agency personnel reporting that the 
legislative fiscal analyst is influential, comments pertaining to tenure included:
She has been around for a number of years. She is a senior analyst, 
she works independently. (Agency Official)
Those analysts with some amount of time on an issue are influential. 
(Agency Official)
She is very influential. She has been around a long time, very 
experienced. (Agency Official)
She is somewhat influential in the budget. She [LFA] has been around a 
long time too, twenty years or more. She is well-respected by the 
members and the agency. (Executive Budget Analyst)
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Therefore, these comments suggest that tenure on the job can be a factor in the 
influence of legislative fiscal analysts. Although the provision of information to the 
legislators is the most dominant reason for influence, the ability of the legislative 
fiscal analyst to provide accurate and in-depth information regarding a particular 
agency is likely to increase with time on the job.
Legislative Analyst Expertise
In addition to the key budget actors citing the provision of information as a 
reason for legislative fiscal analyst influence, analyst knowledge of a particular 
agency or expertise and tenure on the job may also lead to influence as suggested in 
the model o f legislative fiscal analyst influence discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Legislative fiscal analyst expertise is measured by the number of agencies the analyst 
has responsibility for in terms of providing fiscal and programmatic information, 
budget review and analysis, and budget recommendations. It is expected that 
legislative fiscal analysts who have fewer agencies will have more influence than 
those who have responsibility for a larger number of agencies.
Legislative analysts pointed to their own individual qualities as why they are 
influential in addition to their ability to provide budget recommendations or 
information necessary for legislative decision making. When asked, why are you 
influential, six of the nine analysts (67%) reporting that they are influential 
commented that their influence comes fi"om the knowledge they have regarding then- 
assigned agency(s). Some analyst comments included:
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The individual analyst has influence on their own because what analysts 
tell the committee on the agency's budget can hinder or help the members 
make decisions. We have to be knowledgeable about our agencies and 
present that information to the best of our ability to the legislators. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Influence is based on the knowledge I possess about my agencies. You 
have to get stuff right. This grows with the number of years on the job. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
There is no way legislators can understand it [education budget] and 
with high staff turnover in the legislature and in the education department, 
I am viewed as knowledgeable. There are also generic education issues 
that I deal with. I have knowledge of the programs and I inform them 
[legislators] about the education programs. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Comments &om the legislators in this study lend support to the analyst 
responses. Five of the 11 legislators interviewed (45%) specifically reported that the 
knowledge of an agency and/or expertise in a particular policy area is a reason why 
the legislative fiscal analyst is influential. Responses &om legislators illuminate the 
importance of analysts as knowledgeable experts in a particular policy area:
The three analysts here [Corrections, Education, Medicaid] are the more 
seasoned, experienced analysts. Nobody knows Medicaid more than this 
legislative analyst. They are all influential because of their background 
knowledge on their agencies and experience, we can't be experts in the 
nitty gritty o f budgets, especially when you get down to the technical 
aspects of the budget. We carry other legislation besides the budget, 
we have constituent interests. That's their [LFAs] work to provide us 
with background information that we would like to have. (Legislator)
They are seen as the experts in a particular area, much more so than 
we are. (Legislator)
We tend to listen closely to them [LFAs], we give what they say a lot of 
credibility because they are the experts on the agency budgets. (Legislator)
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They have the institutional knowledge, the expertise. They have the 
full-time job. As a &eshman who had to jump in on the ^propriations 
committee I did not realize the volumes of material that we have to go 
through and read. It is astounding. The volume of material and the 
depth of material and term limits make staff influential. If re-elected,
I do not think that I will get to the point where I don't need them, they 
are experts in one particular area. (Legislator)
The education person [Education LFA] is the most influential, he tends 
to get listened to the most, he has more credibility due to his personality. 
He is very knowledgeable and trustworthy. He is good at providing us 
with information and providing us with answers, regardless if it is 
good or bad. (Legislator)
The remaining legislators cited the provision of information by the analyst as 
a reason for influence and five legislators also stated that analysts are influential 
because they provide objective and nonpartisan information to all legislators.
Agency personnel also reported that expertise is a reason for influence when asked to 
discuss why the legislative fiscal analyst is influential. Eight of 21 (39%) cited 
either expertise, tenure, or some combination of those &ctors as a reason for 
influence. Some of the agency personnel comments focusing on the expertise of the 
legislative fiscal analyst included:
Because of term limits and the fact that the Medicaid budget is very 
complex she is very influential. Federal requirements change over time, 
state programs change over time, idiosyncracies of the program, she must 
have knowledge/history of program. She is someone who can reach back 
and say in the early 1980s the oil/gas industry declined and we saw 
Medicaid growth in this area, so now We can expect to see increases in 
this area due to the economy. [LFA], personally as an individual, smart lady, 
does her homework, they have to rely on her but easy for them to do because 
she is knowledgeable and credible. (Agency Official)
She is influential because the legislature has highest regard for her.
Because of her knowledge of the agency, expertise, competence, length of 
tenure and historical memory, and trust. All of these are equally important 
(Agency Official)
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As stated earlier in this chuter, the primary reason for influence cited by the 
agency ofBcials was the provision of information and to some extent the development 
of budget recommendations in Arizona and Colorado. Likewise, executive budget 
analysts also reported that expertise plays an important role in the degree of 
legislative fiscal analyst influence. Of those executive budget analysts reporting that 
their legislative counterparts have some degree of influence, four of nine analysts 
(44%) commented that this influence is due to the expertise and knowledge of a 
policy area. These executive budget analysts commented:
He is very influential. There are not many persons at the legislature 
that have the intricate knowledge of school Gnance. The policy people 
tend to rotate with different leadership, but the fiscal analyst has been in 
his current position for many years. Legislators are confident 
regarding his recommendations on education related issues.
(Executive Budget Analyst)
Very influential. The current analyst is a talented individual, highly qualified,
very knowledgeable. The analyst provides a vital role in challenging 
assumptions that are made in terms of whether an agency is asking for 
more than they need. (Executive Budget Analyst)
Influential. The legislative analyst has credibility with legislators as an 
expert on the agency budget and how to reflect the legislature's desired 
changes in law. (Executive Budget Analyst)
In summary, a majority of legislative fiscal analysts reported that their 
influence comes &om the knowledge they have regarding their assigned agency(s). 
Slightly less than half o f the legislators specifically cited analyst knowledge or 
expertise as a reason for influence. Thirty-nine percent of agency personnel and 44 
percent of executive budget analysts reported that legislative fiscal analyst influence 
stems &om expertise and knowledge of the agency. Therefore, comments 6om  the
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key budget actors suggest that expertise, as well as the development of budget 
recommendations and the provision of information are reasons why legislative fiscal 
analysts are influential.
LFA Staff Size
This study expected larger fiscal staffs to be more influential than smaller 
fiscal offices due to the ability of analysts in larger offices to specialize in a single 
policy area. Therefore, staff size could be linked to the ability of analysts to become 
experts in a particular agency's budget or policy area, and this expertise has already 
been established as being important to legislative fiscal analyst influence This study 
cannot deHnitively say whether staff size is kctor in the influence of analysts. In 
reviewing the size of fiscal staf^ the Arizona fiscal analysts in this study operated in 
the largest fiscal office, yet Arizona analysts were not perceived to have the highest 
influence among the analysts in this study. Colorado and Kansas, states where the 
analysts received the highest perceived levels of influence, represented the middle 
range of staff size in this study. However, Maine fiscal analysts operated in the 
smallest fiscal office and were perceived to have the least amount of influence of all 
legislative analysts in this study. These analysts also have the heaviest agency load 
among the legislative analysts. As discussed above, analyst knowledge and expertise 
seem to be linked to influence as several comments f"om the key budget actors 
reported these characteristics as reasons for influence. These comments were found 
in every state under study, including Maine, so staff size is not a powerful 
explanatory 6ctor in legislative f  seal analyst influence.
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LFA Contact with Legislators and Other Budpet Actors
It is expected that legislative fiscal analysts with higher levels of contact with 
other budget actors and with more visibility in the budget process will be perceived to 
be more influential than their counterparts with less visibility. There is some support 
for this linkage. Chapter Four discussed the amount of contact between analysts, 
legislators, agency personnel, and executive budget analysts. Overall, Maine 
legislative analysts have less contact and visibility than the other legislative analysts 
in this study and Maine analysts have the lowest levels o f influence based upon the 
perceptions o f the key budget actors. Maine legislators reported more contact with 
the fiscal office director and principal fiscal analyst than with rank and file analysts. 
Providing support far this claim is the fact that Maine legislators were less able to 
identify by name the legislative analyst responsible for a specific policy area than 
legislators in other states. Although Maine fiscal analyst contact with agaicy 
personnel mirrors that of other analysts where contact tends to be heavier during the 
period of agency budget request review, executive budget analysts reported 
contacting legislative fiscal analysts less &equently than the executive budget analysts 
in other states. While other analysts in this study are very visible making individual 
presentations before committees, staging subcommittees, attending caucus meetings, 
Maine analysts are less visible in the process. Maine analysts do not make 
presentations before any committee and do not staff subcommittees due to the 
absence of subcommittees within the appropriations committee.
When reviewing the linkage between contact and influence on an individual 
analyst basis, the two budget actors reporting that the legislative analyst in Maine had
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no influence also reported very little contact with the analyst. The same was true for 
one agency ofRcial in Kansas. This agency official reported the analyst as only 
somewhat influential and also had little contact with the analyst regarding agency 
budgetary matters. In Arizona, one minority party legislator reporting that the 
legislative fiscal analyst is only somewhat influential also commented that contact 
with the minority committee staffer was more Sequent than contact with the 
legislative fiscal analyst. All budget actors in Colorado reported that the legislative 
fiscal analysts are influential and all budget actors except for the executive budget 
analysts reported Sequent contact, especially during the peak periods of agency 
budget review and preparation of budget recommendations. Although the executive 
budget analysts and legislative fiscal analysts in Colorado have less interaction with 
each other as described earlier in this chapter, the executive budget analysts still 
reported high influence for their legislative counterparts. Despite the connection 
between contact and influence with the Colorado executive budget analysts, the 
comments 6om other budget actors in all states under study suggest that contact and 
visibility in the budget process conditions the degree of influence.
Level o f Discretion and Direction Given Fiscal Analvsts
The model of legislative fiscal analyst influence in this study assumed that 
analysts given less direction and more discretion &om legislators will be perceived as 
more influential by the legislators. In this study, the level o f discretion given to the 
legislative Gscal analyst was measured threefold. First, analysts were asked to report 
the whether direction is given by legislators and the level o f discretion they have in 
developing recommendations, creating policy options, and providing information to
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legislators. Second, legislators were asked to report the whether direction is given to 
analysts and to further report the amount of discretion analysts have in making 
recommendations and providing information. Third, documents such as legislative 
manuals and staff reports were reviewed to identify any specific constraints or 
parameters placed on analysts in developing recommendations, creating policy 
options, and providing information to legislators.
When reviewing the comments &om analysts and legislators, all respondents 
reported that direction is given by the legislators. Chapter Four indicated that 
direction occurs whai legislators or committees direct analysts to answer specific 
questions, provide specific information regarding an agency's budget request, or to 
develop a series of policy options or alternatives. However, Colorado analysts 
perceived the least amount direction from legislators in terms of providing 
information, developing policy options, or providing budget recommendations. In 
particular, when developing budget recommendations, all three Colorado analysts 
reported either some direction or little direction &om the budget committee. In 
contrast, analysts &om the other states in this study reported more direction in the 
form of office visits with the appropriations committee chairs and members prior to 
the development of the recommendations, meetings with subcommittee chairs to 
discuss meeting agendas, and general direction in the form of legislators asking 
analysts for specific information. Therefore, all analysts and all legislators in this 
study reported that direction is given to analysts. Little difference appeared in the 
comments among analysts and legislators. However, Colorado analysts reported the 
least amount of direction. These analysts also have the highest levels o f perceived
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influence among all of the analysts in this study. Interestingly, the two minority 
legislators interviewed in Arizona commented that perhaps the analysts received too 
much direction &om the m^ority party or the chairs of the appropriations committee.
When reviewing legislative manuals and fiscal staff documents, there are 
several examples of direction given to analysts either by the legislative committee or 
by the fiscal office. In Colorado, legislative direction through common policy has 
previously been discussed. Common policy provides for the uniform calculation of 
items such as personal services, health insurance, and operating expenses. These 
calculations are used by the analysts in developing the budget recommendations. In a 
fiscal staff document summarizing the legislative role in the budget process, the 
development of budget recommendations in Arizona is discussed. This staff 
document, used as a reference for legislators, outlines the process of budget 
recommendation development. It describes a uniform format to be used by each 
analyst in presenting the agency budget information, defines key terms used by the 
analysts, and describes the types of recommendations made by the Arizona analysts. 
Two types of recommendations are made. First, standard changes include increases 
or decreases due to salary adjustments, rent, and risk management. Second, 
recommendations are also made on policy issues. Policy issues are defined as 
increases or decreases due to demographic changes and changes in programs 
necessary to bring overall spending in line with available resources. Analysts in 
Kansas receive legislative direction on how to present their analyses of agency budget 
requests. This direction primarily concerns a uniform format where analysts are told 
how to present the agency budget information to the legislature. For instance, the
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legislature may request the analysts to compare current year expenditures and 
appropriations to previous years or to present information using charts and graphs 
As discussed in Chfq)ter Three, the fiscal note process in Maine is an important and 
time-consuming activity for legislative analysts. Because of the importance of this 
activity, the fiscal office in Maine provides a detailed document on the development 
of fiscal notes. This document provides a guide for analysts and state agencies as 
much of the information for the fiscal note comes &om state agency estimates. This 
document defines a fiscal impact, the types of bills requiring a fiscal note, the sources 
of information used by the fiscal analyst in estimating the Sscal impact and the role of 
state agencies in estimating the fiscal impact on their programs, and the format of the 
fiscal note. Although direction in all states is fairly explicit, influence still varies 
among the four states.
In terms of discretion, all analysts &om each of the 6)ur states under study 
reported a great deal o f discretion in providing information, policy options, and 
budget recommendations to legislators. This is a higher degree of discretion than 
that reported by the legislators interviewed where ten of the 13 legislators reported 
that analysts have "some" discretion in providing information or making budget 
recommendations. Three legislators &om different states reported that the analyst 
has a great deal of discretion. A majority of legislators, when asked to rate the kind 
of discretion held by analysts, typically replied that they had some discretion but 
within certain boundaries such as providing information in a nonpartisan and 
objective manner to members of all political parties.
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When reviewing reported levels of discretion by state, by analyst, and by 
legislator, there were no patterns in the degree of discretion other than analysts 
reporting higher discretion than legislators. Therefore, all analysts reported having a 
great deal of discretion, even those with lower levels of perceived influence. In this 
study, this variable is not good at explaining variation in legislative fiscal analyst 
influence.
Legislative Tenure and Analvst Influence
Legislator inexperience or lack of knowledge may be the result of several 
factors limiting the time legislators have on the job and thus conditioning the 
influence of legislative fiscal analysts. In Arizona and Maine, a biennial budget cycle 
may reduce the amount of time that legislators spend on the budget as the budget 
decision is not made on an annual basis. This many reduce the ability of the 
legislators to become experts on the budget, increase the reliance on analysts far 
budgetary information, and thus increase legislative 6 seal analyst influence.
Likewise, term limits also reduce the time legislators have to become experts on the 
budget. Therefore, it is expected that legislators with less tenure in the legislature, 
less tenure on the appropriations committee, and less tenure as committee chair will 
result in higher levels of legislative Gscal analyst influence.
Among the legislators interviewed in this study, the legislators &om Kansas, 
as a group, had the most tenure in the legislature, followed by the Colorado legislator. 
The Kansas legislators interviewed averaged 15 years in the legislature and 12 years 
on the appropriations committee, making them the most tenured committee members 
as well. The Kansas legislators are not term limited, unlike legislators in Arizona,
293
Colorado, and Maine. The Arizona legislators in this study had the least amount of 
tenure in the legislature at six years, followed by Maine legislators with eight years.
In the states with the most senior legislators (Kansas and Colorado) all legislators 
ranked the legislative fiscal analyst as either very influential or influential. As a 
group, Maine and Arizona legislators had lowa^ levels of perceived legislative Gscal 
analyst influence. When reviewing Arizona and Maine legislators individually, those 
with the longest tenure in the legislature perceived the analysts as only somewhat 
influential, while legislators with the least tenure in the legislature and on the 
appropriations committee rated the analysts as very influential and influential. 
Therefore, when reviewing the link between tenure and legislator perception of 
analyst influence, diSerences among states appear. In Kansas and Colorado, all 
members interviewed had nine to 18 years experience in the legislature and all rated 
the legislative analyst as very influential or influential. In Arizona and Maine, the 
legislators with eight to 12 years experience in the legislature (three of eight 
legislators interviewed) reported that the analyst is only somewhat influential. The 
assumption in the model that legislators with the least experience would rate analysts 
as more influential is home out in Arizona and Maine. However, it should be noted 
that no legislator with less than nine years experience was interviewed in Kansas and 
Colorado.
Due to the advent o f term limits in many state legislatures, including three of 
the states in this study (Arizona, Colorado, and Maine), the researcher sought to 
explore differences in influence among newly elected legislators and those with more 
tenure in office. The legislative hscal analysts in this study were asked to identify the
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legislator most likely to be influenced, the legislator who has been in the legislature 
longer or those legislators newly elected. Five of nine (55%) legislative fiscal 
analysts reporting that they have influence in the budget process commented that they 
influence legislators who have been in the legislature for some time. Three of the 
nine (33%) analysts reported that they believe to influence both old and new members 
or that it was difOcult to say which group they influence the most, and one analyst 
reported that he influenced new members rather than more tenured legislators.
Of the analysts reporting more influence over seasoned legislators, responses 
centered on relationships built between analyst and legislator and the lack of 
knowledge of new legislators. Several analysts reported:
I influence people who have been around longer. The new people don't 
know us. They don't know Wio we are or where we are located. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I influence the committee and subcommittee chairs the most and they are 
the ones who have been around for awhile. They have more experience. 
But the new members are highly reliant on us for information, so there 
is some influence here too. Although sometimes they don't call because 
they don't know who to call. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The longer members have been around. They survive because 
they rely on analysts for information. Younger people are ignorant in 
terms of what we can do for them or they are arrogant and don't think 
they need our help. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Members who have been around longer, we have history, they know 
I am not coming 6om left field, if we have worked together once and 
they found me useful, and I didn't screw up, they will come to me again. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Those who have been around longer because it is experience that is 
important. The new members are cautious of us. Not sure what role stafF 
play, they test the waters more. The older members know what basis we 
use to make our recommendations, they trust staff The new members are 
just trying to get a feel for the process. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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The lone analyst reporting that he influenced newly elected members more so 
than tenured members said so because members with tenure have an understanding of 
the budget and are not as dependent upon staff. New members, however, rely on staff 
to show them how the budget process works and once they have mastered the 
process, then they become less reliant on staff. Several analysts commented that they 
influence both senior and junior legislators, and some analysts had difficulty deciding 
whom they influence. Comments &om these analysts included:
Depends upon the individual member. New members rely on us for 
information as people who have historical knowledge. But the older 
members who have used us for information in the past continue to use 
us as resources. Those members who want fiscal information use us 
and those whose interests lie elsewhere do not. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I can't say. Newly elected members are impressed by what you know, 
but they are "green," not effective, don't know whether they listened or 
they don't know how to pursue the issue. More senior members or members 
in leadership positions know you better and are in a better position to get 
things done. Maybe more inOuence here because they can act on what 
you say. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Term limits has changed everything. Difficult to say whether more or less 
influence because of this. Two different ways to look at it. Most people think 
that we [staff] will have more influence, because we are all that they have.
But when new members hear things &om staff about legislative intent many 
years ago or what happened years ago, they don't care. They think, I am in 
power now. When used to, members were part of a long-term club, where the 
institution mattered. The institution has changed. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
All analysts reported being trusted by the legislators and trust between analyst 
and legislator was cited as a reason for influence by some of the respondents in this 
study. This trust is likely to increase analyst influence as the legislator gains 
confidence in the information provided by the analyst. Several analysts responded:
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With term limits, it is an issue of trust. The newer members trust us 
less, when they do begin to trust us, it is time for them to leave.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
You build trust with time working with members.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The older members know what basis we use to make our recommendations, 
they trust staff The new members are just trying to get a feel for the 
process. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
However, a term-limited legislature is thought to be problematic for the 
analysts. When asked to describe the m^or challenges faced by fiscal analysts, five 
of the eight legislative fiscal analysts in this study who work for term-limited 
legislatures commented that term limits pose challenges for staff These analysts 
commented:
We can't assume a knowledge base, members change and we can't build 
upon an idea. We have to go back to the basic concepts and descriptions 
of programs. It is hard to get through all of the information.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We are feeling the challenges of term limits. The issues are complex. 
Medicaid takes a while to understand, by the time you unda^tand it, you 
are term limited. The is a challenge that &ces the institution.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
We have to assist term-limited legislators in developing a vision far long 
term solutions to budget issues. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The cadre of "old guard" is no longer around. These were the people who 
truly understood the process. Now you get people who don't have time to 
understand the budget process or they don't care, they are single-issue people 
who don't care about anything else but than one issue.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
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With 8 new legislature it is more diSRcult to explain things to them.
There is not the same degree of understanding that we saw with the older 
legislature. Institutional knowledge is leA to the staA  ̂that is not necessarily 
our role, but it has fallen to us. Institutional knowledge used to be with the 
legislature. It is also an issue of trust. The newer members trust us less, 
when they do begin to trust us, it is time for them to leave.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Although some of the analysts in this study had difficulty determining whom they 
influence the most, many analysts in term limited states are concerned about the 
challenges term limits bring.
Biennial Budget
In this study, both Arizona and Maine operate under a biennial budget cycle. 
The model of legislative fiscal analyst influence assumed that analysts in states using 
a biennial budget cycle would have more influence due to the decreased amount of 
time that legislators have to learn about the budget. Colorado and Kansas analysts 
have the highest levels of influence and these analysts operate in states with an annual 
budget process. The two states with biennial budget cycles were also the states where 
the analysts had lower perceived levels o f influence compared to Colorado and 
Kansas analysts. Peihaps the visibility and interaction of analysts with legislators are 
higher in states with an annual budget process and this leads to an increase in their 
perceived influence by the key budget actors.
In summary, the data Aom this study is mixed on the impact of tenure and 
lack of legislator knowledge on the perceived influence of legislative fiscal analysts. 
From the legislator perspective, Kansas and Colorado legislators, two states with the 
highest overall legislative tenure, had higher perceptions of legislative fiscal analyst
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influence. However, legislators in Arizona and Maine with the highest tenure 
perceived less analyst influence than legislators with less tenure in those states. From 
the analyst perspective, slightly more than half of the analysts reported that they 
influence legislators who have more tenure in office. Yet, several analysts 
commented that it was difficult to determine the type of legislator who is influenced 
the most by analysts.
This research shows that there are several important variables that provide 
justifications for legislative fiscal analyst influence. The most important of these is 
the provision o f information by the analysts in this study. For Colorado analysts, and 
to some extent Arizona analysts, the development of budget recommendations also 
leads to influence. The legislative hscal analysts are seen as experts by many of the 
key budget actors and this enhances their ability to provide information to legislators. 
Those analysts with more contact with budget actors and more visibility in the 
process also exhibit greater influence. In addition to these variables, other sources of 
influence were also found during the interviews. These sources will be discussed 
next.
Other Potential Factors Conditioning Influence
There were other factors found through key budget actor comments that could 
be potential factors in legislative fiscal analyst influence. These Actors were not part 
of the model outlined at the beginning of this chapter. However, future research 
should consider the inclusion of legislative trust of individual staS) the reputation of 
the fiscal office, and a shared philosophy between analyst and legislator as potential 
factors conditioning legislative fiscal analyst influence.
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Chapter Four found that legislative fiscal analysts reported that they are 
trusted by legislators. Further, a primary reason for this trust is the ability of the 
analysts to provide honest, accurate, timely, and reliable information to legislators. 
Because information provision was cited by most key budget actors as a reason for 
influence, trust could be an important intervening variable in the influence of 
legislative fiscal analysts. Although no legislator specifically mentioned trust as a 
reason for legislative Gscal analyst influence, five of 21 agency personnel reporting at 
least some legislative fiscal analyst influence commented that trust is a reason for 
analyst influence. Comments &om these agency personnel included:
The legislature has to trust its staff because decisions are made with little 
time to reflect or judge the long term implications. The staff has to be the 
sounding board to judge the reasonableness and workability of legislative 
changes. (Agency OfBcial)
She is highly regarded by most members o f the appropriations committee 
and they trust her. (Agency Official)
They [committee] have to trust someone and they trust staff.
(Agency Official)
It should be noted that trust of individual staff could be linked to the trust of 
the fiscal office. The comments f-om the agency officials above indicate that the 
legislature trusts staff! If the fiscal office as a whole is trusted, then that trust could 
pass onto the individual legislative analyst. Future research should include a trust 
variable for both the individual analyst as well as trust of fiscal office. The 
importance of the fiscal office emerges again as a reason for influence when analysts 
were asked. If influential, where do you think your influence comes 6om? Does it 
come &om you as an individual, the fiscal office, or some other source? Six of nine
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(67%) analysts responded that the reputation of the fiscal office and/or the fiscal 
office director was a reason why they are influential. General comments in this area 
reflect the importance of working in an office that has the respect of legislators as 
well as the tenure, skill, and respect of the fiscal office director as sources of 
influence. Common responses &om analysts included:
The director has been around for 15 years, he has respect and that reflects 
positively on the office. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The ofGce and director have such credibility. The fiscal section is highly 
credible. Other legislative staff is aware of this. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The staff director is influential because he has an overall view of 
the budget. He has tremendous influence, direct access to members, can 
explain the overall process to them, especially with term limits. The 
combined office has influence because the budget would not get done 
without this ofBce. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The director of office is well respected. He's been around for a long time.
And if boss likes you, others like and respect you. (Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
The above comments indicate that the reputation of the fiscal office as a 
whole may condition the influence of the legislative Gscal analysts. Supporting this 
claim are comments &om two agency ofGcials. They also recognized that fiscal 
office reputation is a factor in the influence of legislative fiscal analysts. These 
comments included:
The influence he [LFA] possesses doesn't just come &om him as 
an individual, but it was the same with the analyst before him. The 
legislature relies on these people to do all the work. The ofBce is 
influential and that is why they are all influential. (Agency Official)
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Also, the fiscal officer director helps staff the education committee 
and he also does a lot in school finance and with the funding formula. 
They (director and LFA) work together a lot. The director is 
well-respected and he has also been there a long time. (Agency Official)
The importance of the fiscal ofRce and/or director in the influence of the legislative 
fiscal analyst is the perception that if the fiscal office is credible and the fiscal ofBce 
director is credible, then staff will be perceived as credible and influential.
In addition to some agency personnel recognizing the importance o f trust on 
influence, trust may be linked to expertise and tenure on the job. Two legislative 
fiscal analysts reported being trusted because of taiure on the job and doing good 
work for the legislature. These analyst comments included:
Over time, committee members become familiar with us. They have 
experience with me. The longer you have been around the more trust 
they have in you. You build a track record, it is experience. They know 
that you aren't going to go ofT and recommend something outlandish. 
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
I am trusted because of the long number of years doing good work 
and solving problems for them. It is performance and reputation.
(Legislative Fiscal Analyst)
Therefore, trust may have an indirect impact on influence because trust is built 
by providing accurate and objective information to legislators, which is the primary 
way that analysts are influential. Further, trust may be enhanced by length of time on 
the job, performing that job well, and being associated with a fiscal office that is also 
respected. Although only reported by one legislator, another interesting reason for 
legislative fiscal analyst influence could be an ideological connection between the 
analyst and legislator. This legislator commented:
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This analyst is influential, many are somewhat influential for me, but this 
depends upon my views about things. Some analysts 6vor a way 
you are thinking. I am a fiscal conservative. If we have the same 
philosophy, I more often listen to, have more conversations with, and 
trust them more than those who don't share my philosophy. Some 
analysts have to be pushed to come up with cuts.
This comment suggests that for this particular legislator, the ideology of the 
analyst matters. However, as discussed earlier, a larger number of legislators replied 
that the nonpartisan nature of the fiscal oSice and the ability o f the analysts to 
provide objective information to all legislators are reasons why analysts are perceived 
to be influential. Future research should compare the influence of nonpartisan and 
partisan staGs.
Point in Budget Process Where Legislative Fiscal Analyst is Most Influential
The issue of when the legislative fiscal analyst is most influential on 
legislative decision making concerning the budget was addressed by questioning both 
legislatures and legislative fiscal analysts. Legislators were asked to identify the 
point in the budget process where the legislative fiscal analyst is the most influential 
in terms of decision making on the budget. Likewise, analysts were asked to identify 
the point in the budget process where they believed to be the most influential on the 
decision making of the legislators.
Table 5 .6 shows the importance of the agency budget request analysis and the 
development of budget recommendations in Arizona, Colorado, and Kansas. All 
Arizona legislative fiscal analysts responded that the point at which they are most 
influential is at the committee level when they present the analysis of the agency
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budget request or her budget recommendations. Three of the four Arizona legislators 
reported that analyst influence comes early in the legislative session when analysts 
present their reviews of the agency budget requests and the subsequent 
recommendations. One legislator comment included:
They are influential very early in the process when we are trying to 
zero in on the revenue numbers and when they present the agency 
budgets to us. After the presentations are over, then the JLBC staff 
is there to provide us with the "what ifs", what happens if we do 
this or that, suppose we do this, suppose we do that. They become 
more reactive toward the end of the process. (Legislator)
The remaining Arizona legislature, a member of the minority party, cited the end of 
the session as the most influential point for legislative fiscal analysts. This legislator 
responded:
Toward the end when there begins to be some focus on the budget, 
when the caucus begins to panic over things being cut. If something is 
being cut, we want JLBC staff there to answer questions about impact. 
(Legislator)
Similar responses are found in Colorado where all the analysts and the 
legislator commented that the most influential period is the analysis of the agency 
budget requests and later in the session, the presentation of the budget 
recommendations. Kansas analysts and legislators also responded that the analyst 
presentations before the committees and subcommittees at the beginning of the 
legislative session is the point at which analysts have the most influence. The Maine 
analysts had difficulty determining the point at which they were inSuential due to 
their perception of no influence in the budget process. Therefore, no response could 
be derived from the analysts. In contrast to the legislators in Arizona, Colorado, and
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Kansas, all four legislators interviewed in Maine reported that analysts were 
influential at the end of the legislative session. Comments &om these legislators 
included:
At the end of the session where it becomes more clear on what we have 
to do, we have more questions for them about agency budgets or governor's 
recommendations. AAer the executive recommendations are sent to us 
and after the members change that budget a bit, then we have to reconcile 
the budget, staff help us with that. (Legislator)
When we are really down to the crunch time and we have to make 
decisions on the budget at the end of the session. (Legislator)
Probably when we are close to wrapping up the budget, at the end of the 
session, that is when we are really needing the analysts to tell us what will be 
the impact of cuts, if we do not fülly fund something, what would the results 
be if not fully funded? (Legislator)
Maine legislators, unlike their counterparts in the other states under study, seem to 
rely on fiscal stafF more at the end of the session. While the analysts and legislators 
in the other states place importance on the analysis of agency requests and 
presentation of budget recommendations, no Maine legislator specifically mentioned 
the summary of the agency budget requests as the point where analysts are the most 
influential. As stated before, Maine analysts do not make presentations before the 
committee on the agency budgets, this activity is the responsibility o f the fiscal office 
director, the principal analyst, and the state agencies. Perhaps the difference in the 
point o f influence is due to the inability of Maine analysts to individually make 
presentations of agency budget requests before the committee. It is also interesting to 
note that both analysts and some legislators &om Maine commented on the 
importance o f fiscal notes in their decision making. Fiscal notes are produced by the
305
analysts throughout the legislative session, although the legislators commented that 
Maine analysts are more influential at the end of the session.
Table 5.6




Presentation of budget recommendations by analyst 




Presentation of executive budget and budget recommendations 




Presentation of agency budget requests




End of legislative session 
No Response
Although not identiûed as an independent variable in the original model of 
legislative fiscal analyst influence, the point in the budget process where analysts 
have the most influence could condition the kind of influence exerted on the decision 
making of legislators. This study indicates that there is variation among the states in 
terms of the point of influence. Legislators in Arizona, Colorado, and Kansas 
indicate that the presentation of agency budget requests and the budget 
recommendations are the primary point of analyst influence on their decision making. 
This suggests that analysts in these states have the ability to &ame the issues early on 
in the process of budgetary decision making. In these three states, the presentation 
and evaluation of agency budget requests and/or executive budget occur immediately 
prior to the legislative session or at the beginning of the legislative session.
Therefore, these analysts are influential at the very beginning of the process where
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they have the ability to shape decision making by informing legislators of agency 
requests and the key issues involving those requests. In contrast, legislators in Maine 
reported that analysts are more influential at the end of the session when information 
is needed to make final budget decisions. Maine analysts appear to be less influential 
at the early stages of the session perhaps due to their inability to present their own 
agency budget request summaries or budget recommendations. This research 
suggests that the point in the budget process where analysts are the most influential 
should be considered as a new independent variable in future research. The point at 
which analysts are influential varies in this study and this variation could be linked to 
diSerent types of influence being exerted by the analysts.
Summary of Factors Conditioning Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence
The preceding pages discussed the degree of influence and the various factors 
conditioning the influence of legislative Gscal analysts in this study. A m^ority of 
the comments from legislative fiscal analysts, legislators, agency personnel, and 
executive budget analysts, suggest that legislative 6 seal analysts are influential in the 
budget process and that there are several sources of influence. Primarily, legislative 
fiscal analysts are influential in the budget process because they are information 
providers. They provide the information that becomes the basis for legislative 
deliberation and decision making on the budget. Information provision was cited by 
the m^ority of key budget actors as both how and why analysts are influential. As 
information providers, analysts in all four states operate in an environment of some 
direction &om the legislators such as responding to specific requests for information
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and policy options, following specific guidelines on how to present budgetary 
information, and in developing budget recommendations for those analysts engaging 
in this activity. However, these analysts also have a great deal of discretion in 
providing information in terms of what the legislators hear and see. Therefore, by 
summarizing and clarifying information, legislative fiscal analysts influence the 
legislature in the budget process.
This study also found that the key budget actors interviewed had different 
perceptions o f influence. When reviewing the fbur sets of actors, analysts perceived 
the highest level o f influence. This is not surprising as individuals often rate 
themselves higher in self-assessments. Overall, agency personnel perceived slightly 
more influence for legislative Gscal analysts than legislators perhaps due to the 
importance of analysts as facilitators of information between legislator and agency. 
This is an important relationship as reflected in Chapter Four where it was established 
that a m^ority of agency personnel believed it to be very important to establish a 
good relationship with the legislative Gscal analyst responsible for their agency's 
budget. Legislators also perceived high influence as a group, although slightly less 
than the agency personnel and the legislative fiscal analysts. This is explainable due 
to the fact that legislators see themselves as the body with the final say on decisions. 
They are the elected ofRcials. Although the legislators are presented with 
information, policy options, and budget recommendations by the analysts, they must 
make the final decision. This is borne out in some of the legislator comments on how 
analysts are not policy initiators and do not impact the actual decision on the budget. 
Not surprisingly, the executive budget analysts perceived the least amount of
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influence due perhaps to the executive-legislative relationship in the budget process 
and the fact that many of these analysts reported less significance in establishing a 
good relationship with the legislative fiscal analyst than that reported by the agency 
personnel.
Chapter Two presented the model of legislative fiscal analyst influence used 
in this study. Figure 5.2 presents a revised model of legislative fiscal analyst 
influence based upon the key budget actor comments. Figure 5.2 indicates that there 
are several important independent variables. First, several variables are labeled as 
organizational variables because they represent the working environment of the 
analysts such as the provision of information through the variety of duties performed 
by the analysts, fiscal office reputation, type of staff  ̂and legislator tenure in ofBce. 
Second, several variables relate directly to individual legislative fiscal analysts such 
as tenure, expertise, and legislator trust in analysts. Third, procedural variables 
represent the actual process of developing the budget and include analyst contact and 
visibility in the budget process, the development of budget recommendations, and the 
primary point of influence in the budget process.
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Figure 5.2
Revised Model of Legislative Fiscal Analyst (LFA) Influence
Independent Variables:
Organizational variables
# LFA information provision through a variety of
duties and roles
# Fiscal ofBce reputation
# Type of staff
# Legislator tenure in ofRce
Legislative Gscal analyst variables
# LFA tenure
# LFA expertise
# Legislator trust of the LF A
Procedural variables
# LFA contact with budget actors and visibility in the
budget process
# Budget development
# Primary point of influence
V
Dependent Variable:
State budget policy influence
• Reported degree of influence by LFAs and other 
key actors
# Rankings of LFA influence compared to other key 
actors
* Congruence between LFA appropriation 
recommendations and final legislative 
appropriations
Figure 5 .3 crosswalks the variables in the original model o f legislative fiscal 
analyst influence to the variables in the revised model of fiscal analyst influence and 
shows the reorganization of the variables into organizational variables, individual 
legislative Gscal analyst variables, and procedural variables as discussed above. 
Further, Figure 5.3 indicates that several variables in the original model were not
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found to be important in determining legislative fiscal analyst influence. These 
variables include staff size, discretion given the legislative fiscal analyst, and the 
biennial budget cycle. Finally, Figure 5 .3 shows the addition of several new 
variables linked to legislative fiscal analyst influence. These variables were not a 
component of the original model of legislative 6 seal analyst influence.
Figure 5.3
Original Model Revised Model
Control Variable:
Structure of fiscal staff office; Nonpartisan 
Independent Variables:




► *LFA information provision 
through a variety of duties/roles
'Fiscal office reputation 
Type of staff




*LFA contact with budget ac 
budget procès
'Level of discretion given L
variables
Legislator inexperience or lack of kno' 
'Biennial budget c 
'Term limit;
'Tenure of legislator
islative fiscal analyst variables 
'LFA tenure 
'LFA expertise 
'Legislator trust of the LFA
'LFA contact with budget actors/ 
visibility in the budget process 
'Budget development
'Primary point of influence
Dependat Variable:
State budget policy influence
'Reported degree of influence by LFAs and other key actors 
'Rankings of LFA influence compared to other key actors 
'Congruence between LFA appropriation recommendations and final legislative 
qipropnations
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The next sections will discuss the relative importance of the independent 
variables in the revised model as well as the differences among the fbur states under 
study on each variable.
Independent Variables Conditioning LFA Influence
Information provision directly conditions the influence of the legislative fiscal 
analyst in all fbur states as confirmed by the comments &om the key budget actors in 
this study. It is the strongest reason fbr how and why legislative fiscal analysts are 
influential in the state budget process.
From the legislator perspective, the most useful information provided by 
analysts is that which gives a broad picture and historical analysis o f agency 
expenditures and programs, key issues con&onting the agency, and explanation of 
past decisions. For the most part, the legislative analysts in this study believe that the 
analysis of agency requests and the development of budget recommendations are the 
most useful types of infbrmation provided to legislators. These types of infbrmation 
can occur through all o f the duties identified by the legislative fiscal analysts in 
Chapter Three. In&rmation is provided to legislators when analysts monitor agency 
expenditures, analyze agency budget requests and prepare Gscal notes, develop policy 
options and budget recommendations. Further, when analysts staff subcommittees 
the potential arises to disseminate infbrmation to legislators. Therefbre, infbrmation 
provision occurs within all fbur types o f duties discussed in Chapter Three: clerical 
worker, monitor, facilitator, and policy initiator. Although the primary duty cited by 
all analysts in each state was the analysis of agency budget requests, some differences
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in duties arise among the analysts. Arizona and Colorado analysts cited the 
preparation of budget recommendations as a primary duty along with analyzing the 
agency budget request. Kansas analysts reported the important clerical task of 
stafRng subcommittees as a secondary duty fbr the legislature. Maine analysts 
commented that fiscal note preparation was a significant, but secondary duty 
performed fbr the legislature. The original model o f legislative fiscal analyst 
influence assumed that analyst duties would condition analyst influence. The original 
model suggested that those analysts responsible fbr preparing budget 
recommendations would be the most influential. Although comments &om some 
budget actors in Colorado and Arizona specifically linked budget recommendations to 
legislative analyst influence, infbrmation provision was also cited as how and why 
analysts in those states were influential. Therefbre, budget recommendations can be a 
source of influence, but the more general activity of providing infbrmation that occurs 
through many duties, seems to be a more important source of influence.
Infbrmation provision can also occur through the various roles identified fbr 
legislative fiscal analysts. It was established in Chapter Four that most budget actors 
perceived the &cilitator role fbr legislative fiscal analysts as the most appropriate. 
However, the key budget actors also recognized that analysts perfbrm multiple roles 
including clerical worker, monitor, and policy initiator. Further, key budget actors in 
Colorado perceived some policy initiation on the part of legislative fiscal analysts in 
that state, more so than key budget actors in the other states. For Colorado analysts, 
the policy initiator role seems to be an important role fbr the legislative fiscal analysts 
as well as facilitation. For Kansas analysts, the facilitator role was deemed the most
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important. Facilitating and monitoring were selected as appropriate roles fbr analysts 
in Arizona and Maine.
While providing infbrmation through a variety of duties and roles, analysts 
exert different types of influence. First, analysts provide the fbundation fbr 
budgetary decision making by giving basic ûscal and historical infbrmation about an 
agency and its budget to legislators. Second, when analysts summarize and simplify 
agency budget requests by parsing out infbrmation to legislators, pointing out areas of 
concern, or identifying key issues, they sh ^ e  legislative deliberation and debate. 
Analysts can narrow the range of legislative discussion by identifying issues, 
developing policy alternatives, or making specific budget recommendations. 
Therefbre, analysts can engage in agenda setting where they are influential in 
determining what gets elevated to the attention of the decision makers as well as 
being influential because they provide the basic infbrmation about an agency and its 
budget.
As Figure 5.2 indicates, specific individual legislative fiscal analyst variables 
are also linked to influence. Tenure and expertise are important qualities of a 
legislative fiscal analyst. An analyst who has been on the job a number of years 
working with one agency or policy area has the expertise to convey infbrmation about 
the agency and its programs to the legislature. Comments &om budget actors also 
linked tenure on the job as a reason why the analyst is influential. In addition, 
comments 6om the budget actors confirmed that analysts are seen as experts and that 
this expertise is a reason why analysts are influential. In support of this expertise, 
legislators indicate that when they need specific infbrmation about an agency's
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budget, they most oAen go to the legislative fiscal analyst assigned to that agency 
rather than the fiscal office director. Although the provision of infbrmation was cited 
more Aequently than either tenure or expertise, the latter two variables could directly 
impact the ability of analysts to provide accurate and timely infbrmation to 
legislators. The original model of legislative fiscal analyst influence assumed that 
staff size would condition influence where analysts in larger offices would have the 
ability to become experts in a particular policy area, thus increasing their influence. 
Although inconclusive in this study, staff size is probably an important indirect 
element in influence. Maine analysts, with the least amount of perceived influence 
operate in the smallest Ascal office which suggests that size of office may be linked to 
inAuence or perhaps linked to the ability o f the analyst to become an expert on one 
agency or policy area. The workload is larger in a smaller office and time constraints 
may preclude the analyst Aom preparing a detailed analysis of the many policy areas 
under her supervision.
InkrmaAon provision has been noted as the pnmary source of inAuence fbr 
legislative Ascal analysts, with legislative A seal analyst tenure and expertise directly 
impacting the ability of the analyst to provide that infbrmation. In addition to these 
sources of inAuence, there are several secondary sources of inAuence including 
legislator trust of the legislative Ascal analyst, Ascal office reputaAon, type of staff  ̂
legislator tenure in office, contact and visibility in the budget process, the 
development of budget recommendaAons, and the primary point of inAuence in the 
budget process. Some of these vanables such as the legislator trust of analyst, Ascal 
office reputation, type of staff) the process of preparing budget recommendations, and
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the pnmary point of influence were not part of the original model o f legislative fiscal 
analyst influence introduced in Chapter Two. These new variables should be 
included in any future research on the influence of legislative Gscal analysts.
All o f the legislative fiscal analysts in this study reported that they are trusted 
by the legislators. Chapter Four indicated that legislative fiscal analysts believed that 
trust is built by providing accurate, timely, and objective infbrmation to legislators. 
Therefbre, trust is linked to the provision of infbrmation, an activity already 
established as the primary reason 5)r legislative fiscal analyst influence. Although 
legislators were not asked to validate this claim with a speciGc question regarding 
trust of the legislative fiscal analyst, several legislators and agency personnel 
commented that trust between legislator and analyst was a reason fbr influence. 
Legislative analyst trust could also be linked to the reputation of the fiscal ofBce. 
Similar to the trust issue, the legislative fiscal ofRce was also cited as a source of 
influence by some of the key budget actors, including some of the legislative Gscal 
analysts. As discussed earlier in this chapter, if the fiscal office is respected and 
trusted, then those characteristics could transfer onto the individual analyst. 
Ultimately, however, the analyst must perfbrm her duties and roles adequately fbr the 
legislature. Trust and the G seal office reputation were not part of the original model 
of legislative fiscal analyst influence presented in this study, but should be part of 
future research on this topic.
Trust between analyst and legislator is likely to increase analyst influence as 
the legislator gains confidence in the infbrmation provided by the analyst. Therefbre, 
when there are established relationships between analyst and legislator, analyst
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influence may increase. However, these relationships may be reduced when the 
tenure of the legislator is short. One reason fbr the shortness of tenure is term limits. 
The comments by the analysts in those states with term limits suggest that slightly 
more than half o f the analysts believe that they influence more senior members of the 
legislature rather than junior members. If this is indeed the case, then analyst 
influence over time could decrease in those states with term limits.
The nonpartisan nature of the analysts in this study was an unexpected reason 
fbr influence fbr some of the key budget actors. Although not a factor in the model of 
legislative fiscal analyst influence, other than one of the criteria fbr case selection, the 
ability o f analysts to provide objective infbrmation to legislators in both chambers 
and fbr both political parties was seen as a source of influence fbr some budget actors 
in this study. Therefbre, analysts who are able to present information in an objective 
and nonpartisan fashion may be seen as more influential than those who cross the line 
and interject their own policy preferences. Interestingly, several analysts commented 
that they do not seen themselves as "pushing policy" or "advocating fbr a particular 
policy" in the course of perfbrming their duties fbr the legislature. Further, in 
responding to questions regarding whether legislators ask analysts fbr advice, the 
majority of the analysts in this study responded that they make special effbrt to move 
these questions away &om advice to one of giving the legislator several policy 
options or alternatives. This suggests that the analysts are well aware of their role as 
nonpartisan stafF and in fulfilling that role, some legislators and other key budget 
actors see analysts as influential. Future studies should include other types of staff) 
such as partisan staf^ to compare influence between nonpartisan and partisan staGs.
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Finally, there are several procedural variables impacting influence: analyst 
contact with other budget actors and visibility in the budget process, budget 
recommendation development, and primary point of influence. Legislative fiscal 
analyst contact with key budget actors and visibility in the budget process was one of 
the variables in the original model o f legislative fiscal analyst influence. This 
research provided several instances linking influence with contact. First, there were 
two specific budget actors rqxirting little interaction or contact with the legislative 
fiscal analyst who reported little influence and little importance in establishing a good 
relationship with the analyst. Second, legislative fiscal analyst and executive budget 
analyst in one state who had previous worted together developed a good relationship 
and had Sequent contact. This particular executive budget analyst perceived the 
legislative fiscal analyst as very influential. In addition, analysts in states where there 
is more opportunity to contact or interact with legislators and agency personnel were 
perceived to be more influential. For example. Chapter Four indicated that analysts 
in Maine had the least contact with legislators and agency personnel and also had the 
lowest perceptions of influence compared to analysts in the other three states.
The process of developing budget recommendations in Colorado and Arizona 
differs and this may explain why Colorado analysts are perceived to be more 
influential than Arizona analysts. One assumption in this research was that legislative 
fiscal analysts who developed budget recommendations would have higher levels of 
influence due to the ability of the analysts to suggest policy changes by increasing or 
decreasing funds, and revising programs and/or levels of service. However, the 
provision of budget recommendations may not always link to analyst influence. If  the
318
budget recommendations are seen as coming &om committee chairs, done in concert 
with or "negotiated with" the executive budget ofBce, and/or are perceived to be 
"technical" recommendations as opposed to "policy" recommendations, then 
influence of the legislative fiscal analyst may be reduced. In Arizona, the process of 
developing budget recommendations seems to be more collaborative involving 
legislative Gscal analysts, committee chairs and members, and the executive budget 
analysts. In contrast, the Colorado legislative fiscal analysts seem to work more 
independently with less interaction with the executive budget office and committee 
members. This issue is ripe for future research to address more specifically the 
development of budget recommendations on the part of both types of analysts. The 
current research did not seek to directly research the development of budget 
recommendations, but future research should review the process in several states to 
see how these recommendations are made in terms of who is involved, the sources of 
infbrmation used, and the rationale fbr the budget recommendations.
Finally, the primary point o f influence also conditions the type of influence 
exerted by the analysts. Those analysts who have the ability to be influential at the 
beginning of the process may be in a better position to be agenda setters. They shape 
the legislative debate on the budget early in the process. Whereas those analysts with 
influence in the latter stages of the process may provide crucial infbrmation, but the 




Although the variables discussed above condition the influence of the 
legislative fiscal analyst, there are differences in the degree of influence by state and 
the strength of the states on each variable. Colorado analysts have the highest 
perceptions o f influence among the analysts in this study. These analysts performed 
well on the variables in this study that were expected to increase legislative fiscal 
analyst influence.
Colorado analysts are influential because they provide infbrmation through a 
variety of roles. They are influential as policy initiators because of the budget 
recommendations that they develop but they are also influential as facilitators and 
monitors. Colorado analysts are experts in a particular policy area because they have 
responsibility fbr only one or two agencies. Further, of the analysts in this study, the 
Colorado analysts had the longest tenure on the job. Colorado analysts are also 
highly visible in the budget process with two opportunities to make fbrmal 
presentations befbre the joint budget committee, prior to the session with the 
summary and analysis of agency budget requests and during the session with the 
presentation of budget recommendations. Agency personnel, in particular, reported 
Sequent contact with the analysts during these periods. As noted in Chapter Four, the 
&equency of contact between agency and analyst in Colorado was higher than in any 
other state. Further, when the Colorado analysts make their recommendations they 
seem to operate more independently from their Arizona counterparts, thus leading to 
the perception that they do initiate policy and thus, are more influential.
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Kansas analysts are also perceived to be influential, but less so than the 
Colorado analysts. Kansas analysts are influential because they do what is expected 
of them by the legislature: to provide information and staff subcommittees. 
Therefore, Kansas analysts are influential as facilitators and to some extent as clerical 
workers. Those are very important duties as suggested by the comments &om both 
analysts and legislatures. Although Kansas analysts have responsibility for more 
agencies than analysts in Colorado and Arizona, they have more tenure than analysts 
in Arizona and Maine. Similar to analysts in Colorado, Kansas analysts also have 
high visibility in the budget process due to formal presentations before the 
appropriations committees but also as primary staff for the subcommittees.
Although performing the same duties as their counterparts in Colorado, 
Arizona analysts have less perceived influence than analysts in Colorado and Kansas. 
Arizona analysts are influential primarily because they are facilitators, although 
monitoring and some policy initiating play a role in their influence. Further, Arizona 
analysts operate in the largest fiscal office, thus increasing their expertise in a 
particular policy area. Similarly to Colorado, Arizona analysts also have high 
visibility in the budget process by presenting information before committees, visiting 
with legislators, and answering questions in caucus meetings. Although Arizona 
analysts exhibit many of the same characteristics as their Colorado counterparts, they 
are less influential. This research has suggested that the differences in the process of 
developing budget recommendations between Arizona and Colorado analysts may 
condition the degree of influence. Arizona analysts are more dependent upon
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legislative direction and interaction with the executive budget office than their 
Colorado counterparts.
Maine analysts are the least influential analysts in this study perhaps for a 
variety of reasons. The influence that is attributed to them stems from providing 
general information and fiscal notes and this is borne out in the primacy of the 
Acilitation role for these analysts. Maine analysts do not prepare budget 
recommendations or policy options and this places them at a disadvantage with 
analysts in the other states because they have less opportunity to provide information 
to legislators. Further, comments &om three of the four legislators suggested that 
analysts should play a larger role in the process by being more proactive in 
developing policy options for the legislature. Because they do not make 
presentations on their analyses of agency budget requests and due to the lack of 
subcommittees they are less visible in the budget process. The Maine analysts in this 
study also had the least amount of tenure on the job than analysts in the other states 
and operate in the smallest fiscal office. Therefore, tenure and expertise, two of the 
variables associated with influence in this study, are not present in the Maine 
analysts. In contrast to the other states, Maine legislators reported that analysts are 
more influential at the end of the legislative session. This may hinder the ability of 
Maine analysts to become agenda settas and shape the legislative discussion on the 
budget early in the legislative session. This suggests that the legislature should 
consider increasing the role of staff in an effort to be more competitive with the 
executive branch. The legislature can formally direct staff to provide policy options 
or recommendations, but it has to choose to do so.
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In summary, the legislative fiscal analysts in this study are influential as 
information providers and that information can be provided through a variety of 
duties and roles performed by analysts. Legislative fiscal analysts provide basic 
information as well as identify key issues that set the parameters for legislative 
decision making. The last chuter of this study will compare the findings o f this 
research with previous literature. It will also propose questions for the future study of 
legislative fiscal analyst influence.
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NOTES
1. Information regarding budget recommendations in Arizona was also 
obtained for FY 2003. The results for FY 2003 were very similar to F Y 2002 and 
therefore were omitted in this study.
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CHAPTER SK
Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence: Summary of Findings and Future Research
Previous chapters have outlined the duties, roles, relationships, and influence 
of legislative fiscal analysts in the state budget process. The findings presented in the 
previous chapters support and expand previous research on legislative staff and 
legislative fiscal analysts in particular. This chapter will briefly summarize and 
compare the findings of this study with previous literature and discuss areas where 
future research should be conducted.
Summary of Research Design
This study relied primarily on data f"om 57 interviews with legislative fiscal 
analysts, legislators, agency personnel, and executive budget analysts in four states: 
Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, and Maine. The legislative fiscal analysts selected for 
this study worked in nonpartisan fiscal staff offices or nonpartisan joint committee 
staff offices. As discussed in Chapter Two, the nonpartisan office and joint 
committee represent the most common types of organizational structures for 
legislative fiscal staff. At the time that data collection began in October of 2001, all 
four states were experiencing unforeseen and rapid revenue shortfalls. Fiscal stress 
was an element common to the selected states as well as most states in the country. 
Despite the common dscal problems, there were differences among the states on a 
variety of political and institutional variables. Arizona and Kansas had Republican 
governors and predominantly Republican legislatures, while Colorado and Maine 
operated under divided government. Legislators are term limited in Arizona,
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Colorado, and Maine, but not so in Kansas. Although all four states conduct annual 
legislative sessions, Arizona and Maine biennially enact two annual budgets while 
Colorado and Kansas develop annual budgets. Further diSerences in the budget 
process arise with Arizona and Colorado legislatures having significant power in the 
budget process to create their own budget document &om which legislative 
deliberations begin. In contrast, Kansas and Maine are "executive budget states" 
where the executive budget is the primary starting point for legislative deliberations. 
Staff duties and size of Gscal staff were also taken into account in the process of case 
selection. Arizona and Colorado analysts work in the largest fiscal ofRces and 
prepare budget recommendations for the legislature. Although Kansas analysts do 
not make formal recommendations, they do develop policy options for legislators and 
committees. Maine analysts work in the smallest fiscal ofRce and have primary 
responsibility for analyzing the executive budget and/or agency requests. Maine 
analysts do not provide budget recommendations or policy options to legislators.
Summary of Findings
This research began by interviewing legislative Sscal analysts responsible for 
three distinct policy areas: corrections, education, and Medicaid. This study revealed 
no variation in duties, roles, relationships, and influence among these policy areas. 
Rather, variation was &und among the states in several o f the variables to be outlined 
in this chapter.
In discussing the characteristics of the legislative fiscal analysts in this study. 
Chapter Three (pages 99-103) found that most analysts held the master's degree, were
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between the ages of 35 and 45, and were slightly more likely to be female. In this 
study, when comparing these characteristics with executive budget analysts, some 
differences arise. More women made up the ranks of legislative Gscal analysts than 
executive budget analysts. The executive budget analysts were younger and held 
slightly less tenure than the legislative fiscal analysts. The legislative analysts are 
more likely to hold degrees in public administration, political science, and public 
policy while their executive budget counterparts are more likely to be educated in 
business related fields. Most legislative analysts reported working previously in a 
state agency or a local government, while most executive budget analysts reported 
working in either state agencies or the private sector. However, with respect to 
education, similarities between the two types of analysts are found. Legislative fiscal 
analysts and executive budget analysts are highly educated individuals, with 86 
percent holding a master's degree or doctoral degree
Chapter Three (page 106) also revealed that legislative fiscal analysts were 
very pleased and satisfied with their jobs. This satisfaction draws mainly &om the 
great variety and challenge of the job including the exciting political environment in 
which these analysts work. Long work hours and pressure to perform within a 
limited amount of time are the primary negative factors regarding work as a 
legislative fiscal analyst.
Legislative fiscal analysts &om all four states perform many of the same 
duties. Chapter Three (page 138) showed that all of the analysts engaged in the 
review and analysis of agency requests and executive recommendations, agency 
monitoring, and responding to legislator requests for information. The analysis of
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agency requests and executive recommendations is the primary duty for all analysts. 
Colorado and Arizona analysts also reported that the development of budget 
recommendations is a primary duty. Reflecting the strength of the legislature in 
Arizona and Colorado, analysts not only develop budget recommendations for the 
legislature, but they also draft the ^propriations bills that are the basis for legislative 
deliberation on the budget.
From the description of duties by the legislative fiscal analysts, facilitating 
and monitoring are the two types o f duty common to all eleven analysts. The main 
component of facilitation includes the review and evaluation of agency budget 
requests and executive recommendations, but also includes activities such as 
understanding the assigned agency(s) including both fiscal and programmatic issues 
as well as developing contacts with agency personnel and the executive budget ofRce 
in an effort to collect pertinent information regarding state agencies. Facilitation also 
requires communication skills to effectively disseminate that information in a variety 
of formats to the legislator or legislative committee. Monitoring activities include 
tracking agency expenditures and trends in caseloads, or monitoring the 
implementation of a program.
Chapter Four described the frequency and nature of contact between analysts 
and other key budget actors, discussed the role of the analyst in the budget process 
and with the state agency, and described the relationships that exist between analyst, 
legislator, agency personnel, and executive budget analysts. Chapter Four (pages 
150-157) revealed that legislative analysts have primary contact with chairs and 
members of the fiscal committees and provide them with information that is the basis
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for legislative decision-making on the budget including summaries of agency 
programs and services, explanations of the historical context of agencies and past 
decisions, and reviews of problem areas or issues. Much of this information is 
provided to legislators during the budget process when the analyst provides her 
review and evaluation of the agency budget request and if appropriate, presentation of 
budget recommendations. It is during these periods in the budget process where 
analysts and legislators report very Sequent contact with each other.
Although the mzyority of analysts, legislators, and agency personnel selected 
the facilitator role as that which best describes the legislative fiscal analyst, other 
roles were cited reflecting the different duties performed by the analysts as indicated 
on pages 188 and 189 in Chapter Four. Legislators in Kansas selected the facilitator 
role along with the clerical role indicating the importance of the Kansas analysts as 
the sole staff for the subcommittees. Likewise, Arizona and Maine analysts are 
perceived primarily as facilitators, but are seen as monitors as well. The policy 
initiator role was more prominent in Colorado with the Colorado legislator, some 
agency personnel, and legislative analysts in Colorado selecting the policy initiator 
role due to the development of budget recommendations by the legislative fiscal 
analysts. It should be noted that only the Colorado legislator selected the policy 
initiator role as the sole role for analysts among all the respondents in Colorado. 
Although Arizona analysts also prepare budget recommendations, less support for the 
policy initiator role was found for the Arizona analysts. Therefore, even though 
analysts develop budget recommendations in these states and this is one activity 
comprising the policy initiator role, the perception of analysts as facilitators is more
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significant than analysts as policy initiators. Furthermore, comments &om analysts 
and legislators indicated that analysts do not provide advice or their own opinions to 
legislators.
Recognizing that legislative fiscal analysts are instrumental in providing 
information to legislators on agency programs and fiscal issues, the m^ority of 
agency personnel reported on pages 207 and 208 in Chapter Four that it is very 
important for them to establish a good working relationship with the legislative fiscal 
analyst. The relationship between analyst and agency is symbiotic. Comments &om 
analysts and agency personnel suggest a need for these budget actors to work together 
in responding to legislative inquiries and assisting in legislative decision making on 
the budget. Contact between analyst and agency is heavy during the periods where 
analyst review agency budget requests and make recommendations. This contact 
mirrors the point in the budget process where both analysts and legislators reported 
heavy contact with each other. However, legislative fiscal analyst contact with the 
executive budget analysts is not as uniform as the contact with the other budget 
actors. Differences in contact vary by state and by individual analyst, perhaps 
reflecting the state specific legislative-executive relationship in the budget process as 
well as personal relationships among the analysts. Executive budget analysts, as a 
group, reported less importance in establishing a good relationship with the legislative 
fiscal analysts than agency personnel, although some individual executive budget 
analysts reported that it was very important to establish a good relationship with then- 
legislative counterparts (Chapter Four pages 229 and 230). A more independent 
relationship between the two types of analysts is apparent in Colorado where analysts
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there have less contact with each other than that rqiorted by the analysts in the other 
three states under study.
Chapter Five (pages 243 and 244) &und that the m^ority o f respondents 
perceived legislative fiscal analysts to be influential in the budget process. In 
addition, legislative fiscal analyst budget recommendations in Arizona and Colorado 
were similar to the final legislative appropriations in those states further indicating 
analyst influence. Legislative fiscal analysts are primarily influential in the budget 
process because they are information providers. Information can be provided through 
the many duties and roles identified for the analysts. Analysts exert influence by 
providing the information that is the basis for legislative deliberation and decision 
making on the budget as well as shaping the parameters of decision making by 
identi^ing key issues and problems for legislators.
The remainder of this chapter will discuss these findings in relationship to 
previous research, explore new variables that should be included in future research, 
explain the contribution of the current research to the study of legislative fiscal 
analysts, and provide future research questions for the study of legislative fiscal 
analysts. The next section will compare the findings of this study to previous 
literature regarding legislative G seal analyst characteristics, relationships with key 
budget actors, and the role played by legislative fiscal analysts in the state budget 
process.
Legislative and Executive Analvst Characteristics
The legislative fiscal analysts in this study had similar background 
characteristics to legislative analysts in previous studies (Aro and Swords 2000;
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Willoughby and Finn 1996). The findings regarding legislative fiscal analyst 
demographic, educational, and professional characteristics generally support a study 
by Willoughby and Finn (1996). Although Willoughby and Finn's study found that 
the typical legislative fiscal analyst is male, the current study found the analysts to be 
almost equally divided between male and female. Other analyst characteristics in this 
study were quite similar to previous research. In Willoughby and Finn's study, the 
average age of the legislative analyst was about 39 with six years of job experience, 
held previous employment in a state agency, and had completed a master's degree 
typically in business or public administration. These characteristics were present for 
the analysts in this study as well.
One of the key budget actors that the legislative fiscal analyst interacts with is 
the executive budget analyst. There is significant research on the background 
characteristics of executive budget analysts (Gosling 1987; Lee 1991; Lee 1997; 
National Association of State Budgeting OfRcers 1999; Thurmaier and Gosling 1996; 
Tomkin 1998; Yunker 1990). In the current study, both types o f analysts were highly 
educated with the majority holding master's degrees, however, the legislative analysts 
are more likely to hold degrees in public administration, political science, and public 
policy while their executive budget counterparts are more likely to be educated in 
business related Gelds. More women made up the ranks of legislative Gscal analysts 
than executive budget analysts and overall the executive budget analysts were 
younger and held slightly less tenure than the legislative G seal analysts. Most 
legislative analysts reported working previously in a state agency or a local 
government, while most execuGve budget analysts reported working in either state
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agencies or the private sector. The higher presence of previous employment in the 
private sector for executive budget analysts is linked to the higher presence of 
business related degrees among this group. Executive budget analysts may be pulled 
&om the ranks of the private sector more &equently than legislative fiscal analysts 
and those executive budget analysts 6om the private sector are more likely to have 
business or accounting degrees. Some recent research has indicated that executive 
budget analysts are moving away &om more traditional business degrees to public 
policy and public administration degrees reflecting the change ûom monitoring to 
more policy analysis (Lee 1997; Thurmaier and Gosling 1996; Tomkin 1998). 
However, in this study, the m^ority of executive budget analysts held the more 
traditional business degrees.
Although this study only included eleven legislative fiscal analysts, the 
characteristics o f the respondents were similar to larger studies of legislative Escal 
analysts (Willoughby and Finn 1996) and legislative staff in general (Aro and Swords 
2000). Therefore, the findings reported in this study are based on comments &om 
legislative fiscal analysts with characteristics that are representative of analysts in 
larger studies, thus increasing the validity of the current study.
Legislative Analyst Relationships with Key Budget Actors
The relationship between analyst and legislator is one where the analyst 
provides fiscal information through a variety o f duties most often to legislators who 
sit on the fiscal committees. Although analysts in different states reported different 
patterns and degrees of contact with the legislators on the fiscal committees, similar 
types of information are provided to similar legislators during key periods in the
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budget process. Although analysts provide information to all members of the 
legislature, analysts in this study reported working primarily for members of the Gscal 
or budget committees. This study supports previous research showing that "rank and 
Gle" legislators receive little direct support Gom legislative Gscal staff (Rosenthal 
1971). The key periods of contact between analyst and legislator are the presentation 
of the agency budget requests and, for those analysts in Arizona and Colorado, the 
presentation of budget recommendaGons. Analyzing agency budget requests and 
developing budget recommendations are the primary duties performed in the budget 
process by the legislative Gscal analysts as discussed on page 139 in Chapter Three.
In Chapter Four (page 178), analysts reported that they are trusted by the legislators 
to provide honest, reliable, objective, and nonparGsan information. The analysts 
provide information under modest amounts of direcGon Gom the legislators but with a 
great deal of discreGon in summarizing and analyzing agency budget requests and in 
pointing out areas of concern in an agency's budget request.
Just as there are penods of heavy contact between analyst and legislator, the 
same is true between analyst and agency. The key periods in the budget process, the 
review of the agency budget requests and the development of budget 
recommendations, elicit the most frequent contact between analyst and agency 
personnel. The nature of this contact centers on the agency budget request and 
legislation or proposals that could impact the agency's budget. The analyst/agency 
relaGonship is symbiotic. Analysts and agency personnel use each other as sources of 
information. On the analyst side, state agencies are the starGng point for getGng 
clariGcaGon and justiGcation concerning the agency budget request. On the agency
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side, state ofBcials rely on analysts to keep them abreast of legislative activity 
concerning their agency's budget and for disseminating key information regarding 
their agency to legislators. The relationship between analyst and agency is extremely 
significant and is reflected in the importance that agency personnel place in 
establishing a good relationship with the legislative fiscal analyst. These findings are 
consistent with previous research showing that agency budget officials feel it is 
important to maintain good relations with legislators as well as legislative fiscal 
analysts (Duncombe and Kinney 1987). The current research provides additional 
support for the importance of this relationship because actors, in addition to agency 
budget officials, were interviewed. These additional actors also included agency 
legislative liaisons and agency directors. The comments h"om each group suggest that 
trust and respect is necessary so that each group feels comfortable accepting the 
information provided by the other. As key actors in the budget process, analysts and 
agency personnel must work together to respond to the various information requests 
by legislators.
Relationships between legislative fiscal analysts and executive budget analysts 
vary among states and among analysts within the same state as revealed on pages 
228-234 in Chapter Four. While performing similar duties, each type of analyst has 
a different boss with a different agenda and this leads to some secrecy, competition, 
and disagreement between the two groups of analysts. In Colorado, where analysts 
are responsible for preparing budget recommendations for their respective bosses, 
competition, less interaction, and even secrecy surrounding the budget 
recommendations conditions the relationships. In Arizona and Kansas, analysts &om
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both sides rely upon each other for information, to verify calculations, and to assess 
the plausibility of a proposal. Kansas analysts report very collegial relationships, 
perhaps due to the fact that the legislative fiscal analysts do not make budget 
recommendations, and therefore, pose no threat to the executive budget staff. In 
Maine, a more lopsided relationship occurs where perhaps a weaker legislative staff is 
forced to rely on the executive budget stafF for much of the information provided to 
the legislature. The relationship between legislative fiscal analyst and executive 
budget analyst may in fact, mirror the relationship between the legislative and 
executive branches. Stronger legislatures allow their staffs a larger role in the 
process, through the development of policy options and budget recommendations. 
This, in turn, may condition the relationship between legislative and executive staff
Legislative Analvst Roles
Most of the key budget actors in this study reported multiple roles for the 
legislation fiscal analyst, although the facilitator role was selected most frequently 
&om among clerical worker, agency advocate, monitor, and policy initiator. There 
were some role differences among the states in this study. Few legislators perceived 
analysts to be policy initiators (page 189 in Chapter Four), even among those f  seal 
analysts who develop budget recommendations, although the policy initiator role was 
most closely associated with the Colorado legislative fiscal analysts, signaling the 
importance of the development of the budget recommendations. The lack of 
perceived policy initiation, particularly in Arizona this may be perplexing, but 
perhaps can be explained by the fact that in the course of developing budget 
recommendations, information is analyzed and disseminated to legislators, a key
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component of the Acilitation role. Further, a policy initiator is defined as an 
individual who proposes new programs or services and/or changes in existing 
programs and services. In many cases, this is done at the request of the legislators 
and, at the very least, it is the legislators themselves who have the final say as to 
whether a proposal made by an analyst is accepted, rejected, or modified. Facilitation 
is the primary role for Kansas and Maine analysts.
When comparing the roles of legislative fiscal analysts and research on the 
roles of executive budget analysts, differences arise. Although the general duties of 
both types of analysts are similar in that each has responsibility for a specific policy 
area and each provides information to their bosses regarding agency budget requests, 
the nature of their jobs differ, and therefore, their roles differ as well.
When analyzing the roles of executive budget analysts, Thurmaier and 
Willoughby (2000) found that executive budget analysts report multiple roles with 
respect to their assigned agencies that included advocate, facilitator, adversary, policy 
analyst, and other. This is quite similar to the responses given by legislative Gscal 
analysts, as the majority of analysts reported multiple roles with respect to their 
assigned agencies. In the case of executive budget analysts, however, the advocacy 
role was the most f-equent role choice whereas the facilitator role was the most 
Sequent choice for most of the legislative analysts. In explaining the selection of the 
advocacy role for executive budget analysts, Thurmaier and Willoughby (2000) argue 
that most executive budget offices are attempting to move away Gom the traditional 
role of "antagonist" or "naysayer." In the advocacy role, the executive budget 
analyst presents the agency's highest priorities in the best light possible to the
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governor. The degree of advocacy is often contingent upon the relationship between 
the executive budget analyst and agency officials and the amount and quality of 
information provided by them. The necessity of building a good relationship with 
the executive budget analyst in order to secure agency budget requests is supported 
by Duncombe and Kinney (1987). They find that agency officials understand the 
importance of establishing a good relationship with the executive budget office and 
work to enhance this relationship.
Interestingly, while agency officials in this study overwhelmingly responded 
that it was either "very important" or "important" to establish a good relationship 
with the legislative fiscal analyst, no agency official or legislative fiscal analyst 
selected the advocacy role with the legislative fiscal analyst that they interact with 
most &equently. When legislative analysts are responding to information requests or 
identifying agency issues and needs, advocacy may occur, but it is not a role that 
characterizes the relationship between legislative analysts and agencies according to 
the responses from these groups. Differences in roles between legislative fiscal 
analysts and executive budget analysts reflect the different positions of the analysts. 
While some research shows that executive budget analysts are moving away from the 
monitor role (Lee 1997; Thuramaier and Gosling 1997; Tomkin 1998), agency 
control is very important for the legislative fiscal analyst due to legislative oversight 
of the executive branch agencies. In this light, analysts identified the monitor role as 
the second most frequent role that explains their relationship to state agencies, 
particularly for the analysts in Arizona and Colorado.
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Legislative Fiscal Analyst Influence
In this study, the mtyority of all respondents perceived legislative fiscal 
analysts to be very influential or influential in the state budget process (pages 243 and 
244 in Chapter Five). Of the four groups interviewed, legislative fiscal analysts 
perceived themselves to be more influential than the other three groups, even as two 
analysts &om the same state reported no influence. This is not surprising as 
individuals often rate themselves higher in self-assessments. Overall, agency 
personnel perceived more influence for legislative fiscal analysts than legislators due 
to the relationships built between analyst and agency. Legislators also perceived high 
influence as a group, although slightly less than the agency personnel and the analyst 
self-assessment. This is explainable due to the fact that legislators see themselves as 
the body with the final say on decisions. Not surprisingly, the executive budget 
analysts perceived the least amount of influence due perhaps to competition with the 
legislative analyst or the fact that many of these analysts can do their jobs without 
much contact with each other.
The results from this analysis can be compared with an earlier study on key 
budget actor views of legislative fiscal stafT influence. Balutis (1975) interviewed 
House and Senate members of the New York legislature in the late 1960s and found 
that 96 percent of the 51 legislators interviewed perceived stafF to be either "very 
influential" or "influential." Similar results were obtained &om executive branch 
officials, including members of the governor's staff  ̂ executive budget office, and 
agency personnel as 80 percent reported that legislative analysts were either "very 
influential" or "influential." Overall, the Balutis study finds a slightly higher
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percentage of legislators and agency personnel reporting that stafTwere "very 
influential" or "influential" than those legislators and agency personnel in the current 
study. However, Balutis only reports findings &om one state at a period in time when 
the New York legislature had just recently expanded the number of fiscal staff in both 
the House and the Senate. The high influence perceived by the legislators and 
executive branch officials in New York may have been due to the recent staff 
expansion and visibility in the budget process at that particular period in time.
Variables Conditioning Influence
Analysts as Information Providers
When assessing the source of influence, the legislative fiscal analysts in this 
study are influential in the budget process because they are information providers as 
revealed in Chapter Five, pages 258-280. They provide the information that becomes 
the basis for legislative deliberation and decision making on the budget. From the 
legislative perspective, the most useful information provided by analysts is that which 
gives a broad picture and historical analysis of agency expenditures and programs, 
key issues consenting the agency, and explanation of past decisions. For the most 
part, the legislative analysts in this study believe that the analysis of agency requests 
and the development of budget recommendations are the most useful types of 
information provided to legislators.
This provision of information can occur through all o f the primary duties and 
the various roles identified for legislative fiscal analysts: clerical worker, monitor, 
facilitator, and policy initiator. Information is provided to legislators when analysts
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monitor agency expenditures, analyze agency budget requests, prepare fiscal notes, 
develop policy options and budget recommendations, and even when analysts stafF 
subcommittees, the potential arises to disseminate information to legislators. 
Although the primary duty cited by all analysts in each state was the analysis of 
agency budget requests, some differences in duties arise among the analysts.
Arizona and Colorado analysts cited the preparation of budget recommendations as a 
primary duty along with analyzing the agency budget request. Kansas analysts 
reported the important clerical task of staffing subcommittees as a secondary duty for 
the legislature. Maine analysts commented that fiscal note preparation was a 
significant, but secondary duty performed for the legislature.
The degree of influence difkrs by state. Colorado analysts have the highest 
perceptions o f influence among the analysts in this study as shown on page 245 in 
Chapter Five. They are influential as policy initiators because of the budget 
recommendations that they develop, but they are also influence because they provide 
basic information. Kansas analysts are also perceived to be influential, but less so 
than the Colorado analysts. Kansas analysts are influential because they provide 
information and staff subcommittees. Therefore, Kansas analysts are influential as 
facilitators, and to some extent as clerical workers. These are very important duties 
as suggested by the comments &om both analysts and legislators. Although 
performing the same duties as their counterparts in Colorado, Arizona analysts have 
less perceived influence than analysts in Colorado and Kansas. Arizona analysts are 
influential primarily because they are facilitators, although monitoring and some 
policy initiating play a role in their influence. The perceptions surrounding how
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budget recommendations are developed appear to differentiate Arizona analysts from 
Colorado analysts. Comments suggest that Arizona analysts are more dependent 
upon legislative direction and interaction with the executive budget ofKce than their 
Colorado counterparts.
Maine analysts are the least influential analysts in this study perhaps for a 
variety of reasons. Maine analysts do not prepare budget recommendations or 
policy options and this places them at a disadvantage because they have one less 
opportunity to provide information to legislators. They do not make presentations on 
their analyses of agency budget requests and due to the lack of subcommittees, they 
are less visible in the budget process. They also had the least amount of tenure on the 
job than analysts in the other states. Further, some Maine legislators would like to 
see analysts play a larger role in the budget process by being more proactive and 
develop policy options for the legislature.
How does the current study compare with previous research on the influence 
of both legislative fiscal analysts and executive budget analysts? Previous research 
suggests that legislative analysts are influential primarily as information collectors 
and agenda setters with staff influence connected to information gathering, types of 
infarmation sources used, and presenting information to legislators (Balutis (1975b; 
Gray and Lowery 2000; Guston, et al. 1997; Hammond 1990; Kingdon 1984; 
Patterson 1970; Whiteman 1995). Research on executive budget analysts also links 
influence and information provision. Tomkin (1998) argues that examiner decisions 
determine the structure of analyses and the options provided to senior ofBcials.
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The current study on legislative fiscal analysts supports the influence of staff 
as in&rmation providers. Further, analysts exert different types of influence through 
information provision. Basic fiscal and historical information about an agency's 
budget provides the background or the foundation for budgetary decisions. However, 
when analysts summarize and simplify agency budget requests by parsing out 
information to legislators, pointing out areas of concern, or identifying key issues, 
they shape legislative deliberation and debate. Analysts narrow the range of 
legislative discussion by identifying issues, developing policy alternatives, or making 
specific budget recommendations. Therefore, analysts engage in agenda setting where 
they are influential in determining what issues get elevated to the attention of the 
decision makers.
Weissert and Weissert (2000) suggest that influence is a product of 
information gathering, agenda setting, and proposal shying. Their study of 
legislative health policy analysts and fiscal analysts in five states finds that analysts 
are almost always influential as information gatherers, but less so as agenda setters 
and proposal shapers. Weissert and Weissert define information gathering as the 
collecting and reporting of unbiased findings to legislators. Agenda setting occurs 
when analysts place items on the policy agenda by bringing issues to the attention of 
legislators or by developing ways to save money in a particular program. Proposal 
shaping is defined as persuading members to choose one option over another or stafiT 
estimating the impact of a proposed change. Weissert and Weissert found little 
evidence of the latter two types of influence, although fiscal stafF provided more 
examples of agenda setting and proposal shaping than the health policy staff. The
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comments 6om the key budget actors in this study point to legislative fiscal analysts 
as information gatherers, agenda setters, and proposal shapers.
The analysts in this study certainly collect and disseminate data objectively to 
the legislators. They also set the agenda by reducing complex and large agency 
budget requests down to more narrowly defined areas and by bringing key issues to 
the fbre&ont. When it comes to proposal shaping, this study found no evidence of 
proposal shaping as defined by Weissert and Weissert. There is no evidence that 
legislative fiscal analysts persuade members to choose one policy option over 
another. In &ct, many legislative fiscal analysts were quick to comment that they do 
not try to persuade members or directly influence their decision making. However, 
many analysts do engage in calculating the impact of proposed legislation or 
proposed policy options. Therefore, they shape decision making by presenting 
options, but not by persuading legislators to choose one option over another.
The current study supports some aspects of research done by Snow and Clarke 
(1999). These researchers suggested that nonpartisan legislative fiscal offices are of 
two distinct staff types: facilitators and leaders. Snow and Clarke's facilitator 
category is synonymous with this study's facilitator role. In their study, they argued 
that facilitators provide Technical support in budget hearings" by preparing 
information that is the foundation for legislator decisions on the budget (Snow and 
Clarke 1999, 15). This study supports their argument. Leaders, however, represent 
fiscal analysts who make recommendations in budget hearings and are "agenda 
setters through [the] presentation of preferences" (Snow and Clarke 1999, 15). The 
current study indicates that agenda setting occurs in the facilitator role as well
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because analysts are expected to inform legislators of key agency issues, potential 
problems, and areas of concern. Therefore, analysts have the ability to influence the 
agenda by selecting the issues for legislative debate and they do this not solely as 
"leaders" but as "facilitators" as well.
The previous discussion concludes that legislative fiscal analysts are 
influential by providing information to legislators that assist them in making 
decisions on the budget. Furthermore, analysts are in a position to shape the 
discussion on the budget by identi^ing key issues through their analysis of agency 
requests, providing policy options, and preparing budget recommendations.
Therefore, all analysts in this study have the potential to influence the legislature on 
the budget decision, although those analysts in states providing both policy options 
and budget recommendations, in addition to basic budgetary information, are in a 
better position to do so than analysts who lack the ability to engage in the first two 
activities. This research found other reasons 6)r influence in addition to the provision 
of information. Some of these variables were part of the original model of legislative 
fiscal analyst influence and some are new variables and potential sources of influence 
that should be included in any Aiture study on legislative fiscal analysts. The 
variables found to be linked to legislative fiscal analyst influence will be discussed 
below.
Legislative Fiscal Analvst Tenure
Tenure on the job can impact the ability of analysts to provide in&rmation 
and develop budget recommendations. Various comments &om the respondents 
indicated that tenure on the job was a factor in the influence of the analyst as
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indicated on page 281 in Chapter Five. An analyst who has been on the job a number 
of years working with one agency or policy area has the expertise to convey 
information about the agency and its programs to the legislature.
Legislative Fiscal Analvst Expertise
In Chapter Five (page 283), various comments &om the budget actors confirm 
that analysts as are seen as experts and that this expertise is a reason why analysts are 
influential. Legislators report that they if they need specific information about an 
agency's budget, they most often go to the legislative fiscal analyst assigned to that 
agency. The current study supports previous research (Weissert and Weissert 2000) 
indicating that staff expertise is a good predictor of analyst influence.
Legislator Tenure in Office
One of the more interesting questions today is the impact of term limits on the 
legislative process. Conventional wisdom concerning term limits contends that the 
loss o f legislative expertise and knowledge of the legislative process due to tarn  
limits may cause a power shift toward other actors. In those states with legislative 
term limits, it is expected that fiscal staff may have more influence due to the 
inexperience of term-limited legislators. Some research indicates that in term-limited 
legislatures, power shifts to legislative staff and sometimes to committee chairs 
(Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000). An ongoing study by the National Conference of 
State Legislatures finds that legislative staff report that they exert more influence in 
the legislative process as a result of term limits (NCSL 2000). In some of the early 
research on staff influence (Patterson 1970a, 1970b), higher levels o f influence were
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associated with inexperienced committee chairmen or junior members who are just 
learning the ropes. From this body of research one can argue that term limits reduce 
the knowledge of members, thus increasing staff influence.
However, there is a growing body of literature presenting a different view of 
the impact of term limits with regard to the influence of legislative staff. DeGregorio 
(1995) found that as congressional committee chairs accumulate experience, they also 
develop more independence &om staff) indicating less staff influence with legislator 
tenure. Some analyst comments in this study support the view that legislators who 
have been in office longer are influenced more. Although six of 11 (55%) analysts in 
this study reported influencing more seasoned legislators the most, the remaining 
analysts either could not make a judgment or reported influencing both kinds of 
members (pages 293-298 in Chapter Five). This study does not offer a definitive 
answer on who is influenced the most by legislative staff although it appears that 
members with more tenure are either thought to be influenced the most or at least 
influenced as much as newly elected members. Further, some scholars argue that 
term limits will reduce the trust between legislators and staff where the member may 
be more prone to get information and advice from sources other than staff (Weberg 
1999; Weissert and Weissert 2000). In fact, DeGregorio (1995) argues that 
committee chairs are more likely to delegate authority to congressional staff aides 
with whom they have a longstanding and comfortable relationship. Therefore, when 
there are established relationships between analyst and legislator, analyst influence 
may increase. Term limits are likely to reduce these relationships and analyst 
influence is likely to decrease in those states with term limits.
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LFA Contact with Budpet Actors and Visibility in the Budget Process
Comments &om key budget actors indicated that when analysts have Sequent 
contact with legislators, agency personnel, and executive budget analysts, the 
perception of analyst influence is higher. Further, this study found that those 
analysts operating in ofGces where they are given the opportunity to be visible in the 
process are perceived to be more influential (Chapter Five, pages 288-289). The 
opportunities for visibility include staffing committees, presenting information before 
committees and caucuses, and appearing the house and senate chambers when 
appropriation bills are being debated.
The variables discussed above were part of the original model o f legislative 
fiscal analyst influence introduced in Chapter Two of this study. However, other 
potential variables were identified through the interviews. These variables are 
discussed below.
Legislator Trust of LFA
This study found some support for a linkage between legislator trust of the 
legislative fiscal analyst and influence (Chapter Five, page 300). There appears to be 
such a linkage in this study as well as previous studies. Future research should 
include a trust variable and in order to assess the impact of trust on influence all 
budget actors (legislative fiscal analysts, legislators, agency personnel, and executive 
budget analysts) should be asked if legislators trust legislative fiscal analysts.
Further, comparisons of trust should be made between term limited states and non- 
term limited states as it appears that term limits could reduce trust between analyst
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and legislator. It is expected that that legislative trust of analysts will increase 
legislative Sscal analyst influence
Fiscal OfRce Reputation
A positive perception of the legislative fiscal ofGce was linked to analyst 
influence in this study as revealed on pages 301-302 in Chapter Five. If  the analyst 
works in an ofRce that is respected and trusted, one assumes that the analyst will also 
be respected and trusted. Future research should include a legislative 5 seal office 
variable. It is expected that a respected legislative fiscal ofRce will increase 
legislative fiscal analyst influence.
Type of Staff
This study found that the nonpartisan nature of stafT was a source of influence 
for some of the key budget actors interviewed (Chapter Five, page 255). In fulGlling 
their role as analysts operating in nonpartisan offices, analysts are expected to provide 
objective information to all members of the legislature. This study indicated that 
analysts who do this are thought to be influential by some of the key budget actors. 
Future research should include a stafT variable and compare perceived influence 
among nonpartisan and partisan staff
The Process of Budget Development
This study assumed in the original model of legislative fiscal analyst influence 
that analysts responsible for preparing budget recommendations would be more 
influential than analysts without this responsibility. The current research provides
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support for this assumption, but also indicates that the process of developing those 
budget recommendations can condition the degree of influence (Chapter Five, pages 
271-279). Future research should study how analysts make the recommendations and 
the types of individuals involved in the process. It is expected that analysts with more 
independence in preparing their own recommendations will be perceived more 
influential than analysts who rely on other key budget actors in the preparation of 
budget recommendations.
Primary Point of Influence
The point of legislative fiscal analyst influence differed in this study and could 
impact the degree of influence and the kind of influence exerted by legislative fiscal 
analysts. In this study, the analysts who influenced the budget at the beginning of the 
process were perceived to be more influential than those analysts who influenced the 
budget at the end of the process (Chapter Five, pages 303-307). Therefore, it is 
expected that analysts with the opportunity to influence the budget at the beginning of 
the process will be more influential due to their ability to shape the decision making 
of the legislators.
Are Legislative Fiscal Analysts Too Influential?
In addition to discovering the 6ctors associated with legislative fiscal analyst 
influence, this research adds to the growing debate over un-elected individuals, such 
as analysts, usurping the decision making powers of elected ofhcials. Because 
anecdotal evidence and empirical research indicates legislative staffers are influential, 
some scholars have questioned the role of staff in the policy process. There are two
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primary arguments against the widespread use of legislative staff: 1) staffers, as 
experts, give advice and make decisions as unelected individuals not accountable to 
citizens and 2) staff come between the elected ofGcial and her constituents, thus 
subverting the representative process. Therefore, many scholars have questioned the 
growth and technical expertise of legislative staf^ particularly at the congressional 
level, and claim that legislators abdicate their responsibilities for lawmaking by 
deferring too often to experts among their staffs (Kofmehl 1962; Malbin 1980; Meller 
1952; Meller 1967; Patterson 1967). In fact. Price (1971) identified some 
congressional staff as entrepreneurial when they develop policy options, negotiate 
deals, and push specific policies. Malbin (1977, 1980) further argues that staffs 
increase the workload of the members, thus reducing their ability to directly interact 
with each other to solve the nation's most pressing problems.
Are the analysts in this study entrepreneurial? Do they give advice? Do they 
drum up new business for state legislators? The analysts in this study operate in 
nonpartisan offices and several analysts commented that they do not see themselves 
"pushing policy" or "advocating for a particular policy outcome" in the course of 
performing their duties for the legislature. Further, several budget actors commented 
on the ability o f analysts to remain nonpartisan and present objective information to 
the legislature. In responding to questions concerning advice, the majority of the 
analysts in this study responded that they make special effort to avoid giving advice 
to legislators by giving the legislator several policy options or alternatives. This 
suggests that the analysts are well aware of their role as nonpartisan staff and in
351
fulfilling that role, some legislators and other key budget actors see analysts as 
influential.
However, two minority legislators in this study commented that perhaps the 
analysts received too much direction &om the m^ority party or the chairs of the 
appropriations committee. These comments suggest that while analysts in this study 
operate in nonpartisan offices, if work is primarily performed for the chairs o f the 
committee, then the m^ority party is likely reap more benefits &om the staff than the 
minority party. In &ct, some of the analysts were aware of this perception by the 
minority legislators. These analysts commented that they try to "go out of their way" 
to provide information and services to the minority party because of this perception.
In determining whether analysts increase the workload of legislators, little 
evidence was faund supporting this assertion. Legislative fiscal analysts were asked 
to describe the kinds of projects that they undertake at their own initiative. Several 
observations can be made. First, not all analysts reported undertaking projects at their 
own initiative. Second, no analyst reported undertaking an unsolicited project 
unrelated to any of the policy areas under their purview. Third, for those that did 
report undertaking projects, they did so only in the context of the policy areas under 
their review. Most of these projects serve as educational or informational projects 
where the analyst attempts to learn more about his/her agency or specific program. 
Analysts undertake projects to educate themselves to inform legislators. They do 
initiate projects but the projects are within the confines of their role as &cilitator. 
Analysts tour state agency facilities with agency personnel and members of the 
legislature, update existing models for caseload projections, and educate themselves
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on new agency programs and services. Analysts engaging in these kinds of activities 
do report that they share this information with members and this could lead to more 
work on the part of the legislator, however, one can also argue that these activities 
improve the information given to legislators.
Comments &om key budget actors in this study indicate that these analysts 
appear to be following an appropriate role for nonpartisan staff. Appropriate 
legislative staff relationships with state legislators are most clearly described in the 
Model Code of Conduct for Legislative Staff developed by legislators, legislative 
staff) and the National Conference of State Legislatures in 1996. According to this 
code, the staGT role is to support the state legislature, without credit claiming or the 
appearance of being influential. The Code promotes the ideals of trustworthiness, 
objectiveness, and fairness by encouraging stafT
.. To give the legislature the full benefit of their knowledge and skills 
without usurping the authority to make legislative decision, which has 
been exclusively delegated to legislators. A trustworthy legislative 
staff member provides objective advice, information, and alternatives 
to legislators, independent of the staff member's personal beliefs or 
interests or interests of third parties. A trustworthy staff member 
avoids activities that conflict with this objectivity or give the 
appearance of conflict. A trustworthy legislative staff member treats 
all legislators with equal respect and provides services of equal quality 
to all legislators to whom he or she is responsible (National C on^ence 
of State Legislatures, 1996).
Therefore, this study indicates that the legislative fiscal analysts interviewed are not 
influencing legislators by giving advice, making decisions for them, or promoting 
their own policy preferences.
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Suggestions for Fiscal Staff Offices
What can legislative fiscal offices do to increase the contribution of legislative 
fiscal analysts in the legislative decision making process on the state budget?
Several suggestions can be made. First, due to the advent of term limits, some type of 
legislative orientation becomes a crucial function. Many analysts remarked that 
those members with less tenure could not identify fiscal staf^ the fiscal staff office, or 
the services offered by staff. Second, analysts with the greatest influence seem to be 
located in ofBces where analysts are more visible in the process. Legislative fiscal 
offices may want to consider giving analysts the opportunity to present budget 
analyses to committees in order to increase analyst exposure. Third, knowledge of 
an agency or expertise was cited as a reason for influence by many of the key budget 
actors in this study. Fiscal offices should consider expanding staff to give analysts an 
opportunity to specialize in one policy area or agency. However, this expansion must 
come &om the legislature and based upon recent staff studies by Weberg (1997) 
indicating that legislative staff growth has declined in recent years, plus the current 
fiscal crisis in the states, staff expansion is not likely to occur.
Contributions of Current Research
This research focuses on a specific type of legislative staff: the legislative 
fiscal analyst. Legislative Gscal staffs provide a great variety of services to the 
legislature such as the review and analysis of agency budget requests and executive 
recommendations, fiscal analysis of bills, monitoring of agency expenditures, drafting 
bills and amendments, gathering and disseminating a variety of fiscal and
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programmatic information, and in some cases, making budget recommendations to 
legislative committees. Given that fiscal staffs provide these types of services that 
assist legislators in making decisions about the budget, it is important to understand 
their role in the development of budget policy.
Despite this crucial role in the budget process, little recent attention has been 
paid to this group of key budget actors. Although several studies assessed the basic 
duties and characteristics of legislative fiscal staff in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
academic community has been largely silent about these players in the state budget 
process since that time. The current research fills a gap in the literature on legislative 
fiscal analysts and provides a &amework for future research in this area.
The current research supports and adds to the existing body of work on 
legislative fiscal analysts by further defining the factors linked to legislative fiscal 
analyst influence in the state budget process. This study found that the primary 
variable linked to influence is the ability o f analysts to provide budgetary information 
to legislators. This is also the conclusion of previous studies on legislative staff and 
legislative fiscal analysts (Patterson 1970a; Snow and Clarke 1999; Weissert and 
Weissert 2000). Analysts exert this influence by not only providing the basic 
information about the budget but also as agenda setters. Unlike a previous study 
(Snow and Clarke 1999), indicating that agenda setting occurs with staff who develop 
budget recommendations, the current study indicates that agenda setting also occurs 
among those analysts who do not develop budget recommendations. Agenda setting 
refers to shaping the decision making parameters by developing policy options and
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identifying key issues and concerns, activities undertaken by analysts who are not 
given the responsibility of making budget recommendations.
This study supports previous research (Weissert and Weissert 2000) indicating 
that legislator trust in the analyst and analyst expertise are important variables 
conditioning influence. In addition to trust and expertise, the current research 
identifies new variables linked to influence that have not been variables in past 
research, but should be included in future studies on legislative fiscal analyst 
influence. These variables include fiscal office reputation, the process of budget 
development, the primary point of influence, and the type of staff
In addition to identifying new variables for future studies, the current study 
sheds light on whether legislative fiscal analysts are too influential in the budget 
process by giving advice, making decisions for legislators, and promoting their policy 
preferences. This study provides no support for these activities. Comments &om 
both analysts and other budget actors reveal that analysts are fulfilling their role as 
nonpartisan staE. Several analysts commented that they do not see themselves 
"pushing policy" or "advocating for a particular policy outcome" in the course of 
performing their duties for the legislature. In responding to questions concerning 
advice, the m^ority o f the analysts in this study responded that they make special 
eSbrts to avoid giving advice to legislators by giving the legislator several policy 
options or alternatives. Further, several budget actors commented on the ability of 
analysts to remain nonpartisan and present objective information to the legislature.
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Future Research
This study sets the stage for more research on legislative fiscal analyst 
influence. In addition to the new variables that should be considered for future 
research discussed earlier in this chapter, other issues should be included in studies on 
legislative fiscal analysts.
The current study examined a small number of analysts in nonpartisan fiscal 
olSRces. The first avenue of future research should expand the number of analysts 
studied to include analysts within other legislative staff structures. Chapter Two 
identified Ave different stafT structures. Future research should address these 
questions: Are there differences in the degree of influence among nonpartisan central 
staff separate House and Senate committee staff or ofRce sta@̂  and partisan or 
caucus staff? What are the factors that condition possible differences in influence 
among these differing staff structures? Is the level of trust between analyst and 
legislator similar or different in the partisan staff offices?
The second avenue of research should focus on the sources of analyst 
information. If analysts provide the basic information that legislators use to make 
decisions, then we should be concerned about where they get their facts. Where do 
analysts get their information and does this condition the content of the information? 
How do analysts decide what issues to elevate to the attention of the legislators?
The third avenue of research should determine the types of duties performed 
by all fiscal staffs. Do we see a trend toward a more active role for staff in terms of 
providing policy options and recommendations to the legislature? How many state 
legislatures allow their legislative staff to make budget recommendations? Are there
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differences in the duties and roles among the various staff structures? This study 
suggested that budget recommendations were definitely a source of influence for the 
Colorado analysts, but perhaps less so for the Arizona analysts. Research should be 
conducted on how budget recommendations are made to further analyze the link 
between recommendations and influence. If such a link persists, are the legislatures 
more powerful in terms of their relationship with the executive? Are analysts who 
make recommendations located in strong state legislatures or do strong state 
legislators allow their analysts to make recommendations? What difference does this 
make in terms of the outcome of the budget?
Conclusion
The current study represents an attempt to focus on a group of key budget 
actors that has previously been neglected in research on the state budget process. The 
current research explored the characteristics of legislative fiscal analysts and the 
relationships built between analysts and other key budget actors. The main goal of 
the research sought to assess the influence of legislative fiscal analysts and the factors 
associated with this influence. Legislative fiscal analysts in this study were found to 
be influential primarily because they provide information to legislators and shape the 
decision making process of legislators. This research adds to previous literature on 
this subject by testing a model and suggesting refinements for future testing of 
legislative Ascal analyst influence. Further, the researcher hopes that the current 




Interview Questions - Legislative Fiscal Analysts
Section 1: Demographic/Professional Background
1. How long have you worked in the legislative fiscal ofBce?
2. What is your age?
3. What is your current position or ofGcial title?
4. How long have you held your current position?
5. What is the highest degree attained?
6. What was your academic m^or in highest degree attained?
7. Whoe did you work prior to attaining currœtjob?
8. Why did you choose your job with the legislature?
 work is interesting/challenging ____ opportunities for advancement
 interest in pohtics ____ job security, pay, beneSts
 to serve public ____ other, explain
 to help formulate public policy
8a. What is the most important reason?
Section II: Questions concerning the nature of your work during the budget process.
9. How many state agencies do you have responsibility for?
10. What do you do for the legislature when it is making decisions speciGcally about the 
budget?
11. What do you see as your primary duty as an analyst in terms of what you do for the
legislature when it is making decisions specifically about the budget?
12. Do you attend budget hearings/committee hearings on the budget?
 yes  no
12a. If yes, what do you do in the budget hearings?
13. Are you present in the House and/or Senate chamber when qipropriation bills come up far 
debate?
yes  n̂o
13a. If yes, why are you there?
Section HI: Question concerning interim duties.
14. What do you do for the legislature during the interim?
Section IV: Questions concerning direction and discretion:
15. Are you given policy direction hy members of the legislature, committee, or committee chair 
in terms of the information and/or recommendations that you provide to them? In other words, 
are you told that specific items should be increased, decreased, or that certain things are off the 
table in terms of discussion or what issues to focus on, etc?
 yes ____ 0̂0
15a. If yes, describe the kind of direction given or provide examples.
16. How much discretion do you think you have in providing in&rmation or making 
recommendations to legislators?





Section V: Questions concerning information provision:
17. How do you get your requests for informatisa &om legislators?
 directly &om legislator  &om other legislative staff
 other, explain
 from supervisor/director  from other legislative fiscal analyst
18. How do you usually provide information to membas?
 face to face (verbally)
 in written form (letter, position paper)
 through a siqrervisor or director
formal presentation to manbers of committee
19. What is the most common method of providing information?
20. What method do you think is most effective?
20a. Why?
21. What kinds of information do you most hequently provide during budget process?
21a What kinds of information do you most ûequently provide during the interim?
22. From the kinds of information that you provide legislators, what kinds do you think are most
useful for them?
23. To Wiat extent do you think legislators rely on you for information?
 a great deal
 some
 little or none
24. Do legislators ask you directly far advice?
 yes  no
24a If yes, do you
 give it freely
 tell monber that giving advice is not the job of staff
If you give advice freely, on what basis do you do so?
25. What is your opinion of the trust members have in you?




26. How do you build trust?
27. Who do you come into contact with the most?




 member of a particular political party
membars in one chamber as opposed to the other chamber (House v. Senate) 
other (explain)
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28. Who do you do the most work for?




 member of a particular political party
 monbas in one chamber as opposed to the other chamber (House v. Senate)
other (explain)
Section VI: Perceptions of Influence:






30. If influential, where do you think your influence comes ûom?
 you as an individual
 fiscal ofBce
 fiscal office director
 other, explain
31. When the legislature is making decisions on the budget, at what point do you have the most
influence on their decisions?
 during face to face contacts with manbers outside of committee hearings
 during committee hearings
 on chamber floor
 other, explain
32. Who do you influence the most?




 member of a particular political party
 members in one chamber as opposed to the other chamber (House v. Senate)
 otha (explain)
32a. Why?
33. Are you more likely to influence members who have been in the legislature longer or those 
members newly elected?
33a. Why?
Section VII: How are you influential?
34. What specific things do you do to influence legislators?
34a. What things are the most successful?
35. What do otha analysts do to influence legislators?
Section VIH: Legislative Fiscal Analyst Recommendations
36. Do you provide provide recommendations to legislators and/or committees regarding the 
budget?
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36a. If yes, ^ a t  was your line-item ^prcq)nation recommendatioa for Name of apencv?
36b. What was the corresponding legislative line-item appropriation adopted by the legislature? 
36c. If changes were made to your recommendation, why were these changes made?






37. Other than making line-item recommendations, what other types of things do you make 
recommendations on?
37a. Do you provide policy options?
37b. If yes, provide an example.
37c. How often are your policy options accepted by legislature?
38. What projects do you undotake at your own initiative?
38a. Are the outcomes of these prqects used by legislators?
38b. Why or why not?
39. What projects are undertaken at the request of others?
39a. Are the outcomes of these projects used?
39b. Why or why not?
Section IX: Relationship with Executive Budget Analysts
40. How much contact do you have with analysts in the executive budget office?
 daily
 several times per week
 several times per month
 rarely or never
 contact varies according to agency
 contact varies according to executive budget analyst
other, explain
41. Does contact vary between the interim and the legislative session?
41a. How?
42. What is the nature of this contact? (In other words, why are you contacting the EBA or why 
is the EBA contacting you?)





44. How difBcult is it to obtain information hom executive budget analysts?
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Secdon X: Relationship with State agency personnel
45. How much contact do you have with state agency personnel? 
daily
 several times per week
 several times per month
 r̂arely or never
 ĉontact varies with state agency
 ĉontact varies according to agency staff
 pother, explain
46. Does contact vary between the interim and the legislative session?
46a. How?
47. What is the nature of this contact? (In other words, wty are you contacting the state agency 
personnel, or why are they contacting you?)
48. In general, how would you describe your role with respect to your agencies?
 advocate (si^porter of agency and agency programs)
 monitor ((program monitor, expenditure monitor) )
 facilitator (information gatherer, supplying information about agency to legislators,
analyzing agency budget)
 policy analyst (Wiere analyst recommMids or initiates new policy or changes in current
program operation to legislature through budget recommendations or policy 
(qrtions/ alternatives)
 other
 role varies by agency




 varies with agency
Section XII: Ending Questions
50. What do you like most about your job?
51. What do you see as the major challenges and/or changes faced by legislative fiscal staff?
52. What do you like least about your job?
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Interview Questions - Legislators
Section I: Background of Legislator
1. How long have you been a member of the legislature?
2. How long have you been a member of the appropriations or joint budget committee?
3. How long have you been chair o f ___________committee/subcommittee?
Section II: Name Recognition
4. Who is the legislative Sscal analyst responsible for die Dqiartment of Corrections budget?
5. Who is the legislative fiscal analyst responsible for the Department of Education budget?
6. Who is the legislative fiscal analyst responsible for the Medicaid budget?
Section III: Frequency of Contact
7. How much contact do you have with the legislative dscal analyst for?
Corrections Education Medicaid
 no contact ____ no contact  no contact
some contact some contact some contact
frequent contact  frequent contact  frequent contact
7a. How much is frequent contact?
7b. Are there differences among analysts?
8. Concerning the budgets for these three agencies, who do you have more contact with, the 
legislative fiscal office director or the LFA?
8a. Are there differences among analysts?
8b. Why?
9. Who generally initiates contact, the LFA or you?
9a. Are there differences among analysts?
9b. Why?
Section IV: Relationship with Legislative Fiscal Analyst
10. What do you feel is the role of the legislative fiscal analyst in the budget process?
 policy initiator (where analyst recommends or initiates new policy or changes in
current program operation to legislature through budget recommendations or 
policy options/alternatives) 
monitor (program monitor, expenditure monitor)
6 cilitator (information gatherer, supplying information about agency to 
legislators, analyzing agency budgets) 
technical role (setting up meetings, developing agendas at request of members, 
etc.) 
other
10a. What role best describes the role of the legislative Escal analysts?
11. What kinds of information provided by the legislative Escal analysts do you feel are the 
most useful for you in the decision making process concerning these agencies' budgets?
12. What kinds of information would you like to receive from the analysts that you are not 
getting now? In other words, what other kinds of information would be useful?
13. Do you give policy direction to the LFA in terms of the information or recommendations 
provided by the legislative fiscal analyst?
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14. What kinds of policy direction do you give legislative fiscal analysts when they make 
recommendations? Create policy options? Provide you with information?
15. Overall, how much discretion do you think the legislative Gscal analysts have in making 
budget recommendations, providing policy options and/or information to you and the 
committee?
 a great deal of discr^on
 some discretion
 no discretion
16. Do you ask these analysts An advice concerning the Corrections Department, Education 
Department, and Medicaid?
   Yes No
16a. If yes, what kind of advice?
16b. Are there differences among analysts?
Section V: Perception of Influence
17. How influential do you think the legislative fiscal analyst is in terms of your decision 
making on the budget?
Corrections Analyst Education Analyst Medicaid Analyst
 very influential ____ very influential ____ very influential
 influential ____ influential ____ influential
somewhat influential somewhat influential somewhat influential
not influential  not influential   not influential
18. If very influential or influential, why is the LFA influential?
Corrections Analvst
 knowledge of agency, expertise, competence
 length of tenure as staffer
■ personal abilities, charismatic
 influential as member of the fiscal office
 other, explain
Education Analvst
 knowledge of agency, expertise, competence
 length of tenure as stafkr
 personal abilities, charismatic
 influential as member of the fiscal office
 other, ex p l^
Medicaid Analvst
 knowledge of agency, expertise, competence
 length of tenure as staf&r
 personal abilities, charismatic
 influential as member of the fiscal office
 other, explain
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19. If very influential or influential, how is the legislative fiscal analyst influential regarding 
the budget request for these agencies?
19a. Are there diSerences among analysts?
20. What specific changes did the LFA make or recommend to the legislature concerning the 
Corrections budget. Education budget, and Medicaid?




22. If legislative Escal analyst is not influential, why not?
23. How would you rank the analyst in terms of his/her contribution or influence on the 
(Corrections, Education, Medicaid) budget in comparison to other budget actors? On a scale 
of 1 (no contribution) to 5 (high contribution).
Corrections
Legislative fiscal analyst 




Appropriation committee members 
Other members of legislature 



































Appropriation committee members 
Other members of legislature























Legislative fiscal analyst 




Appropriation committee members 
Other members of legislature 






























Interview Questions-Agency Personnel 
Section I. Background of agency personnel.
1. How long have you been the (director, legislative liaison, or budget ofBcer) of the 
_____________ ^Department?
Section H. LFA Name Recognition and Frequency of ContacL
2. Who is the legislative Sscal analyst responsible for the___________budget?
3. How much contact do you have with the legislative fiscal analyst during the period when 
legislators are making decisions on the budget
daily
 several times per week




4. Does contact vary between the interim and legislative session?
4a. How?
5. Who do you have more contact with, the legislative hscal ofBce director or the legislative 
hscal analyst?
6. Who generally initiates contact, the legislative fiscal analyst or you?
7. Under what conditions are you likely to come into contact with the legislative fiscal 
analyst? In other words, why is the legislative fiscal analyst contacting you or why do you 
contact him/her?
8. How do you view the role of the legislative fiscal analyst in terms of the Education 
budget?
 agency advocate (supporter of agency or agency programs)
  6cilitator (information gatherer, supplying information about agency to
legislators, analyzing agency budget)
 monitor role (program monitor, expenditure monitor)
 policy initiator (where analyst recommends or initiates new policy or changes
in current program operation to legislature through budget recommendations 
or policy options/alternatives)
 other, explain






9a. Why is it important/not important?
10. Do you seek advice Aom the legislative fiscal analyst on how to present budget or 
program information? How to approach legislators? Other? If applicable, provide an 
example.







12. If influential, why is the LFA influential regarding your agency's budget?
13. If influential, how is the LFA influential regarding your agency's budget?
14. If LFA is not influential, why not?
15. Are you aware of any changes, recommendations, or policy options/altematives made by 
the legislative fiscal analyst regarding your agency's budget during the last legislative 
session?
15a. If yes, provide an example.
16. How would you rank the legislative fiscal analyst who has responsibility for the
____________budget in terms of his/her contribution or influence on the____________
budget in comparison to other budget actors cm a scale of 1 (no contribution or influence) to 5 
(high contribution or influence)?
Legislative fiscal analyst 
Legislative fiscal ofRce director 
Executive budget analyst 
Executive budget director 
Lobbyist(s)
Governor
Governor's personal stafi 
Appropriation committee or 
subcommittee members 






































Interview Questions -Eiecutive Budget Analysts 
Section I. Background Information
1. How long bave you worked in the executive budget ofRce?
2. Wbat is your age?
3. Wbat is your current position or ofGcial title?
4. How long bave you held your current position?
5. Wbat is the highest degree attained?
6. Wbat was your academic m^or in highest degree attained?
7. Where did you work prior to attaining current job?
8. Why did you choose your job with the executive budget ofBce?
 work is interesting/challenging ____ ^opportunities for
advancement
 interest in politics ____ job security
 to serve pubUc other, explain
 to help formulate public policy
8a. What was the most important reason?
9. How many agencies do you have responsibility for?
Section II. Name Recognition and frequency of Contact
10. Who is the legislative fiscal analyst responsible for the_________________budget?
11 How much contact do you have with the legislative fiscal analyst during the period when
legislators are making decisions on the budget?
 daily
several times per week 




12. Does contact vary between the interim and legislative session?
12a. How?
13. Who do you have more contact with, the legislative fiscal office director or the 
legislative fiscal analyst responsible for the  ___________   budget?
14. Who generally initiates contact, the legislative fiscal analyst or you?
15. Under what conditions are you likely to come into contact with the LFA during the 
legislative session? In other words, why is the legislative fiscal analyst contacting you or 
why are you contacting the legislative fiscal analyst?






17. Why is it important/not important?
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19. If influential, why is the LFA influential regarding the_________
20. If influential, how is the LFA influential regarding the_________
21. IfLFA is not influential, why not?
22. Are you aware of any recommendations or policy options/alternatives made by the 
legislative fiscal analyst regarding the corrections budget during the most recent legislative 
session?
22a. If yes, provide an example?
23. How would you rank the analyst in terms of his/her influence on the_____________
budget in comparison to other budget actors? On a scale of 1 (no influence) to 5 (high 
influence).
Legislative fiscal analyst 




Governor’s personal staff 
Appropriations committee members 
or subcommittee members



































Arizona State Legislature (90) 
Senate: 15 Democrats, 15 Republicans 
House: 24 Democrats, 36 Republicans
Joint Legislative Budget Committee (16) 
8 Democrats, 8 Republicans
Joint Legislative Budget Committee (JLBC) Staff (25)
Committee Director 
Committee Assistant Director
Senior Fiscal Analyst Junior Fiscal Analyst
* Agency responsibility * Agency responsibility
Analysts provide services to:
Joint Legislative Budget Committee (16)
8 Democrats, 8 Republicans
Senate ^propriations Committee (12)
6 Democrats, 6 Republicans
House Appropriations Committee (17)
6 Democrats, 11 Republicans
Joint Committee on Capital Review (14)
Sources: Arizona Senate and House membership in&rmation available at 
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/MemberRoster.asp accessed on November 17, 2001; JLBC 
membership information available at http://www.azleg.state.az.us /jlbc.htm accessed on 
November 17, 2001; JLBC Staff information available at
http://www.azlee.state.az.us/ilbc/jlbcstf.htm accessed on August 17,2001; and Senate and 
House Appropriations Committee and Joint Committee cm Cf^ital Review membership 
available at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/StandingCom.asp accessed on November 17, 2001.
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Colorado State Legislature (103) 
Senate: 19 Democrats 
17 Republicans 
House: 27 Democrats 
40 Republicans
V
Joint Budget Committee (JBC) (6) 
3 Democrats 
3 Republicans
Joint Budget Committee StafT (24) 
Committee Director
Chief Legislative Analyst Principal Analyst
* Agency * Agency
Responsibility Responsibility
T
Senior Analyst Analyst 
* Agency * Agency
Responsibility Responsibility
Sources: Colorado House and Senate membership available at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/2002a/inetdir.nsf7opendatabase accessed on May 23,2002; JBC 
membership available at http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/leg dir/ibc/member.htm accessed on 
May 23,2002 and JBC staff membership available at
htlp://www.state.co.us/|gov dir/lee dir/ibc/staff htm accessed on May 23, 2002.
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Kansas State Legislature (165) 
Senate: 10 Democrats, 30 Republicans 





Principal Analyst (3) 
* Agency
responsibility
Senior Fiscal Analyst (2) 
* Agency
responsibility





Senate Ways and Means Committee (11) 
3 Democrats, 8 Republicans
House Appropriations Committee (23)
8 Democrats, 15 Republicans
Sources: Kansas Senate membership available at
http://www.ksleEislature.ore/senateroster/index.html accessed on November 7, 2001; Kansas 
House membership available at http V/www.ksleeislature. org/houseroster/index.btml accessed
on November 11, 2001; Fiscal Division staff available at
kttp://skvwavs.lib.ks.us/ksleE/KLRD/klrd.html accessed on October 12, 2001; Senate Ways 
and Means Committee membership available at
http://www.ksleEislature.orp/commsched/senate/scommittees.pdf accessed on November 11, 
2001; and House Appropriations Committee membership available at
http://www.kslegislature.org/commsched/house/hcommittees.pdf accessed on November 11, 
2001 .
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Maine State Legislature (188) 
Senate: 19 Democrats 
15 Republicans 
1 Independent
House: 88 Democrats 
62 Republicans
1 Independent
2 Indian Tribe Representatives
Legislative Council











Primary staf^ Joint 
Committee on Appropriations 




* Primary staff Joint * Agency
Committee on Taxation (13) responsibility 
8 Democrats 
5 Republicans
Sources: Maine Senate membership available at
http://www.state.me.us.lepis.senate/senators/candidates/e]ect2002.htm accessed on May 28, 
2002; Maine House membership available at http://janus.state.me.us/house/hbiolist.htm 
accessed on May 28, 2002; Joint Standing Committee on .^propriations and Financial 
Af&irs membership available at http://ianus.state.me.us/house/it com/a6.htm accessed on 
May 28, 2002; OFPR stafFavailable at http://www.state.me.us/leeis/ofpr/contact.htm 
accessed on June 28, 2001; Joint Committee on Taxation membership available at 
http://ianus.state.me.us/house/jt com/t htm accessed on May 28, 2002.
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Hanse Subcommittee: Gray 
Senate Subcommittee: Hamilton
FY 2000 FY200I FY2002 FY 2003
DESCRIPTION ACTUAL ESTIMATE OSPB JLBC OSPB JLBC
O P E R A T IN G  BUD GET
fu l l  Time Equivalent Positions 144.9 144.9 147.9 147.9 147.9 147.9
Personal Services 
Employee Related Expenditures 
All Other Operating Expenditures: 
Professional and Outside Services 
Travel - In State 
Travel - Out of State 
















































Education Commission of the States
Special Education Audit
State Board of Education




























































SUBTOTAL - Other Appropriated Funds 947,500 970,100 1,053,800 984,800 1,052,700 985,000
SUBTOTAL - Appropriated Funds 15,495,200 15,723,000 16,495,700 14,224,900 17,293,000 14,685,700
Other Non-Appropriated Funds 1,444,400 1,127,400 1,182,400 1.182,400 1548,900 1548,900
TOTAL - ALL SOURCES 16,939,600 16,850,400 17,678,100 15,407,300 18.541,900 15,934,600
C H A N G E IN FU N DING SUM M ARY FY 2001 to FY 2002 JLBC 
S Change % Change
FY 2001 10 FY 2003 ILBC















Total Appropriated Funds (1,498,100) -9.5% (1,037,300) -6.6% (2,535,400)
PR O G R A M  D E SC R IPT IO N  — The General Services Adniinistratian (GSÂ) program is divided into a number o f  units, 
including School Finance, Data Processing, Career Ladders, Teacher Certification and Special Education, which provide fo r  
the ongoing operation o f  the Department o f  Education. The State Superintendent o f  Public Instruction is fu n d e d  through this 
cost center.
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PERFORM ANCE MEASURES
•  % completion o f on-line Arizona Financial 
Information System (AFIS) Import and Reporting 
Project.
» % o f  schools that conduct on-line data transfer with 
the agency.
® % difference betw een the Average Daily Membership 
(ADM) statewide total reported as o f  March 1st each 
year versus the year-cnd actual total:
— Charter schools
— School districts
« Average num ber o f  days to process applications for 
certification services 

































C om m ent:
» “Baseline” means that the department will use the performance measure for the first time that year and therefore does not yet 
have an estim ate for it. For years after the “baseline" year, the numbers shown indicate the anticipated increase or decrease 
for the new measure relative to its “baseline" score.
RECOM M ENDED CHANGES FROM FY 2001
F Y 2002 FY 2003
S tan d a rd  Changes
Pay A nnualization GF 5 80,500 5 80,500
OF 9,800 9,800
ERE Rates GF 20,200 20,500
OF 4,900 5,100
Risk M anagem ent GF 3,300 1,200
Rent GF 41,300 41,300
A chievem ent Testing GF 185,300 647,700
The JLBC recommends a total biennial General Fund 
increase o f 5833,000 for Achievement Testing. This 
am ount includes a FY 2002 increase o f S I85,300 above 
FY 2001 and a F Y 2003 increase o f 5647,700 above 
FY 2001. The recommended FY 2002 increase consists of 
a 5(83,900) decrease for Stanford 9 testing below F Y 2001 
and a 5269,200 increase for Arizona Instrument to 
Measure Standards (AIM S) testing above FY 2001. The 
recommended FY2003 increase consists o f  a 5109,300 
increase for Stanford 9 testing above FY 2001 and a
5538,400 increase for AIMS testing above FY2001 (see 
Table 1).
T able I
S tan fo rd  9 & AIM S Estim ated 
T estin? Costs fJLBC Recom m endation)
Fiscal Y ear S tanford 9 AIMS l£X2j
FY 2001 Appropriation S1.943.5Û0 53,167,200 55.110,700
FY2002 Above FY 2001 fS3.900> 269.200 1S5JOO
FY 2002 Total S 1,859,600 53.436,400 53,296,000
FY2Ü03 Above FY 2001 109.300 538.400 647.700
FY 2003 Total St.968,900 53.974.800 $5,943,700
Both types o f  testing are required under A.R.S. § 1 5-741, 
which mandates “norm-referenced testing” o f  grades 3-12 
and AIMS testing o f  at least 4 grades designated by the 
State Board o f  Education. The board currently requires 
grades 3, 5, 8 and 10 to be .AIMS tested every year, plus 
any 11'̂  and 12"" grade students who have not yet passed 
the high school AIMS test. As o f December 2000, it is not 
known when high school students will be required to pass 
the high school version o f  the AIMS test in order to 
graduate. This is because the Superintendent o f  Public 
Instruction recommended in November 2000 that the issue 
undergo further review. The State Board o f  Education 
accepted this recommendation and has not yet issued 
revised guidelines for it.
The AIMS test gauges student achievement relative to 
specific academic standards established by the State Board 
o f Education. The Stanford 9 measures student 
achievement relative to that o f students in comparable 
“nom i” groups nationwide. Stanford 9 testing has been 
conducted in Arizona since FY 1997. Prior to FY 1997 the 
Iowa Test o f Basic Skills (ITBS) was used for norm- 
referenced testing.
For FY 2001, the Education Omnibus Reconciliation Bill 
(ORB) from FY2000 and FY 2001 notw ithstands the 
statutory requirement that grades 3-12 be Stanford 9 tested, 
and instead requires that grades 2-11 be tested. Continuing 
this policy in FY 2002 and FV 2003 would require either a 
permanent statutory change to A.R.S. § 15-741 or 
reenactment o f the existing ORB provision (see “JLB C  
Recommended Statutory Changes"). Since perm anent law 
currently requires that the Stanford 9 be adm inistered to 
Grades 3-12, the JLBC recommendation assum es that 
those are the grade levels that will take the Stanford 9 
during the biennium. This would result in an estim ated 
savings o f 5(83,900) in FY2002 below  FY 2001.
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A savings would occur for the first year o f  this change 
because the num ber o f  12"' graders added to the testing 
population would be less than the number o f  2”* graders 
dropped from  it for that year. By the second year 
(FY 2003), however, enrollment growth in Grades 3-12 as 
a whole w ould more than offset the one-time decline in the 
testing population from FY 2002. This would result in an 
increased cost o f $109,300 in FY 2003 above FY 2001 
under our estim ates.
The recom m ended funding amounts for Stanford 9 testing 
include the anticipated price increases shown in Table 2. 
That table shows a breakdown o f Stanford 9 testing costs 
per pupil for FY 2001 through FY 2003. Based on current 
departm ent estimates, unit costs for the test would increase 
from about $2.39 per pupil in FY 2001 to $2.62 per pupil 
in FY 2002 and then to $2.75 per pupil in FY 2003 under 
the JLBC recommendation. The relatively smaller cost 
increase anticipated for FY 2002 versus FY 2003 (3 cents 
versus 13 cents per pupil) for the Stanford 9 reflects 
elimination o f  2"'̂  Grade testing under the JLBC 
recom m endation in FY 2002. Per pupil testing costs for 
2"'* G raders are higher than for other grade levels because 
only 2'"' Graders use scannable test books, which are more 
expensive. The total cost shown for FY 2001 in Table 2 is 
$117,700 less than the appropriated amount shown in 
Table I  because fewer students are expected to take the 
Stanford 9 test during F Y 2001 than was assumed in the 
FY 2001 appropriation.
Table 2
Fsflmated S tanford 9 Testînp Costs fJLBC Recommendation)
F Y 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003
Estimated Estimated Estimated
Total Cost 51,823,800 51,859.600 52,052,800
Pupils Tested 703,861 709,780 746,473
Average Cost/Pupil S2.59 $2.62 5175
Recommended FY 2002 and FY 2003 funding totals for 
AIMS testing (see Table 3) likewise would cover both 
additional students and higher testing costs per student. 
This is because they assume a 3.5% funding increase per 
year for enrollment growth plus a 5% funding increase per 
year for contract cost inflation. The 3.5% annual 
enrollment growth assumption is based roughly on current 
JLBC projections for enrollment growth during the 
biennium. The 5% annual contract inflation assumption is 
based on the maximum increase allowed each year under 
the current m ulti-year AIMS contract. Average per pupil 
costs for AIMS testing are not shown in Table 3 because 
the department currently anticipates that all AIMS tests 
will be used for several years. This would spread out their 
development costs over an unknown timeframe, which 
makes it impossible to compute average per pupil costs for 
them.
Table 3 does not include costs for AIMS testing changes 
that are recommended by the department. Those changes 
would cost an additional $1,924,400 in FY 2002 and
S 1,982,100 in FY 2003 above FY 2001 and would provide 
the program with total funding o f  $5,360,800 in FY 2002 
and $5,956,900 in F Y 2003 (see Table 4). Funding 
changes requested by the department include 1) $303,700 
per year to develop 1 new high school test each year, 2) 
$1,441,500 per year to field test the new high school test, 
3} $260,000 per year (rather than $83,100 in F Y 2002 and 
$89,500 in FY 2003) for more detailed student guides, 4) 
$195,200 per year to develop performance standards in 
order to set passing scores for revised tests, and 5) varying 
amounts (including some scoring savings) per year for 
other miscellaneous changes.
Table 3
FY 2002 FY 2003
Estimated Estimated
Scoring ofTests S 2,980,700 S3,433.400
Publish Student Guides to State
Academic Standards and AIMS Test 83,100 89,500
Print Tests and Teacher Directions for
Grades 3. 5 and 8 62,600 6^,500
DeliverTest Materials 167,800 181,000
Print Tests and Teacher Directions for
High School 25,400 23,400
Pre and Post Test Workshops 61,700 66,500
Miscellaneous 54.100 58.400
TOT A t 53.436,400 S3.974.SOO
Table4
Estimated ATMS Testin'^ Gosts TAoenrv Re^nuest)
FY 2002 FY 2003
Estimated Estimated
Scoring ofTesis $ 2.342,800 52,909,000
Field Test New High School Test 1,441,500 1,441,500
Develop Additional H i^  School Test 303.700 303,700
Publish Student Guides to State
Academic Standards and AIMS Test 260,000 260,000
Print Tests and Teacher Directions for
Grades 3. 5 and 8 237,700 240.700
Develop Performance Standards 195,200 195,200(thresholds for passing tests)
DeliverTest Materials 154.700 154,700
Print Tests and Teacher Directions for
High School 106,900 112,000
Scoring and Reporting for Special
Education Version of Test 100,000 100,000
Report Student Scores 93,100 115,000
Pre and Post Test Workshops
(10 @ 55,740) 57,400 57,400
Out o f Level Testing
(for some special education pupils) 42,900 42,900
Miscellaneous 24.900 24.800
TOTAL S5J60,800 55,956.900
JLBC Recommendation 3.974 800
Difference from JLBC -
Recommendation Sl.924.400 SL982.100
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It should be noted that annual costs o f AIMS testing would 
increase substantially above those shown in Table 4 if  new 
tests m ust be written for each testing year. A lawsuit that 
w ould m andate new AIMS tests each year is still pending. 
The cost o f  developing new tests each year is unknown 
because it would depend upon bids submitted by 
contractors. A very preliminary response from the current 
AIMS contractor, however, suggests that it would be about 
S3,000,000 per year. This total consists o f 55,000,000 for 
the elem entary tests plus 53,000,000 (51,500,000 X 2) for 
2 versions o f the high school test each year. Two new 
versions o f  the high school test would be required each 
year because that test is administered twice yearly.
The recommended changes described above, along with 
5(1,600) in standard changes shown elsewhere, would 
result in a total FY 2002 Achievement Testing 
appropriation o f 55,477,500. This would be an increase of 
S 183,700 above FY 2001. For FY 2003, the recommended 
increases plus 5(1,500) in standard changes shown 
elsewhere would result in a total Achievement Testing 
appropriation o f 55,940,000. This would be an increase of 
5646,200 above FY 2001.
The Executive recommends fully funding the agency 
request, which would provide an increase o f 52,245,200 in 
FY 2002 above FY 2001 and an increase o f  53,039,700 in 
FY 2003 above FY 2002. These amounts assume that the 
Stanford 9 test would be administered to pupils in Grades 
1-9, as requested by the department. (Again, the JLBC 
recommendation assumes that Grades 3-12 would be 
tested, since those are the grades that require Stanford 9 
testing under current law.) The department wants to drop 
Stanford 9 testing for Grades 10 and 11 because it believes 
that test results for those grades are not very useful. It 
wants to add Stanford 9 testing for 1" Graders and 
continue Stanford 9 testing for 2'* Graders because it 
believes that it needs to do so in order to assemble school 
accountability “profiles" required by Proposition 301. The 
JLBC recommendation does not include funding for non­
formula changes lo tne Achievement Testing ornvram 
because it oeiicves that those changes involve policy 
decisions tnat warrant further input irom memoers.
FY 2001 Sunolemental for Achievement Testing
The JLBC also recommends a FY 2001 General Fund 
supplemental o f  5553,900 for Achievement Testing. This 
amount would cover increased scoring costs due to more 
students taking the AIMS test than was anticipated for 
FY2001. It would not, however, cover an additional
51,891,400 in unfunded AIMS testing costs that the 
department expects to incur by the end o f FY 2001, Those 
costs, if  funded, would increase the total supplemental 
am ount for Achievement Testing to 52,445,300 (see Table 
5). The JLBC does not recommend funding for items 
other than “ Scoring” in Table 5 because it believes they 
reflect policy decisions that should have been subject to 
legislative review prior to their e.xpenditure.
As show n in Table 5, the 52,245,300 total estimated 
shortfall for Achievement Testing includes a FY  2000 
shortfall o f 5952,300 that was carried forward into 
F Y 2001 plus an additional estimated shortfall o f
51,463,000 from FY 2001 itself. Therefore the 52,445,300 
requested supplemental is larger than the 52,245,200 
increase requested by the department for FY 2002 because 
the supplemental amount is a cumulative shortfall over two 
budget years (FY 2000 and FY 2001). In addition, some 
o f the costs included in the requested supplemental are 
one-time in nature, such as the 5259,900 increase in 
FY 2000 for “report development” (for improving earlier 
versions o f  test score reports).
Table  5 provides a breakdown of the various shortfall 
components for FY 2000 and FY 2001 by the department. 
The cumulative 2 -year costs for those items are as follows:
1) 5573,000 for changes in the high school mathematics 
test, 2) 5553,900 in increased scoring costs due to more 
students being tested than expected, 3) 5234,800 for 
guidebooks for elementary students, 4) 5259,900 to 
develop e.xpanded reports of test scores. 5) 5236.400 for 
guidebooks for high school students, 6) 5100,000 to score 
and report results for special education versions o f  the 
AIMS tests, 7) 5100,000 for changes to the AIMS reading 
tests, 8) 591,200 to convert the AIMS database from a 
mainframe-based computer system to the new S.AIS 
system, 9) 587,100 to use scannable books for Grade 
testing, 10) 532,900 for “out o f level" testing (which ia 
allowed for some special education pupils) and
576.100 for miscellaneous costs.
1 1 )
Table 5
Reauested FY 2001 Sunnlemental for Achievement Testing
F Y 2000 FY 2001
Jbhortf^H S’-iortfal! Total SiorfYI
Math Test clunges 0 5573,000 $573,000
Scoring 125.000 428.900 553.900
Student Guides (elitTrentary) 141,900 142,900 284,800
Report Development 259,900 0 259,900
Student Guides (high school) n 3.200 113,200 236,400
Special Education test 0 100.000 100,000
Reading Test changes 0 100,000 100,000
Computer Code char.ges 91,200 0 91:200
Grade 3 Scannable Books 87.100 0 87.100
Out ofLevel Testing 82,900 0 82.900
Miscellaneous 76.100 0 76.100
TOTAL S9S2J00 51,443,000 S2.44SJOO
The Executive recottunends fully funding the departm ent 
request for all years. This would provide 52,445,300 in 
supplemental fiinding for FY 2001. It also would provide 
an increase o f 52,245,200 in FY 2002 above the original 
FY 2001 appropriation and an increase o f  53,039,700 in 
FY2003 above the original FY 2001 appropriation.
S tuden t A ccountability  
In fo rm ation  System  GF (2,002,600) (2,002,600)
The JLBC recommends a total biennial General Fund 
decrease o f  5(4,005,200) for the Student Accountability 
Information System (S.AIS). This amount includes a
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decrease o f  $(2,002,600) in both FY 2002 and F Y 2003 
below FY 2001, which would eliminate funding for SAIS 
aevciopm ent. inosc  monies will nui be needed auci 
FY 2001 because system development essentially w ill be 
com pleted by the start o f  FY 2002. After FY 2001, SAIS 
costs prim arily will be driven by ongoing maintenance 
needs, including any reprogramming required in order to 
comply with future changes in funding formulas and data 
collection needs. Monies for SAIS maintenance in 
F Y 2002 and FY 2003 are recommended under the 
“Education 2000 • School Accountability " policy issue in 
the .Assistance to Schools Cost Center.
ADE has received a total o f  $7,505,200 from the state for 
SAIS development since monies were first appropriated 
for this purpose in FY 1997. In addition, the department 
has provided school districts and charter schools with 
approximately $20,000,000 in federal pass through monies 
for SAIS-related infrastructure and training costs since 
FY 1997. This funding has been in addition to 
approximately $120,000,000 in federal monies that school 
districts and charter schools have received since that time 
under the federal “e-rate” program. That program helps 
school districts and charter schools pay for Internet access.
The Executive concurs.
ADM Auditor GF 59,600 59,600
The JLBC recommends a total biennial General Fund 
increase o f  SI 19,200 for establishing a full-time Average 
Daily Membership (ADM) auditor position in the 
department. This amount includes an increase o f $59,600 
and 1 FTE Position in both FY 2002 and FY 2003 above 
FY 2001. The JLBC recommends establishing this 
position because the department currently does not 
dedicate any staff to m onitoring school district and charter 
school ADM counts. Those counts, however, determine 
the largest single expenditure in state government* the cost 
o f  Basic State Aid.
The purpose o f  the position would be to ensure that school 
districts and charter schools submit valid and accurate 
ADM counts for Basic State Aid funding purposes. This 
monitoring has the potential to substantially reduce Basic 
State Aid costs, since a pilot test o f  S.MS in Pinal County 
in FY 1997 determined that 2.5% o f pupils in the test were 
incorrectly counted by more than one school district. 
“Double counting" o f ADM is particularly likely in states 
with high mobility rates, like Arizona. Since S .\IS  will 
begin to collect ADM data on an individual student basis 
in FY 2002, the ability to detect ADM counting errors will 
be enhanced starting that year, making the hiring o f a full­
time ADM auditor now more useful.
For simplicity, the JLBC recommends that the new ADM 
auditor position, if  approved, be incorporated into the 
overall operating budget o f  the cost center, rather than into 
a new Special Line Item. In order to assure the intended 
use o f  the new position, the JLBC recom m ends that a 
footnote be added to the operating budget o f the cost
center. This footnote would specify that the department is 
to use at least 1 FTE Position from its operating budget for
Recommended Footnotes " below).
The Executive does not make a recommendation on this
issue.
C h a rte r  School 
A dm inistration GF 49,800 49,800
The JLBC recommends a total biennial General Fund 
increase o f  $99,600 for Charter School Administration. 
This amount includes an increase o f $49,800 and 1 FTE 
Position in both FY2002 and FY2003 above FY 2001.
The increase is recommended because o f  the dramatic 
increase in the number o f  charter schools in the state since 
FY1996* their first year o f existence in Arizona. By 
FY 2003, that number is expected to exceed 500. Each 
charter school requires many o f  the same state-level 
services required for individual school districts, such as 
computation and processing of state aid payments and 
oversight and distribution o f  federal grants. Rapid growth 
in the number o f charter schools in the state therefore has 
substantially increased the department’s administrative 
workload. The number o f personnel authorized for the 
Charter School Administration program, however, has 
remained unchanged at 4 FTE Positions for the past 
several years. The recommended increases, plus standard 
changes shown elsewhere, would result in total program 
funding o f 5 FTE Positions and $259,800 for FY2002 and 
5 FTE Positions and $259,900 for FY2003.
This program differs from the State Board o f Education 
and State Board for Charter Schools (both o f  which 
sponsor and monitor charter schools) in that the 2 boards 
do not provide administrative support for the statewide 
charter school program in general. Instead they only 
provide sponsorship, monitoring and instruction-related 
services to the individual schools that they sponsor. 
Another difference is that the 2 boards are not under the 
administrative jurisdiction o f  the department, whereas the 
Charter School Administration program is. In addition, 
auditing responsibilities differ among the 3 entities in that 
the boards are only responsible for auditing schools that 
they sponsor, whereas the Charter School Administration 
program is responsible for auditing all charter schools for 
generic issues such as federal grant compliance. (Charter 
schools also may be sponsored by school districts. The 
Auditor General is responsible for financial and 
compliance audits for those charter schools.) Finally, the 
Charter School Administration program serves as the 
initial statewide contact for the public-at-large regarding 
generic charter school issues.
The Executive concurs regarding the 1 FTE Position 
increase, but recommends funding it at a cost o f  $41,200 in 
FY2002 and $37,900 in FY2003.
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S tate  B o a rd  o f Education  G F 49,800 49,800
The JLBC recommends a total biennial General Fund 
increase o f $99,600 for investigations o f alleged immoral 
or unprofessional conduct by school employees that the 
State Board o f  Education is required to conduct pursuant to 
A.R.S. § 15-203(A.20) and A.R.S. § 15-350. This amount 
includes an increase o f  $49,800 and 1 FTE Position in both 
F Y 2002 and F Y 2003 aboveFY 200I.
This increase is recommended because o f  growth in the 
num ber and severity o f cases requiring investigation in 
recent years and the paramount concern o f maintaining 
student safety in schools. In FY 1999, for example, the 
board, took action against 19 teachers and administrators 
accused o f some type o f  sexual offense* up from 6 
in FY  1995. Investigations o f  alleged immoral or 
unprofessional conduct o f all types increased during that 
period from 46 cases in FY 1995 to 111 in FY 1999.
Because o f  this trend, plus a statutory change last year that 
requires all existing teachers to be re-fingerprinted 
whenever their teaching certificates arc renewed, the board 
projects that the number o f  cases requiring investigation 
will increase from 111 in FY 1999 to 140 in FY 2002 and 
176 in F Y 2003, Re-fingerprinting is expected to turn up 
additional cases o f  criminal misconduct because it will 
trigger a repeated background check on each teacher or 
adm inistrator who applies for recertification. Under prior 
law, background checks were conducted only when school 
em ployees /îrs f  applied for professional certification. 
Upon a finding o f  immoral or unprofessional conduct, the 
board may revoke, suspend, suspend with conditions or 
censure a school employee.
The recommended increases, along with standard changes 
shown elsewhere, would increase the board's overall 
budget to 4 FTE Positions and $306,300 for FY 2002 and 
$306,400 for FY 2003. The board 's base budget currently 
includes 3 FTE Positions and 3262,900. This includes 1 
FTE Position and 3100,000 for charter school monitoring. 
By law the board is required to monitor the financial and 
academic accountability o f  charter schools that it sponsors. 
The board currently sponsors 70 charter schools at 140 
different school sites.
The Executive concurs regarding the 1 FTE Position 
increase for certification-related investigations, but 
recommends that it be funded at a cost o f $50,900 in 
F Y 2002 and $45,700 in FY2003.
The Executive, however, also recommends an increase of 
1 FTE Position and $51,100 in FY 2002 above FY 2001 
and 1 FTE Position and $45,900 in FY 2003 above 
FY 2001 for charter school monitoring. The JLBC does 
not recommend additional funding for charter school 
m onitoring because (as mentioned above) the board 
received an increase o f  $100,000 and 1 FTE Position for 
charter school monitoring in FY 2000 that remains in its 
base budget.
In addition, the Executive recommends an increase o f  
$ 114,400 in both FY 2002 and FY 2003 above FY 2001 In
order to make the board a separate state agency. Currently 
it functions as a separate Cost Center within the 
department. The Executive believes that the board needs 
to be a separate state agency in order to increase its 
autonomy from the department. The JLBC does not 
concur with this recommendation because a compelling 
need for the proposed change has not been established.
JLBC RECOMMENDED FORMAT —  Operating
Lump Sum with Special Line Items for the Program. The 




Monies collected by the Department o f  Education for 
teacher certification fees, as authorized by A.R.S. ü 
15-531, paragraphs 1 and 2, shall be deposited in a 
Teacher Certification Fund for use in funding costs for the 
Teacher Certification program.
M odifica tion  o f  Prior Year F ootno tes
The appropriated amount includes $1,859,600 for FY 2002
and $1,968,900 for FY 2003 for norm-referenced testing o f
pupils in grades 2 through- H 3 THROUGH 12. T he
appropriated.amount also iac{udeS'$65,QOO in.R-¥-T 9t)i.)..aad
365,000 in. FY-300I for reporting Stanford 9 reading test 
 by-individual clascroom for pupils in grade- ""
T  The recommended change in grade levels lo he tested is 
based on the requirement currently in statute fo r  norm- 
referenced testing. Language dealing with fu n d in g  fo r  
additional reporting o f  reading test scores is deleted  
because the department now covers this cost with m onies 
fro m  the School Report Cards program 's budget in the 
Assistance to Schools Cost Center.
New Footnotes
At least 1 FTE Position from the departm ent's operating 
budget shall be used for auditing Average Daily 
Membership (ADM) counts from school districts and 
charter schools. This footno te  relates to the I  new FTE  
Position that is being recommended fo r  A D M  auditing  
under the "A D M A uditing"policy issue above.
Deletion o f  Prior Year Footnotes
The JLBC recommends deleting the footnote regarding the 
use o f monies appropriated for S.AIS development, since 
monies will not be appropriated for that purpose after 
FY 2001. (The JLBC recommends an appropriation for 
SAIS maintenance for FY 2002 and FY 2003, but the 
intended use o f  those monies does not require clarification 
through an explanatory footnote.)
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JL B C  R E C O M M E N D E D  STA TU TO RY  CHA NGES
As noted above under narrative for the “Achievement 
Testing” policy issue, temporary ORB provisions have 
been employed since FY 1998 to notwithstand the 
requirement in A.R.S. § 15-741 that Grades 3-12 be 
Stanford 9 tested and require instead that Grades 2-11 be 
tested. I f  members o f  the Legislature would like to make 
this a perm anent change, the JLBC recommends that 
A.R.S. § 15-741 be amended so that ORB language would 
not be needed for this issue on an ongoing basis.
O TH ER ISSUES FOR LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION
FY 2001 Supplem ental
LEP Cost Study: The JLBC recommends a FY 2001 
General Fund supplemental o f SI 50,000 for a 
court-m andated study o f costs associated with serving 
Limited English Proficiency (LEP) pupils. Those pupils 
currently generate additional funding o f  roughly S I50 
apiece through the existing LEP “Group B” weight in the 
Basic State Aid formula. Because o f an ongoing lawsuit 
regarding the adequacy o f state LEP funding (“Flores v. 
State o f Arizona”), a federal judge has ordered the 
department to complete a cost study of LEP programs prior 
to the start o f  the 2001 Legislative Session.
The departm ent asked fo ra  delay in the study’s due date in 
view o f the 2 -year length o f  time that it takes to complete a 
similar cost study for special education programs under 
A.R.S. §15-236. The federal judge, however, denied this 
request and stated in doing so that the cost study would be
required even i f  voters approve Proposition 203 in 
November 2000 (which did occur). He said that the cost 
study would be needed under Proposition 203 because the 
“structured English immersion” teaching approach 
required by that Proposition still would result in add-on 
costs for LEP students.
The recommended S I50,000 supplemental for this issue 
equals the departm ent’s estimate o f  contract costs for the 
study. The JLBC recommends this funding in o rder to 
comply with the court order. The JLBC is concerned, 
however, that this cost study may not be able to generate 
valid and accurate findings because it is being done during 
a very short timeframe.
Achievement Testing: The JLBC also recom m ends a 
FY2001 General Fund supplemental o f 5553,900 for 
Achievement Testing. That recommendation is discussed 
above under the “Achievement Testing” policy issue.
E.xecutive Recom m endation
The Executive recommends a 5(61,200) funding decrease 
for the Education Commission o f  the States (ECS), which 
would eliminate funding for that item and thereby cancel 
Arizona’s membership in ECS. The JLBC does not concur 
on this issue because some members o f  the A rizona 
Legislature currently participate in ECS activities. ECS is 
a nonprofit, nationwide interstate compact formed in 1963. 
Its primary purpose is to help state education leaders 
improve the quality o f public education.
SUM M ARY O F FUNDS - SEE AGENCY SUM M ARY
Click here to return to Table o f Contents
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Department o f  Education
DEPARTAIENT OF CORRECTIONS 
FY 2002-03 FIGURE SETTING RECOMMENDATIONS
JBC Working Document — AU Decisions Subject to Change
Staff Recommendation Does Not Reflect Committee Decision
OVERVIEW
The Department's budget request reflects the major functions and cost centers involved in operating 
the state’s secure prison facilities and community programs which serve inmates or offenders paroled 
6om inmate status. The Department's budget request is based on eight mtyor program areas within 
the Department, with those program areas further broken down into 36 subprograms. The eight 
major program areas are designated by roman numerals and are capitalized. The 3 6 subprogram areas 
are listed alphabetically beneath each program area, and are shown in italics.
Throughout the document, new decision items related to operating expenses associated with 
expansions or reductions of existing Department ofCorre étions (DOC) facilities (base reduction item 
number 3) and those impacting several line items in different subprograms (decision item number 4; 
base reduction item numbers 2, and 5) are shown in two ways:
1) isolated (in total) from all other subprograms at the beginning of the document so that the 
Committee can see the total funding associated with the request; and
2) broken down into each related subprogram area (e.g. housing/security, food services,
medical services, etc.) so that the Committee can see the total funding required
(Department-wide) for each of the 36 subprograms.
REQUEST VERSUS RECOMMENDATION
The total staff recommendation as reflected in the numbers pages for the Department of Corrections 
is significantly lower than the official Department request. However, the staff recommendation still 
has the following items pending:
1. Legal Services - approximately $1,625,338 General Fund based on the Department's request.
2. Multi-use Network - approximately $529,559 General Fund based on the Department's request.
3. Dispatch Services - approximately $278,708 General Fund based on the Department's request.
4. Vehicle Lease Payments - approximately $2,838,085 General Fund based on the Department's 
request.
5. Purchase o f Services from the Computer Center - approximately $47,367 General Fund based 
on the Department's request.
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These line items may be set at a diSerent amount &om the Department's request based on the 
Committee's Goal actions. StafFbas provided these amounts in order to give the Committee an idea 
01 ihe total Oenerai l-und that wiii oe requireu to luno tne Department oi corrections, tne 
Department of Corrections would require $500,273,015 General Fund based on a combination of 
recommendations in this document and the estimates shown above. Given this estimate, the 
recommendation would be 52,101,800 less than the amount requested by the Department as reGected 
in the numbers pages.
DEPARTMENT-WIDE REQUESTS
The Department's budget request includes several decision items, base reduction items, and budget 
amendments which have a direct impact on several subprograms within the budget. Therefore, staff 
is presenting these decision items with recommendations at the beginning of the figure setting 
document so the Committee can get a sense of the requests in whole. The recommended amounts 
will be built into the individual lines, where appropriate, and highlighted for the Committee's review.
ügfwesr/h r fùrcM/irmM /ru«i Comwif/rgf's ComwoM fo/icy q /a  2. J  f grccMl Amfwcrfom (o PfnoMc/
Services. The Department is requesting that security related line items be exempted from the 2.5 
percent base reduction. The Department requests that a 1.5 reduction, rather than a 2.5 percent 
reduction, be applied to the personal services line item in the following subprograms:
>- Maintenance 
>- Housing and Security 
>- Food Service 
>■ Laundry
>  Boot Camp 
YOS
>■ Case Management 





>- Parole ISP 
>- Community
>  Community ISP
>  YOS Aftercare
The Department advised staff that they disagree with the following arguments for taking a 2.5 percent 
base reduction on personal services line items:
Retiring employees result in vacancy savings because of the pay differential of the retiree 
and the person hired to replace them. The Department argues that the savings generated from
the differential between a retiree's salary and the replacement salary is barely sufficient to cover
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the cost of the pay out for sick and vacation leave which are not funded in the base 
appropriation.
>- Recent years have bad higher turnover rates, therefore, more vacancy savings should be 
available. The Department contends that the 10.02 percent turnover rate in FY 2000-01 was 
a modest .27 percent increase over the 9.75 percent rate in FY 1999-00 At the Department of 
Corrections.
Statewide nearly half of all employees are at the maximum pay for their respective 
positions. The Department estimates that only 3 5 percent of its enqiloyees are at the maximum 
or near maximum pay due to the dramatic growth of the Department in the last five years.
Departments hire new employees at a rate higher than the minimum. The Department does
not argue this fact. However, they do state that when employees are hired at higher than the 
minimum it is because they are a transfer or promotion from elsewhere in the Department or 
state personnel system and not a new employee.
>- Agencies have flexibility within pots lines. The Department contends that the pots lines are 
not fully funded and the shortages must be absorbed in other personal services lines.
Departments have flexibility with respect to how they fund retirement payouts. The
Department indicates that they have unfunded payments in FY 2001-02 that make them unable 
to take advantage of this flexibility. According to the Department, these anticipated shortages 
include overtime, legal services, personnel settlements, unemployment security payments, call 
back pay for medical/mental staff, and Parole Board raises.
The Department concludes that they have made every attempt to be fiscally responsible. They have 
implemented a staffing template and given back $1.7 million in savings because of adjustments and 
elimination ofpositions. The Department indicates that a 2.5 percent reduction to personal services 
will be a serious problem.
Recommendation: Staff recommends a 1,5 percent base reduction be applied to the 
Personal Services line item in the Maintenance Subprogram, Housing and Security 
Subprogram, and Food Services Subprogram rather than a 2.5 percent base reduction.
Staff requested that the Department provide historical data for FY 2000-01 so that a historical 
review of vacancy savings could be performed. Staff requested a list of all the positions vacated 
in FY 2000-01, the reason the position was vacated, the length of time the position was vacated, 
the salary at the time the position was vacated, the minimum salary for the position, and the 
salary for the replaced position. The Department indicated that this data would be difficult to 
obtain for the fhll year, but agreed to provide the information for the month of August 2000. 
The Department had a total of 588 staff turnover in FY 2000-01 and 66 in August 2000 (the 
highest number in any given month o f that fiscal year).
Staff annualized the average savings per vacant position in August 2000 to determine the average 
vacancy savings for FY 2000-01. In staffs estimation, the Department generated 1.63 percent 
savings due to vacancies (the salary at time vacant multiplied times the number of months vacant)
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and 1.74 percent savings due to pay dif&rential (the salary at time vacant less the minimum 
salary). This equates to a total estimated average annual vacancy savings of 3.37 percent. When 
the impact of hiring personnel at a rate higher than the minimum is factored into the calculation,
the estimated annual average vacancy savings is 2.59 percent.
Staff recommends reducing base funding in the Personal Services line items in the Maintenance 
Sul^rogram, Housing Subprogram, and Food Services Subprogram by 1.5 percent rather than 
the 2.5 percent required by the Committee common policy. Staff recommends this course of
action for the following reasons;
1. The 3.37 percent vacancy calculated above does go  ̂include the 1.5 percent reduction to the 
base taken in FY 2001-02.
2. The Department is required to fund payouts from vacancy savings and the 3.37 percent 
vacancy calculated above does not account for this requirement.
3. The Department is required to fund overtime payments out of vacancy savings and the 3.37
percent vacancy calculated above does not account for this requirement.
4. The Department is only funded for 80 percent of shift differential and the Department is 
expected to make up the additional 20 percent through vacancy savings and pots flexibility.
5. The Maintenance Subprogram, Housing Subprogram, and Food Services Subprogram are 
the largest divisions that are primarily responsible for direct supervision of inmates and 
would have the most diificulty covering the positions left vacant due to the base personal 
services reductions.
Utilizing a 1.5 percent reduction for the above mentioned divisions and applying Committee 
policy to the remaining divisions results in an overall reduction o f 56,092,987 (55,819,328 GF, 
541,934 CF, and 5231,725 CFE) to personal services in the Department o f Corrections. This 
represents an overall reduction of 2.0 percent to the Department's personal services base. If 
Committee policy was applied to all divisions in the Department, an additional 51,604,022 
General Fund would be reduced and would represent an overall reduction of 2.5 percent to the 
Department's personal services base.
Committee Policy on Reduction fo r  Computer Related Spending. The Committee established a 
policy to reduce all continuation funding for computer and computer related items. The Department 
of Corrections does not have a specific line item for this type of expenditure. They utilize existing 
appropriations from various operating line items within the budget. Staff ask the Department to 
provide a schedule of expenditures from FY 2001-02 in order to determine the amount of reduction 
necessary. The Department provided the following information based on two COFRS object codes 
(3128-02 - Computer Equipment and 3116 - Software Purchases):





Executive Durector $9,821 $2,075 $11,896
External Capacity $0 $191 $191
Utilities $0 $580 $580
Maintenance $8,124 $5,579 $13,703
Housing $14,698 $3,316 $18,014
Food Service $5,295 $3,690 $8,985
Medical Services $39,320 $26,744 $66,064
Laundry $937 $0 $937
Superintendents $25,157 $31,432 $56,589
Boot Camp $60 $0 $60
Youthful Offender System $889 $11,538 $12,427
Case Management $563 $50 $613
Mental Health $791 SO $791
San Carlos $2,752 $6,684 $9,436
Legal Access $18,681 $7,160 $25,841
Business Operations $7,324 $2,094 $9,418
Personnel $906 $230 $1,136
Offender Services $747 $219 $966
Communications SO $12,429 $12,429
Transportation $454 $0 $454
Training $1,688 $232 $1,920
Information Systems $7,782 $12,917 $20,699
Facility Services $0 $540 $540
Labor $1,245 SO $1,245
Education $6,407 $7,756 $14,163
Recreation $281 $780 $1,061
Sex Offender Treatment $0 $4,643 $4,643
Volunteers $2,108 $179 $2,287
Community Reintegration $0 $280 $280
YOS Aftercare $17,421 $11,221 $28,642
Parole Board $0 $140 $140
Tatgl (ITX'tll $324150
I
The Department requested that they be exempted from the Committee's common policy of reducing 
Operating Expenses by the amount of computer related purchases in FY 2002-03. The Department 
cites the following reasons they should be exempted:
>- The Department uses computers to limit the number ofFTE required and believe a reduction in
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the operating budget will hamper their ability to maintain the computers.
The Department contends they have not received an increase speciGca% for the purchase of 
personal conçuters since FY 1999-2000 (in response to Y2K).
The Department indicates it is their practice not to replace any computer unless it is more cost
effective to replace the computer rather than repair it, or if a programming change requires an 
upgrade of the computer.
The Department removes very few computers 6om service. When a con^uter is replaced, the
old computer is passed down to an employee who previously did not have a computer.
The Department contends that each facility weighs the need fora new computer against all other 
items needed and only purchases the computer if it is determined to be the highest priority.
jRgcommeMtfanoM. Staff recommends each operating expense line item in the subprograms 
shown in the Table above be reduced by the amount in the total column. In staffs
estimation, the Committee's common policy to eliminate funds for personal computers is based 
on the current budgetary constraints. As such, all departments wUl have to eliminate these 
expenses. The above amounts reflect the Department's best estimate o f the level of funding in 
operating expenses that was expended on computers and computer related items in F Y 2001-02. 
Staff has made the necessary reduction to each impacted operating line item throughout this 
document.
Decision Item # 4 - Inmate Treatment Programs. The Department is requesting 5220,452 General 
Fund and 4.0 FTE for increased mental health treatment within the Department. The 4.0 FTE will 
assist in meeting the needs of the Offenders with Serious Mental Illness (OSMI) and allow the 
Department to offer rehabilitative programs needed by the inmate population. In addition, the 
funding will permit the Department to contract for 10 community aftercare beds for mentally ill 
offenders.
Recommendation: Staff recommends a total of $36,500 General Fund for the community 
corrections portion of this decision item be approved. This decision item is separated into 
two distinct components;
1. Additional Mental Health Positions in Correctional Facilities: The first component is 
$183,952 and 4.0 FTE to hire additional mental health professionals within the Department's 
facilities. The Department would add 2.0 FTE to the Fremont Correctional Facility, 1.0 
FTE to the Colorado Territorial Correctional Facility, and 1.0 FTE to the Colorado State 
Penitentiary. These additional FTE would assist the already existing mental health personnel 
in managing the growing mentally ill inmate population. The Department intends to submit 
a request in the FY 2003-04 budget request for another 5.0 FTE for this purpose. Staff 
recommends these positions not be added in FY 2002-03 because of the State's current 
budgetary constraints. While these positions would undoubtedly benefit the Department of 
Corrections' mentally ill inmate population, it is an expansion at a time when funding is not
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readüy available. The Department's Mental Health Subprogram has 63.8 FTE and the San 
Carlos Subprogram has 223.4 FTE that are dedicated to caring for the Department's 
mentally iH inmates. The Department should request this decision item again in a future year 
when funding constraints are less significant.
2. CofMTMWMÜy CbrrectfoMs In the second component of this decision item, the
Department is requesting $36,500 General Fund to pay a S10 differential for additional beds
in a community corrections therapeutic community ($10 per day * 365 days * 10 beds = 
$36,500) for mentally ill offenders. Staff recommends that funding for these beds be 
approved. The Department indicates that inmates that particçate in therapeutic
communities both while incarcerated and while on community corrections are much less 
likely to recidivate (5.0 percent recidivism in the first year as compared with the 
Department-wide first year recidivism rate of 37.9 percent).
The following Table shows the request and recommendation for FY 2002-03 funding and FY 
2003-04 annualization by line item.
FY 2002-03 and Associated FV 2003-04 Annualization for Inm ate T reatm ent Program s
........ n - t ii- e s
f V  02-04
-M
Mental Health - Personal Services 163,689 4.0 165,689 4.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Mental Health - Operating Expenses 2,000 2,000 0 0
Mental Health - Start-up Costs 15.062 0 0 0
Communications - Operating Expenses 1,200 1,200 0 0
Community Supervision - Community 
Mental Health Services 36,500 36,500 36,500 36,500
220,452 t 3»ï,2«0 3.0 .1
G eneral F ttnd m 45JE l i i i S i
Base Reduction Item # 2 and Budget Amendment Base Reduction Item # 4c - Drug Offender 
Surcharge Reduction. The Department submitted a request to reduce various line items that are 
impacted by the reduction in available Drug Offender Surcharge Funds.
Recommendation : Staff recommends a reduction of $631,998 in Drug Offender Surcharge 
Funds and 6.5 FTE based on the staff calculation. Staff is recommending the following 
programs be reduced;
>- Research Function in the Planning and Analysis Section o f  the Executive Director’s Office. 
The Department has 1.0 FTE dedicated to Alcohol and Drug Services research activities. 
This 1.0 FTE is funded through the Drug Offender Surcharge Fund. The activities 
performed by this position include program evaluation studies of substance abuse treatment 
programs and validation research of the State mandated Standardized Offender Assessment 
(SAO) battery. Staff recommends a reduction for this function of 1.0 FTE and 
$74,347.
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/nmafg Dn/g jRafwcdon TYogrom. The Department bas funded this subprogram wkh Drug 
Offender Surcharge Funds since FY 2000-01. The Inmate Drug Reduction Program was 
established through a three year federal grant. When the grant was eliminated, the 
Department requested that the program be funded with General Fund in FY 2000-01. 
During the figure setting process for FY 2000-01, it was determined by the JBC that there 
was not sufBcient General Fund to fund the program so the program was eliminated. During 
the caucus process on the Long BiH, the General Assembly chose to fund the program with 
the Drug Offender Surcharge Fund. The Department indicated that the Inmate Drug 
Reduction Program:
□  increased the random and reasonable suspicion testing o f inmates from 13 percent to 
25 percent of the prison population;
□  created a database to track inmate movement and to provide needed intelligence on 
drug activities within the prison system; and
□  restructured internal and external sanctions to respond to positive drug tests.
Although this program appears to be beneficial in reducing drug usage in the prison system, 
staff believes it is not as appropriate a use of Drug Offender Surcharge Fund as are drug 
treatment programs. The drug testing that is done in this program is a component o f an 
investigative procedure more than a treatment component. During the budget process for 
FY 2000-01, staff asked the following question and received the following response from 
the Department with regard to the use ofDrug Offender Surcharge Fund for this program:
Question: "Is there money available from the Drug Offender Surcharge Fund to finance 
this (Inmate Drug Reduction Program)? If there is, why didn't the Department request 
Drug Offender Surcharge Funds for the program? If there isn't, why is the Department 
attempting to expand the program?"
Answer: "The conclusions reached by the Committee [interagency committee that 
recommends the level of funding from the Drug Offender Surcharge Fund] will answer 
the availability of these funds and may also determine the program's applicability to the 
intent of this source. Previously, funding received from the Drug Offender Surcharge 
Funds to the Department of Corrections have focused on assessment, treatment and 
research. It is unclear thus far as to whether interdiction, testing, and intelligence will 
be included in the mission of the fund. In either case, the Department's commitment to 
reduce drug use among known offenders dictates expansion of coordinated interdiction 
and testing of this population. We have never used Drug Offender Surcharge Funds 
for the Inmate Drug Reduction Program, but this does not mean we cannot."
Staff recommends that no funding from the Drug Offender Surcharge Fund be used 
for the Inmate Drug Reduction Program and the program be eliminated unless the 
Department can identify another source of funding.
>■ Drug and Alcohol Treatment, Drug Treatment Program and Drug Offender Surcharge. 
The Department of Corrections provides a range of substance abuse services that include: 
1) intake assessment and evaluation; 2) self-help meetings; 3) a range of facility based
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education and treatment programming; 4) community based urinalysis testing; 5) case 
management and treatment services for parolees; 6) standardized offender assessment 
training; 7) research, program evaluation, and data management; and, 8) specialized 
community based continuing care services for dual diagnosed offenders and facility based 
therapeutic community graduates. The Department indicates that they will reduce 
assessment services at Denver Reception and Diagnostic Center, assessment services for 
Parole T ASC, and drug treatment counseling. Additionally, the Department wiH scale back 
the match of federal fund grants. Staff recommends a reduction of $35,553 in the Drug 
Treatment Program line item and a reduction of $250,584 and 1.0 FTE in the Drug 
Offender Surcharge Program line item.
The following Table shows the request and recommendation for FY 2002-03 funding by line
item.
FY 2002-03 Reduction for Drug Offender Surcharge Fund Programs
................. $Tifeprn«ra.m .............................................. . .  .e y .( a - * )  . . . .
EDO:
Personal Services (51,076) (51,076) (1.0)
STD (65) (65)
Salary Survey (12,295) (12.295)
Anniversary (5,019) (5,019)
Operating Expenses M.M2) (18921
Subtotal EDO (74,347) (74,347)
Inmate Drug Reduction Subprogram;
Personal Services (32,466) (1.0) (175,114) (-U )
Operating Expenses (47,400) (47,400)
Contract Services 149,000) (49.000)
Subtotal IDRP (12:,866) (271,514)
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Subprogram
Drug Treatment Program (143,324) (35,553)
Drug Ofren<kr Surcharge 050.534) (250.584) ILO]
Subtotal Diug and Alcohol Treatment (394,408) (1.0) (286,137) (1.0)
Tirfat .. . .tS ÎW lJ  , É p i <631,998} £6 5)
Cash Fands  ̂ - ,<Î.O) 1 (631,998} ■ £6.S)
Base Reduction Item # 3  - Colorado Women's Correctional Facility 50 Bed Reduction. During 
the supplemental process for FY 2001-02, the Department requested and was granted authority to 
decommission 50 beds at Colorado Women's Correctional Facility (CWCF). The inmates were 
transferred to Denver Women's Correctional Facility (DWCF). There was room at DWCF because 
o f lower than anticipated female prison population growth. The 50 beds that were decommissioned 
at CWCF were located in a modular unit that was considered a life safety hazard. The transfer of the 
inmates from CWCF to DWCF occurred in October 2001. This request seeks to annualize the partial 
year reduction for a full fiscal year.
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The bill would require every child between the ages of 6 and 18 years of age to attend school. Current law does not require 
17 and 18 year olds to attend school.
Estimated Impact
We cannot precisely estimate a fiscal impact for the bill because we cannot predict its affect on the statewide dropout rate. If 
the bill were to reduce the statewide high school dropout rate to zero (as an extreme example), however, we estimate K-12 
equalization funding costs would increase by roughly $225 million in F Y 2003 and $237 million in FY 2004. Under this 
scenario we also estimate that costs for new school construction would increase by about $500 million on a one-time basis. 
This entire $500 million potential cost is shown under F Y 2003 in the table above, but most likely would be spread over 3 or 
more years.
The Arizona Department of Education and the School Facilities Board do not have fiscal impact estimates for this bill. 
Assumptions
Tables I and 2 show estimated increases in statewide Average Daily Membership (ADM) counts and K-12 equalization 
funding costs for high school pupils if the bill caused the statewide dropout rate to drop to zero (as an extreme example). The 
ADM estimates in the “Current Law” column of each table are current JLBC projections. The “If No Dropouts” columns 
show roughly what statewide ADM counts would be for each grade level under a dropout rate of zero. Those columns 
assume that each grade level after Grade 9 would be slightly smaller than the previous grade level due to ongoing population 
growth. The ADM “Change” column in both tables equals the “If No Dropouts” total for each row minus the “Current Law” 
total for the same row.
The last column in both tables (“Cost at $4,400 [$4,500] per ADM pupil”) provides a rough estimate of how K-12 
equalization funding costs (state plus local) would increase under a hypothetical dropout rate of zero. The estimates shown 
equal the ADM “Change” figure for a respective row multiplied by either $4,400 (for FY 2003) or $4,500 (for FY 2004).
The $4,400 and $4,500 amounts are our current rough estimates of average per pupil funding for those years under the state 
K-12 equalization funding formula.
(Continued)
Assumptions (Cont’d) 391
Tahle 1: Potential Fiscal Imoact fFY 30031 (extreme example that assumes a dropout rale o f  zero under die billj
Estimated Statewide Average Dailv Membershio CADMl Cost at $4,400 per
Grade Level Current Law If No Dropouts Change ADM pupil
Grade 9 74,663 76,000 1,333 S5,874d)00
Grade 10 65,580 75,500 9,920 43.648,000
Grade 11 57,325 75,000 17,475 76,890,000
Grade 12 32.188 74300 22312 98.172.800
Total 249,958 301W ) 31.042 3224384.800
Tahle 3: Potential Fiscal Impact fFY 20041 (extreme example that assumes a dronnut rate o f  zero under the hill)
Estimated Statewide Average Dailv Membershio fADMl Cost at $4,400 per
Grade Level Current Law IfNoDrooouts Change ADM  pupil
Grade 9 76,903 78,280 1375 $6.187,700
Grade 10 67347 777,765 10318 45,979,200
Grade 11 39,251 77250 17,999 80396.600
Grade 12 53.754 76.735 22381 103.416,100
Total 257,457 310.030 52373 $236,579.700
We cannot estimate the extent to which the “high end” costs in Tables I and 2 actually would occur under the bill because we 
cannot predict how the bill will affect the statewide dropout raté. This is because we cannot predict how the bill would affect 
the decision making process for students who contemplate dropping out of school. Part of this uncertainty is because the bill 
does not require school districts or other entities to hire additional personnel to enforce the higher mandatory school 
attendance age. A.R.S. § 15-804, which is unchanged by the bill, allows school districts to hire “attendance officers,” but 
does not require them to be hired.
Under the extreme scenario depicted in Tables I and  2, the state would pay roughly 99% of the total costs and “local share” 
revenues would cover the remaining 1%. This is because most school districts already meet their entire “local share” funding 
requirement under current law, so additional costs due to ADM growth (if any) under the bill would be paid entirely by the 
state for those districts. The only exception would be for “zero aid” districts, which are school districts that still have some 
“unused” local share funding because of their very high levels of taxable property value per pupil. Zero aid districts currently 
pay for all of their own K-12 formula costs and would continue to do so under the bill. We estimate, however, that only 
about 1% of costs for ADM growth above current levels (if any) under the bill would be paid by zero aid districts.
The bill would directly effect only 17 and 18-year-old pupils (most of whom are 11'*' and 12* Graders), since younger pupils 
already are required to attend school under current law. For simplicity, however. Tables 1 & 2 assume that the bill would 
affect dropout rates for all 4 high school years. Most of the ADM changes in the tables nonetheless are for pupils in Grades 
11 and 12, since those grades currently are most affected by ADM declines due to dropouts.
Tables I & 2 do not include funding for additional high schools that potentially would be required under a statewide dropout 
rate of zero. We estimate very roughly that this could cost about $500 million on a one-time basis. The $500 million 
estimate assumes 100 square feet of space per pupil and a $100 cost per square foot (50,000 pupils X 100 square feet per 
pupil X $100 per square foot = $500 million). The square foot per pupil and cost per square foot assumptions in the 
calculation are based roughly on the funding formula for new school construction that is prescribed for FY 2002 in A.R.S. § 
15-2041 under current law.
Local Government Impact
Under the extreme scenario depicted in Tables I and 2, local school districts would have to expand their staffs and build 
additional high school space in order to accommodate higher numbers of high school pupils. This potentially could increase 
local K-12 equalization formula costs for “zero aid” districts. It also potentially could increase the amount of local “Class B” 
bond revenues that school districts would seek to generate under A.R.S. § 15-1021 in order to supplement funding for new 
school construction that would be provided to them by the School Facilities Board. We cannot predict the extent to which 
either these new costs would occur or the extent to which they would occur under the bill.
Amendments
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